Inc. v. Scheidler National Organization for Women

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling by a unanimous vote. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist first held that the clinics had standing to bring their claim. Citing Hishon v. King (1984), he noted that because their complaint had been dismissed at the pleading stage, it would not have to be sustained "if relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Nothing was needed to confer standing, the Chief Justice wrote, other than the extortion and injury allegations in the complaint.

Not only did the petitioners have standing to bring their case before the Court, RICO could be used against the respondents. The statutes contained no provision stating that the racketeering enterprise had to be economically motivated, and though "arguably an enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign commerce would have a profit-seeking motive," RICO's use of the word "affect" suggested an alternative interpretation. Consulting the dictionary, the Chief Justice found that Webster defined "affect" as "to have a detrimental influence on"--something an enterprise could do without making, or seeking to make, a profit.

Nor does "enterprise" necessarily indicate an economic motive. Whereas in (a) and (b), an enterprise is "an entity acquired through illegal activity or the money generated from illegal activity," in (c) it "connotes generally the vehicle through which the unlawful pattern of racketeering activity is committed." An enterprise, the Court held, "need only be an association in fact that engages in a pattern of racketeering activity." For further proof that an economic motive need not be cited, the Court made reference to the congressional statement of findings that precedes the RICO chapter and "refers to activities that drain billions of dollars from America's economy." The activities cited in Scheidler, particularly preventing access to clinics, might not benefit the perpetrators; but they unquestionably drained income from the clinics, and hence impeded the flow of commerce. If the congressional findings were not enough, one had only to note the 1984 amendments broadening a set of guidelines on RICO prosecutions issued by the Department of Justice in 1981. Finally, "the statutory language is unambiguous, and there is no clearly expressed intent to the contrary in the legislative history that would warrant a different construction." Accordingly the Court overruled the judgment of the lower court.