Appellants
Mahan, Secretary, Virginia State Board of Elections, and others
Appellees
Henry E. Howell, Jr., Clive L. DuVal II, City of Norfolk, and others
Appellants' Claim
The district court had invalidated the Virginia General Assembly's plan for redistricting in state elections and had substituted an unfair plan of its own.
Chief Lawyer for Appellees
Andrew P. Miller, Attorney General of Virginia
Chief Lawyers for Appellants
Henry E. Howell, Jr., and Clive L. DuVal II, arguing for themselves
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
21 February 1973
Decision
That the Virginia General Assembly's plan was constitutional and should be upheld, except for its handling of 36,700 people who were "home-ported" at theU.S. Naval Station at Norfolk; in that case, the Court approved the districtcourt's revision of the state plan.
Significance
Electoral districts were supposed to be as equal in population as possible. But Mahan v. Howell established two qualifications to that principle: that states could be more flexible in creating state legislative districts than in creating U.S. congressional districts, and that preserving such existingpolitical units as counties and cities was a valid consideration in drawingstate electoral districts.
"One person, one vote"--that principle is one of the basic slogans of U.S. democracy. It is also one of the reasons that electoral districts are constantly being redrawn. An electoral district is the unit within which a person votes. To elect U.S. Representatives, a person votes in a congressional district.To elect members of the state legislature, a person votes in a legislative district. Ideally, each type of electoral district has the same number of people in it.
In the 1960s, civil rights leaders claimed that African Americans were crowded into big electoral districts, while white Americans were divided up into smaller districts. As a result, white people had the chance to elect more thantheir fair share of representatives to state and national office. Many stateswere ordered to re-draw their electoral districts in order to make them morefair.
What Is the Percentage?
In 1971, Virginia revised its state constitution. At the same time, it reapportioned the electoral districts for its House of Delegates and its state senate. Almost immediately, two suits were brought against the Virginia plan. Henry E. Howell, Jr. and Clive L. DuVal II charged that the variation in population between House of Delegates districts in the new plan was just too large.They also charged that the particular way that the districts were divided was"racial gerrymandering." Howell and DuVal were claiming that the legislaturehad drawn its electoral districts so as to give white people more than theirfair share of voting strength, at the expense of African American voters.
Howell and DuVal took their case to the district court, which agreed with them. The district court found that under the state plan, there was as much as a16.4 percent difference between the smallest and the biggest delegates district--far too great a variation to be truly fair to all voters. DuVal argued that actually, the difference was even greater, as much as 23.6 percent. Either way, the district court objected to the state plan, and it substituted a plan of its own.
Home-Port or Home Address?
At the same time, another suit was brought against the way the state senate districting had been done. The city of Norfolk had been split into three districts, with all African American voters isolated in one district, and all U.SNavy personnel assigned to another. In fact, U.S Navy personnel did not liveonly in the district to which they had been assigned. Their ships were dockedin that district--their "home port"--but their actual residences were elsewhere. Thus, claimed the suit, the way the districts had been drawn was unfairto both African Americans and to U.S. Navy personnel.
When the district court overturned the state's plan, the state appealed to the Supreme Court. In a 5-3 decision, the Court approved the state's original plan, except for the part relating to Norfolk. The Supreme Court agreed with the district court.
Flexibility and Local Control
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, explained that two principles had guided the decision. First, the Court believed that in drawing districts for state legislatures, "more flexibility is permissible than with respect to congressional redistricting." By those standards, Rehnquist wrote, the 16.4 percent variation from the smallest district to the largest "may well approachtolerable limits," but it did not exceed them.
Second, the state had been justified in "preserving the integrity of political subdivision lines," such as counties and cities. In other words, if two cities were located side by side, the state would be justified in making each city its own electoral district, even if one were slightly larger than the other. That way, the Court explained, each city's residents could elect representatives that would advance their own city's interest when the state legislature came to deal with local issues.
However, Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall strongly disagreed. They thought that the state's redistricting plan had indeed been unfair, and they believed the district court had been right to make a new plan.
Equality of Representation
Justice Brennan, writing for the minority, said the Court had had no basis for dismissing out of hand DuVal's contention that the gap between the smallestand the largest district was actually 23.6 percent. If DuVal was right, thatwould make the gap in Virginia almost as large as the 26.48 percent gap in another case--and the Court had found that gap too large.
Second, Brennan said, the Court was wrong to claim that there were two separate standards, one for congressional districts, the other for state legislatures. Perhaps a state might need to use different procedures to figure out howto create legislative districts, but that was far from saying that the two types of districts had different standards.
Finally, Brennan said, the Court was wrong to give so much weight to preserving existing political subdivisions. The most important criterion in drawing electoral districts was to make them as nearly equal in size as possible, so that every person's vote would count equally. Besides, Brennan said, the burden of proof in showing the importance of existing political subdivisions was on the state--and the state had failed to meet that burden. Brennan pointed out that even under the state's plan, many voters from small towns would be lumped into districts with larger towns. He failed to see the difference betweenthat situation and one in which a town was broken up into two districts. Headded two more objections:
Clearly, the Court was divided on the question of whether the state redistricting plan did indeed violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This type of argument--local control versus civil rights--would continue in various forms and in various locations for the next several decades.
Related Cases
Gerrymandering
Gerrymandering refers to a state legislature's ability to re-establish boundaries of election precincts in ways that give one political party or group ofpeople some advantage over another. It may include redrawing districts to exclude groups who do not support the dominant party in office at the time of redistricting.
The term was coined by Benjamin Russell, a newspaper editor in 1812. During Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry's second term in office, the state legislature reapportioned the voting districts giving the Democratic-Republicans an edge in the state elections of senators. One new district was oddly shapedand spread out. An artist used the shape of the district to create a joke, adding " . . . wings, claws, and teeth to its outline, prompting the suggestionthat it resembled a salamander." Russell gave it the name Gerrymander, thereby connecting the newly coined word to the governor.
This practice creating oddly shaped voting districts to provide one group with an advantage in an election over another may be challenged constitutionally, according to the U.S. Supreme Court. This applies even when voting districts are designed to provide an advantage to minority voters, as set down in Shaw v. Reno (1993).
Sources
Grolier Electronic Publishing, Inc., 1995.
Mahan, Secretary, Virginia State Board of Elections, and others
Appellees
Henry E. Howell, Jr., Clive L. DuVal II, City of Norfolk, and others
Appellants' Claim
The district court had invalidated the Virginia General Assembly's plan for redistricting in state elections and had substituted an unfair plan of its own.
Chief Lawyer for Appellees
Andrew P. Miller, Attorney General of Virginia
Chief Lawyers for Appellants
Henry E. Howell, Jr., and Clive L. DuVal II, arguing for themselves
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
21 February 1973
Decision
That the Virginia General Assembly's plan was constitutional and should be upheld, except for its handling of 36,700 people who were "home-ported" at theU.S. Naval Station at Norfolk; in that case, the Court approved the districtcourt's revision of the state plan.
Significance
Electoral districts were supposed to be as equal in population as possible. But Mahan v. Howell established two qualifications to that principle: that states could be more flexible in creating state legislative districts than in creating U.S. congressional districts, and that preserving such existingpolitical units as counties and cities was a valid consideration in drawingstate electoral districts.
"One person, one vote"--that principle is one of the basic slogans of U.S. democracy. It is also one of the reasons that electoral districts are constantly being redrawn. An electoral district is the unit within which a person votes. To elect U.S. Representatives, a person votes in a congressional district.To elect members of the state legislature, a person votes in a legislative district. Ideally, each type of electoral district has the same number of people in it.
In the 1960s, civil rights leaders claimed that African Americans were crowded into big electoral districts, while white Americans were divided up into smaller districts. As a result, white people had the chance to elect more thantheir fair share of representatives to state and national office. Many stateswere ordered to re-draw their electoral districts in order to make them morefair.
What Is the Percentage?
In 1971, Virginia revised its state constitution. At the same time, it reapportioned the electoral districts for its House of Delegates and its state senate. Almost immediately, two suits were brought against the Virginia plan. Henry E. Howell, Jr. and Clive L. DuVal II charged that the variation in population between House of Delegates districts in the new plan was just too large.They also charged that the particular way that the districts were divided was"racial gerrymandering." Howell and DuVal were claiming that the legislaturehad drawn its electoral districts so as to give white people more than theirfair share of voting strength, at the expense of African American voters.
Howell and DuVal took their case to the district court, which agreed with them. The district court found that under the state plan, there was as much as a16.4 percent difference between the smallest and the biggest delegates district--far too great a variation to be truly fair to all voters. DuVal argued that actually, the difference was even greater, as much as 23.6 percent. Either way, the district court objected to the state plan, and it substituted a plan of its own.
Home-Port or Home Address?
At the same time, another suit was brought against the way the state senate districting had been done. The city of Norfolk had been split into three districts, with all African American voters isolated in one district, and all U.SNavy personnel assigned to another. In fact, U.S Navy personnel did not liveonly in the district to which they had been assigned. Their ships were dockedin that district--their "home port"--but their actual residences were elsewhere. Thus, claimed the suit, the way the districts had been drawn was unfairto both African Americans and to U.S. Navy personnel.
When the district court overturned the state's plan, the state appealed to the Supreme Court. In a 5-3 decision, the Court approved the state's original plan, except for the part relating to Norfolk. The Supreme Court agreed with the district court.
Flexibility and Local Control
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, explained that two principles had guided the decision. First, the Court believed that in drawing districts for state legislatures, "more flexibility is permissible than with respect to congressional redistricting." By those standards, Rehnquist wrote, the 16.4 percent variation from the smallest district to the largest "may well approachtolerable limits," but it did not exceed them.
Second, the state had been justified in "preserving the integrity of political subdivision lines," such as counties and cities. In other words, if two cities were located side by side, the state would be justified in making each city its own electoral district, even if one were slightly larger than the other. That way, the Court explained, each city's residents could elect representatives that would advance their own city's interest when the state legislature came to deal with local issues.
However, Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall strongly disagreed. They thought that the state's redistricting plan had indeed been unfair, and they believed the district court had been right to make a new plan.
Equality of Representation
Justice Brennan, writing for the minority, said the Court had had no basis for dismissing out of hand DuVal's contention that the gap between the smallestand the largest district was actually 23.6 percent. If DuVal was right, thatwould make the gap in Virginia almost as large as the 26.48 percent gap in another case--and the Court had found that gap too large.
Second, Brennan said, the Court was wrong to claim that there were two separate standards, one for congressional districts, the other for state legislatures. Perhaps a state might need to use different procedures to figure out howto create legislative districts, but that was far from saying that the two types of districts had different standards.
Finally, Brennan said, the Court was wrong to give so much weight to preserving existing political subdivisions. The most important criterion in drawing electoral districts was to make them as nearly equal in size as possible, so that every person's vote would count equally. Besides, Brennan said, the burden of proof in showing the importance of existing political subdivisions was on the state--and the state had failed to meet that burden. Brennan pointed out that even under the state's plan, many voters from small towns would be lumped into districts with larger towns. He failed to see the difference betweenthat situation and one in which a town was broken up into two districts. Headded two more objections:
Of the 124 political subdivisions in the Commonwealth, only 12 would be divided by the District Court's plan. More significant, the number of persons [taken out of their home political subdivisions by the plan] . . . would still be less than 1 percent of the total statepopulation.
Clearly, the Court was divided on the question of whether the state redistricting plan did indeed violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This type of argument--local control versus civil rights--would continue in various forms and in various locations for the next several decades.
Related Cases
- Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
- Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
- Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
- Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
- Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
- Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
- Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997).
Gerrymandering
Gerrymandering refers to a state legislature's ability to re-establish boundaries of election precincts in ways that give one political party or group ofpeople some advantage over another. It may include redrawing districts to exclude groups who do not support the dominant party in office at the time of redistricting.
The term was coined by Benjamin Russell, a newspaper editor in 1812. During Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry's second term in office, the state legislature reapportioned the voting districts giving the Democratic-Republicans an edge in the state elections of senators. One new district was oddly shapedand spread out. An artist used the shape of the district to create a joke, adding " . . . wings, claws, and teeth to its outline, prompting the suggestionthat it resembled a salamander." Russell gave it the name Gerrymander, thereby connecting the newly coined word to the governor.
This practice creating oddly shaped voting districts to provide one group with an advantage in an election over another may be challenged constitutionally, according to the U.S. Supreme Court. This applies even when voting districts are designed to provide an advantage to minority voters, as set down in Shaw v. Reno (1993).
Sources
Grolier Electronic Publishing, Inc., 1995.
Further Readings
- Biskupic, Joan, and Elder Witt, eds. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court, 3rd ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1996.
- Hall, Kermit L., ed. Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
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