Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party

The First Amendment enables political parties to associate and freely express their political platform. Parties are absolutely free to determine who will represent party ideas and send the party message to voters. As pointed out in FindLaw Annotated Constitution, the political association between parties is considered an "integral part of basic constitutional freedom." However, in order to achieve party in political competition, minor parties usually use candidate "fusion," (multiple nominations) as a convenient way to increase their chances to win an election. New Party believed that Minnesota's "fusion ban" was therefore a wholly inappropriate prohibition that violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendment. They claimed that nomination of another party's candidate was a proper and legal way to deliver their political platform to potential voters. The attorney for New Party reasoned that parties have an unquestionable right to choose who will be the bearer of their political ideas. Thus, in presenting its case before the court, counsel for New Party contended that a "fusion ban burdens its right to communicate its choice of nominees on the ballot on terms equal to those offered other parties, and the right of the party's supporters and other voters to receive information." Further, the respondent's attorney argued that New Party did not believe there existed any valid state interest to preclude nomination of a candidate who was already nominated for elections by another party.

Representing the petitioner before the U.S. Supreme Court, counsel for the state of Minnesota argued that minor parties must use their own political platforms and avoid exploitation of other candidates' popularity to make a significant "step forward" in the "political struggle" for voters. He maintained that, as enacted, the Minnesota's statute was justified in order to provide electoral stability, prevent voter confusion and ballot manipulation, and promote candidate competition. The state felt attaining voters could be misled if New Party was allowed to take advantage of the popularity of another party's candidate. Counsel for the petitioner argued that access to a ballot should be determined by a party's own merit, rather than a "fusion strategy," which could confuse potential voters into voting for a particular, popular candidate even if they were not acquainted with the (fusion) party's own views.

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff's claim and overturned the appellate court. The majority decision held that Minnesota's statute did not contain restrictive regulations which intruded on the rights of political parties that employ fusion candidacy. They considered Minnesota's law a reasonable act which did not seriously infringe on freedoms of association under the First and Fourteenth Amendment. Although the Court recognized that the Constitution guarantees substantial rights regarding political association, they believed that a ban on double candidacies prevented electoral abuse and maintained electoral fairness.

In rendering their decision, the Court cited as precedent the same cases which New Party's attorney used to support his arguments in court: Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee (1989) and Tashijan v. Republican Party of Connecticut (1992). Unlike counsel for the respondent, Justice Rehnquist found no similarity--the cases cited, he pointed out, violated a core of associational rights and interfered in the internal structure of political parties. Conversely, Minnesota statute did not ban New Party from endorsing or choosing members; they were only forbidden to nominate persons who were already candidates endorsed by another party. The Court reasoned that if New Party wanted to have Andy Dawkins as their representative on the ballot, they had to convince him to be their candidate and forego nomination by another party. Rehnquist further reasoned that Minnesota's statute did not prevent New Party from independently choosing to endorse any candidate they wished. The statute did not deny political participation in elections nor intrude on how the New Party organized politically.

In writing the majority decision, Rehnquist emphasized that although the provisions of First Amendment provide minor parties with the possibility of creating fusion strategies which may enable them to enlarge the popular base of their nominees, that possibility should not be considered a privilege that states may not restrain. He reasoned that because Minnesota's fusion ban did not prohibit New Party's access to the ballot that the restrictive requirements of the statute were not "severe burdens" that jeopardized New Party's First and Fourteenth Amendment associational rights. Burdens imposed by Minnesota's statute were not so high as to be considered irregular, rather, they recognized the state's interest in protecting correctness of competition. Moreover, not permitting fusion candidacies supported the state's interest in maintaining the integrity of their political system because, Rehnquist wrote, "the State need not narrowly tailor the means it chooses to promote ballot integrity."

The majority opinion further cited a previous ban upheld by the Supreme Court which contained restrictive provisions much more prohibitive than the Minnesota statute. (A disaffiliation rule in California, Storer v. Brown 1974, precluded any appearance on a ballot if a candidate was previously affiliated with another party during the electoral year.) Conversely, the only restraint under Minnesota's law was to forbid the possibility of a candidate appearing twice on the same ballot due to her/his nomination by more than one party. While the Court explained that they did not depreciate the "wisdom of fusion," they asserted that Minnesota's fusion ban was "sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation on Party's rights," which, in turn, served to preserve the traditional, American two-party system.