Petitioners
Sharron A. Frontiero, Joseph Frontiero
Respondents
Elliot L. Richardson, Secretary of Defense, et al.
Petitioners' Claim
That requiring different criteria for male spouses of female military personnel--as opposed to female spouses--to qualify for benefits is a violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioners
Joseph L. Levin, Jr.
Chief Lawyer for Respondents
Samuel Huntington
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr. (writing for the Court), Warren E.Burger, William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., PotterStewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William H. Rehnquist
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
14 May 1973
Decision
The federal statutes violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and were overturned.
Significance
The assumption that "the husband in our society is generally the `breadwinner' in the family [while] the wife [is] typically the `dependent' partner," wasshown to be no longer valid. The justices also came within one vote of finding sex an "inherently suspect" category for equal protection purposes.
In this lawsuit, Sharron Frontiero, a married U.S. Air Force lieutenant, andher husband, Joseph, a veteran and full-time college student, challenged a federal statute. The law automatically granted male members of the "uniformed forces" housing and other benefits for their wives. However, it required its female members to demonstrate the "actual dependency" of their husbands beforegranting the same benefit.
According to the statute, a woman's husband was "actually dependent" if his wife provided more than half of his living expenses. Because Joseph Frontieroreceived $205 per month in veteran's benefits, Sharron Frontiero paid less than half of his living expenses, which were $354 per month. Denied the increased medical and dental benefits for her husband and the same housing allowancethat a married male lieutenant automatically received for his spouse, the Frontieros sued. In 1972, the three-judge U.S. Court for the Middle District ofAlabama denied the Frontieros request for relief. Next the Frontieros appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
A Federal Problem
The Frontieros claimed the federal government had abridged their rights. Theysaid that the law violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. (While the Fifth Amendment actually contains only "due process" language and no"equal protection" clause, it had long been interpreted by the Supreme Courtto require the federal government to grant the same "equal protection" specifically required of the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.)
Ruth Bader Ginsburg had argued another case on behalf of the Women's Rights Project (WRP) of the American Civil Liberties Union, and the WRP now asked theFrontieros' lawyer, Joseph J. Levin, Jr., if the organization might join hisSupreme Court appeal. He agreed. The Court granted special leave for the organization to act as amicus curiae, and gave Ginsburg 10 of the 30 minutes in which the Frontieros' case was argued.
A Matter of Convenience
The Court heard arguments on 17 January 1973. Samuel Huntington, representingthe federal government, argued that, in the uniformed services, men and women were treated differently by the law for "administrative convenience." He said that American wives were usually dependent upon their husbands, but that American husbands were not usually dependent upon their wives.
For this reason, Congress had reasonably decided that it was cost-effective simply to view all wives as financially dependent without requiring all the male members of the uniformed services to document that fact. In contrast, if most men were not dependent upon their wives, it was cost-effective and not administratively burdensome to review each female member's documentation of a husband's actual dependency.
Levin argued that the statute unreasonably discriminated because of sex, which was in violation of the Fifth Amendment. He argued that it was discriminatory "as a procedural matter" to require documentation of spousal dependency from women but not from men. In addition, and as a substantive matter, he alsopointed out that it was unfair that a male member who provided less than one-half of a wife's living expenses received spousal benefits, while a "similarly situated" female member obtained none.
Ginsburg focused on the level of judicious scrutiny applied in sex discrimination cases. The Court viewed all laws discriminating because of race, religion, or national origin as "inherently suspect" and subject to "strict judicialscrutiny." To withstand a constitutional challenge, such laws needed to serve a necessary relationship to a compelling state interest. Ginsburg asked theCourt to find sex discrimination as inherently suspect as discrimination based on race, religion, or national origin, and to apply strict judicial scrutiny in this and future sex discrimination cases.
Strict Scrutiny
On 14 May 1973, the Court--with only Justice Rehnquist dissenting--overturnedthe federal statute. Four of the justices-- Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, andWhite--agreed that laws discriminating because of sex were inherently suspectand subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Brennan detailed the historical similarities in race and sex discrimination in America, and the "accident of birth" common to each person's identity insofar as race and national origin:
Justice Stewart agreed that the challenged statutes "work an invidious discrimination in violation of the Constitution," but did not address the scrutinyissue. Powell, joined by Burger and Blackmun, also agreed "that the challenged statutes constitute an unconstitutional discrimination against servicewomenin violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." However, Powell specifically added that he could not agree that classifications based upon sex were "inherently suspect" like those based on race, alienage, and national origin. Therefore, "strict scrutiny" was not to be a standard for the Court. Not until 1976 did the Court employ a mid-level test known as "heightenedscrutiny."
Related Cases
Sharron A. Frontiero, Joseph Frontiero
Respondents
Elliot L. Richardson, Secretary of Defense, et al.
Petitioners' Claim
That requiring different criteria for male spouses of female military personnel--as opposed to female spouses--to qualify for benefits is a violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioners
Joseph L. Levin, Jr.
Chief Lawyer for Respondents
Samuel Huntington
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr. (writing for the Court), Warren E.Burger, William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., PotterStewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William H. Rehnquist
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
14 May 1973
Decision
The federal statutes violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and were overturned.
Significance
The assumption that "the husband in our society is generally the `breadwinner' in the family [while] the wife [is] typically the `dependent' partner," wasshown to be no longer valid. The justices also came within one vote of finding sex an "inherently suspect" category for equal protection purposes.
In this lawsuit, Sharron Frontiero, a married U.S. Air Force lieutenant, andher husband, Joseph, a veteran and full-time college student, challenged a federal statute. The law automatically granted male members of the "uniformed forces" housing and other benefits for their wives. However, it required its female members to demonstrate the "actual dependency" of their husbands beforegranting the same benefit.
According to the statute, a woman's husband was "actually dependent" if his wife provided more than half of his living expenses. Because Joseph Frontieroreceived $205 per month in veteran's benefits, Sharron Frontiero paid less than half of his living expenses, which were $354 per month. Denied the increased medical and dental benefits for her husband and the same housing allowancethat a married male lieutenant automatically received for his spouse, the Frontieros sued. In 1972, the three-judge U.S. Court for the Middle District ofAlabama denied the Frontieros request for relief. Next the Frontieros appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
A Federal Problem
The Frontieros claimed the federal government had abridged their rights. Theysaid that the law violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. (While the Fifth Amendment actually contains only "due process" language and no"equal protection" clause, it had long been interpreted by the Supreme Courtto require the federal government to grant the same "equal protection" specifically required of the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.)
Ruth Bader Ginsburg had argued another case on behalf of the Women's Rights Project (WRP) of the American Civil Liberties Union, and the WRP now asked theFrontieros' lawyer, Joseph J. Levin, Jr., if the organization might join hisSupreme Court appeal. He agreed. The Court granted special leave for the organization to act as amicus curiae, and gave Ginsburg 10 of the 30 minutes in which the Frontieros' case was argued.
A Matter of Convenience
The Court heard arguments on 17 January 1973. Samuel Huntington, representingthe federal government, argued that, in the uniformed services, men and women were treated differently by the law for "administrative convenience." He said that American wives were usually dependent upon their husbands, but that American husbands were not usually dependent upon their wives.
For this reason, Congress had reasonably decided that it was cost-effective simply to view all wives as financially dependent without requiring all the male members of the uniformed services to document that fact. In contrast, if most men were not dependent upon their wives, it was cost-effective and not administratively burdensome to review each female member's documentation of a husband's actual dependency.
Levin argued that the statute unreasonably discriminated because of sex, which was in violation of the Fifth Amendment. He argued that it was discriminatory "as a procedural matter" to require documentation of spousal dependency from women but not from men. In addition, and as a substantive matter, he alsopointed out that it was unfair that a male member who provided less than one-half of a wife's living expenses received spousal benefits, while a "similarly situated" female member obtained none.
Ginsburg focused on the level of judicious scrutiny applied in sex discrimination cases. The Court viewed all laws discriminating because of race, religion, or national origin as "inherently suspect" and subject to "strict judicialscrutiny." To withstand a constitutional challenge, such laws needed to serve a necessary relationship to a compelling state interest. Ginsburg asked theCourt to find sex discrimination as inherently suspect as discrimination based on race, religion, or national origin, and to apply strict judicial scrutiny in this and future sex discrimination cases.
Strict Scrutiny
On 14 May 1973, the Court--with only Justice Rehnquist dissenting--overturnedthe federal statute. Four of the justices-- Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, andWhite--agreed that laws discriminating because of sex were inherently suspectand subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Brennan detailed the historical similarities in race and sex discrimination in America, and the "accident of birth" common to each person's identity insofar as race and national origin:
Our statute books gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes and, indeed throughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to thatof blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes. Neither slaves nor women would hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names, and marriedwomen traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey property or to serve as legal guardians of their own children . . . And although blacks were guaranteed the right to vote in 1870, women were denied even that right . . . until adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment half a century later . .. Nevertheless, . . . women still face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination . . . Moreover, since sex, like race and national origin,is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex would seem to violate the basic concept of our system that legal burdens shouldbear some relationship to individual responsibility . . . statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilitiesof its individual members.
Justice Stewart agreed that the challenged statutes "work an invidious discrimination in violation of the Constitution," but did not address the scrutinyissue. Powell, joined by Burger and Blackmun, also agreed "that the challenged statutes constitute an unconstitutional discrimination against servicewomenin violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." However, Powell specifically added that he could not agree that classifications based upon sex were "inherently suspect" like those based on race, alienage, and national origin. Therefore, "strict scrutiny" was not to be a standard for the Court. Not until 1976 did the Court employ a mid-level test known as "heightenedscrutiny."
Related Cases
- Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
- Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
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