Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party

Petitioner
Michele L. Timmons, Acting Director, Ramsey County Department of Property Records and Revenue
Respondent
Twin Cities Area New Party
Petitioner's Claim
A candidate running for office could not participate in elections as a nominee representing more then one political party. Minnesota's statute imposing prohibition of "fusion appearance" on a ballot, therefore, did not jeopardize associational rights.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Richard S. Slowes
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Laurence H. Tribe
Justices for the Court
Stephen Breyer, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor, William H. Rehnquist(writing for the Court), Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter
Place
Washington D.C.
Date of Decision
28 April 1997
Decision
Respondent's (New Party's) constitutional rights under First and Fourteenth Amendment were not violated by provisions of Minnesota's statute prohibiting "fusion" candidates. Statutory restrictions were held permissible.
Significance
The fusion ban imposed under Minnesota statute was challenged by respondents(New Party), because it imposed severe burdens that restrained associationalrights of minor political parties. The U.S. Supreme Court decided that the "anti-fusion law" was not a burden that infringed on the respondent's rights (i.e., prohibiting New Party's nomination of a candidate already running for office as a candidate of another political party). Conversely, respondent believed that the right to associate and create their electoral strategy should beprotected by the Constitution's First and Fourteenth Amendment.
Electoral procedures evolved through American history in order to reduce possibilities of electoral abuse. After 1888, balloting protocols changed to the"Australian ballot system" (ballots contained either names of candidates andthe parties by which they were nominated). It was considered an important departure from the then, widely-accepted balloting custom when voters did not know which party a candidate belonged to (ballots contained only the names of candidates).
Since 1888, when balloting adapted to the new system, states have dealt withmany reforms, bans, multiple party nominations, and other changes and exceptions to the electoral process but the basic format of American balloting is still the Australian ballot system. One of the outcomes of such procedural change meant that fusion candidacies were not supported by many states. In fact,many states responded to multiple nominations by barring and prohibiting them.
In April of 1994, a minor political party, Twin Cities Area New Party, choseAndy Dawkins as their candidate running for state office as a nominee of theMinnesota Democratic Farmer Labor Party. He did not oppose the dual nomination and, in effect, thus established double candidacy for the 1994 general elections. Dawkins did not actually become a New Party member, he just signed the"required affidavit of candidacy" needed for nomination by New Party. UnderMinnesota statute, the state banned his candidacy as nominee of two parties.Because that statute prohibited a second "appearance" on the ballot of a candidate already nominated by one party, New Party's nominating petition was denied under Minnesota law.
Believing that their associational rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments were violated, New Party challenged Minnesota's statute and its "anti-fusion laws." Fusion is defined as nomination of one candidate by more than one political party. The U.S. District Court ruled in favor of the petitionerfinding that "Minnesota's fusion ban was valid and [a] nondiscriminatory regulation of the election process." However, the U.S. Court of Appeals reversedthe decision because of "restrictive and burdening" provisions under Minnesota's law that jeopardized the constitutional rights of New Party. They found no merit in the reasons which the state felt justified excluding "fusion candidacies for elected office."
The U.S. Court of Appeals decided in favor of the respondent, New Party. Theyheld that provisions under Minnesota's law burdened New Party's freedom to participate in elections with nominees which the respondent believed to be thebest representatives of their "ideologies and preferences." The court foundno compelling state concern which justified anti-fusion laws banning multipleparty nominations. The decision posited that because minor parties usually broaden their chances to win elections by using the benefits of fusion and political association, the preclusive regulations of Minnesota law lessened NewParty's chances of winning and, therefore, intruded on constitutionally-guaranteed associational rights.
Arguing Fusion
The First Amendment enables political parties to associate and freely expresstheir political platform. Parties are absolutely free to determine who willrepresent party ideas and send the party message to voters. As pointed out inFindLaw Annotated Constitution, the political association between parties is considered an "integral part of basic constitutional freedom." However, in order to achieve party in political competition, minor parties usuallyuse candidate "fusion," (multiple nominations) as a convenient way to increase their chances to win an election. New Party believed that Minnesota's "fusion ban" was therefore a wholly inappropriate prohibition that violated theirrights under the First and Fourteenth Amendment. They claimed that nominationof another party's candidate was a proper and legal way to deliver their political platform to potential voters. The attorney for New Party reasoned thatparties have an unquestionable right to choose who will be the bearer of their political ideas. Thus, in presenting its case before the court, counsel for New Party contended that a "fusion ban burdens its right to communicate itschoice of nominees on the ballot on terms equal to those offered other parties, and the right of the party's supporters and other voters to receive information." Further, the respondent's attorney argued that New Party did not believe there existed any valid state interest to preclude nomination of a candidate who was already nominated for elections by another party.
Representing the petitioner before the U.S. Supreme Court, counsel for the state of Minnesota argued that minor parties must use their own political platforms and avoid exploitation of other candidates' popularity to make a significant "step forward" in the "political struggle" for voters. He maintained that, as enacted, the Minnesota's statute was justified in order to provide electoral stability, prevent voter confusion and ballot manipulation, and promotecandidate competition. The state felt attaining voters could be misled if New Party was allowed to take advantage of the popularity of another party's candidate. Counsel for the petitioner argued that access to a ballot should bedetermined by a party's own merit, rather than a "fusion strategy," which could confuse potential voters into voting for a particular, popular candidate even if they were not acquainted with the (fusion) party's own views.
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff's claim and overturned the appellate court. The majority decision held that Minnesota's statute did not contain restrictive regulations which intruded on the rights of political parties that employ fusion candidacy. They considered Minnesota's law a reasonable act which did not seriously infringe on freedoms of association under the First and Fourteenth Amendment. Although the Court recognized that the Constitution guarantees substantial rights regarding political association, they believed that a ban on double candidacies prevented electoral abuse and maintained electoral fairness.
In rendering their decision, the Court cited as precedent the same cases which New Party's attorney used to support his arguments in court: Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee (1989) and Tashijan v. Republican Party of Connecticut (1992). Unlike counsel for the respondent,Justice Rehnquist found no similarity--the cases cited, he pointed out, violated a core of associational rights and interfered in the internal structure of political parties. Conversely, Minnesota statute did not ban New Party fromendorsing or choosing members; they were only forbidden to nominate personswho were already candidates endorsed by another party. The Court reasoned that if New Party wanted to have Andy Dawkins as their representative on the ballot, they had to convince him to be their candidate and forego nomination byanother party. Rehnquist further reasoned that Minnesota's statute did not prevent New Party from independently choosing to endorse any candidate they wished. The statute did not deny political participation in elections nor intrude on how the New Party organized politically.
In writing the majority decision, Rehnquist emphasized that although the provisions of First Amendment provide minor parties with the possibility of creating fusion strategies which may enable them to enlarge the popular base of their nominees, that possibility should not be considered a privilege that states may not restrain. He reasoned that because Minnesota's fusion ban did notprohibit New Party's access to the ballot that the restrictive requirements of the statute were not "severe burdens" that jeopardized New Party's First and Fourteenth Amendment associational rights. Burdens imposed by Minnesota's statute were not so high as to be considered irregular, rather, they recognized the state's interest in protecting correctness of competition. Moreover, not permitting fusion candidacies supported the state's interest in maintainingthe integrity of their political system because, Rehnquist wrote, "the Stateneed not narrowly tailor the means it chooses to promote ballot integrity."
The majority opinion further cited a previous ban upheld by the Supreme Courtwhich contained restrictive provisions much more prohibitive than the Minnesota statute. (A disaffiliation rule in California, Storer v. Brown 1974, precluded any appearance on a ballot if a candidate was previously affiliated with another party during the electoral year.) Conversely, the only restraint under Minnesota's law was to forbid the possibility of a candidate appearing twice on the same ballot due to her/his nomination by more than one party. While the Court explained that they did not depreciate the "wisdom of fusion," they asserted that Minnesota's fusion ban was "sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation on Party's rights," which, in turn, served to preservethe traditional, American two-party system.
Impact
The Court's decision was opposed bitterly by third parties who felt robbed ofa strategy that, once viable, served to enlarge their influence in the political process. Among dissenters, the American Civil Liberties Union was the loudest in criticizing the ruling of the Court, calling its decision a "strikedown of anti-fusion law." The crux of their objection reasoned that if the two party system was permanently privileged in the courts, minor political parties would never get an opportunity to achieve political parity.
Regardless of opposition by minority parties and independent organizations, the U.S. Supreme Court justified the existence of the state of Minnesota's anti-fusion statute and found it only restrictive on a party's right to choose and select candidates already nominated by another party--burdens imposed were, therefore, justifiable and minor. The Court held that Minnesota's law served to avoid ballot manipulation and factionalism and justifiably maintained atwo-party system as well. In essence, the decision of the Court did not recognize multiple nominations as a significant, legitimate means by which minor parties might achieve their political interests. The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court supported an American tendency to preserve and privilege a two-party system by limiting association rights of minority parties.
Related Cases

• Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
  
• Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
  
• Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986).
  
• Tashijan v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
  
• Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214(1989).
  
• Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992).
  
• Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).