Appellants
Jan and Roberta DeBoer
Appellees
Daniel Schmidt and Cara Clausen
Appellants' Claim
That Michigan courts could modify Iowa custody orders under authority of theUniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.
Chief Lawyer for Appellants
Suellyn Scarecchia
Chief Lawyers for Appellees
Richard S. Victor, Scott Bassett, Marian L. Faupel
Justices for the Court
Patricia J. Boyle, James Brickley, Michael F. Cavanagh (writing for the court), Richard A. Griffin, Conrad L. Mallatt, Jr., Dorothy Comstock Riley
Justice Dissenting
Charles Levin
Place
Lansing, Michigan
Date of Decision
2 July 1993
Decision
Found in favor of the Clausens by upholding a Michigan court of appeals ruling that denied the DeBoers legal standing to challenge for custody of baby girl Clausen.
Significance
The ruling asserted legal precedence of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act over previous federal law by compelling states to honor custody requests from other states. Issues focused on the "best interest of the child" proved not significant for court custody determinations. Though issues of inconsistentinterstate child custody processes had been the subject of much debate and reform efforts, inconsistency in court rulings and treatment of children as property still remained as chief concerns of child protection advocates.
Enforcement of interstate child custody orders long presented vexing problems. In early child custody cases, courts traditionally resolved jurisdiction (the power to hear and determine a case) disputes on one or more of the following factors: the father's permanent home, the child's place of residence at the beginning of the dispute, or the child's physical presence in a state otherthan the child's permanent residence. Uncertainty concerning jurisdiction was further complicated by the Full Faith and Credit Clause in Article IV of the U.S. Constitution under which courts could freely modify the custody ordersof sister states. The clause only demands that a state court give the same respect to another state's judgement that it affords its own. Courts historically did not view custody orders as final, even in the state of issue.
In an attempt to reduce jurisdictional disputes, the Supreme Court in Mayv. Anderson (1953) limited the exercise of jurisdiction to courts possessing jurisdiction over the subject of the custody request. With confusion persisting due to inconsistent rulings and enforcement of child custody orders, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws lobbied for theUniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) of 1968. The UCCJA established a formal set of jurisdictional criteria to guide courts in making more consistent claims of jurisdiction over such disputes by largely deferring to states where the child had their most significant contacts. Despite widespread acceptance of the UCCJA by the states, variations in state laws implementing the federal law and differing interpretations resulted in continuing uncertainty about the enforceability of child custody decisions. In 1980, Congress responded again by passing the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) requiring states to enforce child custody decisions by courts of other states when inthe best interest of the child. The act also defined the "home state" as "the State in which, immediately preceding the time involved, the child lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months, and in the case of a child less than six months old, the State in which the child lived from birth with any of such persons."
Concerning child custody orders in general, the U.S. legal system traditionally regarded children as the property of their parents, commonly resolving custody matters with a bias toward keeping children with their biological parents. As a result, the "best interests of a child" were overshadowed by the rights of the biological family. In the 1990s, the courts still tended to focus on the capabilities of the parents rather than on the children's needs.
A Change of Heart
On 8 February 1991, Cara Clausen, age 28 and single, gave birth to a baby girl in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Cara decided she was unable to raise the child on her own and arranged, through an attorney, to have Jan and Roberta DeBoer, whohad been desperately trying to adopt for several years, adopt the baby. On 25February at a routine court hearing, Cara gave the judge a signed release ofparental rights. The judge also received a signed release from Cara's boyfriend at the time, Scott Seefeldt, whom Cara named as the baby's father. With all the appropriate steps taken, the judge severed Cara and Scott's parental rights. The DeBoers and the baby returned home to Michigan.
Days later in a sudden change of heart, Cara announced she wanted the baby after all. More significantly, Cara had lied about the identity of the child'sfather. The actual biological father was Dan Schmidt with whom she had brokenup with months before. This revelation meant that while Cara's parental rights had been severed, Dan's had not. With Dan and Cara planning marriage, Carafiled a motion on 6 March to have her daughter returned. Dan did the same aweek later. The DeBoers, finally finding a healthy newborn to adopt, maintained they should not be penalized for Cara's erratic behavior. The DeBoers wereunable to finalize the adoption as a result of the dispute and legally fought back.
In November of 1991, a district court in Iowa upon hearing the case facts found that Dan Schmidt was the biological father and had not abandoned the child. As a result, the court ruled the adoption void and ordered the child returned by the DeBoers. The DeBoers were granted a legal stay allowing them to keep the child while they appealed the district court's decision. An appellate court affirmed the district court's decision as did the Iowa Supreme Court. Inaddition, the supreme court maintained that a natural parent's right to custody could not to be disrupted without a showing of parental unfitness which was not established by the DeBoers. With the case returned for trial from theIowa Supreme Court, the district court in early December of 1992 terminated the DeBoers' right as temporary guardians of the girl.
On the same day their rights were terminated in Iowa, the DeBoers filed a petition in a Michigan circuit court asking the court to assume jurisdiction under the UCCJA. The DeBoers requested the court to find the Iowa custody ordernot enforceable and return custody back to the them. In response, the Michigan circuit court asserted jurisdiction to determine the best interests of thechild. Upon appeal by the Schmidts, the Michigan court of appeals reversed the Michigan circuit court's decision in March of 1993, concluding the Michigancircuit court lacked jurisdiction under UCCJA. The court of appeals also found that, due to the termination of their guardianship, the DeBoers lacked legal standing to challenge the Iowa court order. The DeBoers appealed the caseto the Supreme Court of Michigan.
Iowa Is Judged Home
In a 6-1 decision, the Michigan Supreme Court found Iowa had jurisdiction over the adoption proceeding under the PKPA's home state jurisdiction requirement. Chief Justice Michael F. Cavanaugh, in writing for the court, rejected theDeBoers' argument that Michigan courts could modify the Iowa custody ruling.Cavanaugh found that the Iowa courts consistently followed the guidelines ofthe PKPA and established Iowa as the home state for baby Clausen. The Iowa custody was thus awarded due to the full faith and credit afforded to decreesfrom sister states under the PKPA in conformity with the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, Michigan courts could not exercise jurisdiction over the interstatecustody dispute. Cavanaugh also rejected the DeBoers' argument that PKPA andUCCJA required an analysis concerning the best interests of the girl since neither act contained a test to measure the child's best interests.
Because an Iowa district court terminated the DeBoers' rights as temporary guardians under the PKPA, the Michigan Supreme Court determined that the DeBoers had no legal authority in seeking custody in Michigan courts. Thus, when the temporary custody order was terminated, the DeBoers became third parties tothe girl and no longer had a legal basis to claim custody.
In the lone dissenting opinion, Justice Levin insisted PKPA actually providedMichigan with jurisdiction to modify the Iowa court order. Levine argued Michigan had both home site status and a sufficient connection to the case for establishing jurisdiction. The girl lived with the DeBoers in Michigan from February of 1991 until July of 1993. She only resided in Iowa for less than three weeks, during which time she was never in custody of either biological parent. According to the facts, Levin contended Michigan indeed had proper jurisdiction under PKPA. Levin argued the majority's finding directly contradictedcongressional intent and, if widely accepted, freed courts to manipulate thePKPA in order to justify their own decisions in future child custody cases.Levin wrote that the PKPA actually seeks to avoid courts "blindly ignoring the consideration of the child's best interests."
Impact
The U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant a further stay to the DeBoers in Julyof 1993. The parental rights doctrine and "best interests of the child" standards continue to be inconsistently applied in child custody cases. The parental rights doctrine maintains that a biological parent is presumed to be thebest parent until they are affirmatively shown as unfit. Through the 1990s, atrend toward considering the best interest of the child grew as promoted inClausen's dissenting opinion. Despite this trend, Iowa courts in Clausen declared they could not, and should not, consider the interests ofthe child, maintaining throughout that only if Dan Schmidt was determined tobe unfit as a parent could the courts consider the interests of the child. Bydeferring to Iowa, the Michigan Supreme Court decision refused to consider evidence of a psychological relationship between the child and third parties.Critics argued the child was treated merely as property rather than as a person with fundamental rights.
Three other child custody decisions were handed down in the month following the Clausen ruling, further contributing to the confusion surrounding custody cases. In Twigg v. Mays, a Florida circuit court determined that a 14-year-old girl, accidentally switched at birth with another baby in thehospital, could not be forced to visit her biological parents. The court ruled that "mere" biological ties were not sufficient to determine the legal parents, and that the only father she has ever known was not just her "psychological" father, but her legal father as well. A few days later, a Florida appellate court allowed a 12-year-old boy to sever ties with his birth-mother under advisement of several adults and a court-appointed guardian. A Vermont court order exemplified the confusion surrounding custody cases. A judge ordereda birth certificate of a nine-month-old boy changed to reflect the names of the adoptive mother and the biological father, although the father was not aware of the adoption until six weeks after the birth.
The ability of biological parents to win custody varies from state to state.Some states allow parents up to two years to return and claim either fraud orduress in order to win back a child. In Iowa, where the Schmidts lived, court rulings allow fathers to "come back at any point in the child's life."
Conflicting local rulings and legislation prompted many adoption agencies andchildren's rights advocates to press the Clausen case to the U.S. Supreme Court. They argued that only clear guidance set forth by the Court couldproduce predictable and consistent lower court rulings. As the twentieth century closed, the uncertainty surrounding the rights of biological parents andthe best interests of the child continued to complicate the complex and emotional custody cases.
Related Cases
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
In 1980, Congress recognized and addressed a growing problem in the United States and its territories. Child custody and visitation disputes between parents were sometimes becoming kidnapping cases. In a dispute, the child could beremoved from one parent and taken out of state. Then the other parent wouldappeal to the court in the new state for a custody or visitation ruling, thereby circumventing the original court's ruling or jurisdiction.
The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, passed by Congress and signedinto law by the president on 28 December 1980, was designed to stop this practice. This legislation established a national standard in custody battles involving more than one state court jurisdiction. The act prohibits one state court from changing a child custody order made by another state. The only exceptions are if the original court clearly no longer has jurisdiction over thematter, or has not accepted jurisdiction in order to change the original decree.
Sources
http://www.brandeslaw.com/uccja.htm. 28 USC Sec. 1738A
http://www.divorcenet.com:80/28uscode.html.
Jan and Roberta DeBoer
Appellees
Daniel Schmidt and Cara Clausen
Appellants' Claim
That Michigan courts could modify Iowa custody orders under authority of theUniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.
Chief Lawyer for Appellants
Suellyn Scarecchia
Chief Lawyers for Appellees
Richard S. Victor, Scott Bassett, Marian L. Faupel
Justices for the Court
Patricia J. Boyle, James Brickley, Michael F. Cavanagh (writing for the court), Richard A. Griffin, Conrad L. Mallatt, Jr., Dorothy Comstock Riley
Justice Dissenting
Charles Levin
Place
Lansing, Michigan
Date of Decision
2 July 1993
Decision
Found in favor of the Clausens by upholding a Michigan court of appeals ruling that denied the DeBoers legal standing to challenge for custody of baby girl Clausen.
Significance
The ruling asserted legal precedence of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act over previous federal law by compelling states to honor custody requests from other states. Issues focused on the "best interest of the child" proved not significant for court custody determinations. Though issues of inconsistentinterstate child custody processes had been the subject of much debate and reform efforts, inconsistency in court rulings and treatment of children as property still remained as chief concerns of child protection advocates.
Enforcement of interstate child custody orders long presented vexing problems. In early child custody cases, courts traditionally resolved jurisdiction (the power to hear and determine a case) disputes on one or more of the following factors: the father's permanent home, the child's place of residence at the beginning of the dispute, or the child's physical presence in a state otherthan the child's permanent residence. Uncertainty concerning jurisdiction was further complicated by the Full Faith and Credit Clause in Article IV of the U.S. Constitution under which courts could freely modify the custody ordersof sister states. The clause only demands that a state court give the same respect to another state's judgement that it affords its own. Courts historically did not view custody orders as final, even in the state of issue.
In an attempt to reduce jurisdictional disputes, the Supreme Court in Mayv. Anderson (1953) limited the exercise of jurisdiction to courts possessing jurisdiction over the subject of the custody request. With confusion persisting due to inconsistent rulings and enforcement of child custody orders, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws lobbied for theUniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) of 1968. The UCCJA established a formal set of jurisdictional criteria to guide courts in making more consistent claims of jurisdiction over such disputes by largely deferring to states where the child had their most significant contacts. Despite widespread acceptance of the UCCJA by the states, variations in state laws implementing the federal law and differing interpretations resulted in continuing uncertainty about the enforceability of child custody decisions. In 1980, Congress responded again by passing the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) requiring states to enforce child custody decisions by courts of other states when inthe best interest of the child. The act also defined the "home state" as "the State in which, immediately preceding the time involved, the child lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months, and in the case of a child less than six months old, the State in which the child lived from birth with any of such persons."
Concerning child custody orders in general, the U.S. legal system traditionally regarded children as the property of their parents, commonly resolving custody matters with a bias toward keeping children with their biological parents. As a result, the "best interests of a child" were overshadowed by the rights of the biological family. In the 1990s, the courts still tended to focus on the capabilities of the parents rather than on the children's needs.
A Change of Heart
On 8 February 1991, Cara Clausen, age 28 and single, gave birth to a baby girl in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Cara decided she was unable to raise the child on her own and arranged, through an attorney, to have Jan and Roberta DeBoer, whohad been desperately trying to adopt for several years, adopt the baby. On 25February at a routine court hearing, Cara gave the judge a signed release ofparental rights. The judge also received a signed release from Cara's boyfriend at the time, Scott Seefeldt, whom Cara named as the baby's father. With all the appropriate steps taken, the judge severed Cara and Scott's parental rights. The DeBoers and the baby returned home to Michigan.
Days later in a sudden change of heart, Cara announced she wanted the baby after all. More significantly, Cara had lied about the identity of the child'sfather. The actual biological father was Dan Schmidt with whom she had brokenup with months before. This revelation meant that while Cara's parental rights had been severed, Dan's had not. With Dan and Cara planning marriage, Carafiled a motion on 6 March to have her daughter returned. Dan did the same aweek later. The DeBoers, finally finding a healthy newborn to adopt, maintained they should not be penalized for Cara's erratic behavior. The DeBoers wereunable to finalize the adoption as a result of the dispute and legally fought back.
In November of 1991, a district court in Iowa upon hearing the case facts found that Dan Schmidt was the biological father and had not abandoned the child. As a result, the court ruled the adoption void and ordered the child returned by the DeBoers. The DeBoers were granted a legal stay allowing them to keep the child while they appealed the district court's decision. An appellate court affirmed the district court's decision as did the Iowa Supreme Court. Inaddition, the supreme court maintained that a natural parent's right to custody could not to be disrupted without a showing of parental unfitness which was not established by the DeBoers. With the case returned for trial from theIowa Supreme Court, the district court in early December of 1992 terminated the DeBoers' right as temporary guardians of the girl.
On the same day their rights were terminated in Iowa, the DeBoers filed a petition in a Michigan circuit court asking the court to assume jurisdiction under the UCCJA. The DeBoers requested the court to find the Iowa custody ordernot enforceable and return custody back to the them. In response, the Michigan circuit court asserted jurisdiction to determine the best interests of thechild. Upon appeal by the Schmidts, the Michigan court of appeals reversed the Michigan circuit court's decision in March of 1993, concluding the Michigancircuit court lacked jurisdiction under UCCJA. The court of appeals also found that, due to the termination of their guardianship, the DeBoers lacked legal standing to challenge the Iowa court order. The DeBoers appealed the caseto the Supreme Court of Michigan.
Iowa Is Judged Home
In a 6-1 decision, the Michigan Supreme Court found Iowa had jurisdiction over the adoption proceeding under the PKPA's home state jurisdiction requirement. Chief Justice Michael F. Cavanaugh, in writing for the court, rejected theDeBoers' argument that Michigan courts could modify the Iowa custody ruling.Cavanaugh found that the Iowa courts consistently followed the guidelines ofthe PKPA and established Iowa as the home state for baby Clausen. The Iowa custody was thus awarded due to the full faith and credit afforded to decreesfrom sister states under the PKPA in conformity with the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, Michigan courts could not exercise jurisdiction over the interstatecustody dispute. Cavanaugh also rejected the DeBoers' argument that PKPA andUCCJA required an analysis concerning the best interests of the girl since neither act contained a test to measure the child's best interests.
Because an Iowa district court terminated the DeBoers' rights as temporary guardians under the PKPA, the Michigan Supreme Court determined that the DeBoers had no legal authority in seeking custody in Michigan courts. Thus, when the temporary custody order was terminated, the DeBoers became third parties tothe girl and no longer had a legal basis to claim custody.
In the lone dissenting opinion, Justice Levin insisted PKPA actually providedMichigan with jurisdiction to modify the Iowa court order. Levine argued Michigan had both home site status and a sufficient connection to the case for establishing jurisdiction. The girl lived with the DeBoers in Michigan from February of 1991 until July of 1993. She only resided in Iowa for less than three weeks, during which time she was never in custody of either biological parent. According to the facts, Levin contended Michigan indeed had proper jurisdiction under PKPA. Levin argued the majority's finding directly contradictedcongressional intent and, if widely accepted, freed courts to manipulate thePKPA in order to justify their own decisions in future child custody cases.Levin wrote that the PKPA actually seeks to avoid courts "blindly ignoring the consideration of the child's best interests."
Impact
The U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant a further stay to the DeBoers in Julyof 1993. The parental rights doctrine and "best interests of the child" standards continue to be inconsistently applied in child custody cases. The parental rights doctrine maintains that a biological parent is presumed to be thebest parent until they are affirmatively shown as unfit. Through the 1990s, atrend toward considering the best interest of the child grew as promoted inClausen's dissenting opinion. Despite this trend, Iowa courts in Clausen declared they could not, and should not, consider the interests ofthe child, maintaining throughout that only if Dan Schmidt was determined tobe unfit as a parent could the courts consider the interests of the child. Bydeferring to Iowa, the Michigan Supreme Court decision refused to consider evidence of a psychological relationship between the child and third parties.Critics argued the child was treated merely as property rather than as a person with fundamental rights.
Three other child custody decisions were handed down in the month following the Clausen ruling, further contributing to the confusion surrounding custody cases. In Twigg v. Mays, a Florida circuit court determined that a 14-year-old girl, accidentally switched at birth with another baby in thehospital, could not be forced to visit her biological parents. The court ruled that "mere" biological ties were not sufficient to determine the legal parents, and that the only father she has ever known was not just her "psychological" father, but her legal father as well. A few days later, a Florida appellate court allowed a 12-year-old boy to sever ties with his birth-mother under advisement of several adults and a court-appointed guardian. A Vermont court order exemplified the confusion surrounding custody cases. A judge ordereda birth certificate of a nine-month-old boy changed to reflect the names of the adoptive mother and the biological father, although the father was not aware of the adoption until six weeks after the birth.
The ability of biological parents to win custody varies from state to state.Some states allow parents up to two years to return and claim either fraud orduress in order to win back a child. In Iowa, where the Schmidts lived, court rulings allow fathers to "come back at any point in the child's life."
Conflicting local rulings and legislation prompted many adoption agencies andchildren's rights advocates to press the Clausen case to the U.S. Supreme Court. They argued that only clear guidance set forth by the Court couldproduce predictable and consistent lower court rulings. As the twentieth century closed, the uncertainty surrounding the rights of biological parents andthe best interests of the child continued to complicate the complex and emotional custody cases.
Related Cases
- May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
- In re Brandon L.E., 183 W.Va. 113 (S.E.2d 515 1990).
- In re Gregory Kingsley, 1992 WO 551484 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992).
- Twigg v. Mays, 1993 WL 330624 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 1993).
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
In 1980, Congress recognized and addressed a growing problem in the United States and its territories. Child custody and visitation disputes between parents were sometimes becoming kidnapping cases. In a dispute, the child could beremoved from one parent and taken out of state. Then the other parent wouldappeal to the court in the new state for a custody or visitation ruling, thereby circumventing the original court's ruling or jurisdiction.
The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, passed by Congress and signedinto law by the president on 28 December 1980, was designed to stop this practice. This legislation established a national standard in custody battles involving more than one state court jurisdiction. The act prohibits one state court from changing a child custody order made by another state. The only exceptions are if the original court clearly no longer has jurisdiction over thematter, or has not accepted jurisdiction in order to change the original decree.
Sources
http://www.brandeslaw.com/uccja.htm. 28 USC Sec. 1738A
http://www.divorcenet.com:80/28uscode.html.
User Comments Add a comment…