Smith v. Allwright - Further Readings
Petitioner
Lonnie E. Smith
Respondent
S. S. Allwright, election judge, et al.
Petitioner's Claim
That rules of the Texas Democratic Party which barred African Americans fromparticipation in primary elections violated his constitutional rights.
Chief Lawyers for Petitioner
Thurgood Marshall and William H. Hastie
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
George W. Barcus
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, William O. Douglas, Felix Frankfurter, Robert H. Jackson, Frank Murphy, Stanley Forman Reed (writing for the Court), Wiley Blount Rutledge, Harlan Fiske Stone
Justices Dissenting
Owen Josephus Roberts
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
3 April 1944
Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the petitioner's claim and overturned two lowercourt decisions to hold that the Texas Democratic Party owed Smith $5000 incompensatory damages, and that the party could no longer exclude African Americans from participation in its primary elections.
Significance
The ruling overturned the Court's decision, made just nine years earlier in Grovey v. Townsend (1935), that since political parties in Texas were designated as private organizations by the state legislature they could exclude African Americans from membership if they saw fit. Smith v. Allwright is a landmark in the Court's support of civil rights, and in the development of the so-called public function concept. The public function concept holdsthat essentially public activities, such as elections, must be subject to constitutional scrutiny even if they are managed by private organizations or corporations.
Reconstruction
In the years immediately following the Civil War, newly freed African Americans wielded immense political power in the southern United States, where theyconstituted a majority of the population. Southern whites saw this new political situation as intolerable, and contrived means to suppress the new votingmajority.
No tactics of suppression were deemed beyond consideration. Vigilante bands such as the Ku Klux Klan and official institutions, including local police forces, combined to terrorize African Americans attempting to exercise their constitutional right to vote. Less crude, but more insidious, were legal and procedural methods of excluding African Americans from participation in the political system.
One such method was the establishment of a virtually one party system in state politics. Throughout the southern United States the Democratic Party (the party that opposed Lincoln within the Union) came to dominate the political scene. As such, Democratic primary elections were tantamount to general elections. With a one party system in place many Southern states then legally excluded African Americans from participation in the Democratic Party, rendering them politically impotent. This tactic was initially successful because the Supreme Court refused to consider cases involving primary elections. In Newberry v. United States (1921), the Court ruled that, since primary elections were unknown to the framers of the Constitution, their operation was outside the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary. This attitude did not last for long, however. Six years later a Texas state law barring African Americans from participation in Democratic Party primary elections was successfully challenged in Nixon v. Herndon (1927), with the Court ruling that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Following this decision the Texas legislature created a Democratic Party Executive Committee and authorized it to exclude African Americans from its primaries. Once again, in Nixon v. Condon (1932), the Court held that the legislature'sauthorization constituted unconstitutional state action since the executive committee was a state creation, and thus, in effect, a public institution. TheTexas Democratic Party responded by holding a convention at which delegatesvoted to exclude African Americans from participating in party primaries.
This latest tactic of the Texas Democratic Party was immediately challenged in Grovey v. Townsend. R. R. Grovey, an African American resident of Houston, Texas, brought suit against the state Democratic Party for its refusalto provide him with a primary ballot. The Supreme Court, however, sided withthe party on this occasion, ruling that since the party delegates had votedto exclude African Americans without state interference, their actions were beyond federal jurisdiction.
A Foot in the Door
The Court's attitude toward the disenfranchisement of African Americans in the South began to change in the late 1930s, as appointees of President Franklin D. Roosevelt began to assert their views in its decisions. A case brought by the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Justice Department to fight corruption in local politics provided the impetus for the Court to reverse its position as defined in Newberry and Grovey.
In 1941 the Civil Rights Division tested the Court's stance on the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary in the case of United States v. Classic. The case involved the willful alteration and false counting of primary election votes by Louisiana election commissioners. By a vote of 5-3, the Court overturned Newberry and ruled that even primary elections must conform toconstitutional provisions guaranteeing citizens the right to vote and have their votes accurately and truthfully counted. Although Grovey was not mentioned in the Court's decision, Classic clearly reversed what the Court had determined to be the private nature of political parties, thus leaving the activities of parties liable to scrutiny for constitutionality.
A Final Test
Lonnie E. Smith, an African American resident of Harris County, Texas, appeared before election judge S. S. Allwright on 27 July 1940 to cast a ballot inthe Democratic Party primary to nominate candidates for the upcoming nationalsenatorial, congressional, and presidential campaigns. Allwright refused Smith's request for a ballot on the basis of his race. Smith left the election office without further comment, but immediately filed a damage suit for $5,000against Allwright and the Democratic Party in the district court. The district court dismissed Smith's suit and the case proceeded to the court of appeals, which confirmed the district court's decision on the basis of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Grovey v. Townsend. The Supreme Court took up the case on certiorari (an order calling up records and proceedings forreview), given apparent discrepancies between its decisions in Groveyand Classic, and heard arguments on 12 January 1944.
An End to State-Sponsored Political Discrimination
Justice Reed delivered the decision of the Court, which voted 8-1 to reversethe lower court rulings and compel the Texas Democratic Party to allow Mr. Smith to cast his primary ballot. In its decision, the Court expressly abandoned the position it adopted in Grovey. The Court reasoned that since theConstitution guarantees all citizens the right to vote, and given the vitalnature of participation in primary elections in light of the virtual one party system operating in the South, primary elections must come under federal jurisdiction and constitutional scrutiny. Furthermore, the state was so intimately involved in the regulation of political parties as to make the parties indistinguishable from many state institutions. This ruling also extended the conclusion reached in Classic, that some private organizations can havefunctions of such public import as to render them liable to legal definitionas public institutions, thereby making them subject to federal jurisdiction.
Impact
Smith v. Allwright ended forever the state- sanctioned denial of the voting rights of large groups of citizens based on their race. Subsequent attempts to exclude African Americans from political participation would includepoll taxes and literacy tests, but these could only be directed against individuals, not entire minority groups. The final battles against this sort of individual exclusion would be fought in the 1950s and 1960s. The ruling also continued the development of the public function concept as first delineated inClassic, which held that the Court had jurisdiction over the actionsof certain ostensibly private organizations and institutions if their functions were judged to be public in nature.
Related Cases
"Public Function" Concept
The "Public Function" concept in connection to voting relates to the authority that is granted to a specified individual, such as a town, city, or countyclerk, to run an election. This delegation of power to said person is governed by the laws of the state. In this position, his or her public function is designated by and limited to parameters established by law. Persons operatingin this capacity are considered officers of the state, and are subject to control and guidance by the state in carrying out his or her duties of office. An individual charged with such responsibility in a public role, must take anoath of office, swearing to uphold applicable laws while executing his or herduties.
Sources
Hall, Kermit L., ed. The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Lonnie E. Smith
Respondent
S. S. Allwright, election judge, et al.
Petitioner's Claim
That rules of the Texas Democratic Party which barred African Americans fromparticipation in primary elections violated his constitutional rights.
Chief Lawyers for Petitioner
Thurgood Marshall and William H. Hastie
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
George W. Barcus
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, William O. Douglas, Felix Frankfurter, Robert H. Jackson, Frank Murphy, Stanley Forman Reed (writing for the Court), Wiley Blount Rutledge, Harlan Fiske Stone
Justices Dissenting
Owen Josephus Roberts
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
3 April 1944
Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the petitioner's claim and overturned two lowercourt decisions to hold that the Texas Democratic Party owed Smith $5000 incompensatory damages, and that the party could no longer exclude African Americans from participation in its primary elections.
Significance
The ruling overturned the Court's decision, made just nine years earlier in Grovey v. Townsend (1935), that since political parties in Texas were designated as private organizations by the state legislature they could exclude African Americans from membership if they saw fit. Smith v. Allwright is a landmark in the Court's support of civil rights, and in the development of the so-called public function concept. The public function concept holdsthat essentially public activities, such as elections, must be subject to constitutional scrutiny even if they are managed by private organizations or corporations.
Reconstruction
In the years immediately following the Civil War, newly freed African Americans wielded immense political power in the southern United States, where theyconstituted a majority of the population. Southern whites saw this new political situation as intolerable, and contrived means to suppress the new votingmajority.
No tactics of suppression were deemed beyond consideration. Vigilante bands such as the Ku Klux Klan and official institutions, including local police forces, combined to terrorize African Americans attempting to exercise their constitutional right to vote. Less crude, but more insidious, were legal and procedural methods of excluding African Americans from participation in the political system.
One such method was the establishment of a virtually one party system in state politics. Throughout the southern United States the Democratic Party (the party that opposed Lincoln within the Union) came to dominate the political scene. As such, Democratic primary elections were tantamount to general elections. With a one party system in place many Southern states then legally excluded African Americans from participation in the Democratic Party, rendering them politically impotent. This tactic was initially successful because the Supreme Court refused to consider cases involving primary elections. In Newberry v. United States (1921), the Court ruled that, since primary elections were unknown to the framers of the Constitution, their operation was outside the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary. This attitude did not last for long, however. Six years later a Texas state law barring African Americans from participation in Democratic Party primary elections was successfully challenged in Nixon v. Herndon (1927), with the Court ruling that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Following this decision the Texas legislature created a Democratic Party Executive Committee and authorized it to exclude African Americans from its primaries. Once again, in Nixon v. Condon (1932), the Court held that the legislature'sauthorization constituted unconstitutional state action since the executive committee was a state creation, and thus, in effect, a public institution. TheTexas Democratic Party responded by holding a convention at which delegatesvoted to exclude African Americans from participating in party primaries.
This latest tactic of the Texas Democratic Party was immediately challenged in Grovey v. Townsend. R. R. Grovey, an African American resident of Houston, Texas, brought suit against the state Democratic Party for its refusalto provide him with a primary ballot. The Supreme Court, however, sided withthe party on this occasion, ruling that since the party delegates had votedto exclude African Americans without state interference, their actions were beyond federal jurisdiction.
A Foot in the Door
The Court's attitude toward the disenfranchisement of African Americans in the South began to change in the late 1930s, as appointees of President Franklin D. Roosevelt began to assert their views in its decisions. A case brought by the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Justice Department to fight corruption in local politics provided the impetus for the Court to reverse its position as defined in Newberry and Grovey.
In 1941 the Civil Rights Division tested the Court's stance on the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary in the case of United States v. Classic. The case involved the willful alteration and false counting of primary election votes by Louisiana election commissioners. By a vote of 5-3, the Court overturned Newberry and ruled that even primary elections must conform toconstitutional provisions guaranteeing citizens the right to vote and have their votes accurately and truthfully counted. Although Grovey was not mentioned in the Court's decision, Classic clearly reversed what the Court had determined to be the private nature of political parties, thus leaving the activities of parties liable to scrutiny for constitutionality.
A Final Test
Lonnie E. Smith, an African American resident of Harris County, Texas, appeared before election judge S. S. Allwright on 27 July 1940 to cast a ballot inthe Democratic Party primary to nominate candidates for the upcoming nationalsenatorial, congressional, and presidential campaigns. Allwright refused Smith's request for a ballot on the basis of his race. Smith left the election office without further comment, but immediately filed a damage suit for $5,000against Allwright and the Democratic Party in the district court. The district court dismissed Smith's suit and the case proceeded to the court of appeals, which confirmed the district court's decision on the basis of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Grovey v. Townsend. The Supreme Court took up the case on certiorari (an order calling up records and proceedings forreview), given apparent discrepancies between its decisions in Groveyand Classic, and heard arguments on 12 January 1944.
An End to State-Sponsored Political Discrimination
Justice Reed delivered the decision of the Court, which voted 8-1 to reversethe lower court rulings and compel the Texas Democratic Party to allow Mr. Smith to cast his primary ballot. In its decision, the Court expressly abandoned the position it adopted in Grovey. The Court reasoned that since theConstitution guarantees all citizens the right to vote, and given the vitalnature of participation in primary elections in light of the virtual one party system operating in the South, primary elections must come under federal jurisdiction and constitutional scrutiny. Furthermore, the state was so intimately involved in the regulation of political parties as to make the parties indistinguishable from many state institutions. This ruling also extended the conclusion reached in Classic, that some private organizations can havefunctions of such public import as to render them liable to legal definitionas public institutions, thereby making them subject to federal jurisdiction.
Impact
Smith v. Allwright ended forever the state- sanctioned denial of the voting rights of large groups of citizens based on their race. Subsequent attempts to exclude African Americans from political participation would includepoll taxes and literacy tests, but these could only be directed against individuals, not entire minority groups. The final battles against this sort of individual exclusion would be fought in the 1950s and 1960s. The ruling also continued the development of the public function concept as first delineated inClassic, which held that the Court had jurisdiction over the actionsof certain ostensibly private organizations and institutions if their functions were judged to be public in nature.
Related Cases
- Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
- Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
- Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
- Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
- United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
"Public Function" Concept
The "Public Function" concept in connection to voting relates to the authority that is granted to a specified individual, such as a town, city, or countyclerk, to run an election. This delegation of power to said person is governed by the laws of the state. In this position, his or her public function is designated by and limited to parameters established by law. Persons operatingin this capacity are considered officers of the state, and are subject to control and guidance by the state in carrying out his or her duties of office. An individual charged with such responsibility in a public role, must take anoath of office, swearing to uphold applicable laws while executing his or herduties.
Sources
Hall, Kermit L., ed. The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
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