Appellant
Massachusetts Board of Retirement, et al.
Appellee
Robert D. Murgia
Appellant's Claim
The state of Massachusetts Board of Retirement believed their provision for mandatory retirement of police officers at age 50 was rationally related to the interest of protecting the public and therefore did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Terence P. O'Malley
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Robert D. City
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White (unsigned)
Justices Dissenting
Thurgood Marshall (John Paul Stevens did not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
25 June 1976
Decision
There was no violation of the Equal Protection Clause: the state of Massachusetts' mandatory retirement provision rationally furthered its purpose of protecting the public by assuring physical fitness of the state police officers.
Significance
Although not the best means available for the purpose of protecting the public, the U.S. Supreme Court found that mandatory retirement of police officersat age 50 was a rational course of action for the state of Massachusetts. TheCourt also found that old workers were not a discrete and insular group andthat the right of governmental employment was, by itself, not fundamental. Therefore, if the reason for a retirement provision was justified by a legitimate state interest, such as public safety, age discrimination was justified.
Old people are subject to age discrimination in every society, especially when employers sometimes believe that age is a viable criteria to measure an ability to work. Employers often perceive older workers as being less productivethan younger ones, and discriminate against them when hiring new workers orretiring old workers. To protect the rights of elder workers, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act in 1967. This act was aimed at shielding senior workers from discrimination in hiring, discharging, compensation, and conditions of employment. Moreover, one of its more salient purposes was to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment. One clause of thisact allowed age discrimination in hiring or discharging if the employer could prove that youth was an occupational qualification reasonably necessary tothe normal operations of the particular business. This clause was applicablewhen a position involved physically burdensome activity or public safety. Though Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia did not invoke the AgeDiscrimination in Employment Act, it involved a position of employment, police officer, which required strenuous physical activity and demanded consideration be given to public safety. In this case the U.S. Supreme Court in fact found that age discrimination should receive less judicial scrutiny than discrimination based on race or sex because aging objectively involved a decreaseof physical and mental abilities.
Rationality of Mandatory Retirement
The state of Massachusetts' statute required retirement of a uniformed statepolice officer upon attaining the age of 50. Adhering to this rule, the Massachusetts Board of Retirement retired Robert Murgia, an officer in the uniformed branch of the Massachusetts State Police. Believing he was in excellent health and deprived from his right to work, Murgia filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts alleging that he was denied equalprotection under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the FourteenthAmendment. His complaint was dismissed, however, because a federal districtjudge believed that the complaint did not allege a substantial constitutionalquestion. Murgia appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuitbut the appellate court sent the case back to the lower court with directions to convene a three-judge panel for review of the case. The three-judge court convened and, after looking at a record consisting of allegations and testimonies submitted by the parties, ruled that the provision of the Massachusetts statute was unconstitutional because it lacked rational basis in furtheringany substantial state interest.
In their review of the case, the court found that service in the uniformed branch of the Massachusetts State Police was arduous and that high versatilitywas required from officers. The police officers had been required to pass anextensive physical examination every two years until age 40, and after that amore rigorous annual examination was required until an officer reached the age of 50. Murgia's record included the testimony of three physicians concerning the physiological and psychological demands of the uniformed police profession, the relationship between aging and the ability to work under stress, and aging and the ability to safely perform police functions.
Looking at all of these arguments the district court found that it was not necessary to apply a strict-scrutiny test, because the age classification established by the Massachusetts statutory scheme did not interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right nor did it operate against a suspect class (seniorpolice officers). The court reasoned that a test of rationality should be applied; the test that evaluated constitutionality of classifications by examining whether they rationally furthered an identified state interest. In this case, the state interest was the protection of the public by assuring the physical preparedness of the state's uniformed police. Ultimately, the court ruled that compulsory retirement at age 50 was irrational (and therefore unconstitutional), because police officers' fitness to perform uniformed police duties was tested individually by annual examination and it was a fact that an officer, in this case Murgia, could pass those examinations after having attained the age of 50.
Dissatisfied with this decision, the Massachusetts Board of Retirement appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court, and, in a per curiam opinion (an opinion given jointly by all the justices trying a case, with no signatoryauthor), the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court.
Not the Best Means . . . But Rational Means
Seven justices of the Supreme Court agreed that the retirement provision of the Massachusetts statute was constitutional. The justices, however, also reasoned that, as written, the act was "imperfect" because it sought to further the state interest of protecting the public by imposing a chronological limitation rather than one based on individualized testing. Justice Stevens did nottake part in the consideration or the decision of the case, and Justice Marshall dissented, supporting the district court's decision.
The Supreme Court first decided which test for equal protection analysis should be used in assessing the constitutionality of the mandatory retirement provision. Agreeing with the district court, the justices found that strict scrutiny was not a proper test. It was used only when the exercise of a fundamental right was restricted or when a suspect group was treated unfairly. The Court found that a right of governmental employment was not by itself fundamental, and that a class of uniformed state police officers over 50 did not constitute a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis. Instead, theCourt held that a suspect class was one "saddled" with disabilities, unequally treated with a specific purpose, or reduced to political powerlessness. Inthe case of over-50 police officers, the Court found that old age did not even define a discrete and insular group. It merely marked a stage that everyonewould reach if they lived out their normal life span. Therefore, justices used the rational-basis standard to examine the age classification of the retirement provision.
The Court found that the retirement provision of the Massachusetts statute satisfied the rationality test because it was realistically related to the identified purpose of protecting the public by assuring physical preparedness ofthe Massachusetts uniformed police. Mandatory retirement at age 50 served toremove from police service those whose fitness for uniformed work preemptively had decreased with age. The Court reasoned that although the provision could have been tailored to determine fitness more precisely through individualized testing after age 50, a maximum-age limitation rationally satisfied the objective of assuring physical fitness. The Court concluded that the state perhaps had not chosen the best means to accomplish its purpose, but where rationality was the test a state did not violate the Equal Protection Clause merelybecause the classifications made by its laws were imperfect.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall agreed with the decision of the district court and reemphasized what he believed was the problem created by not adhering to the results of annual individualized examinations as a means ofdetermining competence. He saw no reason why uniformed police officers couldnot be able to continue service after attaining the age of 50. The medical examinations would still have the predictive ability concerning a police officer's fitness and they would be sufficient means to protect the state's interest. He concluded that there was no reason for automatically terminating thoseofficers who reached the age of 50, and that such action seemed to him the "height of irrationality."
Impact
In the United States, as throughout the world, older people have often been victims of age discrimination. They experience problems with being hired for work and are often discharged because employers believe that advancing age objectively reduces their ability to work effectively. Such treatment not only affects the financial status of older people, but also their health. That is why Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act in 1967. Nevertheless, under certain circumscribed instances, the U.S. Supreme Court held that age discrimination is sometimes justified because certain professions require excellent physical fitness.
In Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, the U.S. Supreme Courtfound that age discrimination in the employment of "over-aged" police officers should be subject to less judicial scrutiny than discrimination by sex orrace. The Court also affirmed that the practice of using a "rational basis test" (competence determined by fixed criteria) rather than a strict-scrutiny test in cases where a state's legislation sometimes restricted the availability of employment opportunities by age requirements. The majority opinion reasoned that people grouped by age were not like suspect classes who were discriminated because they were "saddled" with disabilities, unequally treated witha specific purpose, or politically powerless. Thus, according to the Court, some over-aged classes of people did not necessarily constitute a discrete andinsular group of people whose constitutional rights could be violated. Theywere simply a fluid group of which everyone would become a member one day. Therefore, if a position (such as that of police officer) required demanding physical activity from an employee, and if government could rationalize a discrete issue wherein there existed an overriding issue regarding public safety (as in this case), age discrimination was held to be justified.
Related Cases
Forced Retirement and Public-Safety Officers
Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) to combat what is sometimes caused "ageism." Among the law's provisions is a prohibition against age discrimination with regard to employees between the ages of 40 and 70 years old. Only if age can be demonstrated to be a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business" is it permissible to fire someone on the basis of their age.
An ordinance in the Baltimore city code required firefighters to retire at the age of 55, and in the mid-1980s six Baltimore firefighters brought an age discrimination suit against the city. The case went before the Supreme Court,which on 17 June 1985 struck down the Baltimore ordinance. According to Justice Thurgood Marshall, who delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court, the legislative history of the ADEA, which was amended in 1974 and 1977, suggests that Congress did not consider 55 a bona fide occupational limit for public-safety officers; rather, the designation may have been made "arbitrarily" or "for myriad political purposes."
According to an article in Criminal Justice Newsletter published soonafter the ruling, however, legislators such as Senator Bill Bradley (D-NJ) and others continued to favor different retirement standards for public-safetyofficers than for other Americans: "I am a strong proponent of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act," Bradley said. "But older Americans have as muchreason as anyone to insure that those who must perform emergency services arephysically able to do so."
Sources
"Supreme Court Raises Barrier to Forced Retirement Rules." Criminal Justice Newsletter, July 15, 1985, pp. 1-2.
Massachusetts Board of Retirement, et al.
Appellee
Robert D. Murgia
Appellant's Claim
The state of Massachusetts Board of Retirement believed their provision for mandatory retirement of police officers at age 50 was rationally related to the interest of protecting the public and therefore did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Terence P. O'Malley
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Robert D. City
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White (unsigned)
Justices Dissenting
Thurgood Marshall (John Paul Stevens did not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
25 June 1976
Decision
There was no violation of the Equal Protection Clause: the state of Massachusetts' mandatory retirement provision rationally furthered its purpose of protecting the public by assuring physical fitness of the state police officers.
Significance
Although not the best means available for the purpose of protecting the public, the U.S. Supreme Court found that mandatory retirement of police officersat age 50 was a rational course of action for the state of Massachusetts. TheCourt also found that old workers were not a discrete and insular group andthat the right of governmental employment was, by itself, not fundamental. Therefore, if the reason for a retirement provision was justified by a legitimate state interest, such as public safety, age discrimination was justified.
Old people are subject to age discrimination in every society, especially when employers sometimes believe that age is a viable criteria to measure an ability to work. Employers often perceive older workers as being less productivethan younger ones, and discriminate against them when hiring new workers orretiring old workers. To protect the rights of elder workers, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act in 1967. This act was aimed at shielding senior workers from discrimination in hiring, discharging, compensation, and conditions of employment. Moreover, one of its more salient purposes was to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment. One clause of thisact allowed age discrimination in hiring or discharging if the employer could prove that youth was an occupational qualification reasonably necessary tothe normal operations of the particular business. This clause was applicablewhen a position involved physically burdensome activity or public safety. Though Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia did not invoke the AgeDiscrimination in Employment Act, it involved a position of employment, police officer, which required strenuous physical activity and demanded consideration be given to public safety. In this case the U.S. Supreme Court in fact found that age discrimination should receive less judicial scrutiny than discrimination based on race or sex because aging objectively involved a decreaseof physical and mental abilities.
Rationality of Mandatory Retirement
The state of Massachusetts' statute required retirement of a uniformed statepolice officer upon attaining the age of 50. Adhering to this rule, the Massachusetts Board of Retirement retired Robert Murgia, an officer in the uniformed branch of the Massachusetts State Police. Believing he was in excellent health and deprived from his right to work, Murgia filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts alleging that he was denied equalprotection under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the FourteenthAmendment. His complaint was dismissed, however, because a federal districtjudge believed that the complaint did not allege a substantial constitutionalquestion. Murgia appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuitbut the appellate court sent the case back to the lower court with directions to convene a three-judge panel for review of the case. The three-judge court convened and, after looking at a record consisting of allegations and testimonies submitted by the parties, ruled that the provision of the Massachusetts statute was unconstitutional because it lacked rational basis in furtheringany substantial state interest.
In their review of the case, the court found that service in the uniformed branch of the Massachusetts State Police was arduous and that high versatilitywas required from officers. The police officers had been required to pass anextensive physical examination every two years until age 40, and after that amore rigorous annual examination was required until an officer reached the age of 50. Murgia's record included the testimony of three physicians concerning the physiological and psychological demands of the uniformed police profession, the relationship between aging and the ability to work under stress, and aging and the ability to safely perform police functions.
Looking at all of these arguments the district court found that it was not necessary to apply a strict-scrutiny test, because the age classification established by the Massachusetts statutory scheme did not interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right nor did it operate against a suspect class (seniorpolice officers). The court reasoned that a test of rationality should be applied; the test that evaluated constitutionality of classifications by examining whether they rationally furthered an identified state interest. In this case, the state interest was the protection of the public by assuring the physical preparedness of the state's uniformed police. Ultimately, the court ruled that compulsory retirement at age 50 was irrational (and therefore unconstitutional), because police officers' fitness to perform uniformed police duties was tested individually by annual examination and it was a fact that an officer, in this case Murgia, could pass those examinations after having attained the age of 50.
Dissatisfied with this decision, the Massachusetts Board of Retirement appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court, and, in a per curiam opinion (an opinion given jointly by all the justices trying a case, with no signatoryauthor), the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court.
Not the Best Means . . . But Rational Means
Seven justices of the Supreme Court agreed that the retirement provision of the Massachusetts statute was constitutional. The justices, however, also reasoned that, as written, the act was "imperfect" because it sought to further the state interest of protecting the public by imposing a chronological limitation rather than one based on individualized testing. Justice Stevens did nottake part in the consideration or the decision of the case, and Justice Marshall dissented, supporting the district court's decision.
The Supreme Court first decided which test for equal protection analysis should be used in assessing the constitutionality of the mandatory retirement provision. Agreeing with the district court, the justices found that strict scrutiny was not a proper test. It was used only when the exercise of a fundamental right was restricted or when a suspect group was treated unfairly. The Court found that a right of governmental employment was not by itself fundamental, and that a class of uniformed state police officers over 50 did not constitute a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis. Instead, theCourt held that a suspect class was one "saddled" with disabilities, unequally treated with a specific purpose, or reduced to political powerlessness. Inthe case of over-50 police officers, the Court found that old age did not even define a discrete and insular group. It merely marked a stage that everyonewould reach if they lived out their normal life span. Therefore, justices used the rational-basis standard to examine the age classification of the retirement provision.
The Court found that the retirement provision of the Massachusetts statute satisfied the rationality test because it was realistically related to the identified purpose of protecting the public by assuring physical preparedness ofthe Massachusetts uniformed police. Mandatory retirement at age 50 served toremove from police service those whose fitness for uniformed work preemptively had decreased with age. The Court reasoned that although the provision could have been tailored to determine fitness more precisely through individualized testing after age 50, a maximum-age limitation rationally satisfied the objective of assuring physical fitness. The Court concluded that the state perhaps had not chosen the best means to accomplish its purpose, but where rationality was the test a state did not violate the Equal Protection Clause merelybecause the classifications made by its laws were imperfect.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall agreed with the decision of the district court and reemphasized what he believed was the problem created by not adhering to the results of annual individualized examinations as a means ofdetermining competence. He saw no reason why uniformed police officers couldnot be able to continue service after attaining the age of 50. The medical examinations would still have the predictive ability concerning a police officer's fitness and they would be sufficient means to protect the state's interest. He concluded that there was no reason for automatically terminating thoseofficers who reached the age of 50, and that such action seemed to him the "height of irrationality."
Impact
In the United States, as throughout the world, older people have often been victims of age discrimination. They experience problems with being hired for work and are often discharged because employers believe that advancing age objectively reduces their ability to work effectively. Such treatment not only affects the financial status of older people, but also their health. That is why Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act in 1967. Nevertheless, under certain circumscribed instances, the U.S. Supreme Court held that age discrimination is sometimes justified because certain professions require excellent physical fitness.
In Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, the U.S. Supreme Courtfound that age discrimination in the employment of "over-aged" police officers should be subject to less judicial scrutiny than discrimination by sex orrace. The Court also affirmed that the practice of using a "rational basis test" (competence determined by fixed criteria) rather than a strict-scrutiny test in cases where a state's legislation sometimes restricted the availability of employment opportunities by age requirements. The majority opinion reasoned that people grouped by age were not like suspect classes who were discriminated because they were "saddled" with disabilities, unequally treated witha specific purpose, or politically powerless. Thus, according to the Court, some over-aged classes of people did not necessarily constitute a discrete andinsular group of people whose constitutional rights could be violated. Theywere simply a fluid group of which everyone would become a member one day. Therefore, if a position (such as that of police officer) required demanding physical activity from an employee, and if government could rationalize a discrete issue wherein there existed an overriding issue regarding public safety (as in this case), age discrimination was held to be justified.
Related Cases
- Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
- Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
- San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
- McIlvaine v. Pennsylvania, 415 U.S. 986 (1974).
- Cannon v. Guste, 423 U.S. 918 (1975).
- Weisbrod v. Lynn, 420 U.S. 940 (1975).
Forced Retirement and Public-Safety Officers
Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) to combat what is sometimes caused "ageism." Among the law's provisions is a prohibition against age discrimination with regard to employees between the ages of 40 and 70 years old. Only if age can be demonstrated to be a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business" is it permissible to fire someone on the basis of their age.
An ordinance in the Baltimore city code required firefighters to retire at the age of 55, and in the mid-1980s six Baltimore firefighters brought an age discrimination suit against the city. The case went before the Supreme Court,which on 17 June 1985 struck down the Baltimore ordinance. According to Justice Thurgood Marshall, who delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court, the legislative history of the ADEA, which was amended in 1974 and 1977, suggests that Congress did not consider 55 a bona fide occupational limit for public-safety officers; rather, the designation may have been made "arbitrarily" or "for myriad political purposes."
According to an article in Criminal Justice Newsletter published soonafter the ruling, however, legislators such as Senator Bill Bradley (D-NJ) and others continued to favor different retirement standards for public-safetyofficers than for other Americans: "I am a strong proponent of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act," Bradley said. "But older Americans have as muchreason as anyone to insure that those who must perform emergency services arephysically able to do so."
Sources
"Supreme Court Raises Barrier to Forced Retirement Rules." Criminal Justice Newsletter, July 15, 1985, pp. 1-2.
Further Readings
- Jackson, Vicki C. "Coeur d'Alene, Federal Courts and the Supremacy of Federal Law." Constitutional Commentary, summer 1998, p. 301.
- Tushnet, Mark V. "Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: A Biography." MichiganLaw Review, May 1995, p. 1854.
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