Bailey v. Alabama

Statutory provisions of Alabama law held that failure to fulfill a contractual obligation to work was tantamount to an intent to defraud an employer. However, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that Alabama's peonage law (compulsory service in payment of a debt) provisions were improper according to constitutional safeguards under the Thirteenth Amendment. The conviction of the lower court was thus overturned and states were given clear guidance that the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment applied not merely to slavery but also whenever statutory provisions infringed on the personal freedom of workers.

Alonzo Bailey, the plaintiff, contracted to work for the Riverside Company for one year. He agreed to provisions of a written contract and consented to a salary of $12 per month. He received payment in advance and agreed to perform the duties of farm hand in Montgomery County. After one month, Bailey left the job and did not return his $15 advance to the company. He was consequently accused with planning to deceive his employer and subsequently convicted for fraud under Alabama's peonage law.

Under the Alabama State Code of 1896,

any person who, with intent to injure or defraud his employer, entered into a written contract for service, and thereby obtained from his employer money or other personal property, and with intent and without just cause, and without refunding the money or paying for the property, refused to perform the service, should be punished as if he had stolen it.

Two amendments in 1903 and 1907 resulted in expanding the scope of statutory provisions and resulted in language that stipulated that "refusal or failure to perform service contracted for, or to refund the money obtained, without just cause, should be prima facie evidence of the intent to injure." In essence, if an individual entered into a contract of employment and quit without offering "just cause," he was charged with intent to defraud and harm the employer and held criminally liable.

When his case was adjudicated in the lower court, Bailey asked that instructions to the jury explain that provisions of the Alabama's statute were invalid because "refusal or failure . . . to perform the service alleged" or refund his advance did not "of itself make out a prima facie case" which proved "intent to injure or defraud" his employer. However, in the lower court, the presiding judge saw no relevance in his assertion. The jury thus concluded that terms of the statute clearly characterized Bailey's actions as criminal failure to perform service in accordance with his contract, to return advanced money, and to show any warranted reason to cease work for the Riverside Company. Explaining that circumstances demonstrated "prima facie evidence" (Latin meaning "on the face of it") with intent to injure and defraud the employer, the jury found Bailey guilty. Alonzo Bailey took exception to the court's instructions to the jury and the verdict which ensued and later and brought suit under a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court of Alabama sustained his conviction and held that no constitutional defectiveness existed under the Alabama's statute.

When the plaintiff's case came before the U.S. Supreme Court, the justices first made clear their intention to adjudicate without regard to race (Bailey was black). Justice Hughes pointed out that "the statute, on its face, makes no racial discrimination;" neither did the record of proceedings indicate discrimination based on race. Moreover, because "citizens of all the states are interested in the maintenance of the constitutional guaranties," the Court's reason for choosing to render a decision was to address coercive, oppressive statutory limitations by the state of Alabama.

The majority opinion held that violation of Bailey's contract was not a crime itself. Nothing indicated that the plaintiff had not planned to honor his contract nor had intended to defraud his employer when the contract was joined. Justice Hughes believed that for such a conviction to be justified, "intent should be established by competent evidence, aided only by such inferences as might logically be derived from the facts proved, and should not be the subject of mere surmise or arbitrary assumption." Only provable, concrete evidence indicated criminal behavior. The Court found no supportable evidence, only "conjecture" and "speculation" about circumstances that might prove the plaintiff had intent to injure or defraud. The Court held that it was inappropriate to convict only on the belief that the plaintiff's behavior (refusal to continue service without offering just cause), the breached contract, and the failure to repay the money established viable prima facie evidence. Without proving fraudulent intent, such acts could be characterized solely as a debt. Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court faulted amendments made to the Alabama statute (in 1903 and 1907) that a breach of contract and failure to pay a debt indicated prima facie evidence of a criminal act. Further, the majority opinion ruled that the jury should not have been instructed to merely consider statutory presumptions without considering specific, concrete evidence. Statutory provisions that authorized a jury to convict on the basis of the violation of contract and the failure to pay a debt should have not been accepted alone as "evidence" that gave sufficient cause to convict. Further, the Court questioned the legitimacy of the statutory presumptions wherein a defendant "stood, stripped by the statute of the presumption of innocence, and exposed to conviction for fraud upon evidence only of breach of contract and failure to pay."

The Court found that the jury which considered Bailey's case plainly followed instructions of the Alabama statute without giving sufficient attention to ascertain if there were actually indicators of fraudulent intent. Thus, the Court overturned the findings of the lower courts. Under Alabama's peonage statute, workers were, de facto, constrained by its provisions and burdened by serial sanctions and criminal charges if they breached an employer's contract. Disputing the validity of the statute, the majority found it inappropriate to hold individuals criminally liable for refusal to perform a contract or pay a debt. Retaining workers under such statutory sanctions, in effect, served as a "means of compulsion" by which employees were forced into work.

The justices emphasized that the Thirteenth Amendment provided protection from slavery and involuntary servitude; statutory presumptions like Alabama's thus violated constitutional rights. The majority opinion stressed that peonage servitude (forcible work in order to pay debt) in this case appeared unavoidable through the way the state enforced contract law. Accordingly, workers contracted to perform labor in Alabama by way of contract, with no opportunity to breach the agreement voluntarily, operated on no other premise but that of peonage servitude. Considering that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits involuntary servitude (except as punishment for crime), the justices explained that existence of such a statutory exception did not entitle states to enforce penal laws only because an individual refused to continue service or failed to pay a debt. Involuntary bondage could only be authorized if meted out as punishment for a crime.

The Supreme Court found that lower court decisions were inappropriately influenced by unconstitutional statutory provisions. Bailey's actions were characterized as criminal solely because he ceased working. Moreover, designating his indebtedness as fraud was not consistent with constitutional provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment. Concluding that Alabama's statute was deficient, the justices found no evidence to impose criminal liability on the plaintiff "under the name of fraud." Neither could the majority discover the appropriateness in the definition of prima facie evidence under Alabama statute; instead, the Court named it a "convenient instrument for coercion." Not only was compulsory service prohibited if the payment of debt was in question, but "refusal or failure to perform the act or service, without refunding the money" was incompatible with the Thirteenth Amendment. The Court majority overruled the judgment of Alabama's Supreme Court.