Petitioner
State of South Dakota
Respondent
Elizabeth Dole, U.S. Secretary of Transportation
Petitioner's Claim
That a law withholding federal highway funds from states which did not adopta minimum drinking age of 21 years was in violation of the Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitution, and of constitutional limits on the spending powerof Congress.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Roger A. Tellinghuisen, Attorney General of South Dakota
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Cohen, U.S. Deputy Solicitor General
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Thurgood Marshall, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Antonin Scalia, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Sandra Day O'Connor
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
23 June 1987
Decision
That Title 23 U.S.C. 158, passed by Congress in 1984, did not violate the spending-power clause; rather, in view of a four-part test regarding aspects such as its "pursuit of `the general welfare,'" the Court found that 158 was a noncoercive effort to benefit all.
Significance
Although the Twenty-first Amendment has not often been challenged in the Supreme Court, South Dakota v. Dole addressed other, perennial issues suchas spending power, the relative authority of the federal government and thatof the states, and the line between inducement and encouragement. Perhaps most significant was the last point, because it related to questions of how orwhether Congress may financially reward behavior it deemed beneficial, or withhold such rewards in the face of behavior it wanted to discourage.
Legal Drinking Age
In 1984, Congress passed into law 23 U.S. 158, which ordered the U.S. secretary of transportation to deny a certain percentage of federal highway funds tostates which allowed persons under 21 years of age to drink alcoholic beverages. South Dakota had a law which allowed anyone 19 years of age or older topurchase beer containing up to 3.2 percent alcohol. (Presumably-though the Supreme Court did not specifically address this issue in South Dakota v. Dole--the state did not allow citizens to drink beverages with higher alcohol content until they reached the age of 21.)
South Carolina took the federal government to court over 158, naming Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth Dole (wife of Senator Bob Dole, and future director of the U.S. Red Cross) as the respondent. The suit in district court sought a declaratory judgement that 158 violated Article I, section 8, clause 1of the Constitution, which limits congressional spending power, as well as section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment, which South Dakota interpreted as a limitation on federal authority over states' liquor distribution systems--including age limits.
The district court rejected South Dakota's claims, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. When the case came before the Supreme Court,a number of entities filed briefs of amici curiae on either side. Those urging reversal of the lower courts' rulings included the states of Colorado, Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, New Mexico, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wyoming; as well as the Mountain States Legal Foundation,the National Conference of State Legislatures, and the National Beer Wholesalers' Association. Those urging affirmance included the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, the National Council on Alcoholism, the National Safety Council, and United States Senator Frank R. Lautenberg.
A Four-Part Test
The Court voted 7-2 to affirm the rulings of the lower courts. Chief JusticeRehnquist, writing for the majority, held that "the bounds of" the Twenty-first Amendment had "escaped precise definition." In any case, the Court did notneed to look at the present legal action in light of the Amendment, or at South Dakota's claim that Congress was trying to directly legislate a nationalminimum drinking age. Instead, the proper arena in which to address the casewas from the standpoint of the spending powers clause, and to evaluate the constitutionality of the measures by which "Congress has acted indirectly underits spending power to encourage uniformity in the states' drinking ages."
In United States v. Butler (1936), Steward Machine Co. v. Davis(1937), and other cases, the Court had addressed issues relating to the spending powers of Congress. Through such cases, it had developed a four-part test to limit the exercise of such power. First, such exercise "must be in pursuit of the general welfare," the latter a phrase directly from the Constitution; and in making this determination, Rehnquist wrote, "courts should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress." Second, if Congress wants to put conditions on the states' receipt of federal funds, it should do so in an unambiguous way that makes the states fully aware of their choices and the consequences. Third, these conditions should be related "to the federal interest inparticular national projects or programs." And fourth, of course, the spending regulations could not violate the Constitution.
The only serious challenge, either from South Dakota or from the dissenters on the Court, came in the area of the fourth stipulation. Here the Court turned not to the Twenty-first Amendment, as the petitioners urged, but to Butler, which established that Congress had greater power to indirectly regulate the states by withholding funds than it did to directly regulate. In other words, while it might be difficult under the Constitution for Congress to tell a state what its minimum drinking age should be, there was less limitation on Congress's power to withhold federal highway funds from a state which refused to comply with what Congress viewed as appropriate drinking-age regulations. Rehnquist's point in this area was further reinforced by Oklahoma v.Civil Service Commission (1947), in which the Court found that "the United States is not concerned with, and has no power to regulate, local political activities"--yet it did "have power to fix the terms upon which its money allotments to states could be disbursed."
Finally, the Court noted that the "punishment" imposed on South Dakota was minor, and hardly coercive. If it refused to raise its drinking age, the statewould lose five percent of federal highway funds. As he concluded, Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted the Court's opinion in Steward Machine Co.: "[E]very rebate from a tax when conditioned upon conduct is in some measure a temptation. But to hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is toplunge the law in endless difficulties." In the end, the Court had held--andthe present Court reaffirmed the concept--that freedom of will, not coercion, determined results.
Dissent: 158 Attempts to Regulate
Justices Brennan and O'Connor dissented, both holding that 158 did indeed abridge states' rights to regulate issues involving liquor sale and consumption.Justice Brennan issued a short opinion in which he voiced his disagreement with the majority and his agreement with Justice O'Connor, who wrote at greater length on the thesis that "158 is not a condition on spending reasonably related to the expenditure of federal funds . . . Rather, it is an attempt to regulate the sale of liquor, an attempt that lies outside Congress' power to regulate commerce . . . "
In O'Connor's view, section 158 failed two of the Court's four tests: not only was it unconstitutional, but "establishment of a minimum drinking age of 21is not sufficiently related to interstate highway construction to justify soconditioning funds appropriated for that purpose." The National Conference of State Legislatures, O'Connor wrote, had properly drawn the line between "permissible and impermissible conditions on federal grants" when, in its briefto the Court, it posited that "the difference turns on whether the requirement specifies in some way how the money should be spent, so that Congress' intent in making the grant will be effectuated." If it specified the ways to usefunds--such as building highways--and left it at that, then a law was constitutional; any further commentary wandered into the area of regulation: "A requirement that is not such a specification is not a condition, but a regulation, which is valid only if it falls within one of Congress' delegated regulatory powers." O'Connor found the present case different from those addressed inButler and Oklahoma, nor did the regulations in 158 fit with Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Therefore, Justice O'Connor concluded, "Because . . . 158 . . . cannot be justified as an exercise of any power delegated to the Congress, it is not authorized by the Constitution. The Court errs in holding it to be the law of the land, and I respectfully dissent."
Impact
The issue which originally brought about the legal action in South Dakotav. Dole would become a moot one. By 1998, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, an agency of the federal government, reported at its Website that "Age 21 `drinking laws' remain in all states and continue to save lives (an estimated 846 in 1996 alone)." The larger concerns, however, have not gone away. South Dakota v. Dole was mentioned several times in testimony before Congress in the mid- to late 1990s as the executive branch considered guidelines for federal policy with regard to tobacco--specifically, a "tobacco settlement" in which the federal government would receive vast sums ofmoney as a payoff from cigarette manufacturers for the health problems caused by tobacco. Also under consideration before Congress at the close of the century were a variety of proposals regarding changes to tax laws. Among the benefits suggested for a flat tax or a national sales tax were limits on spending coercion. Much of the present tax law, advocates of such proposals suggested, were made to encourage certain behaviors and discourage others. A simpletax, they indicated, would prevent governmental attempts at behavior modification.
Related Cases
The Twenty-first Amendment
Two facts set the Twenty-first Amendment: it was the only amendment passed torepeal a previous amendment, and it was the only one ratified (albeit indirectly) by the electorate through a vote for delegates.
The Eighteenth Amendment (1919) prohibited the manufacture, sale, and distribution of alcohol. The Volstead Act (1919) authorized the creation of a Prohibition Bureau to enforce the law. In spite of this and the Supreme Court's tacit approval for broadened government police powers, as evidenced by decisionssuch as Olmstead v. United States (1928), the new law-enforcement mechanism proved ineffective.
The opposition to Prohibition spread to the Democratic Party, which in its 1932 presidential platform called for repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. The Senate passed an amendment resolution, and on 20 February 1933, the House endorsed it as well. The new amendment, in addition to repealing the Eighteenth,contained a prohibition against transporting alcohol in violation of state law.
During the months between April and November, citizens of 38 states voted fordelegates, and with 73 percent of the votes in favor of repeal, the actual ratification conventions were mere formalities.
Sources
Bacon, Donald C., et al., eds. The Encyclopedia of the United States Congress. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995.
State of South Dakota
Respondent
Elizabeth Dole, U.S. Secretary of Transportation
Petitioner's Claim
That a law withholding federal highway funds from states which did not adopta minimum drinking age of 21 years was in violation of the Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitution, and of constitutional limits on the spending powerof Congress.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Roger A. Tellinghuisen, Attorney General of South Dakota
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Cohen, U.S. Deputy Solicitor General
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Thurgood Marshall, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Antonin Scalia, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Sandra Day O'Connor
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
23 June 1987
Decision
That Title 23 U.S.C. 158, passed by Congress in 1984, did not violate the spending-power clause; rather, in view of a four-part test regarding aspects such as its "pursuit of `the general welfare,'" the Court found that 158 was a noncoercive effort to benefit all.
Significance
Although the Twenty-first Amendment has not often been challenged in the Supreme Court, South Dakota v. Dole addressed other, perennial issues suchas spending power, the relative authority of the federal government and thatof the states, and the line between inducement and encouragement. Perhaps most significant was the last point, because it related to questions of how orwhether Congress may financially reward behavior it deemed beneficial, or withhold such rewards in the face of behavior it wanted to discourage.
Legal Drinking Age
In 1984, Congress passed into law 23 U.S. 158, which ordered the U.S. secretary of transportation to deny a certain percentage of federal highway funds tostates which allowed persons under 21 years of age to drink alcoholic beverages. South Dakota had a law which allowed anyone 19 years of age or older topurchase beer containing up to 3.2 percent alcohol. (Presumably-though the Supreme Court did not specifically address this issue in South Dakota v. Dole--the state did not allow citizens to drink beverages with higher alcohol content until they reached the age of 21.)
South Carolina took the federal government to court over 158, naming Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth Dole (wife of Senator Bob Dole, and future director of the U.S. Red Cross) as the respondent. The suit in district court sought a declaratory judgement that 158 violated Article I, section 8, clause 1of the Constitution, which limits congressional spending power, as well as section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment, which South Dakota interpreted as a limitation on federal authority over states' liquor distribution systems--including age limits.
The district court rejected South Dakota's claims, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. When the case came before the Supreme Court,a number of entities filed briefs of amici curiae on either side. Those urging reversal of the lower courts' rulings included the states of Colorado, Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, New Mexico, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wyoming; as well as the Mountain States Legal Foundation,the National Conference of State Legislatures, and the National Beer Wholesalers' Association. Those urging affirmance included the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, the National Council on Alcoholism, the National Safety Council, and United States Senator Frank R. Lautenberg.
A Four-Part Test
The Court voted 7-2 to affirm the rulings of the lower courts. Chief JusticeRehnquist, writing for the majority, held that "the bounds of" the Twenty-first Amendment had "escaped precise definition." In any case, the Court did notneed to look at the present legal action in light of the Amendment, or at South Dakota's claim that Congress was trying to directly legislate a nationalminimum drinking age. Instead, the proper arena in which to address the casewas from the standpoint of the spending powers clause, and to evaluate the constitutionality of the measures by which "Congress has acted indirectly underits spending power to encourage uniformity in the states' drinking ages."
In United States v. Butler (1936), Steward Machine Co. v. Davis(1937), and other cases, the Court had addressed issues relating to the spending powers of Congress. Through such cases, it had developed a four-part test to limit the exercise of such power. First, such exercise "must be in pursuit of the general welfare," the latter a phrase directly from the Constitution; and in making this determination, Rehnquist wrote, "courts should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress." Second, if Congress wants to put conditions on the states' receipt of federal funds, it should do so in an unambiguous way that makes the states fully aware of their choices and the consequences. Third, these conditions should be related "to the federal interest inparticular national projects or programs." And fourth, of course, the spending regulations could not violate the Constitution.
The only serious challenge, either from South Dakota or from the dissenters on the Court, came in the area of the fourth stipulation. Here the Court turned not to the Twenty-first Amendment, as the petitioners urged, but to Butler, which established that Congress had greater power to indirectly regulate the states by withholding funds than it did to directly regulate. In other words, while it might be difficult under the Constitution for Congress to tell a state what its minimum drinking age should be, there was less limitation on Congress's power to withhold federal highway funds from a state which refused to comply with what Congress viewed as appropriate drinking-age regulations. Rehnquist's point in this area was further reinforced by Oklahoma v.Civil Service Commission (1947), in which the Court found that "the United States is not concerned with, and has no power to regulate, local political activities"--yet it did "have power to fix the terms upon which its money allotments to states could be disbursed."
Finally, the Court noted that the "punishment" imposed on South Dakota was minor, and hardly coercive. If it refused to raise its drinking age, the statewould lose five percent of federal highway funds. As he concluded, Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted the Court's opinion in Steward Machine Co.: "[E]very rebate from a tax when conditioned upon conduct is in some measure a temptation. But to hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is toplunge the law in endless difficulties." In the end, the Court had held--andthe present Court reaffirmed the concept--that freedom of will, not coercion, determined results.
Dissent: 158 Attempts to Regulate
Justices Brennan and O'Connor dissented, both holding that 158 did indeed abridge states' rights to regulate issues involving liquor sale and consumption.Justice Brennan issued a short opinion in which he voiced his disagreement with the majority and his agreement with Justice O'Connor, who wrote at greater length on the thesis that "158 is not a condition on spending reasonably related to the expenditure of federal funds . . . Rather, it is an attempt to regulate the sale of liquor, an attempt that lies outside Congress' power to regulate commerce . . . "
In O'Connor's view, section 158 failed two of the Court's four tests: not only was it unconstitutional, but "establishment of a minimum drinking age of 21is not sufficiently related to interstate highway construction to justify soconditioning funds appropriated for that purpose." The National Conference of State Legislatures, O'Connor wrote, had properly drawn the line between "permissible and impermissible conditions on federal grants" when, in its briefto the Court, it posited that "the difference turns on whether the requirement specifies in some way how the money should be spent, so that Congress' intent in making the grant will be effectuated." If it specified the ways to usefunds--such as building highways--and left it at that, then a law was constitutional; any further commentary wandered into the area of regulation: "A requirement that is not such a specification is not a condition, but a regulation, which is valid only if it falls within one of Congress' delegated regulatory powers." O'Connor found the present case different from those addressed inButler and Oklahoma, nor did the regulations in 158 fit with Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Therefore, Justice O'Connor concluded, "Because . . . 158 . . . cannot be justified as an exercise of any power delegated to the Congress, it is not authorized by the Constitution. The Court errs in holding it to be the law of the land, and I respectfully dissent."
Impact
The issue which originally brought about the legal action in South Dakotav. Dole would become a moot one. By 1998, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, an agency of the federal government, reported at its Website that "Age 21 `drinking laws' remain in all states and continue to save lives (an estimated 846 in 1996 alone)." The larger concerns, however, have not gone away. South Dakota v. Dole was mentioned several times in testimony before Congress in the mid- to late 1990s as the executive branch considered guidelines for federal policy with regard to tobacco--specifically, a "tobacco settlement" in which the federal government would receive vast sums ofmoney as a payoff from cigarette manufacturers for the health problems caused by tobacco. Also under consideration before Congress at the close of the century were a variety of proposals regarding changes to tax laws. Among the benefits suggested for a flat tax or a national sales tax were limits on spending coercion. Much of the present tax law, advocates of such proposals suggested, were made to encourage certain behaviors and discourage others. A simpletax, they indicated, would prevent governmental attempts at behavior modification.
Related Cases
- United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
- Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
- South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
- New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
- Printz, Sheriff/Coroner, Ravalli County, Montana v. United States,521 U.S. 98 (1996).
- Seminole Nation of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
The Twenty-first Amendment
Two facts set the Twenty-first Amendment: it was the only amendment passed torepeal a previous amendment, and it was the only one ratified (albeit indirectly) by the electorate through a vote for delegates.
The Eighteenth Amendment (1919) prohibited the manufacture, sale, and distribution of alcohol. The Volstead Act (1919) authorized the creation of a Prohibition Bureau to enforce the law. In spite of this and the Supreme Court's tacit approval for broadened government police powers, as evidenced by decisionssuch as Olmstead v. United States (1928), the new law-enforcement mechanism proved ineffective.
The opposition to Prohibition spread to the Democratic Party, which in its 1932 presidential platform called for repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. The Senate passed an amendment resolution, and on 20 February 1933, the House endorsed it as well. The new amendment, in addition to repealing the Eighteenth,contained a prohibition against transporting alcohol in violation of state law.
During the months between April and November, citizens of 38 states voted fordelegates, and with 73 percent of the votes in favor of repeal, the actual ratification conventions were mere formalities.
Sources
Bacon, Donald C., et al., eds. The Encyclopedia of the United States Congress. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995.
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