California v. Acevedo

Petitioner
State of California
Respondent
Charles Steven Acevedo
Petitioner's Claim
That police may search a container seized from an automobile where there is probable cause to believe that the container holds evidence or an illegal substance.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Robert M. Foster
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Frederick Westcott Anderson
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun (writing for the Court), Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor, William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter
Justices Dissenting
Thurgood Marshall, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
30 May 1991
Decision
Marijuana seized from defendant's car could be admitted into evidence at defendant's trial on drug charges. Reversed lower court decision barring admission of marijuana because police had not procured search warrant.
Significance
Established that police need not obtain a search warrant prior to searching aclosed container seized from a vehicle so long as they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle or container contains evidence or an illegal substance.
The United States' "War on Drugs" became a major concern in the 1970s and 1980s. As drug arrests increased, a growing number of defendants sought to exclude drugs found in their possession from evidence at trial. Convictions oftendepended upon the introduction of such evidence. In other criminal cases, defendants sought to exclude from evidence weapons that had been seized in police searches. In Acevedo the Supreme Court delineated the circumstancesunder which evidence seized from a vehicle would be admissible at trial.
The case arose when police officers saw Acevedo place a brown paper bag in the trunk of his car and drive away. The bag appeared to be one of a number ofpackages of marijuana, which police had observed being brought into the building from which Acevedo was leaving. The police stopped the car, opened the trunk and bag, and found the marijuana. Acevedo was charged with possession ofmarijuana for sale.
Prior to trial, Acevedo moved to exclude the marijuana from evidence. His attorney argued that the search of the bag was unconstitutional because the police did not first obtain a search warrant. The trial court denied his motion to exclude the evidence, but the California Court of Appeals reversed and ruled that the officers should not have searched the bag without obtaining a warrant. The California Supreme Court denied the state's petition for review of the court of appeals decision, following which the state applied for and was granted a review of the decision by the U.S. Supreme Court.
A Uniform Rule for Vehicle Searches
The Supreme Court ruled in a 6-3 decision that the search of the bag in Acevedo's trunk was constitutional. Therefore, the marijuana found in the trunk was admissible as evidence at trial. In reaching this result, the Court rejected the respondent's argument that the police should have obtained a search warrant before opening the bag.
The basis of the responden'st challenge was the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. That prohibition has been repeatedlyinterpreted to require that authorities have "probable cause" to conduct a search, just as in an earlier case, United States v. Ross (1982). It has also been interpreted to require that in many circumstances police obtain asearch warrant prior to conducting a search. Where authorities have conducted an unconstitutional search, the remedy courts have imposed is to exclude evidence obtained from the illegal search from consideration by the judge or jury at trial.
The Supreme Court initially narrowed the issues in Acevedo by refusingto review the California Courts' finding that there was probable cause to search the bag. The Supreme Court also did not question the propriety of seizing the bag. Instead, the Court focused exclusively on whether the police should have obtained a search warrant before opening the bag. The legal question addressed was, under what circumstances can a container seized from a vehiclecan be searched without first obtaining a search warrant.
The answer to this question was complicated by the existence of different rules for searching vehicles and containers such as bags or suitcases. In casesinvolving vehicles, the police were allowed to stop a car and conduct a search of the car without first obtaining a search warrant so long as there was probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence or an illegal substance. That search could include searching containers found in the vehicle. In contrast, police having probable cause to believe that a container contained evidence or an illegal substance could seize the container, but could not search it without a search warrant. This distinction resulted in confusion in cases involving containers found inside vehicles. More specifically, the Court had to consider whether the rules applied to searches of vehicles or containers.
Previously, in Arkansas v. Sanders (1979), the Supreme Court had applied the container rule requiring a warrant where police had probable cause tosearch a container which had been placed in a car, but lacked probable causeto search the entire auto. The California Court of Appeals followed Sanders and applied the container rule to Acevedo's case. The California courtconcluded that the container rule applied because at the time Acevedo was stopped there was no reason to be suspicious of anything in the car other than the bag itself. Therefore, there was no cause to search the entire automobile,and the California court held the warrantless search invalid.
The Supreme Court rejected the distinction between vehicle searches and searches of containers in vehicles. It emphasized that the result was confusion for courts and police officers trying to decide whether a warrant was necessaryin a particular case. The Court simplified the area by announcing one rule governing all searches of containers in vehicles:

Until today, thisCourt has drawn a curious line between the search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container and the search of a container that coincidentally turns up an automobile. The protections of the Fourth Amendment must notturn on such coincidences . . . We therefore . . . [provide] one rule to govern all automobile searches. The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.

Justice Scalia wrote a separate opinion in which he concurred with the majority. He would have gone even further in permitting warrantless searches. In his opinion a warrantless search of a closed container located outside a private building would be permissible so long as the police had probable cause to believe the article contained an illegal substance.
Dissent Finds Warrantless Search Unacceptable
Justices Stevens, Marshall and White disagreed with the majority. Stevens urged in his dissenting opinion that the search of Acevedo's bag without a search warrant was unconstitutional. He reasoned that there was no justification for not requiring a warrant where the container had been seized and was underpolice control. Thus, there was no risk that the evidence would be destroyedor hidden before a warrant could be obtained. Under such circumstances Stevens found the loss of individual privacy resulting from the warrantless searchto be unacceptable.
Impact
The Acevedo Court established a clear rule for police to follow when searching containers found in vehicles. At the law enforcement level, the decision has broadened police officers' ability to conduct a search without firstobtaining a search warrant. It has prevented defendants challenging an automobile search from arguing that a search warrant was necessary. Instead, the only question they can raise is whether there was probable cause to initiate the search. As a practical matter, since the Acevedo decision, evidenceobtained in a vehicle search is more likely to be admitted into evidence against a defendant at trial.
Related Cases

• United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
  
• Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
  
• United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
  
• United States v. Cook, 938 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1991).
  
• United States v. Corral, 970 F.2d 719 (10th Cir. 1992).

Kids, Drugs, and Crime
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, in 1992 there were 73,981 arrests relating to the possession, sale, use, growing, and manufacture of illegaldrugs on the part of youths 17 years or age and younger. Of these, 14,529, ornearly 20 percent, took place in California. New York state came in second,with 8,301 arrests (11 percent), and Texas was third with 6,306 (about 8.5 percent).
A 1996 Justice Department study compared drug use by male juvenile arresteesor detainees--as determined by drug tests--in 12 U.S. cities, including the California jurisdictions of Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Jose.
Other cities included: Birmingham, Alabama in the South; Washington, D.C. inthe East; Cleveland, Ohio in the Northeast; Indianapolis, Indiana and St. Louis, Missouri in the Midwest; Denver, Phoenix, and San Antonio, Texas in the West; and Portland, Oregon in the Northwest.
The average percentage of arrestees using drugs of any kind was 53.8 percent,meaning that San Diego, with 53 percent, was almost exactly at the statistical mean. San Jose was well below, with 46 percent; and Los Angeles was abovethe average. However, at 57 percent, it was not substantially above, and it was surpassed by Denver (61 percent), Cleveland (63), and Washington (67).
Sources
Morgan, Kathleen O'Leary, et al., eds. Crime State Rankings. Lawrence,KS: Morgan Quitno, 1994.