Appellants
Berman and other owners of a department store in Washington, D.C.
Appellees
The National Capital Planning Commission, the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency
Appellants' Claim
The government's taking of their store was unconstitutional because it was contrary to the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment.
Chief Lawyers for Appellants
James C. Toomey, Joseph H. Schneider, Albert Ginsberg
Chief Lawyer for Appellees
Simon Sobeloff, Solicitor General
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, Harold Burton, Tom C. Clark, William O. Douglas (writing for the Court), Felix Frankfurter, Sherman Minton, Stanley Forman Reed, Earl Warren
Justices Dissenting
None (John Marshall Harlan II not yet appointed)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
22 November 1954
Decision
Congress and its agencies (which functioned as the District's local government) may take appellants' department store and the land as long as they pay compensation to the owners.
Significance
The decision determined that state legislatures may exercise wide latitude indetermining what serves a "public purpose." And they also have broad leewayin choosing the means to achieve these "public ends." As long as they pay compensation, legislatures may lawfully take property from a private owner and give it to another private owner for his private use.
The Fifth Amendment limits the federal government's power (known as "eminentdomain") to seize private property: "nor shall private property be taken forpublic use, without just compensation." The courts have held that the Fifth Amendment limits also apply to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment's "due process" clause. In addition, the constitution of virtually every state requires payment when property is taken.
Under a 1945 Redevelopment Act for the District of Columbia, Congress createdthe National Capital Planning Commission. The commission was authorized to design comprehensive plans providing for housing, business, and public buildings. To achieve these plans, the commission could condemn land and lease or sell it to private parties for clearance and redevelopment.
Rebuilding the Nation's Capital
In 1950, the Planning Commission proposed to begin redevelopment in the District's southwestern area. In that section lived some 5,000 persons, 98 percentof whom were considered to be African American. Surveys prepared for the commission suggested that residential dwellings in the area were run down. According to these surveys, some 58 percent had only outdoor toilets. More than 80percent had no central heating, and 29 percent had no electricity. The commission estimated that two out of three dwellings were beyond repair.
The Planning Commission's scheme for this blighted area was approved by the District Commission, which served as Washington's local government. Upon its approval, the plan was certified to the Redevelopment Land Agency. This agencyhad the task of actually acquiring the property in the area. Once it assembled the land, the agency would transfer to public agencies property to be usedfor public purposes, such as streets, parks, and schools. It would then lease or sell the remaining land to one or more private companies or individuals.
Included in the property to be condemned under the 1950 redevelopment plan was a department store in reasonably good condition. The store's owners broughtsuit to prevent the government from seizing their property. Since their store posed no threat to public order, health, or safety, the owners argued its confiscation would not to serve any legitimate public purpose.
Moreover, they argued their property was not being taken for "public use" asspecified in the Fifth Amendment. The Redevelopment Agency planned to transfer their land to a private owner, who would develop it for his own private use. When the District Court upheld the Redevelopment Act's constitutionality and dismissed their claim, the store's owners appealed to the Supreme Court.
Writing the opinion for a unanimous court, Justice Douglas affirmed the District Court's decision. Simply by the act of paying compensation, the government demonstrated that an act had a "public" purpose. The people's agreement topayment was sufficient to prove that the public somehow benefits whenever property is transferred from one private owner to another private owner.
Within the District of Columbia, Douglas noted, Congress has "all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs." Since each case wasdifferent, no exact definition of these "police powers" was possible. In economic matters, a legislature could do pretty much anything it wanted to do. Certainly it was up to the legislature to decide that "the public needs to beserved by social legislation." Douglas also noted that even in cases of eminent domain, when the government seizes people's homes and property, "the roleof the judiciary . . . is an extremely narrow one."
There Are No Limits on the Public's Needs
Douglas went on to argue that a legislature's police powers are total and unlimited. (His statement to this effect subsequently was much quoted.)
Once Congress had decided that a certain act serves a public purpose, then itcould use any means to achieve that goal. "Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the means by which it will be attained is also for Congress to determine." Eminent domain is among the methods Congress may legitimately use. And it may seize land as well as buildings. "If the agency considersit necessary . . . to take full title to the real property involved, it may do so. It is not for the courts to determine . . . "
Earlier, Douglas had declared that in eminent domain or takings cases "the role of the judiciary . . . is an extremely narrow one." That role, he concluded, was solely to inquire whether "just compensation" has been paid. The legislature has unlimited discretion in deciding what constitutes a "public" purpose, and it may use any means to achieve that purpose. "The rights of these property owners are satisfied when they receive that just compensation which the Fifth Amendment exacts as the price of the taking."
Related Cases
Berman and other owners of a department store in Washington, D.C.
Appellees
The National Capital Planning Commission, the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency
Appellants' Claim
The government's taking of their store was unconstitutional because it was contrary to the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment.
Chief Lawyers for Appellants
James C. Toomey, Joseph H. Schneider, Albert Ginsberg
Chief Lawyer for Appellees
Simon Sobeloff, Solicitor General
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, Harold Burton, Tom C. Clark, William O. Douglas (writing for the Court), Felix Frankfurter, Sherman Minton, Stanley Forman Reed, Earl Warren
Justices Dissenting
None (John Marshall Harlan II not yet appointed)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
22 November 1954
Decision
Congress and its agencies (which functioned as the District's local government) may take appellants' department store and the land as long as they pay compensation to the owners.
Significance
The decision determined that state legislatures may exercise wide latitude indetermining what serves a "public purpose." And they also have broad leewayin choosing the means to achieve these "public ends." As long as they pay compensation, legislatures may lawfully take property from a private owner and give it to another private owner for his private use.
The Fifth Amendment limits the federal government's power (known as "eminentdomain") to seize private property: "nor shall private property be taken forpublic use, without just compensation." The courts have held that the Fifth Amendment limits also apply to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment's "due process" clause. In addition, the constitution of virtually every state requires payment when property is taken.
Under a 1945 Redevelopment Act for the District of Columbia, Congress createdthe National Capital Planning Commission. The commission was authorized to design comprehensive plans providing for housing, business, and public buildings. To achieve these plans, the commission could condemn land and lease or sell it to private parties for clearance and redevelopment.
Rebuilding the Nation's Capital
In 1950, the Planning Commission proposed to begin redevelopment in the District's southwestern area. In that section lived some 5,000 persons, 98 percentof whom were considered to be African American. Surveys prepared for the commission suggested that residential dwellings in the area were run down. According to these surveys, some 58 percent had only outdoor toilets. More than 80percent had no central heating, and 29 percent had no electricity. The commission estimated that two out of three dwellings were beyond repair.
The Planning Commission's scheme for this blighted area was approved by the District Commission, which served as Washington's local government. Upon its approval, the plan was certified to the Redevelopment Land Agency. This agencyhad the task of actually acquiring the property in the area. Once it assembled the land, the agency would transfer to public agencies property to be usedfor public purposes, such as streets, parks, and schools. It would then lease or sell the remaining land to one or more private companies or individuals.
Included in the property to be condemned under the 1950 redevelopment plan was a department store in reasonably good condition. The store's owners broughtsuit to prevent the government from seizing their property. Since their store posed no threat to public order, health, or safety, the owners argued its confiscation would not to serve any legitimate public purpose.
Moreover, they argued their property was not being taken for "public use" asspecified in the Fifth Amendment. The Redevelopment Agency planned to transfer their land to a private owner, who would develop it for his own private use. When the District Court upheld the Redevelopment Act's constitutionality and dismissed their claim, the store's owners appealed to the Supreme Court.
Writing the opinion for a unanimous court, Justice Douglas affirmed the District Court's decision. Simply by the act of paying compensation, the government demonstrated that an act had a "public" purpose. The people's agreement topayment was sufficient to prove that the public somehow benefits whenever property is transferred from one private owner to another private owner.
Within the District of Columbia, Douglas noted, Congress has "all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs." Since each case wasdifferent, no exact definition of these "police powers" was possible. In economic matters, a legislature could do pretty much anything it wanted to do. Certainly it was up to the legislature to decide that "the public needs to beserved by social legislation." Douglas also noted that even in cases of eminent domain, when the government seizes people's homes and property, "the roleof the judiciary . . . is an extremely narrow one."
There Are No Limits on the Public's Needs
Douglas went on to argue that a legislature's police powers are total and unlimited. (His statement to this effect subsequently was much quoted.)
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order--these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional applicationof the police power to municipal affairs. Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it . . . The concept of the public welfareis broad and inclusive . . . The values it represents are spiritual as wellas physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.In the present case, the Congress . . . [has] made determinations that take into account a wide variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them. Ifthose who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Once Congress had decided that a certain act serves a public purpose, then itcould use any means to achieve that goal. "Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the means by which it will be attained is also for Congress to determine." Eminent domain is among the methods Congress may legitimately use. And it may seize land as well as buildings. "If the agency considersit necessary . . . to take full title to the real property involved, it may do so. It is not for the courts to determine . . . "
Earlier, Douglas had declared that in eminent domain or takings cases "the role of the judiciary . . . is an extremely narrow one." That role, he concluded, was solely to inquire whether "just compensation" has been paid. The legislature has unlimited discretion in deciding what constitutes a "public" purpose, and it may use any means to achieve that purpose. "The rights of these property owners are satisfied when they receive that just compensation which the Fifth Amendment exacts as the price of the taking."
Related Cases
- Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
- Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
Further Readings
- Ball, Howard, and Philip Cooper. Of Power and Right: Hugo Black, William O. Douglas, and America's Constitutional Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Duram, James C. Justice William O. Douglas. Boston: Twayne, 1981.
- Simon, James. Independent Journey: The Life of William O. Douglas.New York: Harper & Row, 1980.
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