Johnson v. Louisiana

Appellant, Frank Johnson, was convicted by a split decision of 12 jurors: nine voted to convict and three to acquit. He contended that provisions under the Louisiana law violated the Constitution because the jury verdict was not unanimous. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, held that a "split-verdict" system was constitutionally "inoffensive" and reasoned that less-than-unanimous jury verdicts did not deprive defendants in criminal prosecutions of their rights under the due process of law. They concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require unanimity in state criminal cases.

Frank Johnson was charged with larceny after being identified from photographs that had recorded his crime. He was also identified in a police lineup as the perpetrator of another, unrelated robbery. At the time Johnson's case went to trial, Louisiana's jury system required a 12-person jury in cases that carried a sentence of hard labor, but a unanimous verdict was not required. Since nine members of Johnson's jury voted guilty, he was convicted. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, Johnson challenged provisions of the Louisiana statute that permitted less-than-unanimous jury verdicts to convict. He believed that, under the Constitution, Louisiana's practice violated the reasonable-doubt standard contained in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. His appeal was denied.

When Johnson's case came before the U.S. Supreme Court on appeal, his attorney argued that the reasonable-doubt standard in criminal cases (so long as there exists a reasonable doubt, a defendant should not be convicted) obligated the state of Louisiana to require a unanimous jury verdict. Because three members of the appellant's jury did not vote to convict Johnson, his attorney asserted the "reasonable-doubt standard has not been satisfied and his conviction is therefore infirm." His attorney further argued that "nine individual jurors will be unable to vote conscientiously in favor of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when three of their colleagues are arguing for acquittal." However, his most impassioned argument was "that guilt cannot be said to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt when one or more of a jury's members at the conclusion of deliberation still possesses such doubt." The case pointed out that if Louisiana requires unanimous verdicts in capital cases and in trials where punishment involves hard labor, then "less-than-unanimous" verdicts in other kinds of trials represented an disparate application of the Equal Protection Clause.

U.S. Supreme Court majority justices noted that the Court had never adhered to unanimity of the jury as "requisite of due process of law." They did not believe that three dissenting (jury) votes assumed an inaccurate decision. They pointed out that, in reaching a verdict, the reasonable doubt criterion was fully satisfied by nine jurors. The Court felt it unlikely that jurors could "vote to convict" without taking into account the views of the three jurors who remained unconvinced by the evidence presented at trial. Minority jurors were not obstructed or prohibited from presenting their doubts and a decision could only have been reached after discussing and arguing about all elements involved in deliberation. The justices did not find it reasonable to believe that nine jurors brought their decision without reasonable consideration of all evidence and opinions. The Court disagreed with appellant's contention that "majority jurors simply ignore[d] the reasonable doubts of their colleagues." When nine of 12 jurors voted to convict there could be no doubts about the legitimacy of their findings--a "substantial majority of the jury were [sic] convinced by the evidence." In an apparent reference to previous findings by the Court, Justice White wrote that "jury verdicts finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt are regularly sustained even though the evidence was such that the jury would have been justified in having a reasonable doubt." He pointed out that a nonunanimous jury did not evidence reasonable doubt about a guilt. Thus, "inharmonious findings" by a jury should not be considered an indicator of deprivation of rights under the due process of law.

The appellant's main objection in presenting his case before the U.S. Supreme Court was Louisiana's law governing conduct of trials. According to the state's statutes, a system of trial classifications determined the number of jurors and verdict requirements that pertained to the gravity of crimes being adjudicated. Unanimous five-person juries were required for crimes that mandated hard labor punishment, and nine to 12 jurors for more serious crimes, but unanimity of 12-person juries for capital offenses.

The Court found that Louisiana's statutory scheme was not discriminatory or offensive. The Court believed that the state's established procedure was practical, efficient and permissible. The system categorically operated with no intention to diminish or to infringe rights of defendants. Justices for the majority pointed out that "the States are free under the Federal Constitution to try defendants with juries of less than twelve men."

Justice Powell, in a separate, concurring opinion, stated that the right to jury trial (the Sixth Amendment) did not require unanimity as a necessary premise of due process. He pointed out that in Apodaca v. Oregon (1972), litigants unsuccessfully argued that unanimity should have been a requirement of the state jury system because the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporates" the Sixth Amendment's provision that everyone has the right to a trial by jury. The Court then held that noncapital state criminal cases did not require jury unanimity. Justice Powell also pointed out that requirements for state criminal trials should be distinguished from requirements for federal courts to have jury unanimity and harmonized verdicts. Justice Powell emphasized that when Duncan v. Louisiana (1968) was concluded, that federal practice and its requirements for unanimity of the jury under the due process of law did not create a similar obligation for states. He also cited Justice Peckham's words in Maxwell v. Dow (1900), "The States should have the right to decide for themselves what shall be the form and character of the procedure in such trials . . . whether there shall be a jury of twelve of a lesser number, and whether the verdict must be unanimous or not . . . " Justice Powell further supported the majority's ruling in citing Jordan v. Massachusetts (1912) wherein the Court declared that "in criminal cases, due process of law is not denied by a state law which dispenses with . . . the necessity of a jury of twelve, or unanimity of the verdict." Justice Powell found no rational precedents, therefore, which supported the appellant's claim that only 12, unanimously agreeing jurors could guarantee principles of fairness and justice. He said jury trial procedure was not debased by "less-than-unanimous" jury provision and that innovations in jury trial procedure should not be considered unconstitutional especially if the law "is the product of a constitutional amendment, approved by a vote of the people in the State, and appears to be patterned on a provision of the American Law Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure." Thus, in rendering a lengthy concurring opinion Justice Powell thoroughly presented a rationale, supported by ample example, that only the notion of jury trial should have been considered fundamental rather than concluding that less-than-unanimous verdicts provided due process protection.

Four dissenting justices disagreed, finding it inappropriate that unanimous jury decisions were required in federal prosecutions and did not apply in state trials. The dissenters believed that unanimity was established as a clear practice through the history of American jurisprudence. In writing for the minority, Justice Douglas cited Andres v. United States (1948), wherein "unanimity in jury verdicts is required where the Sixth and Seventh Amendment apply. In criminal cases this requirement of unanimity extends to all issues--character or degree of the crime, guilt and punishment--which are left to the jury."

Dissenting justices criticized the Court's apparent unequal application of the Sixth Amendment. Douglas explained that equal treatment of cases with respect to the Self-Incrimination Clause applied at federal and state levels, and he found it disturbing the Court derived two different approaches from the Sixth Amendment. Justice Douglas disapproved of any provision that enabled states to jeopardize civil rights. He wrote: "If we construe the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to permit States to experiment with the basic rights of people, we open a veritable Pandora's box."

Dissenting justices reasoned that approval of procedures, which did not require unanimous verdicts could decrease a jury's sense of responsibility because nonunanimous juries were placed in position where they did not have to "debate and deliberate as fully as most unanimous juries." Provisions that enabled less-than-unanimous decisions lessened chances of dissenting jurors presenting arguments and provided a disincentive that the majority might be dissuaded. Conversely, a unanimous jury verdict required more discussion and deliberation which, in turn, encouraged better and finer reasoning required when considering questions about reasonable doubt (which could remain open if verdict was not unified). The dissenting justices considered Louisiana law an inadmissible departure from the principles of unanimity that had been constitutionally recognized. Douglas summarized the minority position saying, "proof beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimity of criminal verdicts and the presumption of innocence are basic features of the accusatorial system."