Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v. Hepps

The Court was once again asked "to define the proper (balance) between the law of defamation and the freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment." The Court first determined this case involved a private citizen, but topics of public interest. Therefore, based on precedence of the New York Times decision, constitutional rule prevailed over common law in this case. Proving truthfulness was not the publisher's responsibility. Justice O'Connor, writing for the 5-4 majority, found that "where a newspaper publishes speech of public concern, a private-figure plaintiff cannot recover damages without also showing that the statements at issue are false." When truth is uncertain, as may often be the case, the Constitution requires favoring the protection of speech. O'Connor wrote, "the common-law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot" apply. In addition, the Pennsylvania shield law places even a greater burden on Hepps to prove defamation and falseness because the Inquirer's sources could not be identified or specifically questioned. In concurrence, Justice Brennan noted that the Constitution directly restricts only government actions limiting free speech. However, such restrictions must apply to private citizens as well when matters of public interest are involved. Burger wrote the press should not fear prosecution from private citizens in matters of public interest. Such fear serves as a "chilling effect" on free speech, meaning the press might be fearful of printing important public information if they were not absolutely sure it was truthful. A private citizen must clearly prove statements are false before recovering damages from the media for defamation. O'Connor noted a likely consequence of this strict standard set by Hepps was that some false statements about private individuals may receive protection by the Constitution in order to protect speech providing important information to the public.