American Civil Liberties Union v. Miller

As written, the overly-broad wording of the act did not only apply to people who misappropriated the identity of another person. The ACLU argued persuasively that the statute prohibited protected free speech such as the use of a pseudonym for protection from discrimination, harassment, or invasion of privacy. Moreover, under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, Congress provided for the non-commercial use of trade names and logos (such as education, news, or commentary). The language of the Georgia statute, however, prohibited such use.

Judge Shoob feared the act could lead to selective prosecution of minorities or unpopular opinions. Lastly, he found that the act infringed on free expression because some individuals in their confusion, may have altered their conduct and behavior over the Internet in spite of the belief that such activities were inherently legal, in a form of self-censorship. For that reason, Shoob believed their constitutionally protected free speech under the First Amendment had been abridged.

In summarizing his decision, Judge Shoob disagreed with the state of Georgia that specific legislation was needed to specifically prevent Internet fraud. Instead, he cited several Georgia statutes already in place that not only addressed fraud and deception but were less restrictive measures. Moreover, besides failing to adequately define what constituted a specific category of Internet-based fraud or deception, the judge noted that Georgia's legislation had not addressed similar practices in print media. Thus, Judge Shoob issued his preliminary injunction enjoining the state of Georgia from enforcing the Georgia law. This temporary injunction became final on 7 August 1997 since the state of Georgia failed to refile their case or appeal the federal court's decision.