Appellant
Edmund Foley
Appellee
William G. Connelie, S. A. Smith
Appellant's Claim
Edmund Foley, an alien with legal permanent residence in the United States, claimed that his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated because he was excluded by New York State statute from taking a preliminary state police examination.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Jonathan A. Weiss
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Judith A. Gordon
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger (writing for the Court), Lewis F. Powell,Jr., William H. Rehnquist, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
22 March 1978
Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York by ruling that excluding aliens from workingin the state police was constitutional. The Court held that the New York State statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to that statute, no person could participate in activities or proceedings conducted by police officers unless s/he was a citizen of the United States.
Significance
In finding it constitutionally permissible to exclude aliens from service onstate police forces, the Court sought to further define which kinds of government positions and offices necessitated citizenship. The Court further defined the limitations of such exclusion by stipulating that states must evidencea link between their interests and the requirement of citizenship for specific state positions. Thus, privileges accorded to immigrants under the U.S. Constitution were further defined as to not only distinguish the limitations ofalien status, but also the nature of what it meant to possess citizenship inthe United States.
The Rights of Immigrants
As a legal alien, Edmund Foley was a legitimate, permanent resident of UnitedStates. He was also eligible, having completed all of the other prerequisites, to become a naturalized citizen after he had resided in the United Statesfor five years. In 1977, Foley applied to take a competitive examination necessary to gain an appointment in the New York State Police. Police authorities, however, applied a New York statute, which precluded persons who were not citizens of the United States from being tested for an appointment to the NewYork State Police. Foley's application was refused.
Foley appealed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming that the state's exclusion of aliens from the New York State Police violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After considering the value of the claim, a three-judge assembly of the district court held that the statute was constitutional.
The case was brought to the U.S. Supreme Court. Justices for the majority opinion held that refusing acceptance of aliens into the state's police force did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Nonetheless, the opinion submitted bythe remaining three, dissenting justices was strong and significant. In presenting their opinion, they cited a decision taken in one of the Court's priorrulings regarding public employment as state police officer. An earlier decree in Sugarman v. Dougall (1973), held that "elective and important nonelective positions" that include wide "policymaking responsibilities" were the only state jobs from which aliens could be excluded from participation. Justice Marshall concluded that state troopers participate in the "execution ofpublic policy" by arresting persons who commit a crime or a felony in New York. But, he posited that the conduct of police officers, in principal, was nodifferent than firefighters or sanitation workers whose work in the "execution" of the public policy entailed no more policymaking than the acts of extinguishing a fire or keeping streets clean. In such a sense, troopers participating in "execution of policy," did not constitute a performance of work thatcould be described as placing them in "executive, policy making positions" ofthe sort which was clearly excluded in the Sugarman decision. Pointing out the difference between "execution of policy" and "application of policy," Justice Marshall held that Federal and State Constitutions, statutes, andregulations provide for the application, rather than the execution ofpolicy that dictates police conduct. Moreover, since the Court previously recognized the difference between the responsibilities of high officials, and the more limited responsibilities of police officers, Justice Marshall emphasized that the police officer is only applying pre-established rules, not makingpolicy. The dissenting opinion went on to point out that because New York statute authorizes "a New York person" to arrest another who commits a felony or offense in New York (New York Criminal Process Law), the state, in essence,gave authority to all private persons, including aliens, to arrest another person. Thus, because New York Criminal Process Law literally permitted anyonearresting authority, Marshall had serious reservations concerning the majority opinion which claimed that a state trooper's search and arrest authority justified exclusion of aliens from the police force.
Justices Stevens and Brennan, in their dissenting opinion, fully agreed withJustice Marshall. Justice Stevens however, appended the minority opinion andfurther amplified Marshall's misgivings. He questioned the wisdom of allowingaliens to practice law, but not to be police officers. He cited, as precedent, the case of In re Griffiths (1973), wherein the Supreme Court heldthat a state could not limit the practice of law only to U.S. citizens. Stevens could not understand how the Court could conclude that an alien's legal practice was less involved with public policy making, and therefore more tolerable than an alien serving as a police officer. Neither could he see an appreciable difference between the requisite allegiance and trustworthiness neededby both a lawyer and a police officer. To address such disparity he felt, "the Court should draw the line between policy making and non-policy making positions," and that the Court should identify the group of characteristics thatjustify the discrimination of aliens. He concluded that the participation ofaliens in the so-called making of policy might be refuted, and that the statemight not forbid aliens access to employment possibilities without justifiedreason.
Nonetheless, while the minority opinion presented a viable argument, the Supreme Court's majority opinion prevailed, holding that excluding aliens from the New York State police force was not a constitutional violation. In a 6-3 decision, the Court agreed that because a trooper in New York was a part of thelaw enforcement body, troopers thus applied public policy. In citing criteria for such judgment, the Court described troopers as officers whose mandate charged them with prevention and detection of crime. They had the power of search, seizure, and arrest without a formal warrant. They could use a weapon toenforce the law. The Court held that the New York statute did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because police officers were part of the "category ofimportant nonelective officers, who participate directly in the execution ofbroad public policy." Thus, the majority opinion went on to maintain that byreason of such authority, citizenship might be a relevant factor in fulfilling particular law enforcement positions. The justices conceded that aliens hada right to education, welfare, and the ability to earn and be involved in licensed professions; however, they felt the right to administer government authority and statutes was a privilege reserved for citizens. The majority opinion further reasoned that just as aliens are not permitted to be a member of ajury, it would be also abnormal for citizens to be "subjected to the broad discretionary powers of noncitizen police officers." Neither would it be appropriate for the removal of every statutory exclusion of aliens from all constitutional privileges, because that would erase all differences between citizens and noncitizens, and "depreciate historic values of citizenship." In acknowledging such historical precedent, the justices underscored the notion that becoming a citizen made a person "part of people distinct from others." And with that distinction, a person became "entitled to participate in the processof democratic decision making," such as was involved in the work of police officers. Thus, the Court concluded that the states had a historical power to exclude aliens from participation in a state's official institutions.
Impact
The Supreme Court's majority decision upheld the tacit notion contained in the New York State statute that the position of aliens was different than the position of citizens. However, with that decision, the Court was careful to stipulate that their ruling in no way was intended to encourage exclusion of aliens from practicing their professions. Their only intent was to make clear that only citizens were allowed to be a member of police forces. Moreover, theCourt's decision gave New York, hence all states, the freedom to exclude aliens from participating in official state occupations and/or institutions.
An issue that the dissenting opinion embraced, but was largely avoided by themajority decision, was the precedent set in the Sugarman case. (EvenJustice Stewart, who ultimately concurred with the majority decision, expressed doubt about the validity of some of the Court's former decisions.) Minority justices held that the Court's decision only took cursory and superficial account of previous legal interpretations and stipulations forwarded by the Court's decision in the Sugarman case. While Sugarman specifically delineated between work that involved "policymaking decisions" and positions that merely entailed the execution of policy and despite Marshall's assertion that police duties involved application rather than determination of public policy, the majority decision prevailed.
In determining that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not violated by a state's citizenship requirement for police officers, themajority opinion held that states must merely show a relationship between their exclusionary policy and a state's interest in that policy. While application of that policy must be examined to determine if a given state position warrants exclusion of aliens, the Court steadfastly maintained that the state police, by virtue of "an almost infinite variety of discretionary powers," justified a state's insistence that police officers also be U.S. citizens. Thus,while being careful to strictly address the exclusion of aliens from the police force, the Court did not address similarly discretionary discrimination in other professions that might be licensed by states. Thus, during the latterdecades of the twentieth century amidst a climate of increasing public questioning of constitutional limits on the rights of immigrants, immigrant and alien rights were specifically limited only with regard to positions which touched on making public policy.
Related Cases
Edmund Foley
Appellee
William G. Connelie, S. A. Smith
Appellant's Claim
Edmund Foley, an alien with legal permanent residence in the United States, claimed that his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated because he was excluded by New York State statute from taking a preliminary state police examination.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Jonathan A. Weiss
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Judith A. Gordon
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger (writing for the Court), Lewis F. Powell,Jr., William H. Rehnquist, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
22 March 1978
Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York by ruling that excluding aliens from workingin the state police was constitutional. The Court held that the New York State statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to that statute, no person could participate in activities or proceedings conducted by police officers unless s/he was a citizen of the United States.
Significance
In finding it constitutionally permissible to exclude aliens from service onstate police forces, the Court sought to further define which kinds of government positions and offices necessitated citizenship. The Court further defined the limitations of such exclusion by stipulating that states must evidencea link between their interests and the requirement of citizenship for specific state positions. Thus, privileges accorded to immigrants under the U.S. Constitution were further defined as to not only distinguish the limitations ofalien status, but also the nature of what it meant to possess citizenship inthe United States.
The Rights of Immigrants
As a legal alien, Edmund Foley was a legitimate, permanent resident of UnitedStates. He was also eligible, having completed all of the other prerequisites, to become a naturalized citizen after he had resided in the United Statesfor five years. In 1977, Foley applied to take a competitive examination necessary to gain an appointment in the New York State Police. Police authorities, however, applied a New York statute, which precluded persons who were not citizens of the United States from being tested for an appointment to the NewYork State Police. Foley's application was refused.
Foley appealed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming that the state's exclusion of aliens from the New York State Police violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After considering the value of the claim, a three-judge assembly of the district court held that the statute was constitutional.
The case was brought to the U.S. Supreme Court. Justices for the majority opinion held that refusing acceptance of aliens into the state's police force did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Nonetheless, the opinion submitted bythe remaining three, dissenting justices was strong and significant. In presenting their opinion, they cited a decision taken in one of the Court's priorrulings regarding public employment as state police officer. An earlier decree in Sugarman v. Dougall (1973), held that "elective and important nonelective positions" that include wide "policymaking responsibilities" were the only state jobs from which aliens could be excluded from participation. Justice Marshall concluded that state troopers participate in the "execution ofpublic policy" by arresting persons who commit a crime or a felony in New York. But, he posited that the conduct of police officers, in principal, was nodifferent than firefighters or sanitation workers whose work in the "execution" of the public policy entailed no more policymaking than the acts of extinguishing a fire or keeping streets clean. In such a sense, troopers participating in "execution of policy," did not constitute a performance of work thatcould be described as placing them in "executive, policy making positions" ofthe sort which was clearly excluded in the Sugarman decision. Pointing out the difference between "execution of policy" and "application of policy," Justice Marshall held that Federal and State Constitutions, statutes, andregulations provide for the application, rather than the execution ofpolicy that dictates police conduct. Moreover, since the Court previously recognized the difference between the responsibilities of high officials, and the more limited responsibilities of police officers, Justice Marshall emphasized that the police officer is only applying pre-established rules, not makingpolicy. The dissenting opinion went on to point out that because New York statute authorizes "a New York person" to arrest another who commits a felony or offense in New York (New York Criminal Process Law), the state, in essence,gave authority to all private persons, including aliens, to arrest another person. Thus, because New York Criminal Process Law literally permitted anyonearresting authority, Marshall had serious reservations concerning the majority opinion which claimed that a state trooper's search and arrest authority justified exclusion of aliens from the police force.
Justices Stevens and Brennan, in their dissenting opinion, fully agreed withJustice Marshall. Justice Stevens however, appended the minority opinion andfurther amplified Marshall's misgivings. He questioned the wisdom of allowingaliens to practice law, but not to be police officers. He cited, as precedent, the case of In re Griffiths (1973), wherein the Supreme Court heldthat a state could not limit the practice of law only to U.S. citizens. Stevens could not understand how the Court could conclude that an alien's legal practice was less involved with public policy making, and therefore more tolerable than an alien serving as a police officer. Neither could he see an appreciable difference between the requisite allegiance and trustworthiness neededby both a lawyer and a police officer. To address such disparity he felt, "the Court should draw the line between policy making and non-policy making positions," and that the Court should identify the group of characteristics thatjustify the discrimination of aliens. He concluded that the participation ofaliens in the so-called making of policy might be refuted, and that the statemight not forbid aliens access to employment possibilities without justifiedreason.
Nonetheless, while the minority opinion presented a viable argument, the Supreme Court's majority opinion prevailed, holding that excluding aliens from the New York State police force was not a constitutional violation. In a 6-3 decision, the Court agreed that because a trooper in New York was a part of thelaw enforcement body, troopers thus applied public policy. In citing criteria for such judgment, the Court described troopers as officers whose mandate charged them with prevention and detection of crime. They had the power of search, seizure, and arrest without a formal warrant. They could use a weapon toenforce the law. The Court held that the New York statute did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because police officers were part of the "category ofimportant nonelective officers, who participate directly in the execution ofbroad public policy." Thus, the majority opinion went on to maintain that byreason of such authority, citizenship might be a relevant factor in fulfilling particular law enforcement positions. The justices conceded that aliens hada right to education, welfare, and the ability to earn and be involved in licensed professions; however, they felt the right to administer government authority and statutes was a privilege reserved for citizens. The majority opinion further reasoned that just as aliens are not permitted to be a member of ajury, it would be also abnormal for citizens to be "subjected to the broad discretionary powers of noncitizen police officers." Neither would it be appropriate for the removal of every statutory exclusion of aliens from all constitutional privileges, because that would erase all differences between citizens and noncitizens, and "depreciate historic values of citizenship." In acknowledging such historical precedent, the justices underscored the notion that becoming a citizen made a person "part of people distinct from others." And with that distinction, a person became "entitled to participate in the processof democratic decision making," such as was involved in the work of police officers. Thus, the Court concluded that the states had a historical power to exclude aliens from participation in a state's official institutions.
Impact
The Supreme Court's majority decision upheld the tacit notion contained in the New York State statute that the position of aliens was different than the position of citizens. However, with that decision, the Court was careful to stipulate that their ruling in no way was intended to encourage exclusion of aliens from practicing their professions. Their only intent was to make clear that only citizens were allowed to be a member of police forces. Moreover, theCourt's decision gave New York, hence all states, the freedom to exclude aliens from participating in official state occupations and/or institutions.
An issue that the dissenting opinion embraced, but was largely avoided by themajority decision, was the precedent set in the Sugarman case. (EvenJustice Stewart, who ultimately concurred with the majority decision, expressed doubt about the validity of some of the Court's former decisions.) Minority justices held that the Court's decision only took cursory and superficial account of previous legal interpretations and stipulations forwarded by the Court's decision in the Sugarman case. While Sugarman specifically delineated between work that involved "policymaking decisions" and positions that merely entailed the execution of policy and despite Marshall's assertion that police duties involved application rather than determination of public policy, the majority decision prevailed.
In determining that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not violated by a state's citizenship requirement for police officers, themajority opinion held that states must merely show a relationship between their exclusionary policy and a state's interest in that policy. While application of that policy must be examined to determine if a given state position warrants exclusion of aliens, the Court steadfastly maintained that the state police, by virtue of "an almost infinite variety of discretionary powers," justified a state's insistence that police officers also be U.S. citizens. Thus,while being careful to strictly address the exclusion of aliens from the police force, the Court did not address similarly discretionary discrimination in other professions that might be licensed by states. Thus, during the latterdecades of the twentieth century amidst a climate of increasing public questioning of constitutional limits on the rights of immigrants, immigrant and alien rights were specifically limited only with regard to positions which touched on making public policy.
Related Cases
- Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
- Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
- In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
- Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 527 (1976).
- Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
- Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
Further Readings
- Biskupic, Joan, and Elder Witt, eds. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court, 3rd ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1996.
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