Appellant
Alan Karcher, Speaker, New Jersey Assembly
Appellees
Daggett, et al.
Appellant's Claim
Gerrymandering by the controlling Democratic Party of the New Jersey legislature did not violate the U.S. Constitution because it relied on "good faith" criteria for legislative redistricting and protected minority voting rights.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Kenneth J. Guido, Jr.
Chief Lawyer for Appellees
Bernard Hellring
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr. (writing for the Court), ThurgoodMarshall, Sandra Day O'Connor, John Paul Stevens
Justices Dissenting
Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C
Date of Decision
22 June 1983
Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court which found the re-districting plan to be unfairly biased in favor of the outgoing political party (then controlling) the New Jersey Legislature.
Significance
In striking down a reapportionment plan enacted into law by the state of NewJersey, the U.S. Supreme Court expressed their support of apportionment of voters into voting districts by a standard that required districts that were "as nearly as practicable" close to numerical equality. That standard, as in previous rulings, deliberately did not set absolute numerical standards which states could use in reapportioning districts. Of equal, or perhaps greater import, this decision did not recognize as valid preservation of racial or ethnic minority voting districts as reasonable justification for a state deviatingfrom numerical equality among voting districts.
According to the 1980 census results, the clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives informed New Jersey's governor that the number of seats to which thestate was entitled had changed from 15 to 14. Amid much haggling and disagreement by both parties, the president pro tem of the New Jersey State Senate, Senator Feldman, drafted a 14-district plan (the Feldman Plan) which was finally passed by the state legislature and signed into law by the governorin January of 1982. The plan had used 1980 census figures as a basis for thenew reapportionment of New Jersey congressional districts. According to thatcensus, the state had just over 7.3 million voters; the ideal voter population per district should have been 526,059. However, the Feldman Plan, as drafted, did not achieve ideal-sized districts. There was an average deviation among them of 0.1384 percent, and maximum disparity of 0.6984 percent. (Interpreted as a population figure, the maximum deviation was 3,574 voters.)
The standards of equal representation alluded to in articles one and two of the Constitution provided that congressional districts should be "as nearly aspracticable" of equal size. However, "as nearly as practicable" did not assume any fixed figure; thus every deviation, no matter how small, was open to challenge as not being equitable. As soon as the plan was enacted, people of varying interests joined with all elected Republican congressmen from New Jersey to challenge the plan (Senator Feldman's constituency was Democrat). Theystated that the plan was contrary to the requirements of articles one and twoof the U.S. Constitution and that the plan should not be used for the election of the members of Congress to the U.S. House of Representatives.
According to precedent set in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler (1969) and White v. Weiser (1973), appellees were required to prove that the variations in population equality avoided a "good-faith" effort to achieve the smallest possible deviation in apportioning districts, and appellants (the state ofNew Jersey) had to prove that deviations were required to achieve some legitimate state objective. However, although New Jersey argued that districts wereapportioned to protect racial minorities, the district court held that the state of New Jersey failed to prove that deviations necessarily preserved thevoting strength of minorities. The Feldman Plan was thus adjudged unconstitutional.
In debating the case for the state of New Jersey, the appellants' counsel explained that that the state legislature's rationale in selecting the Feldman Plan was that it tried to achieve "numerical equality" by keeping numerical disparity between districts as close to zero as possible. However, counsel pointed out, other criteria were taken into consideration such as preventing dilution of minority (African American) voting strength and preserving existing voting district boundaries. Even though the standard deviation for error for the New Jersey census was not yet available, the legislature used the best available data by comparing the standard deviation error in the federal census (which was 2.3 percent). Thus, since the maximum disparity between district populations was 0.6984 percent in the Feldman Plan, the state felt their reapportionment scheme was valid. The attorney for the appellants suggested that inrendering its decision, the district court had not given consideration to other justifiable standards such as preservation of the minority voting rightsby failing to understand that the Feldman Plan would "protect interest(s) ofAfrican American voters in the Trenton and Camden areas." Furthermore, counsel concluded, that because the Supreme Court's decision in Kirkpatrickrejected setting of fixed, numerical reapportionment criteria, the state didnot have a benchmark by which to determine appropriate variation in voting district size.
Conversely, the appellees' attorney argued that at the time when the FeldmanPlan was enacted, several other competing plans were rejected which would have provided considerably lower population disparity between districts. Moreover, the New Jersey legislature did not offer proof of a "good faith" effort byfailing to consider plans with lower maximum population differences betweenvoting districts. The appellees' counsel summarily characterized the state'sreapportionment scheme as being a "typical sample of gerrymandering" by a political party to utilize legal or political resources to their benefit.
No Rationale For Deviation Found
In rendering a decision on appeal, the majority Supreme Court justices soughtto affirm the standard set in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler (1969) and White v. Weiser (1973). In Kirkpatrick, the Court refused to set afixed figure regarding population deviation of reapportioned districts (ostensibly to take into account considerations such factors as maintaining votingdemographics, geography, and to protect the rights of voting minorities). Some deviation was permissible if a state showed that such divergence was necessary to achieve a legitimate objective such as keeping municipal boundaries untouched or maintaining a political environment in which political parties could freely operate. However, although appellants argued that the deviation inthe Feldman Plan was below 0.7 percent and was a reasonable, de minimus solution (acceptable minimum deviation), majority justices did not agree. The Court pointed out that in Kirkpatrick it had also held that that any deviation, no matter how small, required rationale which could be judicially justified. Because the state had failed to sufficiently convince the Courtthat its rationale was justifiable, the justices found no cause to support the appellants' claim.
Feldman Plan Found Flawed
The justices felt appellants failed to consider a possible error in the 1980census and appropriately compensate for a possible undercount of voters in the state. Citing expert evidence of a Princeton University demographer that was presented by appellees (as well as several published studies regarding undercounts in the 1950, 1960, and 1970 censuses), the Court found the Feldman Plan flawed. As such, the justices felt deviations in the Feldman Plan could have been averted or substantially reduced. Like the district court, the Supreme Court took exception the state's failure to consider other plans that reapportioned voting districts with a lower standard maximum deviation. Thus, theCourt affirmed the ruling of the lower court on the grounds that the state failed to show good-faith and offer an acceptable explanation for the difference in population number per congressional district.
Justice Stevens delivered a separate concurring opinion. (The U.S. Supreme Court was divided and Justice Stevens had the decisive vote.) As he understoodthe appellees argument, "district boundaries were unconstitutional because they were product of political gerrymandering." Thus he believed the appellees'claim that the state's apportionment plan had "firmer roots in the Constitution than those provided by Article I, 2".
Stevens pointed out that articles one and two only provided that "representatives should be apportioned among several states," since there were no specific guidelines on how congressional districts in a state should be composed. Instead, Stevens found the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendmentmore applicable in rendering his decision. He maintained a state's power to define groups of voters was in no way constitutionally limited. Thus, Stevensfound no merit in the state's claim that disparity between districts should protect minority voting districts reasoning that, "If they serve no purpose other than to favor one segment--whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic, or political--that may occupy a position of strength at a particular point intime, or to disadvantage a politically weak segment of the community, they violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection."
Stevens observed that an absolute numerical population equality was impossible because of population shifts, mortality, errors in the census, and other justifiable reasons. Nonetheless, in Stevens's opinion, the population equalitystandard was reasonable because it could be "judicially manageable," easy tounderstand, and the figures were readily obtained from the census.
Moreover, Stevens believed that the Equal Protection Clause did not extend its protection only to a certain class of citizens and reasoned it was particularly worthy to consider that "its protection against vote dilution cannot beconfined to racial groups." Further since that clause proscribed racial gerrymandering it was reasonable to assume its protection extended to "other cognizable groups of voters as well." He further believed that there was no need to "create a need" to protect against political gerrymandering just because agroup of voters shared "common ethnic, racial, or religious background." Thus, while Stevens's rationale diverged from the majority opinion, he nonetheless chose to join in their decision to affirm the ruling of the District Courtthat the Feldman Plan represented a gross constitutional violation.
Minority Opinion
Justice White delivered the dissenting opinion. The minority justices held fast to the belief that any legislative apportionment should promote and provide fair, nondiscriminatory voting districts for all citizens which was the intent of the Feldman Plan. The dispute at issue then, according to the minorityjustices, was the maximum standard population deviation among voting districts in the state of New Jersey. The justices felt that the Feldman Plan, witha deviation of less than 0.7 percent, provided "fair and effective representation." The justices pointed out that the margin of estimated error in the 1970 (federal) census was 2.3 percent, substantially higher than deviation in New Jersey's reapportionment plan. Moreover, the undercount in New Jersey was not yet known; therefore, the justices believed that, as in the past, it was reasonable to believe that the 1980 undercount would not have been substantially different than the federal government's undercount (a factor on which, inpart, the state of New Jersey's reapportionment plan was based). Simply, theminority believed deviation in the Feldman Plan was "statistically insignificant." Moreover, Justice White observed that since the Court refused to set anumerical standard below which judicial intervention would not be required, "the courts should give a greater weight to the importance of the state's interest and the consistency with which those interests are served than to the size of the deviation."
Justice Powell delivered a separate dissenting opinion. He shared the minority opinion that New Jersey's reapportionment deviation "was neither `appreciable' nor constitutionally significant." Powell also believed the requirement of respecting municipal boundaries was adhered to in the Feldman Plan. Divergence from constitutional "theoretical exactitude" was permissible because themaximum standard deviation of 0.6984 percent met constitutional requirementsrequiring population be equality apportioned among districts.
Impact
The U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Feldman plan even though the population difference per district was rather small (less than .7 percent). The justices held consistent to previous rulings in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler (1969) and White v. Weiser (1973) by adhering to a standard which gave noexact, numerical guidance regarding the maximum allowable standard deviationbetween voting districts. However, they did insist that the state of New Jersey, by not considering and adopting other reapportionment plans of lesser deviation, violated constitutional limits which required voting districts that were "as nearly as practicable" close to numerical equality. (There was only adifference of .245 percent between the Feldman Plan and competing schemes.)
Equally important, the Court's ruling failed to recognize as valid the stateof New Jersey legislature's design to create districts in which the voting power of racial minorities was preserved. While Justice Stevens was alone in forwarding the idea that New Jersey had "created" rather than preserved the necessity of protecting minority voters against political gerrymandering, the majority opinion tacitly failed to consider protection of voting constituenciesbased on racial or ethnic considerations. Thus, in rendering this decision,the U.S. Supreme Court moved toward less rigorous and vigorous support of minority and equal protection rights by the judiciary, a trend which continued to the end of the century.
Related Cases
Alan Karcher, Speaker, New Jersey Assembly
Appellees
Daggett, et al.
Appellant's Claim
Gerrymandering by the controlling Democratic Party of the New Jersey legislature did not violate the U.S. Constitution because it relied on "good faith" criteria for legislative redistricting and protected minority voting rights.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Kenneth J. Guido, Jr.
Chief Lawyer for Appellees
Bernard Hellring
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr. (writing for the Court), ThurgoodMarshall, Sandra Day O'Connor, John Paul Stevens
Justices Dissenting
Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C
Date of Decision
22 June 1983
Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court which found the re-districting plan to be unfairly biased in favor of the outgoing political party (then controlling) the New Jersey Legislature.
Significance
In striking down a reapportionment plan enacted into law by the state of NewJersey, the U.S. Supreme Court expressed their support of apportionment of voters into voting districts by a standard that required districts that were "as nearly as practicable" close to numerical equality. That standard, as in previous rulings, deliberately did not set absolute numerical standards which states could use in reapportioning districts. Of equal, or perhaps greater import, this decision did not recognize as valid preservation of racial or ethnic minority voting districts as reasonable justification for a state deviatingfrom numerical equality among voting districts.
According to the 1980 census results, the clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives informed New Jersey's governor that the number of seats to which thestate was entitled had changed from 15 to 14. Amid much haggling and disagreement by both parties, the president pro tem of the New Jersey State Senate, Senator Feldman, drafted a 14-district plan (the Feldman Plan) which was finally passed by the state legislature and signed into law by the governorin January of 1982. The plan had used 1980 census figures as a basis for thenew reapportionment of New Jersey congressional districts. According to thatcensus, the state had just over 7.3 million voters; the ideal voter population per district should have been 526,059. However, the Feldman Plan, as drafted, did not achieve ideal-sized districts. There was an average deviation among them of 0.1384 percent, and maximum disparity of 0.6984 percent. (Interpreted as a population figure, the maximum deviation was 3,574 voters.)
The standards of equal representation alluded to in articles one and two of the Constitution provided that congressional districts should be "as nearly aspracticable" of equal size. However, "as nearly as practicable" did not assume any fixed figure; thus every deviation, no matter how small, was open to challenge as not being equitable. As soon as the plan was enacted, people of varying interests joined with all elected Republican congressmen from New Jersey to challenge the plan (Senator Feldman's constituency was Democrat). Theystated that the plan was contrary to the requirements of articles one and twoof the U.S. Constitution and that the plan should not be used for the election of the members of Congress to the U.S. House of Representatives.
According to precedent set in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler (1969) and White v. Weiser (1973), appellees were required to prove that the variations in population equality avoided a "good-faith" effort to achieve the smallest possible deviation in apportioning districts, and appellants (the state ofNew Jersey) had to prove that deviations were required to achieve some legitimate state objective. However, although New Jersey argued that districts wereapportioned to protect racial minorities, the district court held that the state of New Jersey failed to prove that deviations necessarily preserved thevoting strength of minorities. The Feldman Plan was thus adjudged unconstitutional.
In debating the case for the state of New Jersey, the appellants' counsel explained that that the state legislature's rationale in selecting the Feldman Plan was that it tried to achieve "numerical equality" by keeping numerical disparity between districts as close to zero as possible. However, counsel pointed out, other criteria were taken into consideration such as preventing dilution of minority (African American) voting strength and preserving existing voting district boundaries. Even though the standard deviation for error for the New Jersey census was not yet available, the legislature used the best available data by comparing the standard deviation error in the federal census (which was 2.3 percent). Thus, since the maximum disparity between district populations was 0.6984 percent in the Feldman Plan, the state felt their reapportionment scheme was valid. The attorney for the appellants suggested that inrendering its decision, the district court had not given consideration to other justifiable standards such as preservation of the minority voting rightsby failing to understand that the Feldman Plan would "protect interest(s) ofAfrican American voters in the Trenton and Camden areas." Furthermore, counsel concluded, that because the Supreme Court's decision in Kirkpatrickrejected setting of fixed, numerical reapportionment criteria, the state didnot have a benchmark by which to determine appropriate variation in voting district size.
Conversely, the appellees' attorney argued that at the time when the FeldmanPlan was enacted, several other competing plans were rejected which would have provided considerably lower population disparity between districts. Moreover, the New Jersey legislature did not offer proof of a "good faith" effort byfailing to consider plans with lower maximum population differences betweenvoting districts. The appellees' counsel summarily characterized the state'sreapportionment scheme as being a "typical sample of gerrymandering" by a political party to utilize legal or political resources to their benefit.
No Rationale For Deviation Found
In rendering a decision on appeal, the majority Supreme Court justices soughtto affirm the standard set in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler (1969) and White v. Weiser (1973). In Kirkpatrick, the Court refused to set afixed figure regarding population deviation of reapportioned districts (ostensibly to take into account considerations such factors as maintaining votingdemographics, geography, and to protect the rights of voting minorities). Some deviation was permissible if a state showed that such divergence was necessary to achieve a legitimate objective such as keeping municipal boundaries untouched or maintaining a political environment in which political parties could freely operate. However, although appellants argued that the deviation inthe Feldman Plan was below 0.7 percent and was a reasonable, de minimus solution (acceptable minimum deviation), majority justices did not agree. The Court pointed out that in Kirkpatrick it had also held that that any deviation, no matter how small, required rationale which could be judicially justified. Because the state had failed to sufficiently convince the Courtthat its rationale was justifiable, the justices found no cause to support the appellants' claim.
Feldman Plan Found Flawed
The justices felt appellants failed to consider a possible error in the 1980census and appropriately compensate for a possible undercount of voters in the state. Citing expert evidence of a Princeton University demographer that was presented by appellees (as well as several published studies regarding undercounts in the 1950, 1960, and 1970 censuses), the Court found the Feldman Plan flawed. As such, the justices felt deviations in the Feldman Plan could have been averted or substantially reduced. Like the district court, the Supreme Court took exception the state's failure to consider other plans that reapportioned voting districts with a lower standard maximum deviation. Thus, theCourt affirmed the ruling of the lower court on the grounds that the state failed to show good-faith and offer an acceptable explanation for the difference in population number per congressional district.
Justice Stevens delivered a separate concurring opinion. (The U.S. Supreme Court was divided and Justice Stevens had the decisive vote.) As he understoodthe appellees argument, "district boundaries were unconstitutional because they were product of political gerrymandering." Thus he believed the appellees'claim that the state's apportionment plan had "firmer roots in the Constitution than those provided by Article I, 2".
Stevens pointed out that articles one and two only provided that "representatives should be apportioned among several states," since there were no specific guidelines on how congressional districts in a state should be composed. Instead, Stevens found the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendmentmore applicable in rendering his decision. He maintained a state's power to define groups of voters was in no way constitutionally limited. Thus, Stevensfound no merit in the state's claim that disparity between districts should protect minority voting districts reasoning that, "If they serve no purpose other than to favor one segment--whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic, or political--that may occupy a position of strength at a particular point intime, or to disadvantage a politically weak segment of the community, they violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection."
Stevens observed that an absolute numerical population equality was impossible because of population shifts, mortality, errors in the census, and other justifiable reasons. Nonetheless, in Stevens's opinion, the population equalitystandard was reasonable because it could be "judicially manageable," easy tounderstand, and the figures were readily obtained from the census.
Moreover, Stevens believed that the Equal Protection Clause did not extend its protection only to a certain class of citizens and reasoned it was particularly worthy to consider that "its protection against vote dilution cannot beconfined to racial groups." Further since that clause proscribed racial gerrymandering it was reasonable to assume its protection extended to "other cognizable groups of voters as well." He further believed that there was no need to "create a need" to protect against political gerrymandering just because agroup of voters shared "common ethnic, racial, or religious background." Thus, while Stevens's rationale diverged from the majority opinion, he nonetheless chose to join in their decision to affirm the ruling of the District Courtthat the Feldman Plan represented a gross constitutional violation.
Minority Opinion
Justice White delivered the dissenting opinion. The minority justices held fast to the belief that any legislative apportionment should promote and provide fair, nondiscriminatory voting districts for all citizens which was the intent of the Feldman Plan. The dispute at issue then, according to the minorityjustices, was the maximum standard population deviation among voting districts in the state of New Jersey. The justices felt that the Feldman Plan, witha deviation of less than 0.7 percent, provided "fair and effective representation." The justices pointed out that the margin of estimated error in the 1970 (federal) census was 2.3 percent, substantially higher than deviation in New Jersey's reapportionment plan. Moreover, the undercount in New Jersey was not yet known; therefore, the justices believed that, as in the past, it was reasonable to believe that the 1980 undercount would not have been substantially different than the federal government's undercount (a factor on which, inpart, the state of New Jersey's reapportionment plan was based). Simply, theminority believed deviation in the Feldman Plan was "statistically insignificant." Moreover, Justice White observed that since the Court refused to set anumerical standard below which judicial intervention would not be required, "the courts should give a greater weight to the importance of the state's interest and the consistency with which those interests are served than to the size of the deviation."
Justice Powell delivered a separate dissenting opinion. He shared the minority opinion that New Jersey's reapportionment deviation "was neither `appreciable' nor constitutionally significant." Powell also believed the requirement of respecting municipal boundaries was adhered to in the Feldman Plan. Divergence from constitutional "theoretical exactitude" was permissible because themaximum standard deviation of 0.6984 percent met constitutional requirementsrequiring population be equality apportioned among districts.
Impact
The U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Feldman plan even though the population difference per district was rather small (less than .7 percent). The justices held consistent to previous rulings in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler (1969) and White v. Weiser (1973) by adhering to a standard which gave noexact, numerical guidance regarding the maximum allowable standard deviationbetween voting districts. However, they did insist that the state of New Jersey, by not considering and adopting other reapportionment plans of lesser deviation, violated constitutional limits which required voting districts that were "as nearly as practicable" close to numerical equality. (There was only adifference of .245 percent between the Feldman Plan and competing schemes.)
Equally important, the Court's ruling failed to recognize as valid the stateof New Jersey legislature's design to create districts in which the voting power of racial minorities was preserved. While Justice Stevens was alone in forwarding the idea that New Jersey had "created" rather than preserved the necessity of protecting minority voters against political gerrymandering, the majority opinion tacitly failed to consider protection of voting constituenciesbased on racial or ethnic considerations. Thus, in rendering this decision,the U.S. Supreme Court moved toward less rigorous and vigorous support of minority and equal protection rights by the judiciary, a trend which continued to the end of the century.
Related Cases
- Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
- Wesberry v. Sanders, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
- Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
- Giffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
- White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973).
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