Paul v. Davis

Petitioner
Edgar Paul
Respondent
Edward Charles Davis III
Petitioner's Claim
A published flyer which contained the name and picture of the respondent whowas charged (but not convicted) for "shoplifting" did not violate privacy asprovided by Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantees.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Carson P. Potter
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Daniel T. Taylor
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Potter Stewart
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, Byron R. White (John Paul Stevensdid not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
23 March 1976
Decision
Deprivation of constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process of law did not occur through an official distribution of defamatory pamphlets regarding the respondent's alleged shoplifting because reputation alonedid not implicate "liberty" and "property" elements of the Due Process Clause.
Significance
After the publication of the "Active Shoplifters" pamphlets, the respondent (for whom shoplifting charges were dropped) claimed he was denied protection under the due process of law and his reputation was besmirched. Regardless, the Supreme Court found that it was inappropriate to invoke constitutional rights because state law torts should have been invoked for redress. A "mere defamation" without precise delineation of what rights an individual was deprivedcould not be recognized as a violation of "liberty" or "property" as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that unless an individual could distinctly identify injury that resulted in diminishment of specific constitutional rights,defamation alone did not sufficiently justify constitutional protection.
The respondent, Edward Davis was arrested in Louisville, Kentucky, during thesummer of 1971 for shoplifting. He protested his arrest and, after several months, charges against him were "filed away with leave to reinstate." Final action on his "shoplift" charge was left unsettled for more than one year. Ultimately, in December of 1972, charges relating to the incident were dropped by the Louisville Police Court. However, Davis' troubles, relative to that misadventure, had just started.
Due to heightened risk of shoplifting during the Christmas season, Edgar Paul, Chief of Police of Louisville, Kentucky, in concert with Jefferson County law enforcement officials, initiated action to alert local merchants to thieves. Pamphlets were distributed in the Louisville metropolitan area that identified "active shoplifters." Flyers contained the alphabetically arranged mug shot photos of persons arrested for shoplifting, including the photo of EdwardDavis. Flyers included information, compiled by the police departments of the Jefferson County and City of Louisville, about persons arrested for shoplifting during a two-year period, from 1971 to 1972. The flyers suggested that to ensure adequate protection, security personnel should watch for individualswhose pictures were published in the flyers.
Charges against Davis were dismissed just six days after circulation of the flyers had begun. He immediately objected and filed a lawsuit against police authorities in the District Court for the Western District of Kentucky (under42 U.S.C 1983 which provides remedy when position was abused by any official). Davis opted to not file suit in the state courts of Kentucky because he contended that government (city and county) law enforcement officials contributed to the loss of his rights. In his lawsuit, Davis sought a court order (injunction) to bar distribution of the pamphlets.
The district court ruled that (under 28 U.S.C. 1343) "the facts alleged in this case do not establish that plaintiff has been deprived of any right secured to him by the Constitution of the United States." On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found merit in the respondent's (Davis) assertion that he was deprived of his constitutional rights. They cited Wisconsinv. Constantineau (1971) as a related case which justified the respondent's claim under another statute, 42 U.S.C 1983 (related to redress in cases when a state's law abridges constitutional rights). The appellate court held therespondent had "alleged fact that constitute(d) a denial of due process of law."
Due Process Clause Invoked
Respondent's main argument was that the pamphlet violated his privacy and liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Davis particularly objected to the title, "Active Shoplifters." He contended that inclusionof his photo and name in the pamphlet was inappropriate; police action intruded on his privacy and jeopardized his personal autonomy. Davis contended that classifying him as an "active shoplifter" ruined his reputation and limitedfuture employment opportunities. He also maintained that police authoritiesdefamed him by characterizing him as a criminal and that reason alone sufficiently justified bringing suit without having to prove specific damages.
The U.S. Supreme Court found the respondent's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment was incorrect. Five justices for the majority opinion reasoned itwas inappropriate to hold that arrest by law officials and later publicationof that fact entitled a person to claims under 42 U.S.C 1983. The justices also pointed out that attacks on a person's "good name" did not equate to "liberty" or "property" deprivations actionable under 42 U.S.C 1983. The majorityopinion explained that every legally performed action which might be recognizable as injury by state officials could not be regarded as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, injury by governmental employees did not invoke protection under the Due Process Clause unless claims first invoked state-law torts. Citing Screws v. United States (1945), the Court held that "violation of local law does not necessarily mean that the federal rights have been invaded." Only when action by government officials resulted in deprivation of specific rights guaranteed by the Constitution could the issue of a rights violation be considered. Furthermore, the justices stressed that there must always be a clearly understandable right which was forfeited toreasonably expect protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, procedural guarantees established under due process of law were not related to privacyexpectations. According to previous cases where state law torts were available as remedy, they explained that constitutional provisions under the Fourteenth Amendment were not litigated.
No Violation of Fourteenth Amendment Rights Found
The Court found that without first invoking state tort law/remedies, it was inappropriate to petition federal courts for constitutional protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court thus rejected the decision of the appellate court that taint of a person's reputation required action under 42 U.S.C 1983 and invoked the Due Process Clause. A "stigma" on someone's good name didnot entitle the respondent to claim violation of his right to "liberty" and "property" (which were entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment). Further, no provision in the Constitution stipulated that defamation by the government implicated procedural protection under due process of law.
On behalf of the majority, Justice Rehnquist wrote: "we think that weight ofour decisions establishes no constitutional doctrine converting every defamation by public official into a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment." He explained that the respondent's claim was unlike Wisconsin v. Constantineau (1971)and also Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath (1961) wherein the Court held that governmental action deprived individuals of particular rights which previously existed before the state's illegal action (e.g., in Constantineau the plaintiff was deprived of "the right to purchase or obtain liquor on common with the rest of citizenry.") Defamation alone in Constantineau and McGrath was not the primary factor under which those decisionswere rendered but rather the consideration that the "alteration of legal status" was directly attributed to the exercise of unacceptable practice by the state. Further, the majority opinion emphasized that the respondent's petitionfor protection under the Constitution was not proper because his claim thatdefamation could restrict his opportunities for employment or "damage his standing and associations in his community" was not valid since the respondent'semployment was not terminated.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court majority did not find fault in the respondent's objection to being defamed, they held that publication of pamphlets did not entitle him to claim that he was denied any particular constitutional privilege. They concluded that Davis's privacy was not violated by any recognizable right identified in the constitution such as marriage, procreation, contraception, education, etc. Consequently, no previous decisions about privacy were applicable to the respondent's case. Furthermore, the Court believed that the publication of the flyers was defensible because nothing more was allegedthan the fact that the respondent was arrested because of "shoplifting." He was not deprived of any freedom that could be perceived within the domain of privacy that could be secured under the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, becauserespondent had been charged for shoplifting, the Court reasoned that his constitutional rights were not violated and actionable under the provisions of 42 U.S.C 1983.
Minority Opinion
Three justices disagreed with the findings of the majority. The dissenting opinion reasoned that the decision justified the conduct of police officials although their intrusive action defamed and stigmatized the respondent as a criminal. Justice Brennan, writing for the minority, reasoned publication of thepamphlets constituted an illegitimate and improper enforcement of law that assaulted constitutional safeguards. According to 42. U.S.C. 1983, citizens ofevery state were entitled to redress if harmful wrongdoing was the result oflaw enforcement and such wrongdoing deprived them from protection guaranteedby the Constitution. (The majority rejected the respondent's complaint because they reasoned that a recognizable claim under 42. U.S.C. 1983 had to involve forfeiture of a specific constitutional right resulting in deprivation according to the letter of law.) Brennan disagreed that the conduct of police officials was, as the majority reasoned, "purposeful" and performed as "official practice." The respondent was labeled as a criminal without regard to constitutional safeguards. He had never been convicted and his only offense was asingle arrest. His "shoplifting" charge was dropped and he was not convictedfor the offense. The minority opinion, therefore, maintained police unacceptably harmed the respondent by the distribution of 1000 pamphlets which characterized the respondent as a thief, active in shoplifting.
Justices for the minority disagreed that "mere defamation" could not be recognized as a legitimate claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. They found as improper the Court's rationalization that interest in reputation could not be considered infringement of "life, liberty and property" provisions in the Fourteenth Amendment. In his written opinion, Justice Brennan held "the enjoymentof one's good name and reputation has been recognized repeatedly in our casesas being among the most cherished of right enjoyed by a free people, and therefore as falling within the concept of personal liberty." Constitutional lawprovided measures to ensure no guilt could be assumed on the basis of arbitrary actions and that consequences of such conduct had to be correctable as amatter of due process of law. The publication of the flyers, then, had to berecognized as an action that negatively affected the respondent's personal interest in reputation. He had justifiable reason, therefore, to expect constitutional protection.
Impact
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the respondent's constitutional right to privacy was not affected by what they (tacitly) acknowledged was a defamatory publication. The salient consideration which arbitrated their finding was thatno violation of the Fourteenth Amendment occurred because law enforcement hadpublished an official record of fact which stated that the respondent was arrested for shoplifting. The respondent claimed that he was entitled to protection under due process because state officials stigmatized him and impeachedhis reputation; however, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause was not invokable in every case wherein the state might be named as litigant. Moreover, constitutional protection need not automatically be invoked when state torts provided means for redress. Finally, the Court clarified for lower courts that with respect to issues of defamation, constitutional protection could be extended only when the expectation of privacy was abridged as one of the liberties guaranteed (marriage, reproduction, contraception, education) under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Related Cases

• Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
  
• Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
  
• Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
  
• Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
  
• Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).

Megan's Law: Is It Okay to Tell?
Should communities be warned of the possibility of convicted child molestersand rapists moving into their neighborhoods? That question is at the center of the controversy surrounding "Megan's Law," a New Jersey statute that has been emulated by a number of other states. The name of the law comes from thatof seven-year-old Megan Kanka, raped and murdered by a child molester who lived across the street from her and who had served six years for two counts ofchild sexual abuse. When the community found out, it was too late; hence Megan's Law, which requires that released sex offenders register with local authorities before moving in to a neighborhood.
Advocate Bonnie Steinbock, stated that "the paramount issue is the protectionof children, that their rights to be safe from violent sexual assault certainly outweigh the rights of sexual predators not to be stigmatized." Nonetheless, she took issue with the fact that the law may encourage "vigilantism." Aparticularly tragic incident occurred in Warren County, New Jersey, when a father and son broke into the house of a known molester and beat to death a manthey found there--a man who happened to be innocent.
Sources
Steinbock, Bonnie. "Megan's Law: Community Notification of the Release of SexOffenders." Criminal Justice Ethics, 22 June 1995.