et al. Heckler v. Mathews

Petitioner
Margaret M. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services
Respondent
Robert H. Mathews, et al.
Petitioner's Claim
By permitting a brief, five-year exclusion period which temporarily revived gender-based discrimination in awarding retiree benefits to spouses, the Social Security Act, as amended in 1977, did not violate the Due Process Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Mark L. Levy
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
John R. Benn
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr. (writing for the Court), Warren E.Burger, Thurgood Marshall, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
5 March 1984
Decision
Although 1977 amendments to the Social Security Act permitted unequal awarding of benefits between men and women, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the lowercourt ruling that there was no violation of the Due Process Clause; the provisions of a five-year exemption only temporarily revived gender-based discrimination for the justifiable protection of people who planned their retirementsbased on the old law.
Significance
In Heckler v. Mathews, et al. the Court reinforced the collaborative role between legislative and judicial branches of the government. The Court'sruling remained consistent with past decisions which held that gender discrimination was permissible under circumstances in which the government had a rational, overriding justification.
Question of Gender Based Classification
During 1977, the docket of the U.S. Supreme Court contained one case for review which attracted the concern and attention of all three branches of government--judicial, legislative, and executive. By agreeing to hear arguments in Califano v. Goldfarb (1977), the Court decided the constitutionality ofgender-based distinctions which governed awarding of Social Security benefits to spouses concurrently drawing government pensions. In considering Goldfarb's claim, a widower who had been denied benefits to which widows were entitled, the Court found that the provisions of the Social Security Act imposed agender-based distinction which unfairly burdened "a widower but not a widow with the task of proving dependency upon the deceased spouse." Specifically, men were required to prove that at least half their support derived from theirspouses' income at the time of death while women who survived their spouseswere entitled to benefits regardless of how much support derived from their deceased spouse. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision of a lower, U.S. district court "that the different treatment of men and women mandated by 402 (f) (1) (D) (a provision of the Social Security Act) constituted invidious discrimination against female wage earners by affording them less protection for their surviving spouses than is provided to male employees." Throughout 1977, the Court also reiterated the Goldfarb decision with two follow up cases, Califano v. Silbowitz (1977) and Jablon v. Califano (1977).
Before the calendar year elapsed, Congress responded with almost unprecedented unanimity and swiftness by amending Social Security legislation. Because ofthe Court's Goldfarb decision, men would receive previously unawardedbenefits and also collect them retroactively. Fearing that the system wouldbecome overloaded and possibly go bankrupt, Congress authored and passed a revised statute which changed the eligibility criteria by which all beneficiaries were awarded spousal benefits. SSR 79-26 under Title II (Increase in Delayed Retirement Credit, and Delayed Retirement Credit for Widows or Widowers) stipulated that benefits for all spouses, regardless of gender, would be reduced according to a formula that was based on how much money a retiree receivedfrom federal or state pensions. However, legislators understood that many future retirees had made financial plans based on the way the Social Security Act had been written before being amended in 1977. Thus, so that change of lawwould not adversely impact people facing impending retirement, provisions ofthe 1977 amendment allowed for a five-year exemption period for spouses who,prior to 1982, would become eligible to receive spousal benefits. To ensuretheir intention to keep the Social Security fund from being depleted, Congress also passed a severability clause which stipulated that if any part of SSR79-26 was declared unconstitutional, that the pension-offset clause would still remain in effect as the new law of the land.
Individual Rights and Congressional Intent
After Robert Mathews retired from the U.S. Postal Service, he applied for Social Security spousal benefits on his wife's account. Unlike non-civil servantretirees, Mathews did not have to offset double benefits against his spouse's account; civil servants could receive full spousal benefits along with their government pensions. However, under the provisions of Social Security Act (as amended by Congress in 1977), Mathews was denied benefits because he did not depend on his wife for one-half support. After being administratively denied benefits, Mathews requested and received a hearing by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who declared valid the decision to withhold benefits. Mathews pursued his claim via the Appeals Counsel of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS); that review also affirmed denial of benefits. As a result,the Secretary of DHHS, Margaret Heckler, issued an official decision on behalf of the DHHS to enforce the findings of the ALJ and Appeals Counsel.
Mathews continued to believe he had been unjustly denied benefits to which hewas entitled and had exhausted all available administrative avenues available through the DHHS. He then filed suit on behalf of himself and the class ofother nondependent men affected by Heckler's decision. In presenting his casebefore the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Mathewssought a declarative judgment ruling that the pension offset of the 1977 amended Social Security Act was unconstitutional.
The linchpin to Mathews's argument was the Supreme Court's ruling in Califano v. Goldfarb. According to the Goldfarb ruling, gender discrimination was inherent in the pension offset exemption because it violated due process for nondependent men who were similarly situated as nondependent womanwho received benefits. Further, Mathews's attorney claimed the Goldfarb decision rendered the severability clause unconstitutional--it perpetuatedgender discrimination against nondependent men by enforcing the offset exemption clause even though it was held violative of the U.S. Constitution.
In considering the class action claim, the district court first determined that Mathews indeed had standing to bring suit. The pension offset exemption and severability clause assumed gender-based classification; therefore, withholding benefits from the "excluded class" of nondependent men while extending benefits to the "favored class" constituted unequal treatment. Mathews's "injury" qualified him for legal redress. In examining the issues raised in the suit, the district court pointed out that discrimination could only be upheld if it served "important governmental objectives and [was] substantially related to achievement of those objectives." However, the rationale behind the exclusion exemption of the pension offset was faulty. As the Supreme Court ruledin Goldfarb, "Women would have relied upon the practices of the SocialSecurity Administration, yet men would not have relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court." That, the district court believed, violated equal protection provided by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Finally, in considering the congressional offset provision of the amended Social Security Act, the justices held that even if the person achieved successin challenging the provision's constitutionality, the outcome would still penalize litigants because the pension offset would still remain in effect. Thedistrict court viewed such an outcome as merely a means by which Congress made any challenge "fruitless." Further, since the court felt Congress had intended to serve a governmental interest in not penalizing retirees, the severability clause was "an adroit attempt to discourage the bringing of an action bydestroying standing." Thus, the district court held the offset exemption andseverability clause as unconstitutional and ordered the DHHS to pay benefitswithout consideration of dependency and without offset of benefits. After the ruling of the district court, the Secretary of DHHS directly appealed to the Supreme Court for a reversal of the decision.
Circumvention of Legislative Intent
In considering the petitioner's claim, the U.S. Supreme Court too, needed toestablish the validity of Mathews's (now the respondent) standing to bring suit. The Court considered both petitioner's and respondent's arguments. The petitioner maintained that benefits were awarded according to classifications (that of retirees) and were not tied to a monetary award of benefits; hence, there was no differentiation by gender. By agreeing with this point, the justices held that the respondent (Mathews) could reasonably qualify as representative of a class lawsuit. But, to further ascertain the respondent's validity,the Court needed to apply "case or controversy" criteria established by Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood (1979) and Simon v. EasternKentucky Welfare Rights Organization (1976). By not awarding the same benefits to nondependent men and women, the DHHS appeared to be stigmatizing a "disfavored group" in a manner that could cause "serious noneconomic injuries." Hence, according to the legal rubric of Gladstone, the respondent had satisfied the need to show injury due to the conduct of DHHS. Further, since the severability clause would result in withdrawal of benefits from which the respondent could gain relief "by a favorable decision," and since the respondent invoked the right to equitable treatment in which "the appropriate remedy is a mandate of equal treatment," the respondent qualified for standing in accordance with the Simon decision.
In considering the rationale of the lower district court, the justices agreedthat the pension offset applied only to men who could show that half their support derived from their spouse's income (ruled unconstitutionally gender-biased according to the Goldfarb decision). However, the Court reasonedthat "favoring constructions of statutes to avoid constitutional questions" did not "license a court to usurp the policymaking and legislative functions of the duly elected representatives." Hence, after they carefully examined thelanguage of the (1977) amended Social Security Act, the justices held that Congress specifically intended to grant a five-year extension only to addressthe need of retirees who made plans according to pre-Goldfarb legislation. Thus, the Supreme Court reasoned that, "the congressional aim of preventing a fiscal drain on the Social Security trust fund" was circumvented by thedistrict court's requirement that benefits be extended to all retirees.
Ultimately, in a unanimous ruling, the Supreme Court re-confirmed its position regarding discrimination by rendering a decision that was historically andlegally consistent with previous rulings. While the pension offset exceptiondid temporarily restore gender-based classifications when awarding retiree benefits, discrimination was "directly and substantially" linked to an important government objective. Congress' only intent was to protect "individuals whoplanned their retirements in reasonable reliance on the law in effect" priorto the Goldfarb decision. Thus, the exception discriminated "not according to archaic generalizations" about gender roles, but on whether people planned their retirement expecting to receive Social Security benefits according to the law. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court and, tacitly, upheld the constitutionality of Social Security Act as amended by Congress in December of 1977.
Impact
In a series of 1977 rulings including Goldfarb, Silbowitz, and Jablon, the Supreme Court set into motion a public debate regarding the viability and future of retiree benefits as secured under the Social Security Act.Although the Court's decisions held gender discrimination as improper, its decisions also pushed Americans into making decisions about the priority of certain social values--one which society deemed fair, sexual equality, againstthe need to provide for retirees without bankrupting the system. Legislatorsgrappled with the potential of a complete breakdown in the fiscal viability of the Social Security fund and the added pressure from retirees as voiced bythe extremely strong lobby of the Association of Aged and Retired People. Their solution, a pension offset which would not take effect for five years, became an issue which eventually returned to the source of its instigation, theSupreme Court. The justices voted unanimously to uphold the amended languageof the Social Security Act. Their unanimity, however, was not entirely self-motivated. While their decision averted a rift between the judiciary and legislative branches of government, the Court had maintained a consistency in their ruling which reflected historical Supreme Court jurisprudence. More importantly, their decision sought to define a perennial question which confronted and would continue to confront the Court in the years that followed. The issuerevolved around the need to protect the rights of the minority and yet continue to sustain the will of the majority.
Related Cases

• Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26(1976).
  
• Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
  
• Califano v. Silbowitz, 430 U.S. 924 (1977).
  
• Jablon v. Califano, 430 U.S. 924 (1977).
  
• Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979).

Gender and Reverse Discrimination
Women have long fought for equal rights in areas of compensation that range from pay to benefits; but cases such as Heckler signify a counter-trend, that of reverse-discrimination lawsuits. The most famous of these was University of California v. Bakke (1978), which challenged reverse discrimination on the basis of race; but challenges on the basis of gender have beenviewed differently by the Supreme Court. This is perhaps because gender, unlike race, was not a factor in the drafting or the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Part of what makes questions about reverse discrimination difficult is the fact that they can be approached on different levels. There is, for instance, the political or legal level, based on the Constitution, statutes, and generalbeliefs about fairness. But there are also viewpoints based on tradition oron actual practices. Thus for instance alimony laws, which have tended to favor women, are written that way because past experience--at least, prior to the 1970s--showed that women were more likely than men to be financially hurt in a divorce settlement.
Sources
Branch, Kathryn. "Are Women Really Worth as Much as Men?: Employment Inequities, Gender Roles, and Public Policy (Part 3 or 4)." Duke Journal of GenderLaw and Policy, 1 January 1994.