Ashcraft v. State of Tennessee

Petitioners
Ashcraft, Ware
Respondent
State of Tennessee
Petitioners' Claim
That the confessions used to convict the defendants were extorted from them by state law enforcement officers in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioners
James F. Bickers
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Nat Tipton
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black (writing for the Court), William O. Douglas, Frank Murphy, Stanley Forman Reed, Wiley Blount Rutledge, Harlan Fiske Stone
Justices Dissenting
Felix Frankfurter, Robert H. Jackson, Owen Josephus Roberts
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
1 May 1944
Decision
Reversed Ashcraft's conviction and remanded the case to the Supreme Court ofTennessee because if Ashcraft made a confession, it was compelled in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Significance
Not until 1940, in Chambers v Florida, did the Supreme Court acknowledge that psychological coercion could lead to involuntary confessions. Soon after that in Ashcraft v. State of Tennessee, the Court acknowledged that some situations were so inherently coercive that confessions gained from them were inadmissible because they were not voluntary. This case reflected theCourt's desire to curb police abuse by refusing to admit coerced confessions, no matter how relevant the confession might be.
On 5 June 1941, Zelma Ida Ashcraft left her home in Memphis, Tennessee, to visit her mother in Kentucky. Mrs. Ashcraft set out about 3:00 a.m. Her car wasdiscovered in the late afternoon a few miles outside of Memphis and her bodywas found in a slough nearby. At about 6:00 p.m. officers first talked to Mr. Ashcraft, the deceased's husband. He identified the body and was taken to the county jail, where he conferred with officers until about 2:00 a.m.; the officers got no clues from him. The officers also held and interrogated Ashcraft's maid and her friends. During the following week the officers investigated and spoke with Ashcraft several times, but they turned up no evidence.
On Saturday evening, 14 June, officers took Ashcraft into custody. They brought him to a fifth floor room of the Shelby County jail equipped with high-powered lights and other devices used in homicide investigations. The officers sat Ashcraft at a table with a light over his head and began to quiz him. Theyquestioned him in relays until Monday morning, 16 June. From 7:00 p.m. on Saturday until 9:30 a.m. Monday, Ashcraft had no rest from questioning, totaling 36 hours of continuous grilling. At a hearing before a magistrate on Mondaymorning, Ashcraft pleaded not guilty. Ashcraft's version of the questioningcontradicted the officers' version. Ashcraft stated that he was threatened and abused, that his eyes became blinded by the light, he became weary, and hisnerves unbearably strained. He also stated that he never admitted knowledgeof the crime or accused Tom Ware of the murder. The officers stated that theywere kind and considerate and that Ashcraft was cool, calm, normal and thathis eyes were not bloodshot and he did not appear tired. They also stated that after 28 hours of constant questioning, Ashcraft said that Ware overpoweredhim at his home, abducted Mrs. Ashcraft, and was probably the killer. The officers picked up Ware, a 20 year old African American, at about midnight. According to the officers, Ware made a self-incriminating statement early Mondaymorning and signed by mark a written confession saying that Ashcraft had hired him to commit the murder. The officers stated that this confession was read to Ashcraft, who admitted its truth in a detailed statement taken down by areporter. The officers stated that when the statement was read to him at 9:30 a.m., Ashcraft affirmed its truth but refused to sign it, saying he wantedto consult his lawyer. The last episode was witnessed by several people brought in by the police.
Dr. McQuiston, the Ashcraft family doctor, was called in to examine Ashcraftand Ware. Ashcraft told the doctor he had been treated all right and did notcomplain about his eyes. The doctor testified that Ashcraft appeared normal.He also testified that Ashcraft told him that he had not been getting along with his wife for some time, that he had offered her a property settlement andthat he offered Ware money to "make away with his wife." The doctor testified that Ashcraft's statement to him was entirely voluntary.
During the trial, the court noted that people might differ as to whether theconfessions were voluntary and that it was a matter for the jury to decide. The jury was told that "if the verbal or written statements made by the defendants freely and voluntarily without fear of punishment or hope of reward, have been proven to you in this case, you may take them into consideration." Thestate supreme court stated that it was "unable to say that the confessions were not freely and voluntarily made." Tom Ware was found guilty of the murderin state court. Ashcraft was convicted as an accessory before the fact. Bothmen were sentenced to 99 years in the state penitentiary. The Supreme Courtof Tennessee affirmed the convictions.
The Constitution Bars Coerced Confessions
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case because Ware and Ashcraft believedthat the alleged confessions used at their trial had been extorted from themin violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and that they had been convicted solely on the basis of the confessions. Justice Black wrote the opinion for themajority. He noted that the dispute over what actually happened to Ashcraft during the 36 hours of questioning is an "inescapable consequence of secret inquisitorial practices. And always evidence concerning the inner details of secret inquisitions is weighted against an accused." The majority concluded that if Ashcraft made a confession it was not voluntary but compelled. Black noted that the situation was so inherently coercive that its very existence wasirreconcilable with the possession of mental freedom. The Constitution has stood as a bar against the conviction of anyone in an American court by means of a coerced confession. Black mentioned that there were certain foreign nations whose governments convict individuals with testimony obtained by police organizations with unrestrained power to seize people, hold them in secret custody, and wring confessions from them using physical or mental torture. "So long as the Constitution remains the basic law of our Republic, America will not have that kind of government." The Court vacated the judgment of the Tennessee Supreme Court affirming Ware's conviction and remanded his case to that court. Ashcraft's conviction was reversed and remanded.
Supervisory Power
Justice Jackson wrote the dissent. He noted that before this case, a confession was admissible unless it was proved that the will of the confessor had been overcome by torture, mob violence, fraud, trickery, threats, or promises. Even where there was excess and abuse of power by the police, the state couldstill use the confession if it was found that the accused had not lost his freedom of action.

Respect for the sovereign character of the states has always constrained the Court to give great weight to findings of fact of state court. The Supreme Court has no supervisory power over state courts and may not lay down rules of evidence for them or revise their decision because the Court feels it is wiser. The Court has no power to discipline the police of the State of Tennessee or to reverse its convictions in retribution forconduct that the Court may personally disapprove. The burden of protecting society from most crimes against persons or property falls upon the state.

Justice Jackson felt that the Court was establishing a new doctrine that examination in custody of this duration is inherently coercive. American courts hold that a confession obtained by brutality, torture, beating, starvation, orphysical pain is involuntary. "Actual or threatened violence have no place in eliciting the truth and it is fair to assume that no officer of the law will resort to cruelty if truth is what he is seeking." However, a confession obtained by questioning is different because questioning is an indispensable instrumentality of justice. Saying that mere interrogation is unconstitutionalwould unduly hinder the states from protecting society from criminals. Justice Jackson noted that the majority did not quite say this, but he felt it wasmoving far and fast in that direction. "The step it now takes is to hold thisconfession inadmissible because of the time taken in getting it." The duration and intensity of an examination or inquisition has always been regarded asrelevant in estimating its effect on the will of the individual. Some peoplecan withstand for days pressure that others can only withstand for hours. Before this case, the ultimate question was whether the confessor was in possession of his own will and self-control at the time of the confession. "For itsbearing on this question the Court always has considered the confessor's strength or weakness, whether he was educated or illiterate, intelligent or moronic, well or ill, Negro or white." The majority, instead of finding that Ashcraft's freedom of will was impaired, substituted the doctrine that the situation was inherently coercive. If the constitutional admissibility of a confession is no longer measured by the mental state of the confessor but by the length of the questioning, the Court should give a definite number of permissible hours of questioning. Justice Jackson summed up his dissent by stating that"The use of the due process clause to disable the states in protection of society from crime is quite as dangerous and delicate a use of federal judicialpower as to use it to disable them from social or economic experimentation."
After the Supreme Court remanded this case to the Tennessee Supreme Court, that court remanded it to the Criminal Court of Shelby County. Again Ashcraft and Ware were convicted and the state supreme court affirmed. The case returned to the Supreme Court in 1946. Justice Black once again delivered the Court's opinion. He noted that the trial judge construed the Supreme Court's mandate as prohibiting only the admission of the written unsigned confession. Thusthe trial judge allowed the jury to hear testimony relating everything else that happened during the 36 hours of questioning. Black pointed out that the testimony used in the last trial might well have had the same practical effecton the jury that the written unsigned confession might have had. The state of Tennessee claimed that Ashcraft's statement that he knew who killed his wife was exculpatory (showed that he was innocent). Black saw no relevant distinction between the introduction of this statement and the unsigned alleged confession. The Court reversed the decision against Ashcraft and vacated that ofWare. Both cases were remanded to the state supreme court.
Impact
In 1940, in Chambers v. Florida the Supreme Court acknowledged that psychological coercion, as well as physical torture, could produce involuntaryconfessions. The use of such confessions violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In later decisions, such as Ashcraft v. State ofTennessee, the Court acknowledged that some situations were so inherentlycoercive that the confessions produced by them were inadmissible in court. The factor determining admissibility was voluntariness, not veracity. The Court did not reject Ashcraft's confession because it was unreliable. In fact, evidence suggested that Ashcraft was responsible for his wife's murder. But the36 hours of questioning was unacceptable police conduct, and the Court sought to deter this behavior. The Court used this "police conduct" rationale to condemn and deter abusive police interrogation methods. The Court excluded confessions obtained by offensive means regardless of how credible the confession might be. The "voluntary" test, however, was difficult to apply because theterms "voluntariness" and "coercion" were not used analytically, but merelyas conclusions. Not until the mid 1960s did the Court develop a definite ruleregarding the admissibility of prolonged questioning of a suspect in custody. This rule emphasized the right to counsel and the new requirements were based on the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
Related Cases

• Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
  
• Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
  
• Lisbena v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
  
• McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
  
• Ashcraft v. State of Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274 (1946).