Munn v. Illinois - Further Readings
Appellant
Munn & Scott
Appellee
State of Illinois
Appellant's Claim
That the state law of Illinois requiring that a warehouse operate under a state license and that it conform to state-set rates violated the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chief Lawyers for Appellant
W. C. Goudy, John N.Jewett
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Attorney General of Illinois
Justices for the Court
Joseph P. Bradley, Nathan Clifford, David Davis, Ward Hunt, Samuel Freeman Miller, Noah Haynes Swayne, Morrison Remick Waite (writing for the Court)
Justices Dissenting
Stephen Johnson Field, William Strong
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
1 March 1877
Decision
That it was appropriate for the state to regulate a state activity; that eventhough grain elevators operated as part of an interstate network of commerce, it was legitimate for the state to regulate them as long as Congress had not legislated in the area; that the act of Illinois setting up state regulation was not repugnant to the Constitution.
Significance
The decision demarcated between strictly state regulation of domestic commerce within a state and interstate commerce which should be regulated by Congress; it further indicated that business activities were protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, even though that amendment had been passed to protect former slaves.
Setting the Boundary Between State and Federal Regulation
The state of Illinois had passed a law on 25 April 1871, requiring that warehouses take out a license and that they charge rates for storage of grain thatdid not exceed a state-established rate. The next year, on 29 June 1872, thestate filed an action against the firm of Munn & Scott for operating a warehouse without a license and for charging rates higher than permitted underthe state regulation. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in favor of the state, and Munn & Scott appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Attorneys for the appellant argued that the state had deprived Munn & Scott of their property rights by requiring a license and by setting maximum rates. They pointed out that rights to property were not worth anything except to the extent that the property could be put to a use. The free use of the property had been regulated by the state, thus depriving the owners of rights inthe property. The Fourteenth Amendment expressly prohibited states from depriving individuals of property without due process of law.
In his opinion, Chief Justice Waite pointed out that the state had not infringed on the area of federal jurisdiction, in that Congress had not sought to regulate grain warehouses under the interstate commerce clause. In this case,Waite appeared to be warning the states that legislation in areas involving major railroad commerce, such as grain, could readily impinge on a federal jurisdiction, although it had not done so in this case. Waite recognized that state and federal jurisdictions in interstate commerce could easily interfere with each other. In keeping with a modest view of the federal role, and in keeping with a high regard for state and local interests that was typical of theera of the 1870s, Waite ruled that the grain elevators, even though connected to a national network, were essentially local operations. A state could regulate business which was entirely within a state, and the grain elevators fitthat category.
As to the right of the state to regulate business, under the Fourteenth Amendment, Waite argued that private property exposed to the public for public useis also exposed to public regulation in the public interest. If an owner didnot want his property to be used in any way by the public, then the public had little reason to regulate it, but once it was used for public purposes, the owner had to expect regulation. Waite based this principle on a long tradition of British and American common law which gave the government power to setfees for ferries and bridges, for inns and other places of public convenience, and to require licenses for many categories of business.
Two justices, Field and Strong, dissented from Waite's opinion, indicating that they believed that the mere act of regulating, requiring a license, and setting prices consisted of "depriving" property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Even though a minority opinion, the fact that members of the Court regarded the Fourteenth Amendment as applicable to commerce and not simply tocivil rights, suggested that the principles addressed in such cases as Munn and the Slaughterhouse Cases,would have implications for business activities in the future.
Related Cases
Munn & Scott
Appellee
State of Illinois
Appellant's Claim
That the state law of Illinois requiring that a warehouse operate under a state license and that it conform to state-set rates violated the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chief Lawyers for Appellant
W. C. Goudy, John N.Jewett
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Attorney General of Illinois
Justices for the Court
Joseph P. Bradley, Nathan Clifford, David Davis, Ward Hunt, Samuel Freeman Miller, Noah Haynes Swayne, Morrison Remick Waite (writing for the Court)
Justices Dissenting
Stephen Johnson Field, William Strong
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
1 March 1877
Decision
That it was appropriate for the state to regulate a state activity; that eventhough grain elevators operated as part of an interstate network of commerce, it was legitimate for the state to regulate them as long as Congress had not legislated in the area; that the act of Illinois setting up state regulation was not repugnant to the Constitution.
Significance
The decision demarcated between strictly state regulation of domestic commerce within a state and interstate commerce which should be regulated by Congress; it further indicated that business activities were protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, even though that amendment had been passed to protect former slaves.
Setting the Boundary Between State and Federal Regulation
The state of Illinois had passed a law on 25 April 1871, requiring that warehouses take out a license and that they charge rates for storage of grain thatdid not exceed a state-established rate. The next year, on 29 June 1872, thestate filed an action against the firm of Munn & Scott for operating a warehouse without a license and for charging rates higher than permitted underthe state regulation. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in favor of the state, and Munn & Scott appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.
In his opinion, Chief Justice Waite pointed out that the state had not infringed on the area of federal jurisdiction, in that Congress had not sought to regulate grain warehouses under the interstate commerce clause. In this case,Waite appeared to be warning the states that legislation in areas involving major railroad commerce, such as grain, could readily impinge on a federal jurisdiction, although it had not done so in this case. Waite recognized that state and federal jurisdictions in interstate commerce could easily interfere with each other. In keeping with a modest view of the federal role, and in keeping with a high regard for state and local interests that was typical of theera of the 1870s, Waite ruled that the grain elevators, even though connected to a national network, were essentially local operations. A state could regulate business which was entirely within a state, and the grain elevators fitthat category.
As to the right of the state to regulate business, under the Fourteenth Amendment, Waite argued that private property exposed to the public for public useis also exposed to public regulation in the public interest. If an owner didnot want his property to be used in any way by the public, then the public had little reason to regulate it, but once it was used for public purposes, the owner had to expect regulation. Waite based this principle on a long tradition of British and American common law which gave the government power to setfees for ferries and bridges, for inns and other places of public convenience, and to require licenses for many categories of business.
Two justices, Field and Strong, dissented from Waite's opinion, indicating that they believed that the mere act of regulating, requiring a license, and setting prices consisted of "depriving" property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Even though a minority opinion, the fact that members of the Court regarded the Fourteenth Amendment as applicable to commerce and not simply tocivil rights, suggested that the principles addressed in such cases as Munn and the Slaughterhouse Cases,would have implications for business activities in the future.
- Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wallace 36 (1873).
- American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 217 U.S. 563 (1900).
- Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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