Petitioner
Tina B. Bennis
Respondent
State of Michigan
Petitioner's Claim
That she should be allowed to contest the confiscation of the car she jointlyowned with her husband because she did not know her husband would use the car to violate Michigan's indecency law.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Stefan B. Herpel
Chief Lawyers for the Respondent
Larry L. Roberts, Richard H. Seamon
Justices for the Court
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sandra Day O'Connor, William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
Stephen Breyer, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
4 March 1996
Decision
Upheld the state of Michigan's claim that the uncompensated taking of property used as a public nuisance, from an innocent owner, does not violate the DueProcess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Significance
The ruling affirmed the government's right to seize private property, known as forfeiture, if the property was used as a public nuisance. The Supreme Court decided that taking a vehicle did not violate the owner's right to due process because Michigan's nuisance abatement law legally transferred ownership of the car to the state. The Court also decided that the innocent property owner was not entitled to payment for the seized property. This contrasts with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantees of just compensation when property is taken for public use. The ruling assured that law enforcement agencies would be able to use forfeiture laws in their fight against drugs, gambling, and prostitution.
Since 1827, private property has been seized from an innocent owner if the property was used to break the law. A ship, the Palmyra, was commissioned by the King of Spain to attack a U.S. vessel. The owner argued that he hadnot been convicted of privateering, using a privately owned ship to attack anenemy vessel, so the ship should not be confiscated. The court disagreed, stating that the ship was the offender.
Later cases also supported seizure of private property used for illegal purposes, even when respective owners were unaware of illegal use. During Prohibition (1919-1933), when alcohol was illegal, the Court upheld the forfeiture ofcars used to transport liquor, even though the owners did not know the car was being used for this purpose. In 1974, the Supreme Court decided that a yacht leasing company should forfeit a yacht after a customer came on board witha marijuana cigarette.
Michigan Courts Disagree on Seizure of Vehicle
In Bennis v. Michigan, a married couple, in 1988, purchased a 1977 Pontiac for $600 so the husband could drive to his job at a steel mill. WithoutTina Bennis's knowledge, her husband, John Bennis, had oral sex with a prostitute in the front seat of their jointly owned car. Bennis was fined for "gross indecency." A local county prosecutor asked that the car be abated (confiscated) and sold as a public nuisance by the Wayne County Circuit Court under aMichigan "red light abatement" law. The Bennis' car was one of the first confiscated under the Detroit Police Department's policy of cleaning up inner-city prostitution. Tina Bennis, a mother of five, appealed stating she was entitled to half the car's value because she had done nothing wrong and did not know that her husband was committing an illegal act in the family's car.
The judge in the Wayne County Circuit Court, Michael Talbot, who originally ordered the car's abatement, rejected Tina Bennis's arguments. He considered the fact that the couple owned another car and thus had some form of transportation. He also noted that although he had the authority to order that she bepaid her half share after costs were deducted, the amount was so small that almost nothing would be left in this situation.
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision. The courtfelt that Bennis's interest in the car should not be abated unless she knew how the car was being used. Also, the court ruled that the husband's act was not a public nuisance because it only happened once, and no proof existed thathe had paid for the act.
The Michigan Supreme Court disagreed with the appeals court and reinstated the abatement on the grounds that the act was an abatable nuisance. The Michigan Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's description of the nuisance abatement as an "equitable action." The court also decided that the state did not need to prove that the owner knew how her vehicle was being used in order to confiscate the vehicle without payment. The Michigan Supreme Court found that Michigan did not have to provide an innocent-owner defense, according to the Constitution.
Question of Whether Constitutional Rights Violated
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to determine if Tina Bennis'sshare of the forfeited car had been denied her without due process, as guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment. Due process means that the government may not deprive anyone of life, liberty, or property without a fair trial or hearing. The Supreme Court also wanted to determine if the Fifth Amendment had been violated by taking her property for public use without compensation.
On 29 November 1995, the Court heard the arguments in the Bennis case.The Clinton administration argued for the state of Michigan, defending the government's right to seize property used in crimes. The administration's lawyer argued that a property owner's ignorance of illegal activity should not beused as a defense. He added that if a property owner can prove that he or she took "all reasonable steps" to prevent the property from being misused, then the owner should not have the property seized.
Bennis's lawyer, Stefan B. Herpel, argued that in the case of a seized yacht,a passage from the case stated, "It would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of . . . an owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved inand unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property." Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his decision, rejected this statement because it wasobiter dictum (said in passing), rather than in the holdings of the case, which held that the yacht company should forfeit the yacht used for transporting controlled substances, even though the owners had no involvement inor knowledge of the illegal activity.
Petitioner Asserted Fifth Amendment Rights Violated
Herpel also proposed that a criminal defendant may not be punished for a crime if he is found to be not guilty. Rehnquist noted in his decision that thisline of reasoning would require Michigan to show that it was trying to be punitive in denying Bennis her share of the forfeited car.
Herpel argued that seizing the car without paying Bennis for her share violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment by taking private property for public use without payment. Rehnquist wrote, "The property in the automobile was transferred . . . to the State. The government may not be required to compensate an owner for property which it has already lawfully acquired under theexercise of governmental authority other than the power of eminent domain."
Bennis's claim ultimately rested on the premise that the Michigan forfeiturelaw was unfair because it did not require a distinction between co-owners whoparticipate in the misuse of property and innocent co-owners. Rehnquist heldthat this argument did not stand up because the Michigan State Court confirmed the trial court judge's authority to order the payment of half the proceeds after costs, if he saw fit.
A Close Decision
The justices appeared sympathetic to Tina Bennis during the oral arguments presented on 29 November 1995. Justice Ginsburg asked the administration's lawyer, "What was Tina Bennis supposed to do?" Despite this in March of 1996, theCourt voted 5-4 to support the administration against Tina Bennis. Writing for the majority, Rehnquist found that the forfeiture did not violate the DueProcess Clause. He reasoned that a long line of cases held that property maybe forfeited even though the owner did not know it was being put to illegal use. Rehnquist felt the Takings Clause was not violated because of the legal transfer of the car from Bennis to the state. He noted that the government isnot required to pay an owner for forfeited property.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas wrote:
Ginsburg noted that, "Michigan has decided to deter johns from using cars they own (or co-own) to contribute to neighborhood blight, and that abatement endeavor hardly warrants this Court's disapprobation."
Four justices disagreed with the majority. Justice Stevens wrote:
Stevens held that confiscating the car would not prevent John Bennis from committing a similar act in another location. Stevens noted that Bennis "had been sighted twice during the previous summer, without the car, soliciting prostitutes in the same neighborhood." Stevens wanted the decision reversed because of a lack of connection between the car and the act, and because Tina Bennis, "is entirely without responsibility for that act. Fundamental fairness prohibits the punishment of innocent people."
Impact
The Court's ruling in the Bennis case represented a reversal of what appeared to be a growing concern over the use of forfeitures by the government. In 1993, the Court established a constitutional safeguard when it ruled that forfeitures were subject to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of excessivefines. The Bennis decision appeared to be a dismantling of the protections the Court had erected in forfeiture cases.
The Bennis case bolstered government authority to confiscate propertyused to commit a crime. Prosecutors, who considered forfeiture laws a usefultool in the war against crime, welcomed the apparent change in the Court's attitude toward forfeiture. Prosecutor John O'Hair noted that in seven years the Detroit police had seized 9,000 cars from individuals who patronized prostitutes, and that this was the only program that had any effect in fighting prostitution. Larry L. Roberts, the prosecutor who argued the Bennis case, noted that the policy of confiscating johns' cars has spread from the innercity to the suburbs.
Defense attorneys, libertarian conservatives, and the banking industry have expressed concern over the decision in Bennis v. Michigan. The AmericanBankers Association worried that financial institutions might have to inspect property to determine if it was being used properly. A brief filed by the ABA noted that, "The state's assertion of sweeping authority to seize propertyrights of those who have done nothing wrong is frightening."
Related Cases
Tina B. Bennis
Respondent
State of Michigan
Petitioner's Claim
That she should be allowed to contest the confiscation of the car she jointlyowned with her husband because she did not know her husband would use the car to violate Michigan's indecency law.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Stefan B. Herpel
Chief Lawyers for the Respondent
Larry L. Roberts, Richard H. Seamon
Justices for the Court
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sandra Day O'Connor, William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
Stephen Breyer, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
4 March 1996
Decision
Upheld the state of Michigan's claim that the uncompensated taking of property used as a public nuisance, from an innocent owner, does not violate the DueProcess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Significance
The ruling affirmed the government's right to seize private property, known as forfeiture, if the property was used as a public nuisance. The Supreme Court decided that taking a vehicle did not violate the owner's right to due process because Michigan's nuisance abatement law legally transferred ownership of the car to the state. The Court also decided that the innocent property owner was not entitled to payment for the seized property. This contrasts with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantees of just compensation when property is taken for public use. The ruling assured that law enforcement agencies would be able to use forfeiture laws in their fight against drugs, gambling, and prostitution.
Since 1827, private property has been seized from an innocent owner if the property was used to break the law. A ship, the Palmyra, was commissioned by the King of Spain to attack a U.S. vessel. The owner argued that he hadnot been convicted of privateering, using a privately owned ship to attack anenemy vessel, so the ship should not be confiscated. The court disagreed, stating that the ship was the offender.
Later cases also supported seizure of private property used for illegal purposes, even when respective owners were unaware of illegal use. During Prohibition (1919-1933), when alcohol was illegal, the Court upheld the forfeiture ofcars used to transport liquor, even though the owners did not know the car was being used for this purpose. In 1974, the Supreme Court decided that a yacht leasing company should forfeit a yacht after a customer came on board witha marijuana cigarette.
Michigan Courts Disagree on Seizure of Vehicle
In Bennis v. Michigan, a married couple, in 1988, purchased a 1977 Pontiac for $600 so the husband could drive to his job at a steel mill. WithoutTina Bennis's knowledge, her husband, John Bennis, had oral sex with a prostitute in the front seat of their jointly owned car. Bennis was fined for "gross indecency." A local county prosecutor asked that the car be abated (confiscated) and sold as a public nuisance by the Wayne County Circuit Court under aMichigan "red light abatement" law. The Bennis' car was one of the first confiscated under the Detroit Police Department's policy of cleaning up inner-city prostitution. Tina Bennis, a mother of five, appealed stating she was entitled to half the car's value because she had done nothing wrong and did not know that her husband was committing an illegal act in the family's car.
The judge in the Wayne County Circuit Court, Michael Talbot, who originally ordered the car's abatement, rejected Tina Bennis's arguments. He considered the fact that the couple owned another car and thus had some form of transportation. He also noted that although he had the authority to order that she bepaid her half share after costs were deducted, the amount was so small that almost nothing would be left in this situation.
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision. The courtfelt that Bennis's interest in the car should not be abated unless she knew how the car was being used. Also, the court ruled that the husband's act was not a public nuisance because it only happened once, and no proof existed thathe had paid for the act.
The Michigan Supreme Court disagreed with the appeals court and reinstated the abatement on the grounds that the act was an abatable nuisance. The Michigan Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's description of the nuisance abatement as an "equitable action." The court also decided that the state did not need to prove that the owner knew how her vehicle was being used in order to confiscate the vehicle without payment. The Michigan Supreme Court found that Michigan did not have to provide an innocent-owner defense, according to the Constitution.
Question of Whether Constitutional Rights Violated
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to determine if Tina Bennis'sshare of the forfeited car had been denied her without due process, as guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment. Due process means that the government may not deprive anyone of life, liberty, or property without a fair trial or hearing. The Supreme Court also wanted to determine if the Fifth Amendment had been violated by taking her property for public use without compensation.
On 29 November 1995, the Court heard the arguments in the Bennis case.The Clinton administration argued for the state of Michigan, defending the government's right to seize property used in crimes. The administration's lawyer argued that a property owner's ignorance of illegal activity should not beused as a defense. He added that if a property owner can prove that he or she took "all reasonable steps" to prevent the property from being misused, then the owner should not have the property seized.
Bennis's lawyer, Stefan B. Herpel, argued that in the case of a seized yacht,a passage from the case stated, "It would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of . . . an owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved inand unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property." Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his decision, rejected this statement because it wasobiter dictum (said in passing), rather than in the holdings of the case, which held that the yacht company should forfeit the yacht used for transporting controlled substances, even though the owners had no involvement inor knowledge of the illegal activity.
Petitioner Asserted Fifth Amendment Rights Violated
Herpel also proposed that a criminal defendant may not be punished for a crime if he is found to be not guilty. Rehnquist noted in his decision that thisline of reasoning would require Michigan to show that it was trying to be punitive in denying Bennis her share of the forfeited car.
Herpel argued that seizing the car without paying Bennis for her share violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment by taking private property for public use without payment. Rehnquist wrote, "The property in the automobile was transferred . . . to the State. The government may not be required to compensate an owner for property which it has already lawfully acquired under theexercise of governmental authority other than the power of eminent domain."
Bennis's claim ultimately rested on the premise that the Michigan forfeiturelaw was unfair because it did not require a distinction between co-owners whoparticipate in the misuse of property and innocent co-owners. Rehnquist heldthat this argument did not stand up because the Michigan State Court confirmed the trial court judge's authority to order the payment of half the proceeds after costs, if he saw fit.
A Close Decision
The justices appeared sympathetic to Tina Bennis during the oral arguments presented on 29 November 1995. Justice Ginsburg asked the administration's lawyer, "What was Tina Bennis supposed to do?" Despite this in March of 1996, theCourt voted 5-4 to support the administration against Tina Bennis. Writing for the majority, Rehnquist found that the forfeiture did not violate the DueProcess Clause. He reasoned that a long line of cases held that property maybe forfeited even though the owner did not know it was being put to illegal use. Rehnquist felt the Takings Clause was not violated because of the legal transfer of the car from Bennis to the state. He noted that the government isnot required to pay an owner for forfeited property.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas wrote:
Forfeiture of property simply because it was used in crime has been permitted time out of mind . . . This case is ultimately a reminder that the Federal Constitution doesnot prohibit everything that is intensely undesirable . . . Improperly used,forfeiture could become more like a roulette wheel employed to raise revenuefrom innocent but hapless owners whose property is unforeseeably misused . ..
Ginsburg noted that, "Michigan has decided to deter johns from using cars they own (or co-own) to contribute to neighborhood blight, and that abatement endeavor hardly warrants this Court's disapprobation."
Four justices disagreed with the majority. Justice Stevens wrote:
The logic of the Court's analysis would permit the States to exercise virtually unbridled power to confiscate vast amounts of property where professionalcriminals have engaged in illegal acts . . . While our historical cases establish the propriety of seizing a freighter when its entire cargo consists ofsmuggled goods, none of them would justify the confiscation of an ocean linerjust because one of its passengers sinned while on board.
Stevens held that confiscating the car would not prevent John Bennis from committing a similar act in another location. Stevens noted that Bennis "had been sighted twice during the previous summer, without the car, soliciting prostitutes in the same neighborhood." Stevens wanted the decision reversed because of a lack of connection between the car and the act, and because Tina Bennis, "is entirely without responsibility for that act. Fundamental fairness prohibits the punishment of innocent people."
Impact
The Court's ruling in the Bennis case represented a reversal of what appeared to be a growing concern over the use of forfeitures by the government. In 1993, the Court established a constitutional safeguard when it ruled that forfeitures were subject to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of excessivefines. The Bennis decision appeared to be a dismantling of the protections the Court had erected in forfeiture cases.
The Bennis case bolstered government authority to confiscate propertyused to commit a crime. Prosecutors, who considered forfeiture laws a usefultool in the war against crime, welcomed the apparent change in the Court's attitude toward forfeiture. Prosecutor John O'Hair noted that in seven years the Detroit police had seized 9,000 cars from individuals who patronized prostitutes, and that this was the only program that had any effect in fighting prostitution. Larry L. Roberts, the prosecutor who argued the Bennis case, noted that the policy of confiscating johns' cars has spread from the innercity to the suburbs.
Defense attorneys, libertarian conservatives, and the banking industry have expressed concern over the decision in Bennis v. Michigan. The AmericanBankers Association worried that financial institutions might have to inspect property to determine if it was being used properly. A brief filed by the ABA noted that, "The state's assertion of sweeping authority to seize propertyrights of those who have done nothing wrong is frightening."
Related Cases
- Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
- United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973).
- Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
- Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
- Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
User Comments Add a comment…