Petitioner
Richard E. Lyng, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture
Respondent
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Association, et al.
Petitioner's Claim
Construction of a road and harvesting of timber through areas held sacred byNative American was in violation of their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and also in violation of various federal statutes.
Chief Defense for Petitioner
Andrew J. Pincus
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Marilyn B. Miles
Justices for the Court
Sandra Day O'Connor (writing for the Court), William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall (Anthony M. Kennedy did not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
19 April 1988
Decision
Construction of the proposed road does not violate the First Amendment regardless of its effect on the religious practices of respondents because it compels no behavior contrary to their belief.
Significance
Strengthened federal government's right to make land-use and other decisionsin spite of the objections of religious minorities.
In the 1970s the U.S. Forest Service planned to build a road through the Chimney Rock section of the Six Rivers National Forest to link the California towns of Gasquet and Orleans. The section through which the road was planned washeld sacred by Native American tribes resident in the area and was used by them as a site for various religious rites. In response to comments on a draftstatement of its environmental impact report, in 1977 the Forest Service commissioned a study of these sites and the possible impact of the proposed road. The study was finished in 1979, and it found the entire area to be "significant as an integral and indispensable part of Indian religious practice" andthat construction of the road "would cause serious and irreparable damage tothe sacred areas which are an integral and necessary part of the belief systems and lifeway of Northwest California Indian peoples." Thus the study recommended that the road not be built.
The Forest Service rejected the recommendation of the study and in 1982 issued a final environmental impact statement regarding the proposed road. It planned to build the road despite the recommendation of the study, but consideration was given to the points raised, and construction plans were adjusted accordingly. Although alternative routes completely away from the area were rejected because private land would have to be acquired and some of the areas hadsoil stability problems, the Forest Service selected a route for the road that was as far removed as possible from various sites where specific rituals took place. The Forest Service also adopted a plan to allow timber harvesting in the area, with a half-mile buffer zone around all significant sites identified by the 1979 study.
A group of interested parties, among them the state of California, individualmembers of Native American tribes, a Native American association, and conservation groups, filed suit in district court claiming that road construction or harvesting of timber in the area would violate several federal statutes andviolate the rights of Native Americans who used the various sites in the area for religious purposes under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The district court found for the group on both statutory and constitutional claims, the latter because both plans would "seriously damage the salient visual, aural, and environmental qualities" of the area. It further found thatthe road and timber-harvesting plans would violate government trust responsibility regarding water and fishing rights of residents of the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation. The district court issued a permanent injunction barring implementation of both plans.
The court of appeals affirmed the injunction on statutory grounds but rejected part that had been rendered moot by passage of congressional legislation that designated most of the property as wilderness area, under which timber harvesting and other commercial activities are prohibited; it also rejected thedistrict court's finding regarding a breach of government trust responsibility regarding the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation. A majority upheld the district court's constitutional ruling, finding that the government had not provena compelling interest for the construction of the road. The government petitioned for certiorari on the constitutional issue
The Majority Opinion
The Court ruled 5-3 (Justice Kennedy abstained) in favor of the petitioner onconstitutional grounds and remanded the case for further proceedings on thestatutory issues, which the government claimed it could resolve. The majorityfound that both lower courts had not proceeded according to the principle ofjudicial economy, under which constitutional questions are not addressed unless necessary. Had they acted in accord with judicial economy, they would have determined if a constitutional finding on behalf of the respondents would have granted them more relief than had they prevailed on statutory grounds alone. If the respondents would gain no additional relief on constitutional grounds, then a constitutional decision was "unnecessary and therefore inappropriate."
The injunction consisted of four sections, two of which forbade timber harvesting and road building until compliance with environmental statutes could beproven. The sections dealing with the immediate Chimney Rock area, which wasthe subject of the First Amendment claim, prohibited the same activities, this time without any qualifying language. The majority found that this part ofthe injunction must have been supported at least in part on First Amendment grounds, since such broad relief would not be granted on statutory grounds alone.
The majority rejected the respondent group's First Amendment claim, basing their decision on Bowen v. Roy (1986), in which two Native American applicants for state welfare benefits objected to the state's use of a Social Security number for their stepdaughter on religious grounds. O'Connor's opinionquoted Roy: "The Free Exercise Clause affords an individual protection from certain forms of governmental compulsion; it does not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government's internal procedures." The land was publicly owned, and the plan did not coerce individuals into actions contrary to their religious beliefs; nor was any person denied "an equal shareof the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens." The majority rejected respondents' attempts to distinguish this case from Bowen v.Roy because "the government action is not at some physically removed location where it places no restriction on what a practitioner may do" and the use of a Social Security number "did not interfere" with the practice of religion, simply by refusing to make the comparison:
The Court continued by rejecting comparisons to various other cases in whichchallenges to government programs on religious grounds were sustained, in oneinstance a case involving compulsory school attendance, because in these cases the programs required coercive action. In absence of such coercion, the majority declared that "government simply could not operate" if every program had to be in compliance with the religious beliefs of every American, howeversincere and deeply held. Such controversies are inevitable in a diverse society, and any attempts to "reconcile the various competing demands on government" were the function of legislatures, not the Constitution and the Court.
Further discussion noted that the government took many steps to ameliorate the impact of the road on the area, and it rejected the respondents' claim thatthe injunction was valid under the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, which the Court declared was in fact a policy statement only and did not createany "cause of action or any judicially enforceable rights."
The Dissent
The minority, in an opinion written by Justice Brennan, took a more expansiveview of the Free Exercise Clause, declaring that it "is directed against anyform of governmental action that frustrates or inhibits religious practice,"a claim the majority had flatly rejected by saying, "The Constitution, however, says no such thing," and quoting the First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." Brennan noted, however, that one definition of the word prohibit is "to prevent from doing something."
A good portion of the dissent focused on the nature of Native American religious beliefs, finding a centrality of land and reverence for nature in contrast to Western views. For many Native Americans, the land is a "sacred, livingbeing," not a "fungible" asset to be managed. The construction of a road through the area would "completely frustrate the practice of their religion" andin effect will destroy it.
The minority did not accept the majority's distinction between government action that required conduct contrary to one's religious belief and action thatprevented conduct according to that religious belief: "The harm to the practitioners is the same" in either case. The majority reading of Bowen v. Roy as applicable to the case at hand was "altogether remarkable," since thefinding in that case emphasized the "internal" nature of the government action at question, whereas government "land-use decisions are like to have substantial external effects . . . " In this case the government action would "virtually destroy" the respondents' religion. Such a substantial harm did raise aconstitutional question, and leaving the issue to the legislature was an "abdication" that would result in the government having "the unilateral authority to resolve all conflicts in its favor, " a result that does nothing to balance the interest of the government with that of Native Americans.
Impact
The Court's ruling in Lyng has been criticized for its unwillingness to consider the effects of government programs or policies while focusing onlyon the form the government action takes. In a Cornell Law Review article, J. Brett Pritchard stated:
Related Cases
Richard E. Lyng, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture
Respondent
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Association, et al.
Petitioner's Claim
Construction of a road and harvesting of timber through areas held sacred byNative American was in violation of their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and also in violation of various federal statutes.
Chief Defense for Petitioner
Andrew J. Pincus
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Marilyn B. Miles
Justices for the Court
Sandra Day O'Connor (writing for the Court), William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall (Anthony M. Kennedy did not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
19 April 1988
Decision
Construction of the proposed road does not violate the First Amendment regardless of its effect on the religious practices of respondents because it compels no behavior contrary to their belief.
Significance
Strengthened federal government's right to make land-use and other decisionsin spite of the objections of religious minorities.
In the 1970s the U.S. Forest Service planned to build a road through the Chimney Rock section of the Six Rivers National Forest to link the California towns of Gasquet and Orleans. The section through which the road was planned washeld sacred by Native American tribes resident in the area and was used by them as a site for various religious rites. In response to comments on a draftstatement of its environmental impact report, in 1977 the Forest Service commissioned a study of these sites and the possible impact of the proposed road. The study was finished in 1979, and it found the entire area to be "significant as an integral and indispensable part of Indian religious practice" andthat construction of the road "would cause serious and irreparable damage tothe sacred areas which are an integral and necessary part of the belief systems and lifeway of Northwest California Indian peoples." Thus the study recommended that the road not be built.
The Forest Service rejected the recommendation of the study and in 1982 issued a final environmental impact statement regarding the proposed road. It planned to build the road despite the recommendation of the study, but consideration was given to the points raised, and construction plans were adjusted accordingly. Although alternative routes completely away from the area were rejected because private land would have to be acquired and some of the areas hadsoil stability problems, the Forest Service selected a route for the road that was as far removed as possible from various sites where specific rituals took place. The Forest Service also adopted a plan to allow timber harvesting in the area, with a half-mile buffer zone around all significant sites identified by the 1979 study.
A group of interested parties, among them the state of California, individualmembers of Native American tribes, a Native American association, and conservation groups, filed suit in district court claiming that road construction or harvesting of timber in the area would violate several federal statutes andviolate the rights of Native Americans who used the various sites in the area for religious purposes under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The district court found for the group on both statutory and constitutional claims, the latter because both plans would "seriously damage the salient visual, aural, and environmental qualities" of the area. It further found thatthe road and timber-harvesting plans would violate government trust responsibility regarding water and fishing rights of residents of the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation. The district court issued a permanent injunction barring implementation of both plans.
The court of appeals affirmed the injunction on statutory grounds but rejected part that had been rendered moot by passage of congressional legislation that designated most of the property as wilderness area, under which timber harvesting and other commercial activities are prohibited; it also rejected thedistrict court's finding regarding a breach of government trust responsibility regarding the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation. A majority upheld the district court's constitutional ruling, finding that the government had not provena compelling interest for the construction of the road. The government petitioned for certiorari on the constitutional issue
The Majority Opinion
The Court ruled 5-3 (Justice Kennedy abstained) in favor of the petitioner onconstitutional grounds and remanded the case for further proceedings on thestatutory issues, which the government claimed it could resolve. The majorityfound that both lower courts had not proceeded according to the principle ofjudicial economy, under which constitutional questions are not addressed unless necessary. Had they acted in accord with judicial economy, they would have determined if a constitutional finding on behalf of the respondents would have granted them more relief than had they prevailed on statutory grounds alone. If the respondents would gain no additional relief on constitutional grounds, then a constitutional decision was "unnecessary and therefore inappropriate."
The injunction consisted of four sections, two of which forbade timber harvesting and road building until compliance with environmental statutes could beproven. The sections dealing with the immediate Chimney Rock area, which wasthe subject of the First Amendment claim, prohibited the same activities, this time without any qualifying language. The majority found that this part ofthe injunction must have been supported at least in part on First Amendment grounds, since such broad relief would not be granted on statutory grounds alone.
The majority rejected the respondent group's First Amendment claim, basing their decision on Bowen v. Roy (1986), in which two Native American applicants for state welfare benefits objected to the state's use of a Social Security number for their stepdaughter on religious grounds. O'Connor's opinionquoted Roy: "The Free Exercise Clause affords an individual protection from certain forms of governmental compulsion; it does not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government's internal procedures." The land was publicly owned, and the plan did not coerce individuals into actions contrary to their religious beliefs; nor was any person denied "an equal shareof the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens." The majority rejected respondents' attempts to distinguish this case from Bowen v.Roy because "the government action is not at some physically removed location where it places no restriction on what a practitioner may do" and the use of a Social Security number "did not interfere" with the practice of religion, simply by refusing to make the comparison:
Since the Court cannot determine the truth of the underlying religious beliefs that led to thereligious objections . . . we cannot say that the one form of incidental interference with an individual's spiritual activities should be subjected to a different constitutional analysis than the other.
The Court continued by rejecting comparisons to various other cases in whichchallenges to government programs on religious grounds were sustained, in oneinstance a case involving compulsory school attendance, because in these cases the programs required coercive action. In absence of such coercion, the majority declared that "government simply could not operate" if every program had to be in compliance with the religious beliefs of every American, howeversincere and deeply held. Such controversies are inevitable in a diverse society, and any attempts to "reconcile the various competing demands on government" were the function of legislatures, not the Constitution and the Court.
Further discussion noted that the government took many steps to ameliorate the impact of the road on the area, and it rejected the respondents' claim thatthe injunction was valid under the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, which the Court declared was in fact a policy statement only and did not createany "cause of action or any judicially enforceable rights."
The Dissent
The minority, in an opinion written by Justice Brennan, took a more expansiveview of the Free Exercise Clause, declaring that it "is directed against anyform of governmental action that frustrates or inhibits religious practice,"a claim the majority had flatly rejected by saying, "The Constitution, however, says no such thing," and quoting the First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." Brennan noted, however, that one definition of the word prohibit is "to prevent from doing something."
A good portion of the dissent focused on the nature of Native American religious beliefs, finding a centrality of land and reverence for nature in contrast to Western views. For many Native Americans, the land is a "sacred, livingbeing," not a "fungible" asset to be managed. The construction of a road through the area would "completely frustrate the practice of their religion" andin effect will destroy it.
The minority did not accept the majority's distinction between government action that required conduct contrary to one's religious belief and action thatprevented conduct according to that religious belief: "The harm to the practitioners is the same" in either case. The majority reading of Bowen v. Roy as applicable to the case at hand was "altogether remarkable," since thefinding in that case emphasized the "internal" nature of the government action at question, whereas government "land-use decisions are like to have substantial external effects . . . " In this case the government action would "virtually destroy" the respondents' religion. Such a substantial harm did raise aconstitutional question, and leaving the issue to the legislature was an "abdication" that would result in the government having "the unilateral authority to resolve all conflicts in its favor, " a result that does nothing to balance the interest of the government with that of Native Americans.
Impact
The Court's ruling in Lyng has been criticized for its unwillingness to consider the effects of government programs or policies while focusing onlyon the form the government action takes. In a Cornell Law Review article, J. Brett Pritchard stated:
The scope of the constitutional guarantee of free exercise of religion now depends on the Court's tenuous distinction between regulations that coercively impact religious practices and regulations that only make it more difficult for an individual to practice hisbeliefs.
Related Cases
- Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
- Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
- Thomas v. Review Board, Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S.707 (1981).
- Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
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