Petitioner
State of Wisconsin
Respondent
City of New York, et al.
Petitioner's Claim
That the refusal of the U.S. Secretary of Commerce to use a post-enumerationsurvey statistical adjustment to correct the 1990 census represented a violation of the Census Clause of the Constitution.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Peter C. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Drew S. Days, III, U.S. Solicitor General
Justices for the Court
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor,William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens, Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
10 January 1996
Decision
Upheld the actions of the secretary of commerce, affirmed the holding of thedistrict court and reversed the decision of the court of appeals. Because Congress delegated authority for carrying out the census to the secretary, and since the Constitution mandates only that a census be taken every ten years toensure that congressional representation reflects the actual population of the states, the accuracy and method of the census is less important than the fact that the same methods are applied nationwide.
Significance
The ruling upheld the historic procedures used in taking the census, and strongly implied that the application of new methods would invite detrimental political gerrymandering of census results, even if these results might be moreaccurate. The Court also reaffirmed the authority of the Secretary of Commerce to decide the manner in which the census is taken.
An Early Constitutional Compromise
When the United States obtained its independence, debate raged regarding theexact form its government would take. That some form of representative democracy would be established was certain, but within that context there was disagreement between large and small states. Eventually a compromise was reached whereby the new government would comprise two legislative bodies: a Senate inwhich each state would be represented by two individuals; and a House of Representatives in which each state would be represented by a variable number ofindividuals based on population. In this way less populous states would be insured of wielding equal federal influence within the Senate, while more populous states would receive representation commensurate with their size in the House of Representatives. In order to ensure that this system would operate fairly and be able to adjust as the nation grew, the Constitution also providedthat the federal government would undertake a census every ten years for thepurpose of reapportioning seats in the House of Representatives among the states.
Census Procedures and Statistical and Demographic Advances
The manner in which the census is taken has changed relatively little, despite advances in the sciences of statistics and demographics. Various technologies have been employed to speed the gathering and analysis of census data, butthe system still relies on voluntary information and, in some cases, door-to-door canvassing by state authorities. Beginning with the 1970 census, demographic and statistical experts and federal census officials agreed that the traditional method of taking the census resulted in a population count that wastoo low. Many people either mistrusted census authorities or could see no reason to participate in the census, resulting in low counts for such populations.
Many suggestions were made to address this chronic undercount and make the census more accurate. One of the foremost among these was known as dual systemestimation (DSE), a method of census taking which combined sampling, estimation, and traditional census taking techniques to arrive at a more accurate result than traditional methods alone. To illustrate the methods a DSE census would employ, the Court made use of the following analogy:
The 1990 Census
Throughout the mid-1980s the Bureau of the Census conducted tests to determine the accuracy of post-enumeration surveys and DSE procedures. By 1987 the bureau had reached the conclusion that these new methods would improve the accuracy of the census, and recommended that they be employed for the 1990 census. Despite this recommendation the Secretary of Commerce announced in Octoberof 1987 that post-enumeration surveying and DSE procedures would not be usedin the upcoming census. The secretary believed that the statistical models tobe applied in a DSE census would be subject to manipulation for political gain. In response to this decision several states, including Wisconsin, broughtsuit in district court to force the secretary to employ post-enumeration surveys to DSE procedures correct and adjust the results of the 1990 census. Thesuit was put on hold, however, when the secretary agreed to reconsider his decision. In July of 1991 the secretary decided to abide by his original decision, and the district court once again considered Wisconsin's case.
How Accurate Must a Census Be?
Wisconsin's argument before the district court was that, by not making the census as accurate as possible, the secretary of commerce was denying politicalexpression to those individuals not counted. In the state's view, knowing that an undercount existed and doing nothing to correct it constituted a violation of the principle of "one person, one vote" that serves as the foundationof our political system. As such, the state moved to force the secretary to apply post-enumeration surveys and DSE procedures to adjust the most recent census figures. The district court was not swayed by this argument, however, and ruled that the secretary's conduct of the census was constitutionally appropriate. The case then proceeded to the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit. The court of appeals reversed the district court's decision, ruling that the actions of the secretary must come under heightened constitutional scrutiny given the central nature of the concept of one vote per individual to our polity. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case on certiorari after a dissenting court of appeals judge noted that his court's decision contradicted those made in several similar cases.
Distributive Accuracy Versus Actual Accuracy
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the decision of the court of appeals.Once again, the need for accuracy in the taking of the census was crucial tothe decision. Whereas the court of appeals ruled that a deliberate undercounteffectively deprived individuals of their right to vote, the Supreme Court held that the census was distinct from the electoral process. Writing for theCourt, Justice Rehnquist noted that the Constitution mandates that a census be taken every ten years, and that it be conducted by Congress "in such Manneras they shall by Law direct." Furthermore, the Court believed that the constitutional intent of the census was to insure the "distributive accuracy" of population counts among the states to determine their relative representationin Congress, as opposed to actual accuracy of population counts within each state. Since the same method was applied to each state, the known undercount would be nearly the same for each state and the distributive accuracy of the census would remain the same regardless of the method used. As such, the secretary's decision not to use post-enumeration surveys and DSE procedures was judged to be reasonable and to adhere to constitutional standards.
Impact
Wisconsin v. City of New York confirmed the power of the Secretary ofCommerce to determine the method of census taking. Also, by confirming the precedence of "distributive accuracy" over actual accuracy in the census, the Court implied that future secretaries of commerce would also be able to rejectstill more accurate statistical and demographic methods of census-taking.
Related Cases
State of Wisconsin
Respondent
City of New York, et al.
Petitioner's Claim
That the refusal of the U.S. Secretary of Commerce to use a post-enumerationsurvey statistical adjustment to correct the 1990 census represented a violation of the Census Clause of the Constitution.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Peter C. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Drew S. Days, III, U.S. Solicitor General
Justices for the Court
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor,William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens, Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
10 January 1996
Decision
Upheld the actions of the secretary of commerce, affirmed the holding of thedistrict court and reversed the decision of the court of appeals. Because Congress delegated authority for carrying out the census to the secretary, and since the Constitution mandates only that a census be taken every ten years toensure that congressional representation reflects the actual population of the states, the accuracy and method of the census is less important than the fact that the same methods are applied nationwide.
Significance
The ruling upheld the historic procedures used in taking the census, and strongly implied that the application of new methods would invite detrimental political gerrymandering of census results, even if these results might be moreaccurate. The Court also reaffirmed the authority of the Secretary of Commerce to decide the manner in which the census is taken.
An Early Constitutional Compromise
When the United States obtained its independence, debate raged regarding theexact form its government would take. That some form of representative democracy would be established was certain, but within that context there was disagreement between large and small states. Eventually a compromise was reached whereby the new government would comprise two legislative bodies: a Senate inwhich each state would be represented by two individuals; and a House of Representatives in which each state would be represented by a variable number ofindividuals based on population. In this way less populous states would be insured of wielding equal federal influence within the Senate, while more populous states would receive representation commensurate with their size in the House of Representatives. In order to ensure that this system would operate fairly and be able to adjust as the nation grew, the Constitution also providedthat the federal government would undertake a census every ten years for thepurpose of reapportioning seats in the House of Representatives among the states.
Census Procedures and Statistical and Demographic Advances
The manner in which the census is taken has changed relatively little, despite advances in the sciences of statistics and demographics. Various technologies have been employed to speed the gathering and analysis of census data, butthe system still relies on voluntary information and, in some cases, door-to-door canvassing by state authorities. Beginning with the 1970 census, demographic and statistical experts and federal census officials agreed that the traditional method of taking the census resulted in a population count that wastoo low. Many people either mistrusted census authorities or could see no reason to participate in the census, resulting in low counts for such populations.
Many suggestions were made to address this chronic undercount and make the census more accurate. One of the foremost among these was known as dual systemestimation (DSE), a method of census taking which combined sampling, estimation, and traditional census taking techniques to arrive at a more accurate result than traditional methods alone. To illustrate the methods a DSE census would employ, the Court made use of the following analogy:
Imaginethat one wanted to use DSE in order to determine the number of pumpkins in alarge pumpkin patch. First, one would choose a particular section of the patch as the representative subset to which the `recapture' phase will be applied. Let us assume here that it is a section exactly one-tenth the size of the entire patch that is selected. Then, at the next step--the `capture' stage--one would conduct a fairly quick count of the entire patch, making sure to record both the number of pumpkins counted in the entire patch and the number ofpumpkins counted in the entire section. Let us imagine that this stage results in a count of 10,000 pumpkins for the entire patch and 1,000 pumpkins for the selected section. Next, at the `recapture' stage, one would perform an exacting count of the number of pumpkins in the selected section. Let us assumethat we now count 1,100 pumpkins in this section. By comparing results of the`capture' phase and the results of the `recapture' phase for the selected section, it is possible to estimate that approximately 100 pumpkins actually inthe patch were missed for every 1,000 counted at the `capture' phase. Extrapolating this data to the count for the entire patch, one would conclude thatthe actual number of pumpkins in the patch is 11,000.It was widely believed that the use of a DSE count would greatly improve the accuracy of the census.
The 1990 Census
Throughout the mid-1980s the Bureau of the Census conducted tests to determine the accuracy of post-enumeration surveys and DSE procedures. By 1987 the bureau had reached the conclusion that these new methods would improve the accuracy of the census, and recommended that they be employed for the 1990 census. Despite this recommendation the Secretary of Commerce announced in Octoberof 1987 that post-enumeration surveying and DSE procedures would not be usedin the upcoming census. The secretary believed that the statistical models tobe applied in a DSE census would be subject to manipulation for political gain. In response to this decision several states, including Wisconsin, broughtsuit in district court to force the secretary to employ post-enumeration surveys to DSE procedures correct and adjust the results of the 1990 census. Thesuit was put on hold, however, when the secretary agreed to reconsider his decision. In July of 1991 the secretary decided to abide by his original decision, and the district court once again considered Wisconsin's case.
How Accurate Must a Census Be?
Wisconsin's argument before the district court was that, by not making the census as accurate as possible, the secretary of commerce was denying politicalexpression to those individuals not counted. In the state's view, knowing that an undercount existed and doing nothing to correct it constituted a violation of the principle of "one person, one vote" that serves as the foundationof our political system. As such, the state moved to force the secretary to apply post-enumeration surveys and DSE procedures to adjust the most recent census figures. The district court was not swayed by this argument, however, and ruled that the secretary's conduct of the census was constitutionally appropriate. The case then proceeded to the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit. The court of appeals reversed the district court's decision, ruling that the actions of the secretary must come under heightened constitutional scrutiny given the central nature of the concept of one vote per individual to our polity. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case on certiorari after a dissenting court of appeals judge noted that his court's decision contradicted those made in several similar cases.
Distributive Accuracy Versus Actual Accuracy
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the decision of the court of appeals.Once again, the need for accuracy in the taking of the census was crucial tothe decision. Whereas the court of appeals ruled that a deliberate undercounteffectively deprived individuals of their right to vote, the Supreme Court held that the census was distinct from the electoral process. Writing for theCourt, Justice Rehnquist noted that the Constitution mandates that a census be taken every ten years, and that it be conducted by Congress "in such Manneras they shall by Law direct." Furthermore, the Court believed that the constitutional intent of the census was to insure the "distributive accuracy" of population counts among the states to determine their relative representationin Congress, as opposed to actual accuracy of population counts within each state. Since the same method was applied to each state, the known undercount would be nearly the same for each state and the distributive accuracy of the census would remain the same regardless of the method used. As such, the secretary's decision not to use post-enumeration surveys and DSE procedures was judged to be reasonable and to adhere to constitutional standards.
Impact
Wisconsin v. City of New York confirmed the power of the Secretary ofCommerce to determine the method of census taking. Also, by confirming the precedence of "distributive accuracy" over actual accuracy in the census, the Court implied that future secretaries of commerce would also be able to rejectstill more accurate statistical and demographic methods of census-taking.
Related Cases
- Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
- Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
- Department of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442 (1992).
- Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992).
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