American Civil Liberties Union v. Miller

In issuing his decision, Judge Shoob, first needed to establish whether it was appropriate for the U.S. District Court to make a ruling. In that regard, Shoob pointed out that in cases addressing First Amendment issues, the rules of standing are relaxed, especially if citizens might engage in self-censorship under threat of potential prosecution. Quoting from Virginia v. American Booksellers Association (1988), Judge Shoob noted, "The statute's alleged danger is, in large measure, one of self-censorship; a harm that can be realized even without an actual prosecution." Further, Shoob expressed that if he failed to make a ruling, the delay might impose "a chilling effect" on First Amendment-protected free speech. The concept of "chilling effect" relates to individuals deciding not to put forth views for fear of criminal prosecution. Because of these pressing constitutional issues, the court should hear the case.

By specifically upholding the right of the plaintiffs to bring suit, the court directly addressed the heart of Georgia's motion to dismiss. In their initial complaint, the ACLU pointed out that many intended to continue engaging in what they considered constitutionally protected conduct which the law seemed to prohibit. Thus, citing Graham v. Butterworth (1993) as precedence, Shoob ruled that individuals, indeed, faced a credible threat of prosecution even though they had not yet been prosecuted or threatened with prosecution.

Shoob cited four reasons why ACLU would likely succeed on the merits of their claim. First, Shoob did not agree with Georgia's argument that because language of the act was imprecise, the case therefore warranted dismissal so a ruling could be sought from a state court. Instead, Shoob found that the plaintiffs' complaint succeeded precisely because the statute addressed content-based restrictions that were "not narrowly tailored to achieve the state's purported compelling interest" to restrict Internet communications. Specifically, Shoob cited language of the act which he maintained only generally defined as illegal "transmissions which `falsely identify' the sender but were not `fraudulent' within the specific meaning of the (Georgia) criminal code." Shoob held that, "The statute was not drafted with the precision necessary for laws regulating speech" and was, therefore, constitutionally invalid.

While the state maintained that the law only applied to individuals who misappropriated the identity of another entity or person, ACLU argued that the language of the act did not specifically state that intent. Shoob agreed with ACLU noting that, by law, the court must only follow the literal language of the statute. The language of the act, therefore, contained nothing "from which a reasonable person would infer such a requirement."