Horton v. California

Petitioner
Terry Brice Horton
Respondent
State of California
Petitioner's Claim
That the court must suppress the evidence Sergeant LaRault discovered in plain view while conducting a lawful search, because his search warrant did not mention these items and because LaRault did not find them inadvertently.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Juliana Drous
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Martin S. Kaye
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor, William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, John Paul Stevens (writing for the Court), Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
4 June 1990
Decision
Found that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit seizure of belongings not specifically listed in a warrant found in plain sight during a legal search for other items, even though the discovery was not inadvertent, as Coolidgev. New Hampshire (1971) mandated.
Significance
This case removed the inadvertence requirement from one of the exceptions tothe Fourth Amendment's call for a search warrant that specifies the items tobe searched for and seized. Previously, the U.S. Supreme Court held that in order for the police to seize evidence not mentioned in a warrant, they must find it inadvertently and it must be in plain view. However, in Horton v. California the Court argued that the inadvertence requirement was unnecessary and that the other warrant requirements would prevent police abuse of thewarrant, even though the Fourth Amendment requires the warrant to describe all items on some interpretations. Furthermore, this decision granted police greater freedom for obtaining evidence, as long as they met the conditions imposed by the Constitution and the Supreme Court's rulings.
Background Laws and Decisions
As a safeguard against random searches unsupported by strong evidence, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police and other government agents from searching a person's home and possessions without a warrant. The warrant must be issued by a neutral judge for a search based on probable cause, and the warrant must specify the places to be searched and items to be confiscated.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court also acknowledges some exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure clause, including finding evidence while in"hot pursuit" of a suspect, obtaining evidence when there is a strong possibility of its destruction, finding evidence during a frisk as part of an arrest, and discovering evidence in plain view while lawfully searching for itemsmentioned in a warrant. Items seized in such circumstances do not need to belisted in a warrant.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire and other cases helped define the "plain view" doctrine, which allows police to seize items they discover inadvertently because they are in plain view. The Coolidge ruling established three conditions that must be met in order for the seizure of evidence in this manner to be permissible. First, a warrant must authorize the initial search in the first place. Second, the incriminating character of the items must be immediately apparent. Third, the discovery of such items must be inadvertent. Arizona v. Hicks (1987) later reaffirmed that with probable cause, the police may seize evidence under the "plain view" doctrine.
The Crime and the Evidence
The treasurer of the San Jose Coin Club, Erwin Wallaker, was robbed one day after returning from the club's yearly show. Armed with a machine gun and a stun gun, the two attackers approached Wallaker in his garage and stunned him using the electrical shocking device. Then they tied and handcuffed him, before stealing his cash and jewelry. While investigating the armed robbery of theSan Jose Coin Club's treasury, Sergeant LaRault found probable cause to search Terry Horton's home for the stolen property and weapons used in the crime.The warrant the officer obtained to search his home, however, specified searching only for stolen property. When the officer executed the search warrant,he discovered weapons used in the robbery--an Uzi machine gun, a .38 caliberrevolver, and two stun guns--in plain view, but no stolen property. The officer confiscated the weapons as well as a few other items, including clothingdescribed by Wallaker, a handcuff key, and an advertisement for the club's show.
LaRault testified that in addition to looking for the stolen property specified in the warrant, he also sought further evidence that would link the suspect with the robbery, hence making his discovery of the weapons deliberate, notinadvertent. The trial court deemed this evidence admissible, even though the LaRault's warrant did not authorize seizing it. A jury convicted Horton ofarmed robbery and sentenced him to prison. Horton asked the California Courtof Appeals to hear his case, arguing that the court must suppress all evidence not specified in the warrant, because LaRault did not find it inadvertently. However, the court denied his request, relying on a view that if the evidence was in plain sight, then the police could seize it. Horton next petitionedthe California Supreme Court, but it also rejected his petition.
The Case of Terry Horton
Since the California court's interpretation of the "plain view" ruling conflicted with other courts' interpretations, the U.S. Supreme Court decided to hear the case, which began 21 February 1990. While the Court had established the previously mentioned exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's ban on warrantless searches and seizures, it had to sharpen its view on finding and confiscating of conspicuous belongings not inadvertently found and not listed on a search warrant.
The Court had previously ruled that the item must not only be in plain view but also must be obviously incriminating in character. In addition, the Courtfound that the search warrant must authorize the police to search a specificplace and area from where the evidence is conspicuous and the police must discover it inadvertently. However, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, disputed this last condition, that the discovery must be inadvertent, for tworeasons. First, the majority argued that just because the police expect to find more evidence during a search than the warrant specifies should not invalidate the search, providing that the search remained confined to the area andthe duration specified in the warrant or constituted a valid exception to thewarrant.
Second, the Court reasoned that other requirements of the Fourth Amendment safeguard against the police using specific warrants as general warrants, thusrendering the inadvertence requirement unnecessary. Because the police must always have a warrant specifying the person, the place, and the items, they can only search a limited area for a limited amount of time, as authorized by the warrant. The Court felt that if the police followed these rules, the inadvertence policy did not provide any further protection of Fourth Amendment rights, because once the police strayed outside of the specified area of search,they would already have violated the Fourth Amendment and any evidence theyobtained would be inadmissible, whether found advertently or inadvertently. The Court hoped this requirement would replace attempts to judge the admissibility of evidence based on trying to determine what a police officer's expectations were while performing a lawful search.
However, Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented, maintaining that the FourthAmendment explicitly requires search warrants to describe the specific contents to be seized, which the majority overlooked. Nonetheless, despite the apparent liberties taken with the Fourth Amendment, Justice Stevens's view received the most support, and Horton v. California eliminated the inadvertence requirement. The majority argued that the new "plain view" doctrine relied on objective grounds for judging whether evidence not mentioned in a warrant can be permissibly seized, instead of on subjective grounds of trying to read the minds of the police to determine if the discovery of such evidence was truly inadvertent.

In this case the items seized from petitioner's home were discovered during a lawful search authorized by a valid warrant.When they were discovered, it was immediately apparent to the officer that they constituted incriminating evidence. He had probable cause, not [only] tosearch for the stolen property, but also to believe that the weapons and handguns had been used in the crime he was investigating.

Related Cases

• Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
  
• Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
  
• Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
  
• Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).