Appellant
William Herbert Orr
Appellee
Lillian M. Orr
Appellant's Claim
That Alabama's alimony statutes were unconstitutional.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
John L. Capell III
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
W. F. Horsley
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr. (writing for the Court), ThurgoodMarshall, John Paul Stevens, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
5 March 1979
Decision
Invalidated Alabama's statutes by which husbands, but not wives, might be required to pay alimony upon divorce.
Significance
Rejected the premise that married women are necessarily dependent upon theirhusbands for financial support.
Lillian and William Orr divorced in Alabama on 26 February 1974. The decree directed William to pay Lillian $1,240 per month in alimony. Soon he either fell behind or stopped paying altogether, and Lillian brought contempt proceedings against him in the Circuit Court of Lee County, Alabama, demanding back payments.
In defense, William claimed that Alabama's alimony statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, since they required only husbands--never wives--to pay alimony. Lillian believed the law was constitutional. The court agreed with her and ordered William to pay the back alimony plus Lillian's legal fees. William promptly appealed the judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
On 16 March 1977, the court ruled that alimony laws--"designed" to help "thewife of a broken marriage who needs financial assistance"--were constitutional. The judgment against William must stand. William next petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of certiorari--an order that the lowercourt send the trial records to the superior court for review. In May, the state supreme court granted this writ--only to reverse itself six months later,saying the writ had been "improvidently granted." William then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
Questions Never Asked
The arguments took place on 27 November 1978. Lillian could have objected toWilliam's standing to sue. She could have claimed that his suit came too late; after all, he had not complained at the time of the divorce. And she couldhave argued that since they had both agreed and signed on the dotted line, they were bound by state contract law--so it did not matter whether the alimonylaws were constitutional or not. William would still have to pay. However, to the surprise of the justices, she offered none of these arguments. Lillianstood by her original contention that the only issue before the Court was theconstitutional one.
Therefore, the Court addressed these arguments for her. First, it granted William standing to sue. Justice Brennan said: "There is no question but that Mr. Orr bears a burden he would not bear if he were female. This is highlighted, although not altered, by transposing it to the sphere of race. There is nodoubt that a state law imposing alimony obligations on blacks but not on whites could be challenged by a black who was required to pay. The burden alone is sufficient to establish standing."
Second, the Court found that the "unexcused tardiness" of William's challenge"might well have constituted a procedural default under state law, and if Alabama had refused to hear Mr. Orr's constitutional objection on that ground,we might have been without jurisdiction to hear it here."
The third question was whether the Supreme Court should refuse jurisdiction because Alabama's contract laws might have furnished a valid basis for a lowercourt decision in favor of Lillian. In response, Brennan quoted Andersonv. Brand (1938): "We cannot refuse jurisdiction because the state court might have based its decision . . . upon an independent and adequate non-federal ground."
A Woman's Place Is . . .
Turning to the merits of the case, Brennan stressed that recent Supreme Courtdecisions had established that "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." He then examined what might have been three objectives of the alimony statutes in question.
William had suggested that Alabama preferred wives to play dependent roles within families and reinforced that model by requiring husbands to pay alimony.As Brennan pointed out--citing the 1975 case Stanton v. Stanton as one example--a law intending to further that state objective could not stand.
Brennan then turned to the opinion of the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals thatsaid divorced wives needed financial aid. The legislature might have meant to "provide help for needy spouses" and "use[d] sex as a proxy for need." Thelegislature might also have had "a goal of compensating women for past discrimination during marriage, which assertedly had left them unprepared to fend for themselves in the working world after divorce. Of course, . . . assistingneedy spouses is a legitimate and important governmental objective."
Citing the 1979 case Califano v. Webster, Brennan remarked that reducing the disparity of incomes between men and women caused by the "long historyof discrimination" was an important goal. However, there were other ways toachieve it besides burdening husbands. Alabama required individual hearings before any divorce. These could determine which spouses were "needy" and "which women were in fact discriminated against vis-a-vis their husbands, as wellas which family units defied the stereotype and left the husband dependent onthe wife."
Brennan concluded his discussion with a few remarks about women's "proper place":
A Divorce Decision Changes the Meaning of Marriage
The laws governing marriage are more often evaluated during divorce proceedings than during the life of an intact marriage. Thus, in settling the Orrs' dispute about their divorce decree, the Supreme Court radically changed the legal basis of marriage in America. As editor Leslie Friedman Goldstein points out, Anglo-American law had held that the "legal core" of marriage was a woman's obligation to provide sexual and domestic services and a man's obligationto provide financial support. The Court's ruling in Orr v. Orr was a complete rejection of such assumptions and one that, in Goldstein's words, "seismically altered" the marriage institution.
Related Cases
Alimony
Alimony is a type of payment, secured by court order, whereby one member of adivorcing couple agrees to make regular payments toward the support of the other member. Usually the person making the payment is the former husband, andthe person receiving payment is the former wife. This has been so even sincethe mass entrance of women into the workplace following the gains of the feminist movement in the early 1970s, because males still tend to earn more thanfemales--even for comparable work.
Alimony is a form of support, and is generally awarded in situations where divorcing couples have children. Since men gain sole custody of the children only rarely, it is likely that the former wife will be responsible for raisingthem.
In alimony settlements, the income of the higher-earning spouse is treated asan asset, and unless he is in his peak earning years, it is most often an asset that has not reached full maturity. Sometimes the judge will award a token sum of alimony, such as $1.00 a year, in order to facilitate further challenges on the part of the wife, given the fact that it is easier to modify an existing award than to establish one after the divorce is final.
Sources
West's Encyclopedia of American Law, Vol. 1. St. Paul, MN: West Group,1998.
William Herbert Orr
Appellee
Lillian M. Orr
Appellant's Claim
That Alabama's alimony statutes were unconstitutional.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
John L. Capell III
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
W. F. Horsley
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr. (writing for the Court), ThurgoodMarshall, John Paul Stevens, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
5 March 1979
Decision
Invalidated Alabama's statutes by which husbands, but not wives, might be required to pay alimony upon divorce.
Significance
Rejected the premise that married women are necessarily dependent upon theirhusbands for financial support.
Lillian and William Orr divorced in Alabama on 26 February 1974. The decree directed William to pay Lillian $1,240 per month in alimony. Soon he either fell behind or stopped paying altogether, and Lillian brought contempt proceedings against him in the Circuit Court of Lee County, Alabama, demanding back payments.
In defense, William claimed that Alabama's alimony statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, since they required only husbands--never wives--to pay alimony. Lillian believed the law was constitutional. The court agreed with her and ordered William to pay the back alimony plus Lillian's legal fees. William promptly appealed the judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
On 16 March 1977, the court ruled that alimony laws--"designed" to help "thewife of a broken marriage who needs financial assistance"--were constitutional. The judgment against William must stand. William next petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of certiorari--an order that the lowercourt send the trial records to the superior court for review. In May, the state supreme court granted this writ--only to reverse itself six months later,saying the writ had been "improvidently granted." William then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
Questions Never Asked
The arguments took place on 27 November 1978. Lillian could have objected toWilliam's standing to sue. She could have claimed that his suit came too late; after all, he had not complained at the time of the divorce. And she couldhave argued that since they had both agreed and signed on the dotted line, they were bound by state contract law--so it did not matter whether the alimonylaws were constitutional or not. William would still have to pay. However, to the surprise of the justices, she offered none of these arguments. Lillianstood by her original contention that the only issue before the Court was theconstitutional one.
Therefore, the Court addressed these arguments for her. First, it granted William standing to sue. Justice Brennan said: "There is no question but that Mr. Orr bears a burden he would not bear if he were female. This is highlighted, although not altered, by transposing it to the sphere of race. There is nodoubt that a state law imposing alimony obligations on blacks but not on whites could be challenged by a black who was required to pay. The burden alone is sufficient to establish standing."
Second, the Court found that the "unexcused tardiness" of William's challenge"might well have constituted a procedural default under state law, and if Alabama had refused to hear Mr. Orr's constitutional objection on that ground,we might have been without jurisdiction to hear it here."
The third question was whether the Supreme Court should refuse jurisdiction because Alabama's contract laws might have furnished a valid basis for a lowercourt decision in favor of Lillian. In response, Brennan quoted Andersonv. Brand (1938): "We cannot refuse jurisdiction because the state court might have based its decision . . . upon an independent and adequate non-federal ground."
A Woman's Place Is . . .
Turning to the merits of the case, Brennan stressed that recent Supreme Courtdecisions had established that "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." He then examined what might have been three objectives of the alimony statutes in question.
William had suggested that Alabama preferred wives to play dependent roles within families and reinforced that model by requiring husbands to pay alimony.As Brennan pointed out--citing the 1975 case Stanton v. Stanton as one example--a law intending to further that state objective could not stand.
Brennan then turned to the opinion of the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals thatsaid divorced wives needed financial aid. The legislature might have meant to "provide help for needy spouses" and "use[d] sex as a proxy for need." Thelegislature might also have had "a goal of compensating women for past discrimination during marriage, which assertedly had left them unprepared to fend for themselves in the working world after divorce. Of course, . . . assistingneedy spouses is a legitimate and important governmental objective."
Citing the 1979 case Califano v. Webster, Brennan remarked that reducing the disparity of incomes between men and women caused by the "long historyof discrimination" was an important goal. However, there were other ways toachieve it besides burdening husbands. Alabama required individual hearings before any divorce. These could determine which spouses were "needy" and "which women were in fact discriminated against vis-a-vis their husbands, as wellas which family units defied the stereotype and left the husband dependent onthe wife."
Brennan concluded his discussion with a few remarks about women's "proper place":
Legislative classifications which distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the "proper place" of women and their need for special protection .. . Thus, even statutes purportedly designed to compensate for and amelioratethe effects of past discrimination must be carefully tailored. Where, as here, the State's compensatory and ameliorative purposes are as well served by agender-neutral classification as one that gender classifies and therefore carries with it the baggage of sexual stereotypes, the State cannot be permitted to classify on the basis of sex.
A Divorce Decision Changes the Meaning of Marriage
The laws governing marriage are more often evaluated during divorce proceedings than during the life of an intact marriage. Thus, in settling the Orrs' dispute about their divorce decree, the Supreme Court radically changed the legal basis of marriage in America. As editor Leslie Friedman Goldstein points out, Anglo-American law had held that the "legal core" of marriage was a woman's obligation to provide sexual and domestic services and a man's obligationto provide financial support. The Court's ruling in Orr v. Orr was a complete rejection of such assumptions and one that, in Goldstein's words, "seismically altered" the marriage institution.
Related Cases
- Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
- Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
Alimony
Alimony is a type of payment, secured by court order, whereby one member of adivorcing couple agrees to make regular payments toward the support of the other member. Usually the person making the payment is the former husband, andthe person receiving payment is the former wife. This has been so even sincethe mass entrance of women into the workplace following the gains of the feminist movement in the early 1970s, because males still tend to earn more thanfemales--even for comparable work.
Alimony is a form of support, and is generally awarded in situations where divorcing couples have children. Since men gain sole custody of the children only rarely, it is likely that the former wife will be responsible for raisingthem.
In alimony settlements, the income of the higher-earning spouse is treated asan asset, and unless he is in his peak earning years, it is most often an asset that has not reached full maturity. Sometimes the judge will award a token sum of alimony, such as $1.00 a year, in order to facilitate further challenges on the part of the wife, given the fact that it is easier to modify an existing award than to establish one after the divorce is final.
Sources
West's Encyclopedia of American Law, Vol. 1. St. Paul, MN: West Group,1998.
Further Readings
- Goldstein, Leslie Friedman. The Constitutional Rights of Women, rev. ed. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1989.
- New York Times, March 1979, pp. 6, 7, 11.
- O'Connor, Sandra Day. "Women and the Constitution: A Bicentennial Perspective." in Women, Politics and the Constitution. Naomi B. Lynn, ed. Binghamton, NY: Harrington Park Press, 1990.
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