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Fletcher v. Peck - Further Readings

Appellant
Robert Fletcher
Appellee
John Peck
Appellant's Claim
Peck had purchased some land from the state of Georgia, which he later sold to Fletcher. Subsequently, the Georgia state legislature rescinded the original sale to Peck. Fletcher's claim was that he had bought the land in good faith and that Peck was guilty of breach of contract.
Chief Lawyers for Appellant
Luther Martin
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
John Quincy Adams, Robert Goodloe Harper, Joseph Story
Justices for the Court
Samuel Chase, William Cushing, William Johnson, Henry Brockholst Livingston,John Marshall (writing for the Court), Thomas Todd, Bushrod Washington
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
16 March 1810
Decision
That a legislature could repeal or modify the acts of a preceding legislature, but it could not invalidate a previously made contract.
Significance
This was the first time a state law was found invalid because it conflicted with the U.S. Constitution.
The story of Fletcher v. Peck is the story of bribery, corruption, andthe sanctity of contracts. From one of the most scandalous episodes in Georgia state history came a major legal decision that ratified the importance both of contracts and of the federal government.
The story began in 1795, when the Georgia state legislature sold huge portions of its western lands, known as the Yazoo lands. Eventually, this area became the states of Alabama and Mississippi. Meanwhile, the 30 million acres weresold by the state of Georgia for the bargain price of $500,000, or only one-and-a-half cents per acre. Even in 1810, that price was ridiculously low.
Land Grabs and Corrupt Legislators
Virtually every member of the state legislature had been bribed by the land companies to whom the land was sold. As a result, all but one member of the legislature voted in favor of the sale. Moreover, many legislators were financially involved in the project, so when the lands were resold to third parties,they got a share of the profits.
Not surprisingly, the public was outraged at this massive example of corruption. The Act of 1795, which the legislature had passed to ratify the sale, waspublicly burned and all evidence of its passage was supposedly erased from public records. Voters threw out the old legislators and elected new ones. Thenew legislature tried to regain the lands, offering to refund the purchase price to the land companies involved. Not surprisingly, the companies wanted to hold on to their bargains and refused to return the land.
Innocent Third Parties
Meanwhile, the land companies were re-selling the bargain lands to people andcompanies who had not been involved in the original scandal. New legal questions arose regarding the status of these new owners and whether or not they were entitled to hold on to the lands which they had bought in good faith. Itwas a question of whether the sale of the land was tainted to the extent thatthese new owners were not actually owners at all.
One of these new owners was Robert Fletcher, a citizen of New Hampshire. He had bought some 15,000 acres of Yazoo land for $3,000. The man who sold it tohim, Massachusetts citizen John Peck, had put a covenant in the deed, assuring Fletcher that:
[T]he title to the premises as conveyed by the state of Georgia, and finally vested in the said Peck, has been in no way constitutionally or legally impaired by virtue of any subsequent act of any subsequent legislature of the . . . state of Georgia.

In other words, Peck had promised Fletcher that even though the Georgia statelegislature had rescinded the terms of the original sale, Peck still had theright to sell the land to Fletcher.
Fletcher was not entirely comfortable with this arrangement. It seemed to himthat the Georgia legislature was likely to demand the return of the land. Hewas angry that Peck had taken money from him for land that he might have toreturn. As a result, he sued Peck for breach of contract in an attempt to recover the money that he had paid.
Contracts and the Constitution
When the case made it to the Supreme Court 25 years later, the United Stateswas torn between two competing political philosophies. One was known as federalism, which maintained that the federal government was more important than any state government and that one of the most important functions of any government was to protect the sanctity of property. The other major philosophy ofthe time was known as republicanism. This philosophy focused on democracy--the rights of every individual--rather than on property, and on states' rightsrather than federal sovereignty.
When Fletcher v. Peck was heard by the Court, it was embodied in the crux of this controversy. The question of which aspect of the case should be given primacy became a pivotal issue: the state legislature's wish to rescindthe land deal, or the property rights of the people who had bought the land.
The Supreme Court decision was a major step in establishing the sanctity of both contracts and the U.S. Constitution. In an apparently unanimous decisionwritten by Chief Justice Marshall, the Court made three major points:
(1) The original land grant made by the Georgia state legislature was, in effect, a contract.
(2) The U.S. Constitution protects the sanctity of contracts. Indeed, ArticleI, Section 10, Clause 3 of the Constitution provides that "No State shall .. . pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts . . . "
(3) Therefore, the state of Georgia was not legally able to rescind the contract it had entered into when it had granted the Yazoo lands to the original companies--even if bribery and corruption had gone into the making of the contract.
Thus, the Court's decision upheld the two basic tenets of federalism: the supremacy of the federal government over the state governments, and the sanctityof private property. After all, wrote Chief Justice Marshall, there must besome limit to what government could do. And, "where are [these limits] to befound, if the property of an individual, fairly and honestly acquired, may beseized without compensation?"
Related Cases

  • Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 519 (1819).
  • Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122 (1819).
  • Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420 (1837).
  • Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331 (1856).

Ex Post Facto Law
Ex post facto law literally means "law from after the fact." Ex post facto law refers to a law that would include, as a criminal act, all violations of alaw committed before the law was established. In other words, an ex post facto law would apply retroactively to citizens who committed an act before it was considered a crime. Ex post facto laws are considered unfair in most societies and are prohibited in the United States under Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution. Ex post facto laws should not be confused with retroactive laws which apply to civil law.
Only criminal legislation, not civil legislation, is affected by the constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws. In order for a law to be considereda violation of the prohibition, it must damage the offender in some way. Forexample, a law that makes parole requirements more restrictive for a certaincrime cannot be applied to individuals who committed the crime before the law was enacted. The use of ex post facto laws to prosecute former Nazis for war crimes, in particular the crime of "aggressive war," generated considerabledebate over whether retroactive law could be applied to criminal behavior.
Sources
Baltimore Law Review, Vol. 21, 1992.
Marvin Mandel Trial
Maryland Governor Marvin Mandel's trial was a national scandal, exposing massive political corruption at the highest level of state government. The reversal of Mandel's conviction signaled a limit on the ability to attack state crimes through federal statutes.
When a group of businessmen and investors purchased the Marlboro Race Track in Prince George's County, Maryland, in December of 1971, they approached Mandel for help. They wanted to increase the number of racing days that the trackcould operate in one year and acquire interests in other Maryland race tracks. In exchange for his assistance Mandel received cash, valuables, and interest in a waterfront development from the investors.
On 21 August 1977, the jury found Mandel guilty of federal mail fraud and racketeering. Mandel went to prison and served 19 months before his sentenced was commuted.
On 12 November 1987, Judge Frederic N. Smalkin of the U.S. District Court ofMaryland, overturned Mandel's conviction. Smalkin did not deny the strong evidence of bribery and dishonesty presented at Mandel's trial. However, he insisted that the prosecutors had stretched their interpretation of federal mailfraud and racketeering laws in order to prosecute Mandel for what were, in effect, state crimes.
Sources
Knappman, Edward W., ed. Great American Trials. Detroit, MI: Visible Ink Press, 1994.

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