Ohio v. Robinette

Two main issues were outlined in this case. First, whether searches and seizures could be assumed unlawful if police officers, fail to warn drivers that they were "free to go" before engaging in any additional questioning. The second issue addressed concerned whether the "first-tell-then-ask" rule contained in the Ohio State Constitution could be recognized as the "new legal rule" governing adjudication of this case when its language seemingly interpreted the Federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that consent to search could not be presumed "unvoluntary" if a police officer failed to inform a motorist that he had the right to drive away before answering any further questions.

In 1992, respondent, Robert D. Robinette was speeding in his car just north of Dayton, Ohio when Deputy Roger Newsome stopped him. At the time of stopping, Newsome's primary assignment was as an officer on drug interdiction patrol. After a computer check of Robinette's driving license and registration showed no outstanding warrants, Deputy Newsome asked him to step out of his car, warned Robinette to slow down, and gave him back his documents. Then Deputy Newsome asked one more question. He wanted to know if there were "any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like that?" When Robinette answered, "No," the deputy requested a car search and asked for and received Robinette's consent. A search of the car resulted in discovery of a small amount of marijuana and methylenedioxymethamphetamin--an "Ecstasy" pill. Robinette was arrested for possessing illicit drugs.

Before trial, Robinette moved that the evidence obtained be suppressed because, at the time, he did not believe the search was absolutely voluntary: he feared that Deputy Newsome's request could not be contested. Robinette's motion was denied by the trial court and he was charged with "knowing possession of a controlled substances" even though Robinette contended that "continued detention" after the initial traffic stop constituted an unlawful seizure. He believed that the deputy's conduct evidenced an unjustified extension of detention, and that the deputy's motivation for further questioning and investigation was substantially different from the original purpose of the stop--speeding. Robinette appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals where the lower court's decision was reversed. The appellate court found that the "search resulted from unlawful detention." Similarly, the state's appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio was denied. In its written opinion, the Ohio State Supreme Court stated that its findings were consistent with determined guarantees of the Federal and Ohio Constitutions. After finishing the initial detention of a motorist, officers in traffic control had to inform a "detainee" that he was free to go before police could ask any further questions or request permission for a search. A "consensual interrogation," thus, could not be valid if the detaining officer failed, under the provisions of the Ohio Constitution, to indicate to a stopped driver (either verbally or by gesture) "at this time you legally are free to go."

In an 8-1 vote, the Court overruled the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority opinion, first emphasized the Court's certitude that it held jurisdiction over the case. He explained the Supreme Court held jurisdiction because the Ohio Supreme Court judgement was based on previous cases which distinctly relied on federal law and that almost all of the cited cases implemented the U.S. Constitution. He pointed out that it was completely permissible to review Ohio's decision because the general concept of the issue under consideration rested on both Federal and Ohio Constitutions.

The majority opinion found no violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred. Justices held that "once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officer may order the driver to get out of the vehicle." They reasoned that "subjective intentions" (such as Officer Newcomb's mission while on drug interdiction patrol) did not transgress the law if objectively viewed circumstances could justify "continued detention." Also, the Court believed that if there existed a reasonable element which justified continuing to detain a stopped motorist, then there would be no violation of the Fourth Amendment protection. Further, justices believed that consideration of all important elements in every case was required to determine the relative unreasonableness or reasonableness of searches and seizures. Cases that centered on a question of Fourth Amendment violations could not be measured only by applying one basic standard and not implicate "totality of the circumstances."

While Justice Ginsburg agreed with the majority, she separately expressed that the findings of the Ohio Supreme Court were not appropriate because upholding the state's "first-tell-then-ask" rule would not be an appropriate practice for the "nation as whole." Instructions by the state supreme court to police officers in Ohio could not be recognized as orders taken from the Federal Constitution. Moreover, neither did the state supreme court independently rely on state law but referred to both Federal and Ohio Constitutions in its ruling. Justice Ginsburg explained that while actions of the state of Ohio could be applied only within the state, sole reliance on state law, excluding provisions of the Federal Constitution, could not be an adequate basis for the ruling of the state's Supreme Court.

Citing an earlier case, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973), the Court reasoned that before "consent search," the government did not have to advise an individual that he had "a right to refuse the request." Justices also reasoned that it would be impractical to establish a plan wherein police officers had to familiarize detainees with all circumstances which might enable a motorist to deny further communication. Justices did not believe that "normal consent searches" could be justified only after detailed warnings. They concluded that because "voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all circumstances," there occurred no violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Only Justice Stevens dissented. He conceded that the Federal Constitution did not specify that law enforcement officers were required to advise a "lawfully seized person" that he was "free to go" before asking an individual to submit to a voluntary search. But, Stevens pointed out that detention of the respondent for a traffic violation prepared a backdrop for an unlawful search that was in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The deputy had no reasonable grounds to suspect that there were drugs in the respondent's car. In fact, the deputy did not even issue a speeding ticket. Therefore, in Stevens's opinion, by engaging in further questioning without informing the respondent he was free to leave, the deputy created a situation where all evidence was obtained as a by-product of unlawful detention. Furthermore, circumstances did not seem conducive to give the respondent, or any motorist for that matter, the idea that is was permissible to "simply walk away from the officer, get back in his car, and drive away." As Ohio's Supreme Court found, Justice Stevens observed that "most people believe that they are validly in a police officer's custody as long as the officer continues to interrogate them." He pointed out that because ordinary citizens did not know when they were "free to go," officers should not have the ability to use that ignorance as a means to obtain permission for searches. Neither did Justice Stevens find justification in the deputy's "subjective motivation" that the Court reasoned provided "legality" for "continued detention." The reasonableness of continued detention did not exist for any other purpose than might have been justified on the basis of the initial, lawful traffic stop. Consequently, the deputy had no justifiable reason to assume that the respondent concealed drugs in his car. The questioning which proceeded then was promulgated by an unlawful detention and, therefore, produced an illegal seizure. Stevens also found no reason why the state of Ohio should be restricted from protecting its citizens through a provision in the state constitution that enjoined state police officers to warn drivers about their rights when a traffic stop was concluded.