Bond v. Floyd

Petitioner
Julian Bond
Respondent
State of Georgia
Petitioner's Claim
That the Georgia House of Representatives, to which the petitioner had been elected, could not refuse to seat him because of his statements criticizing the Vietnam War.
Chief Lawyers for Petitioner
Howard Moore, Jr., Leonard B. Boudin, Victor Rabinowitz
Chief Lawyers for Respondent
Arthur K. Bolton, William L. Harper, Alfred L. Evans, Jr., Paul L. Hanes
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, William J. Brennan, Jr., Tom C. Clark, William O. Douglas, Abe Fortas, John Marshall Harlan II, Potter Stewart, Earl Warren (writingfor the Court), Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
5 December 1966
Decision
The Georgia House could not refuse to seat Bond, whose statements were protected by the free speech provisions of the First Amendment.
Significance
State legislators enjoy the same absolute right to free speech as other citizens.
Julian Bond was the communications director of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), a black lobbying and direct action group. In June of1965, Bond was elected to the Georgia House of Representatives by a large majority. Just before the House was to meet in January of 1966, SNCC issued a controversial statement regarding the war in Vietnam.
The SNCC declaration said that the U.S. government was responsible for the murder of southern Blacks, that the United States was the aggressor in Vietnam,and that young men should break the law by refusing to be drafted.

We are in sympathy with, and support, the men in this country who are unwilling to respond to a military draft which would compel them to contribute their lives to United States aggression in Vietnam in the name of the "freedom"we find so false in this country.

A radio reporter interviewed Julian Bond by telephone right after the SNCC statement was released. Bond endorsed the statement's contents.
By 10 January, when the Georgia House convened, 75 House members had challenged Bond's right to be seated, and the clerk refused to admit him. When interviewed by a special committee of the House, Bond stuck by his earlier statements. Nevertheless, he asked to take the oath to support the constitutions of his state and the United States required of all legislators by those same documents. (Article Six of the U.S. Constitution requires that legislators in every state take this oath.)
The House voted 184-12 not to seat Bond. His statements, the House said, madeit clear that he could not in good faith take the constitutional oaths. Bond's assertions gave aid and comfort to America's enemies, and they violated the Selective Service law. They "are reprehensible and are such as tend to bring discredit to and disrespect of the House."
Bond sued before the Federal District Court, asserting that by refusing his seat to him, the legislature had violated his First Amendment right to free speech. By a 2-1 decision, the District Court rejected his claim. Bond appealedto the Supreme Court.
Can States Require That Legislators Meet Ethical Standards?
In their arguments before the Court, Georgia's attorneys held that the legislature had exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether an elected representative was qualified to take office. Thus, it could decide whether a specific representative could, without hypocrisy, take the constitutionally mandated oaths.
Bond, the state further argued, had counseled young men to violate the Selective Service laws. Obviously, "advocating violation of federal law demonstrates a lack of support for the Constitution." The state questioned how Bond could take the oath the U.S. Constitution requires.
The key question, in effect, was whether Georgia could impose a stricter standard on legislators than on other citizens.

The State declines toargue that Bond's statements would violate any law if made by a private citizen, but it does argue that even though such a citizen might be protected by his First Amendment rights, the State may nonetheless apply a stricter standard to its legislators.

Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Warren reversed the decision ofthe district court and ruled that the Georgia House could not refuse to seatBond. Warren held that the Supreme Court had the jurisdiction to review the case. Bond had claimed that the Georgia House had deprived him of his free speech rights under the First Amendment. The courts had imposed these rights onthe states by "incorporating" them into the Fourteenth Amendment.
Maximum Freedom to Say Anything, Anywhere, at Any Time
Warren also rejected Georgia's claim that a state can apply a stricter standard of conduct to legislators than to other citizens. Warren first argued thatBond's statements did not violate the law. He then rejected the claim that alegislator's freedom of speech can, under the U. S. Constitution, be any less than that of everyone else.
Warren asserted that a legislator's very function requires maximum freedom ofspeech. "The manifest function of the Amendment in a representative government requires that legislators be given the widest latitude to express their views on issues of policy." Warren referred to New York Times v. Sullivan, (1964). In that decision, the Court had stated that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." Surely, legislators have asmuch First Amendment protection as other citizens.

Legislators have an obligation to take positions on controversial political questions so that their constituents can be fully informed by them, and be better able to assess their qualifications for office; also so they may be represented in governmental debates by the person they have elected to represent them.

In its decisions during the 1960s, the Supreme Court made freedom of speech an absolute right. Chief Justice Warren did not explicitly overrule earlier Supreme Court decisions. Nevertheless, Bond affirmed free speech claimsin circumstances in which the Court previously had denied such claims. It isstriking that the Court protected Bond's expressions of sympathy for draft resisters while the nation was engaged in military conflict. In 1919, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes had upheld Eugene Debs's imprisonment (Debs v. UnitedStates) for statements almost identical to those Bond made nearly 50 years later.
Related Cases

• Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
  
• New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

Qualifications to Run for Congress
The Constitution presents few restrictions regarding who may run for a seat in the Senate or the House of Representatives. The Qualifications Clause, in Article I, sections 2 and 3, makes stipulations in only three areas: age, citizenship, and residency. To run for the House, one must be at least 25 years of age, a U.S. citizen for at least seven years, and a resident of the state from which one intends to run. As for senators, they must be 30 years of age or older, citizens for nine years or more, and residents of their respective states.
Congress has upheld these as the requirements for service in the Senate or House. The Supreme Court, with its ruling in Powell v. McCormack (1969),affirmed the constitutional criteria as the only guidelines. Nonetheless, the two houses of Congress have often acted as judges of their members' qualifications, and both chambers have the authority to expel members. Expulsions inthe House have occurred only four times: three of them in the Civil War eraand the fourth in connection with the ABSCAM bribery scandal in 1981.
Sources
Bacon, Donald C., et al., eds. The Encyclopedia of the United States Congress. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995.
ABSCAM Trials
In 1980 and 1981 a series of trials, known as the ABSCAM trials, were heard in New York on the government sting operation that had resulted in the discovery of many highly placed corrupt political figures. Most notably brought under scrutiny were: U.S. Congressman Michael J. Myers; Mayor Angelo J. Errichetti of Camden, New Jersey; Louis C. Johanson, a Philadelphia councilman; HowardL. Criden, Johanson's former law partner; Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr.;and attorney Alexander Feinberg, an associate of Williams. Other public officials were caught and either expelled from office or turned out by voters atthe next election.
In the first ABSCAM trial Myers, Errichetti, Johanson, and Criden were all found guilty on 30 August 1980. Their attempts to have the convictions overturned were rejected by Judge George C. Pratt on 24 July 1981. In a 136-page decision, he said of the accused: "Their major defense has been that they were tricked into committing the crime on videotape. The government's need to unmasksuch conduct more than justifies the investigative techniques employed in these cases. Without question these convictions were reliable, and no constitutional right of any defendant has been infringed."
Williams and Feinberg were found guilty in a separate trial on 1 May 1981.
Sources
Knappman, Edward W., ed. Great American Trials. Detroit, MI: Visible Ink Press, 1994.