Petitioner
United States
Respondent
Phillip Paradise, Jr.
Petitioner's Claim
The United States claimed that the anti-race discrimination remedy ordered bythe district court violated the Equal Protection Clause under the FourteenthAmendment. (The court order required a "one-for-one" promotion scheme of oneblack police officer for every white police officer advanced to the rank ofcorporal.)
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Charles Fried, U.S. Solicitor General
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
J. Richard Cohen
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr. (writing for the Court), ThurgoodMarshall, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., John Paul Stevens
Justices Dissenting
Sandra Day O'Connor, William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, Byron R. White
Place
Washington D.C.
Date of Decision
25 February 1987
Decision
The Supreme Court affirmed prior decisions of the lower courts, that race-conscious relief ordered by the district court did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. They held that principle of hiring and promoting one black for one white police officer was appropriate and did not violate the constitutional rights of due process or equal protection.
Significance
The Court upheld the district court's order for a "one-for-one" promotion plan to address deliberate discriminatory promotion and hiring practices by theAlabama Department of Public Safety (ADPS). Thus, the Supreme Court ruling did not react to the administration's challenge of the concept of racial quotas. Because the Court's support of this kind of affirmative action was situational, their equivocated support of the concept of racial quotas would later enable that kind of anti-discrimination remedy to be successfully challenged less than a decade after this decision.
In 1972, the Alabama Department of Public Safety (ADPS) was challenged in court by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)for practices that excluded blacks from equal employment opportunities. The United States, together with Phillip Paradise, joined the suit as party plaintiffs. When the suit was brought to court, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama agreed with the plaintiffs that the ADPS systematically excluded blacks from employment and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the court ordered an end todiscriminatory practices and charged the ADPS with rectifying the effects ofpast discrimination. The district court (in its 1972 order) directed ADPS tohire one black police officer for each white officer until blacks composed approximately 25 percent of the state police force. The respondent (Paradise, et al.) appealed claiming that white applicants who had higher eligibility rankings than blacks were denied due process or equal protection under the law because of the one-for-one hiring order.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. Shortly after that 1974 decision, however, petitioners asked for further relief from the district court. Petitioners claimed that the ADPS artificially restricted the size of the police force (and therefore, the number of new-hire police officers) in order to circumvent the court injunction mandating anti-discrimination measures. The district court agreed and characterized the actions of the ADPS as being solely for the purpose of frustrating or delaying full relief to the petitioners.
Petitioners again returned to the district court in September of 1977 and requested supplemental relief (additional aid or compensation for harm done) fordiscriminatory promotion practices by the ADPS. The litigants--petitioners and respondents--were not in complete agreement as to how the ADPS would go about mitigating discrimination in the workplace; however, litigants were boundby a "partial consent decree" (ordered in 1979) which was approved by the district court. As a condition of that decree, the ADPS agreed to develop, within one year, a promotion procedure that would be fair to all potential promotees. The ADPS also agreed that they would conform to promotion procedures that met the 1978 Uniform Guidelines on Employment Selection Procedures. (ADPS would develop similar procedures, initially for rank of corporal, and then extend that practice incrementally to upper ranks--sergeant, lieutenant, captain, and major.) Finally, the court's decree explicitly provided that the petitioners could apply for enforcement of its terms or for other appropriate remedy.
More than a year after the deadline set by the 1979 decree, the Alabama Department of Public Safety proposed a selection procedure for promotion and askedfor approval from the district court. The petitioners, however, objected toimplementation of those procedures, arguing that it had an adverse impact onblacks. As a resolution to that dispute, the district court approved a secondconsent decree in 1981. In that decree, ADPS proposed a promotion procedurein which position advancement within the department was based on a test administered by the ADPS. Of 262 applicants who tested, 60 were black (23 percent). Of those 60 blacks, only five (8.3 percent) were listed in the top half ofthe promotion register and the highest-ranked black candidate was ranked eightieth. The U.S. (at that time, in its role as equal party plaintiff) objectedto that list, maintaining that it had an adverse impact on blacks. Again, litigants attempted to negotiate their differences over how to implement corrective measures; however, they could not agree. In response, the ADPS made no promotions for the next nine months.
White Officers Intervene
Petitioners returned to the court again in April, 1983, to seek an order enforcing the terms of both the 1979 and 1981 decrees. They also requested that criteria for promotions should be the same as hiring, one-for-one. Soon thereafter, four white officers who had been waiting for promotion sought to intervene, claiming that the two decrees were "unreasonable, illegal, unconstitutional or against public policy." In review, the district court ignored assertions of the white claimants noting that even if the ADPS promoted 79 officers to corporal, none would be black. Thus, ADPS was ordered to submit another promotion schema which consisted of at least 15 qualified persons and did not result in deleterious affect on black officers. The ADPS submitted numerous motions for reconsideration of the court's order but the district court held fast to its ruling. Finally, in February 1984, the ADPS promoted eight white andeight black police officers. Interestingly, the U.S. Justice Department (ofthe Reagan administration) challenged the court's order, holding that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment; however, the Court of Appeals for the EleventhCircuit affirmed the district court's decision that the one-for-one promotion scheme did not violate the Constitution of the United States.
"Narrowly Tailored" Requirement Found Acceptable
When the case came before the U.S. Supreme Court the decision of the court ofappeals was upheld. A majority of five justices held that the district court's race-conscious relief order was justified by an absolute governmental interest in eliminating the ADPS's exclusion of the blacks from its police force.Further, justices held that because of the ADPS's consistent resistance to the court's orders, the district court's decision was supported by the publicinterest. The Court ruled the one-for-one promotional requirement was "narrowly tailored," made to serve the purpose of eliminating race discrimination, and was necessary for elimination of the effects of the ADPS's long-standing policy of exclusion of blacks in the upper ranks.
In determining whether the district court's anti-race discrimination remedy was appropriate, the Supreme Court examined and reviewed several aspects of that remedy. It was important to determine if there was a necessity for the remedy, whether it was adequate. Further, the Court needed to determine if the prescribed remedy was flexible in application and how long the remedy had to remain in effect.
The ADPS had initially proposed to promote four blacks and eleven whites. That option, the justices felt, would not have served the district court's purpose because it completely failed to provide quick remedy. Moreover, the ADPS delayed implementation of the court's order for several years. Accordingly, the justices held that the district court had no other alternative than the one-for-one remedy. Further, that remedy was flexible in application at all ranks. If there were no qualified candidates among blacks, the ADPS would also bepermitted to promote only white applicants (but only if/when the ADPS had need to promote). Moreover, the district court's order continued in force onlyuntil the ADPS could come up with a solution which did not have a discriminatory impact on blacks.
In considering the relationship between the court-ordered numerical relief and the percentage of white and black ADPS personnel, the Supreme Court believed that they should not second-guess the lower court's carefully considered decision. That decision was designed to prevent any unfair impact that could occur from inflexible application. The original decrees dealing with discriminatory hiring practices, and also the decree regarding promotions, required theADPS to hire/promote 50 percent of all black applicants until 25 percent ofthe police force was composed of the blacks, or 25 percent of each rank was populated by black officers. The "one-for-one" solution, the Court noted, didnot impose an unacceptable burden on innocent third parties through layoffs or discharge of white employees. Simply, white candidates had to compete withqualified black candidates. Finally, finding the district court's order was "narrowly tailored," the Court chose to privilege judicial precedence which established the authority of federal courts to effect speedy redress. The justices noted that according to Louisiana v. United States (1965), the Court was obliged to provide a decree which would eliminate the effects of discrimination as soon as possible. Similarly, the majority opined that the Court's decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971)stipulated that when a violation was proven and existed for a lengthy period, a district court's powers were broad of necessity. In contrast, Justice O'Connor (writing for the minority) expressed concern that the district court ordered the promotion quota without considering any other available alternativethat would have a lesser effect on the rights of non-minority police officers.
Impact
When litigation was first initiated in 1972 for United States v. Paradise (during the Nixon administration), the government acted as an equal partyplaintiff in the lower courts as part of a concerted effort to eliminate theeffects of gross racial discrimination in the workplace. However, in the fifteen years that intervened between the beginning of litigation and the Supreme Court's decision, a change of political administrations saw the initial action as an example of unbridled, overzealous enforcement of anti-discrimination remedies. Thus, the case arrived at the highest federal court with the U.S.government directly opposed to court-ordered enforcement of racial quotas toeliminate effects of past discrimination.
Although Supreme Court justices ruled against the United States, their decision was rendered with a slim, 5-4 majority. Moreover, because the ruling specifically addressed circumstances and history which pertained only to the recalcitrance of the Alabama Department of Public Safety, the decision was not entirely applicable in a broader context which might provide lower courts with guidance when considering the constitutionality of legislative measures intended to mitigate institutionalized racial discrimination. Indeed, and perhaps because of the specificity of purpose of their ruling, justices did not seek to define what constituted an appropriate, legal legislative redress for racial discrimination. Thus, by choosing not to confront the executive branch, theCourt left an opening for later, successful litigation which sought to eliminate racial quotas and privileging of ethnic minorities as a means of securing equal opportunity based on racial criteria.
Related Cases
United States
Respondent
Phillip Paradise, Jr.
Petitioner's Claim
The United States claimed that the anti-race discrimination remedy ordered bythe district court violated the Equal Protection Clause under the FourteenthAmendment. (The court order required a "one-for-one" promotion scheme of oneblack police officer for every white police officer advanced to the rank ofcorporal.)
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Charles Fried, U.S. Solicitor General
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
J. Richard Cohen
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr. (writing for the Court), ThurgoodMarshall, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., John Paul Stevens
Justices Dissenting
Sandra Day O'Connor, William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, Byron R. White
Place
Washington D.C.
Date of Decision
25 February 1987
Decision
The Supreme Court affirmed prior decisions of the lower courts, that race-conscious relief ordered by the district court did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. They held that principle of hiring and promoting one black for one white police officer was appropriate and did not violate the constitutional rights of due process or equal protection.
Significance
The Court upheld the district court's order for a "one-for-one" promotion plan to address deliberate discriminatory promotion and hiring practices by theAlabama Department of Public Safety (ADPS). Thus, the Supreme Court ruling did not react to the administration's challenge of the concept of racial quotas. Because the Court's support of this kind of affirmative action was situational, their equivocated support of the concept of racial quotas would later enable that kind of anti-discrimination remedy to be successfully challenged less than a decade after this decision.
In 1972, the Alabama Department of Public Safety (ADPS) was challenged in court by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)for practices that excluded blacks from equal employment opportunities. The United States, together with Phillip Paradise, joined the suit as party plaintiffs. When the suit was brought to court, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama agreed with the plaintiffs that the ADPS systematically excluded blacks from employment and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the court ordered an end todiscriminatory practices and charged the ADPS with rectifying the effects ofpast discrimination. The district court (in its 1972 order) directed ADPS tohire one black police officer for each white officer until blacks composed approximately 25 percent of the state police force. The respondent (Paradise, et al.) appealed claiming that white applicants who had higher eligibility rankings than blacks were denied due process or equal protection under the law because of the one-for-one hiring order.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. Shortly after that 1974 decision, however, petitioners asked for further relief from the district court. Petitioners claimed that the ADPS artificially restricted the size of the police force (and therefore, the number of new-hire police officers) in order to circumvent the court injunction mandating anti-discrimination measures. The district court agreed and characterized the actions of the ADPS as being solely for the purpose of frustrating or delaying full relief to the petitioners.
Petitioners again returned to the district court in September of 1977 and requested supplemental relief (additional aid or compensation for harm done) fordiscriminatory promotion practices by the ADPS. The litigants--petitioners and respondents--were not in complete agreement as to how the ADPS would go about mitigating discrimination in the workplace; however, litigants were boundby a "partial consent decree" (ordered in 1979) which was approved by the district court. As a condition of that decree, the ADPS agreed to develop, within one year, a promotion procedure that would be fair to all potential promotees. The ADPS also agreed that they would conform to promotion procedures that met the 1978 Uniform Guidelines on Employment Selection Procedures. (ADPS would develop similar procedures, initially for rank of corporal, and then extend that practice incrementally to upper ranks--sergeant, lieutenant, captain, and major.) Finally, the court's decree explicitly provided that the petitioners could apply for enforcement of its terms or for other appropriate remedy.
More than a year after the deadline set by the 1979 decree, the Alabama Department of Public Safety proposed a selection procedure for promotion and askedfor approval from the district court. The petitioners, however, objected toimplementation of those procedures, arguing that it had an adverse impact onblacks. As a resolution to that dispute, the district court approved a secondconsent decree in 1981. In that decree, ADPS proposed a promotion procedurein which position advancement within the department was based on a test administered by the ADPS. Of 262 applicants who tested, 60 were black (23 percent). Of those 60 blacks, only five (8.3 percent) were listed in the top half ofthe promotion register and the highest-ranked black candidate was ranked eightieth. The U.S. (at that time, in its role as equal party plaintiff) objectedto that list, maintaining that it had an adverse impact on blacks. Again, litigants attempted to negotiate their differences over how to implement corrective measures; however, they could not agree. In response, the ADPS made no promotions for the next nine months.
White Officers Intervene
Petitioners returned to the court again in April, 1983, to seek an order enforcing the terms of both the 1979 and 1981 decrees. They also requested that criteria for promotions should be the same as hiring, one-for-one. Soon thereafter, four white officers who had been waiting for promotion sought to intervene, claiming that the two decrees were "unreasonable, illegal, unconstitutional or against public policy." In review, the district court ignored assertions of the white claimants noting that even if the ADPS promoted 79 officers to corporal, none would be black. Thus, ADPS was ordered to submit another promotion schema which consisted of at least 15 qualified persons and did not result in deleterious affect on black officers. The ADPS submitted numerous motions for reconsideration of the court's order but the district court held fast to its ruling. Finally, in February 1984, the ADPS promoted eight white andeight black police officers. Interestingly, the U.S. Justice Department (ofthe Reagan administration) challenged the court's order, holding that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment; however, the Court of Appeals for the EleventhCircuit affirmed the district court's decision that the one-for-one promotion scheme did not violate the Constitution of the United States.
"Narrowly Tailored" Requirement Found Acceptable
When the case came before the U.S. Supreme Court the decision of the court ofappeals was upheld. A majority of five justices held that the district court's race-conscious relief order was justified by an absolute governmental interest in eliminating the ADPS's exclusion of the blacks from its police force.Further, justices held that because of the ADPS's consistent resistance to the court's orders, the district court's decision was supported by the publicinterest. The Court ruled the one-for-one promotional requirement was "narrowly tailored," made to serve the purpose of eliminating race discrimination, and was necessary for elimination of the effects of the ADPS's long-standing policy of exclusion of blacks in the upper ranks.
In determining whether the district court's anti-race discrimination remedy was appropriate, the Supreme Court examined and reviewed several aspects of that remedy. It was important to determine if there was a necessity for the remedy, whether it was adequate. Further, the Court needed to determine if the prescribed remedy was flexible in application and how long the remedy had to remain in effect.
The ADPS had initially proposed to promote four blacks and eleven whites. That option, the justices felt, would not have served the district court's purpose because it completely failed to provide quick remedy. Moreover, the ADPS delayed implementation of the court's order for several years. Accordingly, the justices held that the district court had no other alternative than the one-for-one remedy. Further, that remedy was flexible in application at all ranks. If there were no qualified candidates among blacks, the ADPS would also bepermitted to promote only white applicants (but only if/when the ADPS had need to promote). Moreover, the district court's order continued in force onlyuntil the ADPS could come up with a solution which did not have a discriminatory impact on blacks.
In considering the relationship between the court-ordered numerical relief and the percentage of white and black ADPS personnel, the Supreme Court believed that they should not second-guess the lower court's carefully considered decision. That decision was designed to prevent any unfair impact that could occur from inflexible application. The original decrees dealing with discriminatory hiring practices, and also the decree regarding promotions, required theADPS to hire/promote 50 percent of all black applicants until 25 percent ofthe police force was composed of the blacks, or 25 percent of each rank was populated by black officers. The "one-for-one" solution, the Court noted, didnot impose an unacceptable burden on innocent third parties through layoffs or discharge of white employees. Simply, white candidates had to compete withqualified black candidates. Finally, finding the district court's order was "narrowly tailored," the Court chose to privilege judicial precedence which established the authority of federal courts to effect speedy redress. The justices noted that according to Louisiana v. United States (1965), the Court was obliged to provide a decree which would eliminate the effects of discrimination as soon as possible. Similarly, the majority opined that the Court's decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971)stipulated that when a violation was proven and existed for a lengthy period, a district court's powers were broad of necessity. In contrast, Justice O'Connor (writing for the minority) expressed concern that the district court ordered the promotion quota without considering any other available alternativethat would have a lesser effect on the rights of non-minority police officers.
Impact
When litigation was first initiated in 1972 for United States v. Paradise (during the Nixon administration), the government acted as an equal partyplaintiff in the lower courts as part of a concerted effort to eliminate theeffects of gross racial discrimination in the workplace. However, in the fifteen years that intervened between the beginning of litigation and the Supreme Court's decision, a change of political administrations saw the initial action as an example of unbridled, overzealous enforcement of anti-discrimination remedies. Thus, the case arrived at the highest federal court with the U.S.government directly opposed to court-ordered enforcement of racial quotas toeliminate effects of past discrimination.
Although Supreme Court justices ruled against the United States, their decision was rendered with a slim, 5-4 majority. Moreover, because the ruling specifically addressed circumstances and history which pertained only to the recalcitrance of the Alabama Department of Public Safety, the decision was not entirely applicable in a broader context which might provide lower courts with guidance when considering the constitutionality of legislative measures intended to mitigate institutionalized racial discrimination. Indeed, and perhaps because of the specificity of purpose of their ruling, justices did not seek to define what constituted an appropriate, legal legislative redress for racial discrimination. Thus, by choosing not to confront the executive branch, theCourt left an opening for later, successful litigation which sought to eliminate racial quotas and privileging of ethnic minorities as a means of securing equal opportunity based on racial criteria.
Related Cases
- Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
- Green v. New Kent County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
- Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
- Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
Further Readings
- Biskupic, Joan, and Elder Witt. Congressional Quarterly's Guide tothe U.S. Supreme Court, 3rd ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly,Inc., 1996.
User Comments Add a comment…
3 months ago
well i agree with this ruling cause im awesomeo