Paul v. Davis

The Court found that without first invoking state tort law/remedies, it was inappropriate to petition federal courts for constitutional protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court thus rejected the decision of the appellate court that taint of a person's reputation required action under 42 U.S.C 1983 and invoked the Due Process Clause. A "stigma" on someone's good name did not entitle the respondent to claim violation of his right to "liberty" and "property" (which were entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment). Further, no provision in the Constitution stipulated that defamation by the government implicated procedural protection under due process of law.

On behalf of the majority, Justice Rehnquist wrote: "we think that weight of our decisions establishes no constitutional doctrine converting every defamation by public official into a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment." He explained that the respondent's claim was unlike Wisconsin v. Constantineau (1971) and also Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath (1961) wherein the Court held that governmental action deprived individuals of particular rights which previously existed before the state's illegal action (e.g., in Constantineau the plaintiff was deprived of "the right to purchase or obtain liquor on common with the rest of citizenry.") Defamation alone in Constantineau and McGrath was not the primary factor under which those decisions were rendered but rather the consideration that the "alteration of legal status" was directly attributed to the exercise of unacceptable practice by the state. Further, the majority opinion emphasized that the respondent's petition for protection under the Constitution was not proper because his claim that defamation could restrict his opportunities for employment or "damage his standing and associations in his community" was not valid since the respondent's employment was not terminated.

Although the U.S. Supreme Court majority did not find fault in the respondent's objection to being defamed, they held that publication of pamphlets did not entitle him to claim that he was denied any particular constitutional privilege. They concluded that Davis's privacy was not violated by any recognizable right identified in the constitution such as marriage, procreation, contraception, education, etc. Consequently, no previous decisions about privacy were applicable to the respondent's case. Furthermore, the Court believed that the publication of the flyers was defensible because nothing more was alleged than the fact that the respondent was arrested because of "shoplifting." He was not deprived of any freedom that could be perceived within the domain of privacy that could be secured under the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, because respondent had been charged for shoplifting, the Court reasoned that his constitutional rights were not violated and actionable under the provisions of 42 U.S.C 1983.