Petitioner
NAACP
Respondent
Robert Y. Button, Attorney General of Virginia
Petitioner's Claim
That Chapter 33 of the Virginia Acts of Assembly, Extra Session 1956, violated its Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Robert L. Carter
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Henry T. Wickham
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, William J. Brennan, Jr. (writing for the Court), William O. Douglas, Arthur Goldberg, Earl Warren
Justices Dissenting
Tom C. Clark, John Marshall Harlan II, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
14 January 1963
Decision
The Court, reversing the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, held that Chapter 33 of the Virginia Acts of Assembly, Extra Session 1956, wasunconstitutional because it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Significance
The decision affirmed the NAACP's freedoms of speech and association in the face of attacks from the state. The Virginia statute would have sharply curtailed the legal activities of the NAACP, which was working to desegregate schools by means of litigation.
The Battle for Desegregation
When Brown v. Board of Education ordered an end to school segregationin 1954, Virginia reacted violently. In spring of 1956, Senator Byrd coined the phrase "massive resistance" to characterize Virginia's response. The stateadopted a resolution to "take all appropriate measures honorably, legally and constitutionally available . . . [in order] to resist [the Court's] illegalencroachment upon [Virginia's] sovereign powers." (S.J.Res. 3, 1956 Va. Acts1213.)
Meanwhile, the NAACP's Legal Defense Fund was concentrating its efforts on claiming the Brown victory. Their chief strategy was litigation: staff attorneys represented those who were denied desegregated schooling. Ordinarily, the NAACP funded only suits in which NAACP attorneys were retained, thoughthere were exceptions to this. Although the NAACP did not direct the attorney's actions in a suit, staff attorneys were expected to follow NAACP policies.States in the South--Virginia and others--responded with legislation designed to hinder or evict the organization. A string of Supreme Court cases answered these efforts.
The NAACP Sues
In 1957, the NAACP and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund sued to restrain the enforcement of Chapters 31, 32, 33, 35, and 36 of the Virginia Acts of Assembly,1956 Extra Session. The organization claimed that the statutes violated its right to freedom of association under the Fourteenth Amendment. Each of the statutes was clearly aimed at the NAACP's legal campaign.
Chapter 31 stated that in order for a group or person to solicit funds to finance a suit, they must be one of the litigants. However, this could be avoided if the person filed organizational information (such as membership lists and financial records) with the state. Chapter 32, purportedly to preserve "interracial harmony and tranquility," required organizations that dealt with racial issues (including those funding litigation "in behalf of any race or color") to register with the state. Chapter 33 expanded the definition of "solicitation," making it illegal for an attorney to work for someone who was not aparty in a suit, and who had no financial interest in the suit. It also outlawed solicitation for an attorney by such a third party. Chapter 35 defined "barratry" as "stirring up litigation." Chapter 36 made it illegal for anyone not directly involved in a lawsuit to offer or accept assistance to help another institute or continue a suit.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia struck down Chapters 31, 32, and 35. The court abstained from judgment on Chapters 33 and 36,and instead waited for interpretation from a state court. The NAACP then took the case to the circuit court, which ruled against it. The Virginia SupremeCourt of Appeals upheld that ruling for Chapter 33, but reversed it for Chapter 36. With only Chapter 33 remaining law, then, the NAACP petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
Petitioner's Claims
The NAACP had argued that the statute deprived it of property without due process and violated its right to equal protection. These two claims were dismissed by the Court. In regard to due process, the Court found that the statutewas within the range of permissible regulations. Equal protection was not anissue because technically the statute applied to many groups, not just to theNAACP or to African Americans (as the Court wrote, "that the petitioner happens to be engaged in activities of expression and association on behalf of the rights of Negro children to equal opportunity is constitutionally irrelevant to the grounds of our decision"). The NAACP also claimed that the statute violated its First Amendment freedoms of speech and association, as extended under the Fourteenth Amendment. It was on these grounds that the Court struckdown the statute.
State's Interests Do Not Justify Suppression of Speech
The Court rejected Virginia's first claim that "solicitation" was not protected by the First Amendment. "[T]he First Amendment," Justice Brennan wrote, delivering the majority decision, " . . . protects vigorous advocacy, certainlyof lawful ends, against government intrusion." Arguing against a narrow interpretation of speech and assembly, he pointed to the decision in NationalAssociation for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama (1958), which protected the right "to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas." He pointed out that some minorities cannot reach their goals byvoting, and these groups often rightly turn to litigation, which may then become their most meaningful form of political association.
The Court also found the statute so vague that "solicitation" could be interpreted as a simple referral to an attorney. The danger presented here was thatit would be illegal to tell people that their rights were being violated andthen direct them to a particular lawyer. "There thus inheres in the statutethe gravest danger of smothering all discussion looking to the eventual institution of litigation on behalf of the rights of members of an unpopular minority." Furthermore, a vague law may easily be used to oppress unpopular groups. Given the racially polarized political climate in Virginia at the time, thestatute could have struck a great blow to the civil rights movement. (Justice Douglas, in his concurrence, noted that in fact the act was "not applied across the board to all groups that use this method of obtaining and managing litigation, but instead reflects a legislative purpose to penalize the NAACP because it promotes desegregation of the races.")
Virginia's second claim was that states traditionally had a legitimate interest in regulating professional conduct. Barratry, persistent incitement of litigation; maintenance, unlawful interference in a suit by providing money to either part; and champerty, assistance by someone outside the suit in exchangefor a share of the matter in suit; had never been protected behavior. The Court agreed that the state had a valid interest, but an interest in maintaining proper professional behavior did not outweigh constitutional rights.
The NAACP's behavior did not meet traditional criteria for unprofessional legal conduct--it was neither malicious, avaricious, nor harmful to the public.As the Court pointed out, "Lawsuits attacking racial discrimination, at leastin Virginia, are neither very profitable nor very popular." The NAACP, rather than seeking personal gain for its attorneys, aimed to vindicate the constitutional rights of its clients. Therefore, the state's regulation was not important enough to justify overruling freedom of speech. The Court ruled for the petitioner.
Justice White concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the Court that the Virginia statute was unconstitutional. However, he agreed with the dissent that the actual legal practices of the NAACP were subject to regulation.
Professional Conduct Not Protected
Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Clark and Stewart, dissented. The dissentbegan with an acknowledgment:
He critically reviewed the organization's activities: The NAACP did aggressively seek out cases, a practice that often resulted in abnormal attorney-client relationships. The organization identified potential litigants, and NAACP attorneys attended meetings bearing blank forms for these target litigants tosign. In some cases clients did not personally interact with the attorneys representing them.
NAACP attorneys were also likely to maintain an agenda not necessarily set bytheir clients' own goals. For example, staff attorneys were directed by theNAACP to always fight for desegregated education, even if their clients preferred equal facilities. The result, White charged, was a distorted relationship to which the state could reasonably object.
In response to the majority's arguments, the dissent pointed out that even iflitigation is a form of political expression, it may still be regulated. Furthermore, the state has a legitimate interest in regulation, and plentiful legal precedent to support its regulations. Finally, the dissent argued, the statute was not as vague as the Court had claimed. Even if it were, the propercourse would be to resolve the ambiguity, rather than reject the entire statute.
Impact
NAACP v. Button was of obvious importance in the Civil Rights movement, and the school desegregation movement in particular. But as Brennan noted,the case was not decided on the grounds of equal protection. Rather, it dealtwith the freedoms of speech and association. Its impact would thus be felt equally by labor unions and other groups. In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar (1964), the Court extended National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Button to protect unions' referral of members to attorneys. This and subsequent cases involving group legal service would reshape the previously more personal attorney-client relationship, affecting not only the rights of various groups but also the professional conduct of the law.
Related Cases
NAACP
Respondent
Robert Y. Button, Attorney General of Virginia
Petitioner's Claim
That Chapter 33 of the Virginia Acts of Assembly, Extra Session 1956, violated its Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Robert L. Carter
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Henry T. Wickham
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, William J. Brennan, Jr. (writing for the Court), William O. Douglas, Arthur Goldberg, Earl Warren
Justices Dissenting
Tom C. Clark, John Marshall Harlan II, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
14 January 1963
Decision
The Court, reversing the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, held that Chapter 33 of the Virginia Acts of Assembly, Extra Session 1956, wasunconstitutional because it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Significance
The decision affirmed the NAACP's freedoms of speech and association in the face of attacks from the state. The Virginia statute would have sharply curtailed the legal activities of the NAACP, which was working to desegregate schools by means of litigation.
The Battle for Desegregation
When Brown v. Board of Education ordered an end to school segregationin 1954, Virginia reacted violently. In spring of 1956, Senator Byrd coined the phrase "massive resistance" to characterize Virginia's response. The stateadopted a resolution to "take all appropriate measures honorably, legally and constitutionally available . . . [in order] to resist [the Court's] illegalencroachment upon [Virginia's] sovereign powers." (S.J.Res. 3, 1956 Va. Acts1213.)
Meanwhile, the NAACP's Legal Defense Fund was concentrating its efforts on claiming the Brown victory. Their chief strategy was litigation: staff attorneys represented those who were denied desegregated schooling. Ordinarily, the NAACP funded only suits in which NAACP attorneys were retained, thoughthere were exceptions to this. Although the NAACP did not direct the attorney's actions in a suit, staff attorneys were expected to follow NAACP policies.States in the South--Virginia and others--responded with legislation designed to hinder or evict the organization. A string of Supreme Court cases answered these efforts.
The NAACP Sues
In 1957, the NAACP and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund sued to restrain the enforcement of Chapters 31, 32, 33, 35, and 36 of the Virginia Acts of Assembly,1956 Extra Session. The organization claimed that the statutes violated its right to freedom of association under the Fourteenth Amendment. Each of the statutes was clearly aimed at the NAACP's legal campaign.
Chapter 31 stated that in order for a group or person to solicit funds to finance a suit, they must be one of the litigants. However, this could be avoided if the person filed organizational information (such as membership lists and financial records) with the state. Chapter 32, purportedly to preserve "interracial harmony and tranquility," required organizations that dealt with racial issues (including those funding litigation "in behalf of any race or color") to register with the state. Chapter 33 expanded the definition of "solicitation," making it illegal for an attorney to work for someone who was not aparty in a suit, and who had no financial interest in the suit. It also outlawed solicitation for an attorney by such a third party. Chapter 35 defined "barratry" as "stirring up litigation." Chapter 36 made it illegal for anyone not directly involved in a lawsuit to offer or accept assistance to help another institute or continue a suit.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia struck down Chapters 31, 32, and 35. The court abstained from judgment on Chapters 33 and 36,and instead waited for interpretation from a state court. The NAACP then took the case to the circuit court, which ruled against it. The Virginia SupremeCourt of Appeals upheld that ruling for Chapter 33, but reversed it for Chapter 36. With only Chapter 33 remaining law, then, the NAACP petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
Petitioner's Claims
The NAACP had argued that the statute deprived it of property without due process and violated its right to equal protection. These two claims were dismissed by the Court. In regard to due process, the Court found that the statutewas within the range of permissible regulations. Equal protection was not anissue because technically the statute applied to many groups, not just to theNAACP or to African Americans (as the Court wrote, "that the petitioner happens to be engaged in activities of expression and association on behalf of the rights of Negro children to equal opportunity is constitutionally irrelevant to the grounds of our decision"). The NAACP also claimed that the statute violated its First Amendment freedoms of speech and association, as extended under the Fourteenth Amendment. It was on these grounds that the Court struckdown the statute.
State's Interests Do Not Justify Suppression of Speech
The Court rejected Virginia's first claim that "solicitation" was not protected by the First Amendment. "[T]he First Amendment," Justice Brennan wrote, delivering the majority decision, " . . . protects vigorous advocacy, certainlyof lawful ends, against government intrusion." Arguing against a narrow interpretation of speech and assembly, he pointed to the decision in NationalAssociation for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama (1958), which protected the right "to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas." He pointed out that some minorities cannot reach their goals byvoting, and these groups often rightly turn to litigation, which may then become their most meaningful form of political association.
The Court also found the statute so vague that "solicitation" could be interpreted as a simple referral to an attorney. The danger presented here was thatit would be illegal to tell people that their rights were being violated andthen direct them to a particular lawyer. "There thus inheres in the statutethe gravest danger of smothering all discussion looking to the eventual institution of litigation on behalf of the rights of members of an unpopular minority." Furthermore, a vague law may easily be used to oppress unpopular groups. Given the racially polarized political climate in Virginia at the time, thestatute could have struck a great blow to the civil rights movement. (Justice Douglas, in his concurrence, noted that in fact the act was "not applied across the board to all groups that use this method of obtaining and managing litigation, but instead reflects a legislative purpose to penalize the NAACP because it promotes desegregation of the races.")
Virginia's second claim was that states traditionally had a legitimate interest in regulating professional conduct. Barratry, persistent incitement of litigation; maintenance, unlawful interference in a suit by providing money to either part; and champerty, assistance by someone outside the suit in exchangefor a share of the matter in suit; had never been protected behavior. The Court agreed that the state had a valid interest, but an interest in maintaining proper professional behavior did not outweigh constitutional rights.
The NAACP's behavior did not meet traditional criteria for unprofessional legal conduct--it was neither malicious, avaricious, nor harmful to the public.As the Court pointed out, "Lawsuits attacking racial discrimination, at leastin Virginia, are neither very profitable nor very popular." The NAACP, rather than seeking personal gain for its attorneys, aimed to vindicate the constitutional rights of its clients. Therefore, the state's regulation was not important enough to justify overruling freedom of speech. The Court ruled for the petitioner.
Justice White concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the Court that the Virginia statute was unconstitutional. However, he agreed with the dissent that the actual legal practices of the NAACP were subject to regulation.
Professional Conduct Not Protected
Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Clark and Stewart, dissented. The dissentbegan with an acknowledgment:
No member of this Court would disagree that the validity of state action claimed to infringe rights assured by the Fourteenth Amendment is to be judged by the same basic constitutional standards whether or not racial problems are involved. No worse setback could befall the great principles established by Brown v. Board of Education .. . than to give fair-minded persons reason to think otherwise.Having said that, Harlan went on to say that state regulation of the NAACP's practice was probably constitutional (though not wise).
He critically reviewed the organization's activities: The NAACP did aggressively seek out cases, a practice that often resulted in abnormal attorney-client relationships. The organization identified potential litigants, and NAACP attorneys attended meetings bearing blank forms for these target litigants tosign. In some cases clients did not personally interact with the attorneys representing them.
NAACP attorneys were also likely to maintain an agenda not necessarily set bytheir clients' own goals. For example, staff attorneys were directed by theNAACP to always fight for desegregated education, even if their clients preferred equal facilities. The result, White charged, was a distorted relationship to which the state could reasonably object.
In response to the majority's arguments, the dissent pointed out that even iflitigation is a form of political expression, it may still be regulated. Furthermore, the state has a legitimate interest in regulation, and plentiful legal precedent to support its regulations. Finally, the dissent argued, the statute was not as vague as the Court had claimed. Even if it were, the propercourse would be to resolve the ambiguity, rather than reject the entire statute.
Impact
NAACP v. Button was of obvious importance in the Civil Rights movement, and the school desegregation movement in particular. But as Brennan noted,the case was not decided on the grounds of equal protection. Rather, it dealtwith the freedoms of speech and association. Its impact would thus be felt equally by labor unions and other groups. In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar (1964), the Court extended National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Button to protect unions' referral of members to attorneys. This and subsequent cases involving group legal service would reshape the previously more personal attorney-client relationship, affecting not only the rights of various groups but also the professional conduct of the law.
Related Cases
- Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
- National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
- Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1(1964).
- United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
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