Goldberg v. Kelly

Appellants
John Kelly, et al.
Appellee
Jack R. Goldberg, Commissioner of Social Services of the city of New York
Appellants' Claim
State and city welfare officials were terminating financial aid without priornotice and hearing, violating due process.
Chief Lawyer for Appellants
Lee A. Albert
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
John J. Loflin, Jr.
Justices for the Court
William J. Brennan, Jr. (writing for the Court), John Marshall Harlan II, William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall, Harry A. Blackmun, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
Hugo Lafayette Black, Warren E. Burger, Potter Stewart
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
23 March 1970
Decision
Since New York's public assistance termination procedure did not allow the payment recipients to be heard before the cancellation, it violated the procedural due process.
Significance
Goldberg v. Kelly changed the constitutional opinion regarding traditional distinction between rights and privileges in relation to the FourteenthAmendment's Due Process Clause.
The Principles Involved
Before Goldberg v. Kelly, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected U.S. residents in certain situations defined as their legalrights through common law.
Common law refers to governmental principles and courses of action which owetheir authority to older bodies of law. In relation to the U.S. Constitution,common law usually refers to governmental procedures handed down from England and the American colonies before the American Revolution. The statutes andcase laws subsumed by common law usually apply to those rules and principleshaving to do with a person's security and the security of property. Common law is in contrast to laws enacted by the legislature. In other words, the DueProcess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed some sort of governmental hearing if a person's rights were compromised.
Traditionally, courts, through common law, have interpreted the basic rightsof an individual as life, liberty, and property. This was in contrast to a person's privileges or benefits received from the government. If the governmentdenied a "benefit" like public employment, welfare or the like, the Due Process Clause was invalid. No hearing was required. The legal interpretation hadbeen that if the government was providing something it did not have to provide, it could impose any conditions it wanted.
In contrast, there was also an "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine that said even though the government could deny benefits for any given reason, it could not deny these benefits if a person's constitutionally protected interests were violated. That was before Goldberg v. Kelly.
During the 1960s especially, it was already becoming apparent that the government had become more of a partner with U.S. residents than previously--to thepoint where a person's life and security were entangled closely with governmental "privileges," such as licenses of all sorts, social security benefits,employment and welfare.
At least one legal scholar pointed out the necessity of creating a new orderof property so that in modern society, these new relationships with the government which had been thought of previously as merely "privileges" or "benefits" would be protected by the safeguards included in the Due Process Clause. In short, the difference between rights and privileges had begun to blur. As this distinction between rights and privileges diminished, another grew to take its place. This would be known as the principle of "entitlement" which became the basis for the Supreme Court to establish a shield of procedural protections to keep the government from erroneously or capriciously depriving a person of something it had given, at its discretion.
With Goldberg v. Kelly, the meaning of property--as used in the Due Process Clause--expanded to include welfare benefits, previously thought of asa privilege or benefit.
What Happened
In New York City, a number of residents had been receiving financial aid fromthe federally-assisted Aid to Families with Dependent Children (ADC) or fromNew York State's general Home Relief program. With no prior notice, these residents alleged, state and city welfare workers were about to terminate, or had terminated financial aid. Since there had been no prior notice or public hearing, these actions violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The group of New York residents took their case to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.
When these cases began, no requirement of prior notice or pre-termination hearing existed. After Kelly, et al. began their court actions, the state and city welfare authorities decided to change their procedures. In essence, the authorities (caseworkers) now had to have an informal discussion with a recipient if there were doubts about the recipient's eligibility. Then the welfare recipient received a letter with the reasons for termination at least seven days before the effective date of termination.
Furthermore, the recipient now had the right to present a written statement to be reviewed by the superior of the administrator who originally approved the termination or suspension. If the superior agreed with the original decision, the benefits would stop immediately. Only then could recipients have the right to a public hearing where they could appear in person, offer oral evidence, confront and cross-examine witnesses, and have public records of the hearing.
Not good enough, said the appellants, who challenged whether these proceduresmet constitutional guidelines. The district court agreed, saying that a post-termination hearing was constitutionally insufficient. Only a pre-termination hearing would satisfy the Due Process Clause.
State and city officials argued that the informal pre-termination combined with the post-termination hearing dispensed with any due process issues. Of allthe defendants, only the Commissioner of Social Services of the City of NewYork appealed.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision.Justice Brennan's opinion held that under the Fourteenth Amendment, procedural due process requirements could only be fulfilled by a pre-termination hearing. Also, the possibility that a truly needy recipient might lose benefits accidentally far outweighed the state's concern about its fiscal and administrative resources.
Finally, according to Brennan's opinion, while the pre-termination hearing did not have to resemble a trial, it needed to meet the minimum procedural requirements of allowing the recipient the opportunity to confront and cross-examine welfare department witnesses, to retain an attorney if so desired, and tobe able to present oral evidence to someone impartial, who would make a decision based only on the legalities involved and the evidence produced at the hearing.
Related Cases

• Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
  
• Mathews v. Eldredge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
  
• Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
  
• Honday v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994).

Procedural Due Process
Procedural due process covers the act of arresting and trying people for crimes as well as other government steps to restrict the life, liberty, and property of people. Procedural due process places limits on the power of state andfederal governments, requiring them to follow to specific procedures for arrests and trials. For procedural due process violation claims, courts must ascertain whether the plaintiffs suffered deprivation of life, liberty, and property and to which procedural safeguards they were entitled.
The Bill of Rights outlines these basic procedural protections, which entitlethe accused to freedom from being tried for the same crime more than once, freedom from providing self-incriminating evidence and testimony, freedom fromcruel and unusual punishment, and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. These protections also include the right to be informed of the crime being charged, the right to a fair and speedy public trial by an impartial jury, the right to representation by an attorney, and the right to cross-examinewitnesses.