Wilson v. Arkansas

Petitioner
Sharlene Wilson
Respondent
State of Arkansas
Petitioner's Claim
That failure of the police to knock and announce their presence prior to a warranted search rendered their entry into her house unconstitutional under theFourth Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
John Wesley Hall, Jr.
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Kent C. Holt, Arkansas Assistant Attorney General
Justices for the Court
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor,William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens, Clarence Thomas (writing for the Court)
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
22 May 1995
Decision
Reversed the decision of the Arkansas State Supreme Court and remanded the case for reconsideration by the trial court, holding that police in possessionof a search warrant are justified in entering a person's house without knocking at the door and announcing their presence only in cases where they may beput in danger or stand to lose evidence by doing so.
Significance
The ruling reverses a tendency of the Court in to allow law enforcement authorities great latitude for action within Fourth Amendment guidelines. While recognizing this, it is significant that the Court remanded this case to the trial court for reconsideration under its ruling rather than reversing the lower court's decision altogether.
Set Up
Arkansas police were operating undercover in pursuit of Sharlene Wilson during the fall of 1992. During November and December of that year undercover officers made a series of narcotics purchases from Wilson, culminating in a potentially violent marijuana buy on 30 December. At this last meeting, Wilson told the informant that she suspected her of working with the police, and produced a semiautomatic pistol and threatened to kill her if her suspicions turnedout to be correct. Judging from this incident that they should proceed withtheir operation before their informant was discovered, the Arkansas State Police applied for and obtained warrants to search Wilson's house the followingday. Wilson lived with another person, Bryson Jacobs, and police noted in their warrant applications that Jacobs had prior convictions for arson and firebombing.
Police officers then proceeded to Wilson and Jacobs' house, finding the frontdoor open and an unlocked screen door closed when they arrived. As they opened the screen door and entered the house, the officers announced themselves and informed the occupants that they possessed search warrants. Officers quickly discovered a quantity of narcotics, including marijuana, methamphetamine,and valium in the house, as well as drug paraphernalia, a gun, and ammunition. They also found Wilson and arrested her in the bathroom as she attempted toflush a quantity of marijuana down the toilet. Jacobs was also taken into custody during the raid.
A Fourth Amendment Violation?
Prior to her trial on narcotics trafficking charges, Wilson filed a motion tosuppress evidence seized by police in their raid on her home. She claimed that the failure of the police to knock on her door and announce their presenceand intentions before entering her home violated her Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable search and seizure. The trial court denied her motionand Wilson was found guilty of all charges against her and sentenced to 32 years in prison. Following her conviction, Wilson appealed the case to the Arkansas Supreme Court, which upheld the trial court's ruling. The state supremecourt could find "no authority for [the] theory that the knock and announce principle is required by the Fourth Amendment." Wilson then appealed her caseto the U.S. Supreme Court, which heard arguments in the matter on 28 March 1995.
Common Law
In examining the petitioner's claim, the Supreme Court was forced to look beyond the Fourth Amendment, which does not mention any requirement for government authorities to identify themselves when making a reasonable search. In this case, the search was reasonable without question since the police had obtained warrants before proceeding. Therefore, the Court was obliged to seek itsanswer in the English common law, recognized as the foundation upon which U.S. law has been built.
When the United States secured its independence from Britain, the individualstates and the union itself were faced with the task of devising their own legal systems. As a practical expedient, the original states decided to retainEnglish common law until their legislatures saw fit to amend it. The languageused by the New York legislature is typical: "such parts of the common law of England as did form the law [New York prior to the Revolution] shall be andcontinue the law of this State, subject to such alterations and provisions as the legislature of this State shall, from time to time, make concerning thesame." In fact, the Court had recognized the standing of common law within American courts in many cases, including Miller v. United States, (1958).
Although the Fourth Amendment does not mention any requirement for authorities to knock and announce themselves before entering a suspect's home, Englishcommon law certainly does. One of its cornerstone principles is that "a man'shome is his castle," within which the individual is a kind of monarch. As stated in Blackstone's Commentaries, although the authorities may even break down a suspect's door to enter his house if he does not answer or refuses to submit to a search, they must knock and announce themselves first. "Butbefore he [the authorities] breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make request to open doors." In effect, common law gives the suspect the chance to willingly submit to a search before the authorities are legally able to direct action to conduct it.
Mitigating Circumstances
Given the position of common law on the subject of knocking and announcing before entering, the Court was forced to reverse the decisions of the trial court and state supreme courts. Despite taking this step, the Court did not completely overturn the rulings of the lower courts, remanding the case instead for reconsideration in light of its finding. The Court also added that, although the petitioner had successfully advanced her case for the need for policeto knock and identify themselves before entering a suspect's house generally,situations could arise where this procedure could be skipped. Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas noted that common law was less clear with regard to whether or not authorities must knock and announce their intentions beforeentering the house of a felon: "Although there has been some doubt on the question, the better opinion seems to be that, in cases of felony, no demand ofadmittance is necessary, especially as, in many cases, the delay incident toit would enable the prisoner to escape." Indeed, the state of Arkansas had argued in this case that because of Jacobs's convictions for arson and firebombing, the police felt that announcing themselves prior to entering the house would have placed them, and the evidence within the house, in jeopardy.
Impact
Wilson v. Arkansas confirmed the common law requirement for authorities to knock and announce themselves before conducting a warranted search. Theruling was less than ironclad, however, as the Court specified that the knockand announce requirement could be ignored in cases where police officers' lives or evidence would be endangered by giving suspects advance notice of thearrival of the authorities. In the final analysis, its chief impact was to clarify the circumstances under which knock and announce requirements could beignored by authorities.
Related Cases

• Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
  
• Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
  
• Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968).
  
• Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997).