Petitioner
State of Ohio
Respondent
Robert D. Robinette
Petitioner's Claim
Provisions of the Fourth Amendment do not require police officers to warn motorists that they are "free to go" at the end of traffic stop.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Carley J. Ingram
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
James D. Ruppert
Justices for the Court
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor,William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
18 November 1996
Decision
The respondent's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when, after beinglawfully stopped, the motorist consented to search even though the police officer failed to advise that motorist had the right to refuse consent, since initial detention was finished. The U.S. Constitution did not specifically stipulate that such searches and seizures were unreasonable.
Significance
Two main issues were outlined in this case. First, whether searches and seizures could be assumed unlawful if police officers, fail to warn drivers that they were "free to go" before engaging in any additional questioning. The second issue addressed concerned whether the "first-tell-then-ask" rule containedin the Ohio State Constitution could be recognized as the "new legal rule" governing adjudication of this case when its language seemingly interpreted the Federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled thatconsent to search could not be presumed "unvoluntary" if a police officer failed to inform a motorist that he had the right to drive away before answeringany further questions.
In 1992, respondent, Robert D. Robinette was speeding in his car just north of Dayton, Ohio when Deputy Roger Newsome stopped him. At the time of stopping, Newsome's primary assignment was as an officer on drug interdiction patrol.After a computer check of Robinette's driving license and registration showed no outstanding warrants, Deputy Newsome asked him to step out of his car, warned Robinette to slow down, and gave him back his documents. Then Deputy Newsome asked one more question. He wanted to know if there were "any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like that?" When Robinette answered, "No," the deputy requested a car search and asked for and received Robinette's consent. Asearch of the car resulted in discovery of a small amount of marijuana and methylenedioxymethamphetamin--an "Ecstasy" pill. Robinette was arrested for possessing illicit drugs.
Before trial, Robinette moved that the evidence obtained be suppressed because, at the time, he did not believe the search was absolutely voluntary: he feared that Deputy Newsome's request could not be contested. Robinette's motionwas denied by the trial court and he was charged with "knowing possession ofa controlled substances" even though Robinette contended that "continued detention" after the initial traffic stop constituted an unlawful seizure. He believed that the deputy's conduct evidenced an unjustified extension of detention, and that the deputy's motivation for further questioning and investigation was substantially different from the original purpose of the stop--speeding. Robinette appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals where the lower court's decision was reversed. The appellate court found that the "search resulted fromunlawful detention." Similarly, the state's appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio was denied. In its written opinion, the Ohio State Supreme Court stated that its findings were consistent with determined guarantees of the Federal and Ohio Constitutions. After finishing the initial detention of a motorist, officers in traffic control had to inform a "detainee" that he was free to go before police could ask any further questions or request permission for a search. A "consensual interrogation," thus, could not be valid if the detaining officer failed, under the provisions of the Ohio Constitution, to indicate toa stopped driver (either verbally or by gesture) "at this time you legally are free to go."
In an 8-1 vote, the Court overruled the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority opinion, first emphasized the Court's certitude that it held jurisdiction over the case. He explained the Supreme Court held jurisdiction because the Ohio Supreme Court judgement was basedon previous cases which distinctly relied on federal law and that almost allof the cited cases implemented the U.S. Constitution. He pointed out that itwas completely permissible to review Ohio's decision because the general concept of the issue under consideration rested on both Federal and Ohio Constitutions.
The majority opinion found no violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred. Justices held that "once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officer may order the driver to get out of the vehicle." They reasoned that "subjective intentions" (such as Officer Newcomb's mission while on drug interdiction patrol) did not transgress the law if objectively viewed circumstances could justify "continued detention." Also, the Court believed that if there existed a reasonable element which justified continuing to detain a stopped motorist, then there would be no violation of the Fourth Amendment protection. Further, justices believed that consideration of all important elements in every case was required to determine the relative unreasonableness or reasonableness of searches and seizures. Cases that centeredon a question of Fourth Amendment violations could not be measured only by applying one basic standard and not implicate "totality of the circumstances."
While Justice Ginsburg agreed with the majority, she separately expressed that the findings of the Ohio Supreme Court were not appropriate because upholding the state's "first-tell-then-ask" rule would not be an appropriate practice for the "nation as whole." Instructions by the state supreme court to police officers in Ohio could not be recognized as orders taken from the Federal Constitution. Moreover, neither did the state supreme court independently relyon state law but referred to both Federal and Ohio Constitutions in its ruling. Justice Ginsburg explained that while actions of the state of Ohio couldbe applied only within the state, sole reliance on state law, excluding provisions of the Federal Constitution, could not be an adequate basis for the ruling of the state's Supreme Court.
Citing an earlier case, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973), the Court reasoned that before "consent search," the government did not have to advise anindividual that he had "a right to refuse the request." Justices also reasoned that it would be impractical to establish a plan wherein police officers had to familiarize detainees with all circumstances which might enable a motorist to deny further communication. Justices did not believe that "normal consent searches" could be justified only after detailed warnings. They concludedthat because "voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from allcircumstances," there occurred no violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Only Justice Stevens dissented. He conceded that the Federal Constitution didnot specify that law enforcement officers were required to advise a "lawfully seized person" that he was "free to go" before asking an individual to submit to a voluntary search. But, Stevens pointed out that detention of the respondent for a traffic violation prepared a backdrop for an unlawful search that was in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The deputy had no reasonable grounds to suspect that there were drugs in the respondent's car. In fact, the deputy did not even issue a speeding ticket. Therefore, in Stevens's opinion, by engaging in further questioning without informing the respondent he was free to leave, the deputy created a situation where all evidence was obtained asa by-product of unlawful detention. Furthermore, circumstances did not seemconducive to give the respondent, or any motorist for that matter, the idea that is was permissible to "simply walk away from the officer, get back in hiscar, and drive away." As Ohio's Supreme Court found, Justice Stevens observed that "most people believe that they are validly in a police officer's custody as long as the officer continues to interrogate them." He pointed out thatbecause ordinary citizens did not know when they were "free to go," officersshould not have the ability to use that ignorance as a means to obtain permission for searches. Neither did Justice Stevens find justification in the deputy's "subjective motivation" that the Court reasoned provided "legality" for"continued detention." The reasonableness of continued detention did not exist for any other purpose than might have been justified on the basis of the initial, lawful traffic stop. Consequently, the deputy had no justifiable reason to assume that the respondent concealed drugs in his car. The questioningwhich proceeded then was promulgated by an unlawful detention and, therefore,produced an illegal seizure. Stevens also found no reason why the state of Ohio should be restricted from protecting its citizens through a provision inthe state constitution that enjoined state police officers to warn drivers about their rights when a traffic stop was concluded.
Impact
The U.S. Supreme Court found that the Ohio Supreme Court did not find adequate and independent grounds apart from the U.S. Constitution to support its decision and its requirements for their police officers to practice a "first-tell-then-ask" rule. They emphasized that the ruling of the Ohio Supreme Court should have been based on the state law, rather than Federal constitutional law. In effect, the Court's rationale served as notice to state courts that thequestion of jurisdiction was largely determined by the rationale of cases and statutes cited. Reliance on federal statutes and federally adjudicated cases yielded a jurisdictional possibility for the U.S. Supreme Court to intervene.
The dissenting opinion held that continued detention was unlawful beyond theoriginal purpose of detention, a traffic violation, once a traffic stop was complete. However, both majority and minority opinions concluded no requirements existed, under the Fourth Amendment, for police officers to notify driverswhen they are "free to go." In differing with the dissenting opinion, the majority ruled that after a vehicle had been stopped, the motivation of a police officer did not have to preclude asking for voluntary consent to search. Insuch instances, under the "totality of circumstances," consent to search wasobligatory, and therefore provisions of the Fourth Amendment did not requirepolice officers to inform motorists that they could refuse additional communication because initial purpose for detention had finished.
Related Cases
State of Ohio
Respondent
Robert D. Robinette
Petitioner's Claim
Provisions of the Fourth Amendment do not require police officers to warn motorists that they are "free to go" at the end of traffic stop.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Carley J. Ingram
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
James D. Ruppert
Justices for the Court
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor,William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
18 November 1996
Decision
The respondent's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when, after beinglawfully stopped, the motorist consented to search even though the police officer failed to advise that motorist had the right to refuse consent, since initial detention was finished. The U.S. Constitution did not specifically stipulate that such searches and seizures were unreasonable.
Significance
Two main issues were outlined in this case. First, whether searches and seizures could be assumed unlawful if police officers, fail to warn drivers that they were "free to go" before engaging in any additional questioning. The second issue addressed concerned whether the "first-tell-then-ask" rule containedin the Ohio State Constitution could be recognized as the "new legal rule" governing adjudication of this case when its language seemingly interpreted the Federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled thatconsent to search could not be presumed "unvoluntary" if a police officer failed to inform a motorist that he had the right to drive away before answeringany further questions.
In 1992, respondent, Robert D. Robinette was speeding in his car just north of Dayton, Ohio when Deputy Roger Newsome stopped him. At the time of stopping, Newsome's primary assignment was as an officer on drug interdiction patrol.After a computer check of Robinette's driving license and registration showed no outstanding warrants, Deputy Newsome asked him to step out of his car, warned Robinette to slow down, and gave him back his documents. Then Deputy Newsome asked one more question. He wanted to know if there were "any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like that?" When Robinette answered, "No," the deputy requested a car search and asked for and received Robinette's consent. Asearch of the car resulted in discovery of a small amount of marijuana and methylenedioxymethamphetamin--an "Ecstasy" pill. Robinette was arrested for possessing illicit drugs.
Before trial, Robinette moved that the evidence obtained be suppressed because, at the time, he did not believe the search was absolutely voluntary: he feared that Deputy Newsome's request could not be contested. Robinette's motionwas denied by the trial court and he was charged with "knowing possession ofa controlled substances" even though Robinette contended that "continued detention" after the initial traffic stop constituted an unlawful seizure. He believed that the deputy's conduct evidenced an unjustified extension of detention, and that the deputy's motivation for further questioning and investigation was substantially different from the original purpose of the stop--speeding. Robinette appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals where the lower court's decision was reversed. The appellate court found that the "search resulted fromunlawful detention." Similarly, the state's appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio was denied. In its written opinion, the Ohio State Supreme Court stated that its findings were consistent with determined guarantees of the Federal and Ohio Constitutions. After finishing the initial detention of a motorist, officers in traffic control had to inform a "detainee" that he was free to go before police could ask any further questions or request permission for a search. A "consensual interrogation," thus, could not be valid if the detaining officer failed, under the provisions of the Ohio Constitution, to indicate toa stopped driver (either verbally or by gesture) "at this time you legally are free to go."
In an 8-1 vote, the Court overruled the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority opinion, first emphasized the Court's certitude that it held jurisdiction over the case. He explained the Supreme Court held jurisdiction because the Ohio Supreme Court judgement was basedon previous cases which distinctly relied on federal law and that almost allof the cited cases implemented the U.S. Constitution. He pointed out that itwas completely permissible to review Ohio's decision because the general concept of the issue under consideration rested on both Federal and Ohio Constitutions.
The majority opinion found no violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred. Justices held that "once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officer may order the driver to get out of the vehicle." They reasoned that "subjective intentions" (such as Officer Newcomb's mission while on drug interdiction patrol) did not transgress the law if objectively viewed circumstances could justify "continued detention." Also, the Court believed that if there existed a reasonable element which justified continuing to detain a stopped motorist, then there would be no violation of the Fourth Amendment protection. Further, justices believed that consideration of all important elements in every case was required to determine the relative unreasonableness or reasonableness of searches and seizures. Cases that centeredon a question of Fourth Amendment violations could not be measured only by applying one basic standard and not implicate "totality of the circumstances."
While Justice Ginsburg agreed with the majority, she separately expressed that the findings of the Ohio Supreme Court were not appropriate because upholding the state's "first-tell-then-ask" rule would not be an appropriate practice for the "nation as whole." Instructions by the state supreme court to police officers in Ohio could not be recognized as orders taken from the Federal Constitution. Moreover, neither did the state supreme court independently relyon state law but referred to both Federal and Ohio Constitutions in its ruling. Justice Ginsburg explained that while actions of the state of Ohio couldbe applied only within the state, sole reliance on state law, excluding provisions of the Federal Constitution, could not be an adequate basis for the ruling of the state's Supreme Court.
Citing an earlier case, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973), the Court reasoned that before "consent search," the government did not have to advise anindividual that he had "a right to refuse the request." Justices also reasoned that it would be impractical to establish a plan wherein police officers had to familiarize detainees with all circumstances which might enable a motorist to deny further communication. Justices did not believe that "normal consent searches" could be justified only after detailed warnings. They concludedthat because "voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from allcircumstances," there occurred no violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Only Justice Stevens dissented. He conceded that the Federal Constitution didnot specify that law enforcement officers were required to advise a "lawfully seized person" that he was "free to go" before asking an individual to submit to a voluntary search. But, Stevens pointed out that detention of the respondent for a traffic violation prepared a backdrop for an unlawful search that was in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The deputy had no reasonable grounds to suspect that there were drugs in the respondent's car. In fact, the deputy did not even issue a speeding ticket. Therefore, in Stevens's opinion, by engaging in further questioning without informing the respondent he was free to leave, the deputy created a situation where all evidence was obtained asa by-product of unlawful detention. Furthermore, circumstances did not seemconducive to give the respondent, or any motorist for that matter, the idea that is was permissible to "simply walk away from the officer, get back in hiscar, and drive away." As Ohio's Supreme Court found, Justice Stevens observed that "most people believe that they are validly in a police officer's custody as long as the officer continues to interrogate them." He pointed out thatbecause ordinary citizens did not know when they were "free to go," officersshould not have the ability to use that ignorance as a means to obtain permission for searches. Neither did Justice Stevens find justification in the deputy's "subjective motivation" that the Court reasoned provided "legality" for"continued detention." The reasonableness of continued detention did not exist for any other purpose than might have been justified on the basis of the initial, lawful traffic stop. Consequently, the deputy had no justifiable reason to assume that the respondent concealed drugs in his car. The questioningwhich proceeded then was promulgated by an unlawful detention and, therefore,produced an illegal seizure. Stevens also found no reason why the state of Ohio should be restricted from protecting its citizens through a provision inthe state constitution that enjoined state police officers to warn drivers about their rights when a traffic stop was concluded.
Impact
The U.S. Supreme Court found that the Ohio Supreme Court did not find adequate and independent grounds apart from the U.S. Constitution to support its decision and its requirements for their police officers to practice a "first-tell-then-ask" rule. They emphasized that the ruling of the Ohio Supreme Court should have been based on the state law, rather than Federal constitutional law. In effect, the Court's rationale served as notice to state courts that thequestion of jurisdiction was largely determined by the rationale of cases and statutes cited. Reliance on federal statutes and federally adjudicated cases yielded a jurisdictional possibility for the U.S. Supreme Court to intervene.
The dissenting opinion held that continued detention was unlawful beyond theoriginal purpose of detention, a traffic violation, once a traffic stop was complete. However, both majority and minority opinions concluded no requirements existed, under the Fourth Amendment, for police officers to notify driverswhen they are "free to go." In differing with the dissenting opinion, the majority ruled that after a vehicle had been stopped, the motivation of a police officer did not have to preclude asking for voluntary consent to search. Insuch instances, under the "totality of circumstances," consent to search wasobligatory, and therefore provisions of the Fourth Amendment did not requirepolice officers to inform motorists that they could refuse additional communication because initial purpose for detention had finished.
Related Cases
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
- Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
- Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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