Ashcraft v. State of Tennessee

Justice Jackson wrote the dissent. He noted that before this case, a confession was admissible unless it was proved that the will of the confessor had been overcome by torture, mob violence, fraud, trickery, threats, or promises. Even where there was excess and abuse of power by the police, the state could still use the confession if it was found that the accused had not lost his freedom of action.

Respect for the sovereign character of the states has always constrained the Court to give great weight to findings of fact of state court. The Supreme Court has no supervisory power over state courts and may not lay down rules of evidence for them or revise their decision because the Court feels it is wiser. The Court has no power to discipline the police of the State of Tennessee or to reverse its convictions in retribution for conduct that the Court may personally disapprove. The burden of protecting society from most crimes against persons or property falls upon the state.

Justice Jackson felt that the Court was establishing a new doctrine that examination in custody of this duration is inherently coercive. American courts hold that a confession obtained by brutality, torture, beating, starvation, or physical pain is involuntary. "Actual or threatened violence have no place in eliciting the truth and it is fair to assume that no officer of the law will resort to cruelty if truth is what he is seeking." However, a confession obtained by questioning is different because questioning is an indispensable instrumentality of justice. Saying that mere interrogation is unconstitutional would unduly hinder the states from protecting society from criminals. Justice Jackson noted that the majority did not quite say this, but he felt it was moving far and fast in that direction. "The step it now takes is to hold this confession inadmissible because of the time taken in getting it." The duration and intensity of an examination or inquisition has always been regarded as relevant in estimating its effect on the will of the individual. Some people can withstand for days pressure that others can only withstand for hours. Before this case, the ultimate question was whether the confessor was in possession of his own will and self-control at the time of the confession. "For its bearing on this question the Court always has considered the confessor's strength or weakness, whether he was educated or illiterate, intelligent or moronic, well or ill, Negro or white." The majority, instead of finding that Ashcraft's freedom of will was impaired, substituted the doctrine that the situation was inherently coercive. If the constitutional admissibility of a confession is no longer measured by the mental state of the confessor but by the length of the questioning, the Court should give a definite number of permissible hours of questioning. Justice Jackson summed up his dissent by stating that "The use of the due process clause to disable the states in protection of society from crime is quite as dangerous and delicate a use of federal judicial power as to use it to disable them from social or economic experimentation."

After the Supreme Court remanded this case to the Tennessee Supreme Court, that court remanded it to the Criminal Court of Shelby County. Again Ashcraft and Ware were convicted and the state supreme court affirmed. The case returned to the Supreme Court in 1946. Justice Black once again delivered the Court's opinion. He noted that the trial judge construed the Supreme Court's mandate as prohibiting only the admission of the written unsigned confession. Thus the trial judge allowed the jury to hear testimony relating everything else that happened during the 36 hours of questioning. Black pointed out that the testimony used in the last trial might well have had the same practical effect on the jury that the written unsigned confession might have had. The state of Tennessee claimed that Ashcraft's statement that he knew who killed his wife was exculpatory (showed that he was innocent). Black saw no relevant distinction between the introduction of this statement and the unsigned alleged confession. The Court reversed the decision against Ashcraft and vacated that of Ware. Both cases were remanded to the state supreme court.