Moose Lodge No. v. Irvis (107 )

Appellant
Moose Lodge No. 107
Appellee
Leroy Irvis
Appellant's Claim
That discrimination against an African American man by a private lodge is not"state action" because the state granted the lodge a liquor license.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Frederick Bernays Wiener
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Harry J. Rubin
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
12 June 1972
Decision
The Moose Lodge is a private club in which the state takes no controlling interest. Therefore, discrimination by the club cannot be outlawed under federallaw.
Significance
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis helped clarify the term "state action" with reference to federal civil rights protections.
Leroy Irvis, an African American man, appeared on the steps of Moose Lodge No. 107 in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Though he was at the private club as the guest of a member, he was refused service on the basis of his race. Irvis suedunder federal civil rights law to have the lodge's state-issued liquor license revoked until it stopped discriminating. He won his case in district court, where it was ruled that the lodge's discriminatory practice was "state action" because it was licensed by the state of Pennsylvania. Moose Lodge No. 107appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, which heard the case arguedon 28 February 1972.
The Issues at Stake
The case hinged on the definition of "state action." "State action" means action taken by the state or one of its officers. If state action is taken thatdiscriminates against someone on the basis of race, it violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. However, a discriminatory action takenby a private official is not covered by constitutional protection. Certainlythe Moose Lodge was a private club in the everyday sense of the term. It received no federal or state money and restricted access to members and their guests. In some earlier cases, however, the Court had found that a strong enoughrelationship existed between a state and a private institution to warrant disallowing the institution's discrimination on the grounds that it violated federal law. This was Irvis' contention. Also, there was a question as to whether the state's policy of restricting the distribution of liquor licenses meant that it had turned the lodge into a state-supported monopoly--and thus subjected it to federal civil rights law.
The Supreme Court Decides
On 12 June 1972 the Supreme Court issued its decision in favor of Moose LodgeNo. 107 and against Leroy Irvis. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, in which he was joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart, Justice White, Justice Powell, and Justice Blackmun. The majority dismissed the lowercourt's ruling that the Moose Lodge's discrimination constituted "state action" because the state had issued its liquor license. In his majority opinion,Rehnquist wrote:

The Court has never held, of course, that discrimination by an otherwise private entity would be violative of the Equal Protection Clause if the private entity receives any sort of benefit or service atall from the State, or if it is subject to state regulation in any degree whatever. Since state-furnished services include such necessities of life as electricity, water, and police and fire protection, such a holding would utterly emasculate the distinction between private as distinguished from State setforth in The Civil Rights Cases and adhered to in subsequent decisions. Our holdings indicate that where the impetus for the discrimination is private, the State must have "significantly involved itself with invidious discriminations . . . in order for the discriminatory action to fall within the ambit of the constitutional prohibition."

On the question of whether the state-licensed lodge represented a state-sponsored monopoly, Rehnquist also sided with the lodge:

However detailed this type of regulation may be in some particulars, it cannot be aid to inany way foster or encourage racial discrimination. Nor can it be said to make the State in any realistic sense a partner or even a joint venturer in theclub's enterprise.

Three justices--Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan, and Justice Douglas--disagreed with the majority view. Douglas and Brennan each wrote separate dissenting opinions, both joined by Marshall. Brennan's took a much different view ofthe state's relationship to Moose Lodge No. 107:

When Moose Lodgeobtained its liquor license, the State of Pennsylvania became an active participant in the operation of the Lodge bar. Liquor licensing laws are only incidentally revenue measures; they are primarily pervasive regulatory schemes under which the State dictates and continually supervises virtually every detail of the operation of the licensee's business. Very few, if any, other licensed businesses experience such complete state involvement.

In Brennan's view, a strong enough relationship existed between the state ofPennsylvania and the Moose Lodge to have its actions classified as "state action." The lodge's discriminatory policies were thus subject to federal civilrights laws.
Following the Supreme Court decision in Moose Lodge v. Irvis, the Pennsylvania Civil Rights Commission took the lodge to court, claiming that its actions violated state law. The Supreme Court refused to hear the case upon appeal, choosing to let the Pennsylvania law stand.
Related Cases

• The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
  
• Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
  
• Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
  
• Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).