Petitioners
Ellis Gregory, Jr., Anthony P. Nugent, Jr.
Respondent
John D. Ashcroft, Governor of Missouri
Petitioners' Claim
The Missouri Constitution's mandatory retirement provision required retirement of state judges over age 70. Petitioners claimed it violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it irrationally distinguished between old and younger judges, and between state judges and other state officials not subject tothe mandatory retirement provision.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioners
Jim J. Shoemaker
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
James B. Deutsch
Justices for the Court
Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor (writing for the Court), William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
Harry A. Blackmun, Thurgood Marshall
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
20 June 1991
Decision
The Missouri mandatory retirement provision did not violate the ADEA becauseits language did not explicitly protect state judges. Neither was the Equal Protection Clause violated because the Court ruled the ADEA rationally furthered the state interest of providing fully functioning judiciaries.
Significance
Missouri's Constitution was challenged as being in violation of federal statute and the U.S. Constitution; however, the Supreme Court rejected petitioners' arguments. The Court held that a state's constitutional provision concerning such an important issue as the right to define the qualifications of a state's highest officials could not be overridden if it did not explicitly opposefederal statutes.
Judges Challenge Mandatory Retirement
An article of the state of Missouri Constitution dictated that all judges other than municipal judges should retire at age 70. Because increasing age often involves deterioration of mental and physical abilities, this provision wasenacted to ensure state judges were fully capable of performing their duties. Subject to this provision were two Missouri state judges: Ellis Gregory, Jr., a judge for the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit, and Anthony P. Nugent, Jr.,a judge for the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District. Both had been appointed to their positions by respondent, Governor John D. Ashcroft of Missouri, and had been retained in office through infrequent retention elections.They ran unopposed and were subject only to a "yes or no" vote. Before dismissal, petitioners sued Ashcroft, the governor of Missouri, in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, challenging the mandatory retirement provision of the Missouri Constitution. They stated that it violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, "No State shall . . . deny to any person within itsjurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
The ADEA, enacted by Congress in 1967, protected senior workers from discrimination in hiring, firing, and in conditions of employment. This act was amended in 1974 also naming states as employers. The term "employees" was also redefined to exclude from the ADEA protection any person elected to public office, or any person chosen by such officer to be on his/her personal staff, or an appointee on the policymaking level, or an immediate adviser on legal questions.
The district court held that mandatory retirement did not violate the ADEA. Because the two judges were appointed by an elected official (the governor), and their judicial duties included making policy by establishing rules of practice on local and state level, judges were "appointees on a policymaking level." They were, therefore, excluded from the protection of the ADEA. The courtalso applied the "rational basis standard" of the Equal Protection analysisand found it was satisfied because Missouri had a justifiable rationale for distinguishing between judges and other state officials not subject to the provision. Other officials, unable to perform their duties because of age, couldbe removed from office considerably easier than judges who ran unopposed inretention elections and whose deterioration in abilities the voters could less easily perceive. The two judges' claims were rejected and the governor of Missouri dismissed them.
Petitioners appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, butthis court affirmed the dismissal. The appellate court agreed with the district court's finding that judges were appointees on the policymaking level andconsequently not protected by the ADEA. It also held that the state rationally distinguished between judges over and judges under 70. Following this decision, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari (a written order to alower court to forward the proceedings of a case for review).
Both Claims Overturned Again
In a 7-2 opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. Justice O'Connor, who delivered the opinion of the Court, first resolved how to apply ambiguous text contained in the ADEA. She maintained the lowercourt's decision wrongly interpreted that the federal statute (the ADEA) could upset the constitutional balance between states and the federal government. (Congress enacted the ADEA and extended it to the states.)
O'Connor explained that the U.S. Constitution established a system of dual, concurrent sovereignty between the states and the federal government (the onlyexception was the Supremacy Clause which gave advantage to the federal government). Since Missouri's right to define the qualifications of its highest state officials was protected by the Tenth Amendment--"the powers not delegatedto the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people"--O'Connor held it obligatory for the Court to be certain of Congress's intent before findingthat a federal law overrode the balance. The Court had already previously ruled that Congress had made its intent "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute" (embodied in the ADEA provisions) not to override Missouri's right to dismiss high state officials (Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police [1989]). Knowing that the Congress did not readily interfere with a state's sovereign powers, the Court gave clear guidance regarding interpretation of the ADEA using the "plain statement rule."
The ADEA stated that the term "employee" (as a person protected by ADEA provisions) should not include "any person elected to public office in any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be onsuch officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the policymaking level oran immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office." Governor Ashcroft, respondent, claimed that the ADEA's exclusion from its protection of certain public officials pertained to the two petitioners, because they were appointed by an elected official (the governor himself), and because they were appointees on the policymaking level.His lawyer argued that state judges did make policy because they fashioned and applied common law adopted in Missouri. Moreover, the two judges' courts made policy by establishing rules of practice on a local and state level.
Petitioners Assert Portions of Act Not Applicable
The petitioners' counter-argument was that judges merely resolved factual disputes and decided questions of law and did not make policy. In addition, thetwo judges claimed that the phrase "appointees on the policymaking level" wasclosely related to other parts of the provision which referred to those in close, working relationships with the elected official who appointed them. Thus, because it was illegal for the judges to work closely with such an electedofficial as governor, that provision of the ADEA did not apply to judges.
The Court found that the governor's arguments were more persuasive because herelied on "the plain language" of the statute. The ADEA nowhere explicitly stated that judges were protected by it, and O'Connor wrote the Court would not read the ADEA to cover state judges unless Congress had made it clear thatjudges were protected by it. Moreover, by such interpretation, judges were not only "policymakers," but also persons "on policymaking level."
Turning to the petitioners' equal protection violation claim, the Court applied the rational basis standard of its equal protection analysis (which was satisfied if a state rationally furthered a legitimate state interest). The twojudges argued that the state did not have rational basis to make two distinctions: between judges who had reached age 70 and younger judges, and betweenjudges 70 and over and other state officials who were not subject to mandatory retirement. The Court again found respondent's arguments more reasonable. The attorney for the governor reasoned that the mandatory retirement provisionhelped a state uphold the public need for fully functioning judiciaries. Moreover, the mandatory retirement provision avoided tedious and perplexing determinations about which judge, at a certain age, was not physically and mentally qualified, and it increased the opportunity for young qualified persons toshare in the judiciary. The Court found all these interests compelling for Missouri. It was rational to conclude that the threat of deterioration at age70 was sufficiently great and the alternatives for removal from office (infrequent retention elections in which judges ran unopposed, voluntary retirement, or even impeachment) were sufficiently inadequate. Thus, Missouri's mandatory retirement provision did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Four Justices Differ in Opinions
Justice White, joined by Justice Stevens (concurring and dissenting in part),agreed with the majority opinion that neither the ADEA nor the Equal Protection Clause prohibited Missouri's mandatory retirement provision. On the otherhand, White could not agree with the majority's use of the "plain statement"requirement for application of federal statute (the ADEA) to state activities (the mandatory retirement provision of the Missouri Constitution). Congress's intent to regulate age discrimination by states through enacting the ADEAwas "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." Therefore, the ADEAcould have been imposed over Missouri's constitutional provision for mandatory retirement for its state judges without fear of violating the balance of federal and state sovereignties.
Dissenting Justices Blackmun and Marshall were of the opinion that parts of cited ADEA text should be viewed as related to one another (that was the argument of the two Missouri judges), and thus concluded that the intention of Congress was not to exclude state judges from the ADEA protection. State judgeswere not "on [a] policymaking level" because they were not accountable to theofficial who appointed them and were precluded from working closely with that official once they had been appointed. In addition, Justice Blackmun statedthat when a statutory term was ambiguous or undefined, the Court should defer to a reasonable interpretation of that term proffered by the agency entrusted with administering the statute. Blackmun referred to Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency which was entitled to administer theADEA, had a position that an appointed judge was not an "appointee on the policymaking level." Nonetheless, the dissenting argument was countered by Justice White's opinion that the EEOC was entitled to little if any deference by the Supreme Court and that its position was inconsistent with "the plain language" of the ADEA.
Impact
Every state is entitled to a certain level of sovereignty. In turn, state sovereignty is carefully balanced with the sovereignty of the federal government. In spite of this balance, Congress has power to impose a federal statute ona state statute or constitution, but does not usually exercise that power lightly. Fearing that Congress's intentions could be misread, the Supreme Courtapplied "the plain statement" requirement in this case, where the state statute was challenged as being in violation of federal statute and the Constitution. Reading the federal statute enacted by Congress in search of a plain statement, the Court found that the ADEA nowhere made it clear that state judgeswere protected by it. Therefore, Missouri's mandatory retirement provision for its state judges did not violate the ADEA. Neither did it violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it rationally furthered a legitimate state interest to uphold the public demand for fully functioning judiciaries. As a final outcome, this decision established that a state'sright to define the qualifications of its highest state officials could notbe overridden by the ADEA's prohibition of age discrimination. Nor would a state violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause as long as itsrequirements reasonably served a legitimate state interest.
Related Cases
Ellis Gregory, Jr., Anthony P. Nugent, Jr.
Respondent
John D. Ashcroft, Governor of Missouri
Petitioners' Claim
The Missouri Constitution's mandatory retirement provision required retirement of state judges over age 70. Petitioners claimed it violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it irrationally distinguished between old and younger judges, and between state judges and other state officials not subject tothe mandatory retirement provision.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioners
Jim J. Shoemaker
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
James B. Deutsch
Justices for the Court
Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor (writing for the Court), William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
Harry A. Blackmun, Thurgood Marshall
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
20 June 1991
Decision
The Missouri mandatory retirement provision did not violate the ADEA becauseits language did not explicitly protect state judges. Neither was the Equal Protection Clause violated because the Court ruled the ADEA rationally furthered the state interest of providing fully functioning judiciaries.
Significance
Missouri's Constitution was challenged as being in violation of federal statute and the U.S. Constitution; however, the Supreme Court rejected petitioners' arguments. The Court held that a state's constitutional provision concerning such an important issue as the right to define the qualifications of a state's highest officials could not be overridden if it did not explicitly opposefederal statutes.
Judges Challenge Mandatory Retirement
An article of the state of Missouri Constitution dictated that all judges other than municipal judges should retire at age 70. Because increasing age often involves deterioration of mental and physical abilities, this provision wasenacted to ensure state judges were fully capable of performing their duties. Subject to this provision were two Missouri state judges: Ellis Gregory, Jr., a judge for the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit, and Anthony P. Nugent, Jr.,a judge for the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District. Both had been appointed to their positions by respondent, Governor John D. Ashcroft of Missouri, and had been retained in office through infrequent retention elections.They ran unopposed and were subject only to a "yes or no" vote. Before dismissal, petitioners sued Ashcroft, the governor of Missouri, in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, challenging the mandatory retirement provision of the Missouri Constitution. They stated that it violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, "No State shall . . . deny to any person within itsjurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
The ADEA, enacted by Congress in 1967, protected senior workers from discrimination in hiring, firing, and in conditions of employment. This act was amended in 1974 also naming states as employers. The term "employees" was also redefined to exclude from the ADEA protection any person elected to public office, or any person chosen by such officer to be on his/her personal staff, or an appointee on the policymaking level, or an immediate adviser on legal questions.
The district court held that mandatory retirement did not violate the ADEA. Because the two judges were appointed by an elected official (the governor), and their judicial duties included making policy by establishing rules of practice on local and state level, judges were "appointees on a policymaking level." They were, therefore, excluded from the protection of the ADEA. The courtalso applied the "rational basis standard" of the Equal Protection analysisand found it was satisfied because Missouri had a justifiable rationale for distinguishing between judges and other state officials not subject to the provision. Other officials, unable to perform their duties because of age, couldbe removed from office considerably easier than judges who ran unopposed inretention elections and whose deterioration in abilities the voters could less easily perceive. The two judges' claims were rejected and the governor of Missouri dismissed them.
Petitioners appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, butthis court affirmed the dismissal. The appellate court agreed with the district court's finding that judges were appointees on the policymaking level andconsequently not protected by the ADEA. It also held that the state rationally distinguished between judges over and judges under 70. Following this decision, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari (a written order to alower court to forward the proceedings of a case for review).
Both Claims Overturned Again
In a 7-2 opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. Justice O'Connor, who delivered the opinion of the Court, first resolved how to apply ambiguous text contained in the ADEA. She maintained the lowercourt's decision wrongly interpreted that the federal statute (the ADEA) could upset the constitutional balance between states and the federal government. (Congress enacted the ADEA and extended it to the states.)
O'Connor explained that the U.S. Constitution established a system of dual, concurrent sovereignty between the states and the federal government (the onlyexception was the Supremacy Clause which gave advantage to the federal government). Since Missouri's right to define the qualifications of its highest state officials was protected by the Tenth Amendment--"the powers not delegatedto the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people"--O'Connor held it obligatory for the Court to be certain of Congress's intent before findingthat a federal law overrode the balance. The Court had already previously ruled that Congress had made its intent "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute" (embodied in the ADEA provisions) not to override Missouri's right to dismiss high state officials (Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police [1989]). Knowing that the Congress did not readily interfere with a state's sovereign powers, the Court gave clear guidance regarding interpretation of the ADEA using the "plain statement rule."
The ADEA stated that the term "employee" (as a person protected by ADEA provisions) should not include "any person elected to public office in any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be onsuch officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the policymaking level oran immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office." Governor Ashcroft, respondent, claimed that the ADEA's exclusion from its protection of certain public officials pertained to the two petitioners, because they were appointed by an elected official (the governor himself), and because they were appointees on the policymaking level.His lawyer argued that state judges did make policy because they fashioned and applied common law adopted in Missouri. Moreover, the two judges' courts made policy by establishing rules of practice on a local and state level.
Petitioners Assert Portions of Act Not Applicable
The petitioners' counter-argument was that judges merely resolved factual disputes and decided questions of law and did not make policy. In addition, thetwo judges claimed that the phrase "appointees on the policymaking level" wasclosely related to other parts of the provision which referred to those in close, working relationships with the elected official who appointed them. Thus, because it was illegal for the judges to work closely with such an electedofficial as governor, that provision of the ADEA did not apply to judges.
The Court found that the governor's arguments were more persuasive because herelied on "the plain language" of the statute. The ADEA nowhere explicitly stated that judges were protected by it, and O'Connor wrote the Court would not read the ADEA to cover state judges unless Congress had made it clear thatjudges were protected by it. Moreover, by such interpretation, judges were not only "policymakers," but also persons "on policymaking level."
Turning to the petitioners' equal protection violation claim, the Court applied the rational basis standard of its equal protection analysis (which was satisfied if a state rationally furthered a legitimate state interest). The twojudges argued that the state did not have rational basis to make two distinctions: between judges who had reached age 70 and younger judges, and betweenjudges 70 and over and other state officials who were not subject to mandatory retirement. The Court again found respondent's arguments more reasonable. The attorney for the governor reasoned that the mandatory retirement provisionhelped a state uphold the public need for fully functioning judiciaries. Moreover, the mandatory retirement provision avoided tedious and perplexing determinations about which judge, at a certain age, was not physically and mentally qualified, and it increased the opportunity for young qualified persons toshare in the judiciary. The Court found all these interests compelling for Missouri. It was rational to conclude that the threat of deterioration at age70 was sufficiently great and the alternatives for removal from office (infrequent retention elections in which judges ran unopposed, voluntary retirement, or even impeachment) were sufficiently inadequate. Thus, Missouri's mandatory retirement provision did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Four Justices Differ in Opinions
Justice White, joined by Justice Stevens (concurring and dissenting in part),agreed with the majority opinion that neither the ADEA nor the Equal Protection Clause prohibited Missouri's mandatory retirement provision. On the otherhand, White could not agree with the majority's use of the "plain statement"requirement for application of federal statute (the ADEA) to state activities (the mandatory retirement provision of the Missouri Constitution). Congress's intent to regulate age discrimination by states through enacting the ADEAwas "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." Therefore, the ADEAcould have been imposed over Missouri's constitutional provision for mandatory retirement for its state judges without fear of violating the balance of federal and state sovereignties.
Dissenting Justices Blackmun and Marshall were of the opinion that parts of cited ADEA text should be viewed as related to one another (that was the argument of the two Missouri judges), and thus concluded that the intention of Congress was not to exclude state judges from the ADEA protection. State judgeswere not "on [a] policymaking level" because they were not accountable to theofficial who appointed them and were precluded from working closely with that official once they had been appointed. In addition, Justice Blackmun statedthat when a statutory term was ambiguous or undefined, the Court should defer to a reasonable interpretation of that term proffered by the agency entrusted with administering the statute. Blackmun referred to Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency which was entitled to administer theADEA, had a position that an appointed judge was not an "appointee on the policymaking level." Nonetheless, the dissenting argument was countered by Justice White's opinion that the EEOC was entitled to little if any deference by the Supreme Court and that its position was inconsistent with "the plain language" of the ADEA.
Impact
Every state is entitled to a certain level of sovereignty. In turn, state sovereignty is carefully balanced with the sovereignty of the federal government. In spite of this balance, Congress has power to impose a federal statute ona state statute or constitution, but does not usually exercise that power lightly. Fearing that Congress's intentions could be misread, the Supreme Courtapplied "the plain statement" requirement in this case, where the state statute was challenged as being in violation of federal statute and the Constitution. Reading the federal statute enacted by Congress in search of a plain statement, the Court found that the ADEA nowhere made it clear that state judgeswere protected by it. Therefore, Missouri's mandatory retirement provision for its state judges did not violate the ADEA. Neither did it violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it rationally furthered a legitimate state interest to uphold the public demand for fully functioning judiciaries. As a final outcome, this decision established that a state'sright to define the qualifications of its highest state officials could notbe overridden by the ADEA's prohibition of age discrimination. Nor would a state violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause as long as itsrequirements reasonably served a legitimate state interest.
Related Cases
- Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
- Penhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
- EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
- Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
- Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
- Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 191 U.S. 58 (1989).
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