Petitioner
Jane Hodgson, et al.
Respondent
State of Minnesota, et al.
Petitioner's Claim
That a Minnesota law requiring minors to notify both their parents before obtaining an abortion was unconstitutional.
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
John Tunheim
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Janet Benshoof
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, Sandra Day O'Connor, John Paul Stevens (writing for the Court)
Justices Dissenting
Anthony M. Kennedy, William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
25 June 1990
Decision
Affirmed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals holding the two-parent notification policy unconstitutional where there is no provision for judicial bypass.
Significance
The Supreme Court's decision in Hodgson v. Minnesota slowed the trendtoward restriction of abortion rights begun in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. However, its split judgment reflected the ambivalence of the Court in cases dealing with statutory constraints on the availability of abortion.
Judicial Background
The landmark case of Roe v. Wade (1973), in which the petitioner successfully challenged a Texas law prohibiting abortions except to save the woman's life, established the benchmark for all future abortion decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, in that decision, held that the right to privacy extends to the decision of a woman, in consultation with her physician, to terminate her pregnancy. By the time Hodgson v. Minnesota wasdecided in 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled on abortion rights cases for almost 17 years. For most of that time, attempts by states to place restrictions on the availability of abortions were ruled unconstitutional. However,changes in the makeup and temperament of the Court during the 1980s served toarrest this trend. As a result, observers watched the Hodgson decision closely for indications of which way the Court would proceed in the future.
The case revolved around two key issues: the right of a minor to terminate apregnancy without notifying her parents, and the ability of a state to imposea waiting period on those seeking an abortion. The Supreme Court had dealt with both those issues before. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.Danforth (1976), the Court had held that parental and spousal consent requirements were unconstitutional because they delegate to third parties an absolute veto power that the state does not itself possess. In Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health (1983) the Court had held that an Ohio law requiring a woman to wait 24 hours between consenting to and receiving anabortion was unconstitutional. However, the Court soon took a dramatic turn toward the restriction of abortion rights. In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989), the Court upheld a Missouri law forbidding the use ofpublic facilities for abortions not necessary to save a woman's life. It ruled that the state may implement a policy favoring childbirth over abortion byallocation of public resources such as hospitals and medical staff. It was inthis atmosphere of uncertainty over the Court's intentions that the Hodgson v. Minnesota case was heard.
The Case at Hand
In 1981, the state of Minnesota enacted a parental notification law for abortion. The law required women under the age of 18 to inform both of their parents of their desire to terminate a pregnancy. After 48 hours, the woman couldthen have an abortion performed with or without parental consent. Exceptionsto this rule were made in cases of medical emergency, parental abuse, or neglect. A separate provision of the law provided for a "judicial bypass" of parental notification. Through this procedure, a judge could allow a minor to have an abortion if he or she felt the woman was sufficiently mature enough to make the decision, or if notifying the parents did not serve the woman's bestinterests. A group of Minnesota citizens, comprised of pregnant minors, doctors, and abortion rights advocates, filed suit in the U.S. District Court. They hoped to have the law struck down as unconstitutional.
The Lower Courts Rule
In 1986, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota issued its first decision in the case. It struck down as unconstitutional two of the threekey parts of the law: the parental notification requirement and the 48-hour waiting period. Although it did hold that the judicial bypass provision of thelaw complied with the Constitution, the district court enjoined the state ofMinnesota from enforcing the law in its entirety. The state then took its case to the U.S. court of appeals. The court of appeals agreed with the district court that parental notification without the possibility of judicial bypassviolated the U.S. Constitution. However, it held that both the 48-hour waiting period and the notification requirement with judicial bypass provision passed constitutional muster. Accordingly, it reversed the district court decision. The original petitioners then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court Affirms the Court of Appeals Decision
On 25 June 1990, the Supreme Court ruled on the case. A five-justice majorityaffirmed the decision of the court of appeals, striking down the notification requirement without judicial bypass as unconstitutional. Five justices alsoagreed that the provision in the Minnesota law requiring notification with judicial bypass was constitutional. However, the justices disagreed on the particulars of this part of the decision and issued separate opinions on the matter.
On the issue of notification without judicial bypass, the Court found that this was not a reasonable way to ensure that parents become involved in a minor's decision to terminate a pregnancy. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens opined:
As to the issue of notification with judicial bypass, a different majority coalesced around the view that consultation with a judge was a reasonable safety valve in cases where both the minor's parents could not be located or properly notified. "[A] judicial bypass is an expeditious and efficient means by which to separate the applications of the law which are constitutional from those which are not." Justice Kennedy concluded.
Voices of Dissent
The most passionate voices of dissent in the case were those most closely identified with, and those most profoundly skeptical of, the concept of constitutionally protected abortion rights. On the one hand, Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun took the view that any requirement that a minor notify parents before terminating a pregnancy was unconstitutional on its face. Writing for the dissenters, Justice Marshall opined:
On the other hand, Justice Scalia was equally adamant that the Court had no right to be ruling on such matters in the first place.
Impact
The "split decision" issued by the Court in Hodgson v. Minnesota did little to clarify the Court's position on the restriction of abortion rights,but provided grist for both sides of the issue in subsequent cases.
Related Cases
Jane Hodgson, et al.
Respondent
State of Minnesota, et al.
Petitioner's Claim
That a Minnesota law requiring minors to notify both their parents before obtaining an abortion was unconstitutional.
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
John Tunheim
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Janet Benshoof
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, Sandra Day O'Connor, John Paul Stevens (writing for the Court)
Justices Dissenting
Anthony M. Kennedy, William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
25 June 1990
Decision
Affirmed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals holding the two-parent notification policy unconstitutional where there is no provision for judicial bypass.
Significance
The Supreme Court's decision in Hodgson v. Minnesota slowed the trendtoward restriction of abortion rights begun in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. However, its split judgment reflected the ambivalence of the Court in cases dealing with statutory constraints on the availability of abortion.
Judicial Background
The landmark case of Roe v. Wade (1973), in which the petitioner successfully challenged a Texas law prohibiting abortions except to save the woman's life, established the benchmark for all future abortion decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, in that decision, held that the right to privacy extends to the decision of a woman, in consultation with her physician, to terminate her pregnancy. By the time Hodgson v. Minnesota wasdecided in 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled on abortion rights cases for almost 17 years. For most of that time, attempts by states to place restrictions on the availability of abortions were ruled unconstitutional. However,changes in the makeup and temperament of the Court during the 1980s served toarrest this trend. As a result, observers watched the Hodgson decision closely for indications of which way the Court would proceed in the future.
The case revolved around two key issues: the right of a minor to terminate apregnancy without notifying her parents, and the ability of a state to imposea waiting period on those seeking an abortion. The Supreme Court had dealt with both those issues before. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.Danforth (1976), the Court had held that parental and spousal consent requirements were unconstitutional because they delegate to third parties an absolute veto power that the state does not itself possess. In Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health (1983) the Court had held that an Ohio law requiring a woman to wait 24 hours between consenting to and receiving anabortion was unconstitutional. However, the Court soon took a dramatic turn toward the restriction of abortion rights. In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989), the Court upheld a Missouri law forbidding the use ofpublic facilities for abortions not necessary to save a woman's life. It ruled that the state may implement a policy favoring childbirth over abortion byallocation of public resources such as hospitals and medical staff. It was inthis atmosphere of uncertainty over the Court's intentions that the Hodgson v. Minnesota case was heard.
The Case at Hand
In 1981, the state of Minnesota enacted a parental notification law for abortion. The law required women under the age of 18 to inform both of their parents of their desire to terminate a pregnancy. After 48 hours, the woman couldthen have an abortion performed with or without parental consent. Exceptionsto this rule were made in cases of medical emergency, parental abuse, or neglect. A separate provision of the law provided for a "judicial bypass" of parental notification. Through this procedure, a judge could allow a minor to have an abortion if he or she felt the woman was sufficiently mature enough to make the decision, or if notifying the parents did not serve the woman's bestinterests. A group of Minnesota citizens, comprised of pregnant minors, doctors, and abortion rights advocates, filed suit in the U.S. District Court. They hoped to have the law struck down as unconstitutional.
The Lower Courts Rule
In 1986, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota issued its first decision in the case. It struck down as unconstitutional two of the threekey parts of the law: the parental notification requirement and the 48-hour waiting period. Although it did hold that the judicial bypass provision of thelaw complied with the Constitution, the district court enjoined the state ofMinnesota from enforcing the law in its entirety. The state then took its case to the U.S. court of appeals. The court of appeals agreed with the district court that parental notification without the possibility of judicial bypassviolated the U.S. Constitution. However, it held that both the 48-hour waiting period and the notification requirement with judicial bypass provision passed constitutional muster. Accordingly, it reversed the district court decision. The original petitioners then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court Affirms the Court of Appeals Decision
On 25 June 1990, the Supreme Court ruled on the case. A five-justice majorityaffirmed the decision of the court of appeals, striking down the notification requirement without judicial bypass as unconstitutional. Five justices alsoagreed that the provision in the Minnesota law requiring notification with judicial bypass was constitutional. However, the justices disagreed on the particulars of this part of the decision and issued separate opinions on the matter.
On the issue of notification without judicial bypass, the Court found that this was not a reasonable way to ensure that parents become involved in a minor's decision to terminate a pregnancy. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens opined:
The requirement that both parents be notified, whetheror not both wish to be notified or have assumed responsibility for the upbringing of the child, does not reasonably further any legitimate state interest. Any such interest in supporting the authority of a parent, who is presumedto act in the minor's best interest, to assure that the abortion decision isknowing, intelligent, and deliberate, would be fully served by a one-parent notification requirement as to functioning families, where notice to either parent would normally constitute notice to both.Futhermore, Stevens reasoned, the two-parent notification requirement was unrealistic--potentially even harmful--in a world where functional two-parent households are increasingly rare.
[A]s the record demonstrates, the two-parent requirement actually disserves the state interest in protecting and assisting the minor with respect to the thousands of dysfunctional families affected by thestatute, where the requirement proved positively harmful. There is no merit to the argument that the two-parent requirement is justified because, in the ideal family, the minor should make her decision only after consultation withboth parents, who should naturally be concerned with her welfare. The State has no legitimate interest in conforming family life to a state-designed idealby requiring family members to talk together.
As to the issue of notification with judicial bypass, a different majority coalesced around the view that consultation with a judge was a reasonable safety valve in cases where both the minor's parents could not be located or properly notified. "[A] judicial bypass is an expeditious and efficient means by which to separate the applications of the law which are constitutional from those which are not." Justice Kennedy concluded.
Voices of Dissent
The most passionate voices of dissent in the case were those most closely identified with, and those most profoundly skeptical of, the concept of constitutionally protected abortion rights. On the one hand, Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun took the view that any requirement that a minor notify parents before terminating a pregnancy was unconstitutional on its face. Writing for the dissenters, Justice Marshall opined:
The parental notification and 48-hour delay requirements . . . do not satisfy the strict scrutinyapplicable to laws restricting a woman's constitutional right to have an abortion. The judicial bypass procedure cannot salvage those requirements becausethat procedure itself is unconstitutional.
On the other hand, Justice Scalia was equally adamant that the Court had no right to be ruling on such matters in the first place.
The randomand unpredictable results of our . . . unchanneled individual views make it increasingly evident, term after term, that the tools for this job are not tobe found in the lawyer's--and hence not in the judge's--workbox. I continue to dissent from this enterprise of devising an Abortion Code, and from the illusion that we have authority to do so.
Impact
The "split decision" issued by the Court in Hodgson v. Minnesota did little to clarify the Court's position on the restriction of abortion rights,but provided grist for both sides of the issue in subsequent cases.
Related Cases
- Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
- Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
- Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
- Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.833 (1992).
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