Appellant
Bartkus
Appellee
State of Illinois
Appellant's Claim
The Supreme Court should void his conviction for bank robbery by an Illinoiscourt. A federal court already had tried and had acquitted him of the same crime.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Walter R. Fisher
Chief Lawyers for Appellee
William C. Wines, Latham Castle
Justices for the Court
Tom C. Clark, Felix Frankfurter (writing for the Court), John Marshall HarlanII, Potter Stewart, Charles Evans Whittaker
Justices Dissenting
Hugo Lafayette Black, William J. Brennan, Jr., William O. Douglas, Earl Warren
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
30 March 1959
Decision
The Court denied Bartkus' appeal and affirmed his conviction. His second trial after a prior acquittal did not deny Bartkus due process of law.
Significance
The majority declared that the Fourteenth Amendment did not impose upon the states the Fifth Amendment's protection against double jeopardy. However, theCourt overruled the Bartkus decision only ten years later in Bentonv. Maryland (1969). In the latter case, the Court held that the double jeopardy prohibition did apply to the states.
Bartkus was arrested under a federal law making it a crime to rob a federallyinsured savings and loan association. He was tried in a federal court and acquitted on 28 December 1953. On 8 January 1954, an Illinois grand jury indicted Bartkus under a state robbery law. The evidence in the Illinois indictmentwas substantially identical to that contained in the prior federal indictment. An Illinois court tried and convicted Bartkus and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.
Bartkus's attorney appealed to the Supreme Court. The Fifth Amendment--referring to the federal government--provides that no person shall "be subject forthe same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Bartkus arguedthat this double jeopardy prohibition had been extended to the states by theDue Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: "Nor shall any State depriveany person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
In January of 1958, the Supreme Court split 4-4, and the case was reargued inOctober. In March of 1959, by a 5-4 vote, the Court denied Bartkus' appeal and affirmed the lower courts. Justice Frankfurter wrote the opinion for the majority. Justice Black dissented, joined by Chief Justice Warren and JusticeDouglas. Justice Brennan filed a separate dissent, which also was joined by Justices Warren and Douglas.
Justice Frankfurter acknowledged that federal and Illinois law officers had cooperated in bringing their separate indictments. For example, the FBI had turned over to Illinois officials all the evidence it had gathered against Bartkus. However, the state officials had brought the case under their own authority. The record did not, Frankfurter argued, show that the state trial was acover for a second federal prosecution--which would have violated the Fifth Amendment.
The Bill of Rights Does Not Restrict the States
For the first time, the Court explicitly ruled on the validity of a state conviction after a defendant had been acquitted in a federal court. The questionwas whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause. Justice Frankfurter declared unequivocally that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply the words of the Bill of Rights to the states."The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the States any of the provisions of the first eight amendments as such."
Frankfurter cited the historical record as well as prior decisions by the Supreme Court and state courts. He began by examining the "original intention" of the Congress and states in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment. In ten of the30 states ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment, the state constitution contained provisions contrary to those in the federal Constitution's Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments. These ten states clearly did not intend to incorporatethe Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment. To do so, they would first have had to amend their own state constitutions.
Furthermore, Frankfurter continued, 12 states joined the United States afterthe Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. In all 12 state constitutions, judicial procedures differed from those in the Bill of Rights. By welcoming them into the Union, Congress attested that a state's powers were not limited by thefirst eight amendments.
For more than a century, Frankfurter continued, the Supreme Court had accepted the validity of consecutive state and federal prosecutions, and state supreme courts also had tolerated double prosecutions. These decisions, Frankfurter declared, had reaffirmed the statement of law in the nineteenth century decision Moore v. Illinois.
Double Jeopardy Is Wholly Uncivilized
In dissenting, Justice Black vehemently argued that the Bartkus decision should be overturned. Perhaps it did not make the entire Bill of Rights applicable to the states. But the Fourteenth Amendment did incorporate those principles of justice "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our peopleas to be ranked as fundamental."
Based on the historical record, Black declared, "Fear and abhorrence of governmental power to try people twice for the same conduct is one of the oldest ideas found in western civilization." Rules against double jeopardy existed inGreek, Roman, and canon law as well as in English common law. Every state prohibits and most foreign nations forbid two trials for the same offense. And,Black continued, the Supreme Court also had barred two trials. The cases cited in Justice Frankfurter's opinion were, Black asserted, really irrelevant to the issue at hand.
In another dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority onsubstantive grounds. Brennan was convinced that the state trial was a sham.The federal officers had solicited the state indictment and prepared and guided the state prosecution. Federal officials participated in the state trial so completely that it was in actuality a second federal prosecution--a secondfederal try at Bartkus in the guise of a state prosecution.
Related Cases
Bartkus
Appellee
State of Illinois
Appellant's Claim
The Supreme Court should void his conviction for bank robbery by an Illinoiscourt. A federal court already had tried and had acquitted him of the same crime.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Walter R. Fisher
Chief Lawyers for Appellee
William C. Wines, Latham Castle
Justices for the Court
Tom C. Clark, Felix Frankfurter (writing for the Court), John Marshall HarlanII, Potter Stewart, Charles Evans Whittaker
Justices Dissenting
Hugo Lafayette Black, William J. Brennan, Jr., William O. Douglas, Earl Warren
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
30 March 1959
Decision
The Court denied Bartkus' appeal and affirmed his conviction. His second trial after a prior acquittal did not deny Bartkus due process of law.
Significance
The majority declared that the Fourteenth Amendment did not impose upon the states the Fifth Amendment's protection against double jeopardy. However, theCourt overruled the Bartkus decision only ten years later in Bentonv. Maryland (1969). In the latter case, the Court held that the double jeopardy prohibition did apply to the states.
Bartkus was arrested under a federal law making it a crime to rob a federallyinsured savings and loan association. He was tried in a federal court and acquitted on 28 December 1953. On 8 January 1954, an Illinois grand jury indicted Bartkus under a state robbery law. The evidence in the Illinois indictmentwas substantially identical to that contained in the prior federal indictment. An Illinois court tried and convicted Bartkus and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.
Bartkus's attorney appealed to the Supreme Court. The Fifth Amendment--referring to the federal government--provides that no person shall "be subject forthe same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Bartkus arguedthat this double jeopardy prohibition had been extended to the states by theDue Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: "Nor shall any State depriveany person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
In January of 1958, the Supreme Court split 4-4, and the case was reargued inOctober. In March of 1959, by a 5-4 vote, the Court denied Bartkus' appeal and affirmed the lower courts. Justice Frankfurter wrote the opinion for the majority. Justice Black dissented, joined by Chief Justice Warren and JusticeDouglas. Justice Brennan filed a separate dissent, which also was joined by Justices Warren and Douglas.
Justice Frankfurter acknowledged that federal and Illinois law officers had cooperated in bringing their separate indictments. For example, the FBI had turned over to Illinois officials all the evidence it had gathered against Bartkus. However, the state officials had brought the case under their own authority. The record did not, Frankfurter argued, show that the state trial was acover for a second federal prosecution--which would have violated the Fifth Amendment.
The Bill of Rights Does Not Restrict the States
For the first time, the Court explicitly ruled on the validity of a state conviction after a defendant had been acquitted in a federal court. The questionwas whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause. Justice Frankfurter declared unequivocally that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply the words of the Bill of Rights to the states."The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the States any of the provisions of the first eight amendments as such."
Frankfurter cited the historical record as well as prior decisions by the Supreme Court and state courts. He began by examining the "original intention" of the Congress and states in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment. In ten of the30 states ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment, the state constitution contained provisions contrary to those in the federal Constitution's Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments. These ten states clearly did not intend to incorporatethe Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment. To do so, they would first have had to amend their own state constitutions.
Furthermore, Frankfurter continued, 12 states joined the United States afterthe Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. In all 12 state constitutions, judicial procedures differed from those in the Bill of Rights. By welcoming them into the Union, Congress attested that a state's powers were not limited by thefirst eight amendments.
For more than a century, Frankfurter continued, the Supreme Court had accepted the validity of consecutive state and federal prosecutions, and state supreme courts also had tolerated double prosecutions. These decisions, Frankfurter declared, had reaffirmed the statement of law in the nineteenth century decision Moore v. Illinois.
Every citizen of the United statesis also a citizen of a State or territory. He may be said to owe allegianceto two sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either. The same act may be an offence or transgression of the laws ofboth.
Double Jeopardy Is Wholly Uncivilized
In dissenting, Justice Black vehemently argued that the Bartkus decision should be overturned. Perhaps it did not make the entire Bill of Rights applicable to the states. But the Fourteenth Amendment did incorporate those principles of justice "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our peopleas to be ranked as fundamental."
Based on the historical record, Black declared, "Fear and abhorrence of governmental power to try people twice for the same conduct is one of the oldest ideas found in western civilization." Rules against double jeopardy existed inGreek, Roman, and canon law as well as in English common law. Every state prohibits and most foreign nations forbid two trials for the same offense. And,Black continued, the Supreme Court also had barred two trials. The cases cited in Justice Frankfurter's opinion were, Black asserted, really irrelevant to the issue at hand.
In another dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority onsubstantive grounds. Brennan was convinced that the state trial was a sham.The federal officers had solicited the state indictment and prepared and guided the state prosecution. Federal officials participated in the state trial so completely that it was in actuality a second federal prosecution--a secondfederal try at Bartkus in the guise of a state prosecution.
Related Cases
- Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
Further Readings
- Ball, Howard, and Philip Cooper. Of Power and Right: Hugo Black, William O. Douglas, and America's Constitutional Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Biskupic, Joan, and Elder Witt, eds. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court, 3rd ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1996.
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