Petitioner
State of Massachusetts
Respondent
Osborne Sheppard
Petitioner's Claim
That evidence found and used against Osborne Sheppard should not be suppressed because it was gathered using a defective warrant.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Barbara A. H. Smith
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
John Reinstein
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White (writing for the Court)
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall
Place
Washington D.C.
Date of Decision
5 July 1984
Decision
Reversed the decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts and held that evidence is admissible, even if gathered under a defective search warrant, as long as the police acted in good faith in executing what they believed was a valid warrant.
Significance
The ruling settled controversy over whether evidence gathered with a defective warrant should be suppressed, even if the police officers acted in good faith. Because the exclusion of evidence gathered by unreasonable search and seizure was designed to prevent police misconduct, the Court determined that excluding evidence obtained in good faith would not serve the purpose of deterring police misbehavior. This ruling assures that criminals will not benefit from clerical errors in search warrants.
On Saturday, 5 May 1979, the burned body of Sandra Boulware was found in an empty lot in the part of Boston, Massachusetts, known as Roxbury. Boulware haddied from multiple blows to the head. On investigating, the police questioned one of Boulware's boyfriends, Osborne Sheppard. He claimed to have last seen Boulware on Tuesday night. Sheppard stated that he had been in a gaming house from 9:00 p.m. on Friday until 5:00 a.m. on Saturday. Witnesses agreed that he had been there, but that he had borrowed a car at 3:00 a.m. to give twomen a ride home. The trip should have taken 15 minutes, but Sheppard did notreturn until almost 5:00 a.m.
The police searched the borrowed car and found bloodstains, hair, and wire similar to that found near Boulware's body. Based on this evidence, Detective Peter O'Malley drafted an affidavit in order to get an arrest warrant and a search warrant so he could search Sheppard's residence. The affidavit listed what the police intended to look for: a bottle of amaretto liquor, two nickel bags of marijuana, a woman's jacket, wire and rope like those found near the victim, a blunt instrument, and clothing with blood, gasoline, or burns on them.
O'Malley showed the affidavit to the district attorney, the district attorney's first assistant, and a sergeant. They all agreed that probable cause existed for a search and arrest. The local court was closed because it was Sunday,and O'Malley had trouble locating a warrant application form. He finally found one that had been used in the Dorchester District regarding a controlled substance. O'Malley deleted the subtitle "Controlled Substance," substituted "Roxbury" for "Dorchester," and added Sheppard's name and address. The words "controlled substance" were not deleted from the part of the form that would become the warrant itself, once signed.
O'Malley brought the affidavit and the warrant form to the home of a judge who agreed to authorize the search. The detective explained that the present form dealt with controlled substances and he showed the judge where he had crossed out the subtitles. The judge told O'Malley that he would make the changesnecessary for a proper search warrant. The judge then took the form, made some changes, and signed and dated the warrant. He had not, however, changed the part of the warrant that authorized a search for controlled substances. Healso did not alter the form to incorporate the affidavit. The judge gave theaffidavit and warrant back to O'Malley, stating that the warrant was sufficient to carry out the requested search.
O'Malley and other officers took the documents to Sheppard's residence, whichthey proceeded to search. While looking for the items listed in the affidavit, they found several pieces of incriminating evidence--bloodstained boots, bloodstains on the floor, a woman's earring with blood on it, bloody clothing,and three types of wire. They then charged Sheppard with first-degree murder.
A suppression hearing was held before the trial itself. This type of hearingis used to determine what evidence will be suppressed, or excluded, from a trial. Excluding evidence is possible because of the exclusionary rule, which states that evidence gathered during an unreasonable search and seizure cannotbe used in a criminal prosecution. At the suppression hearing in the Sheppard case, the judge decided that the warrant did not conform to the Fourth Amendment because it did not describe the items to be seized. The Fourth Amendment forbids unreasonable searches and seizures and states that probablecause must exist for a warrant to be issued and that the warrant must describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. However, the judge ruled that although the warrant was inaccurate, the evidence could still be admitted because the police had acted in good faith. They thought they were executing a valid warrant.
Sheppard was convicted, but appealed on the grounds that the evidence seizedwith the defective warrant should have been suppressed. The Supreme Court ofMassachusetts agreed with this decision. The justices decided that although the police had conducted the search in good faith, the evidence should have been excluded because the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had not recognized a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
The Court Applies the Good Faith Rule
The Supreme Court created the "good faith" rule in United States v. Leon. The rule states that evidence gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure will still be admissible in a trial if the police acted reasonably, although mistakenly. The good faith exception was deemed necessary because the exclusionary rule was designed to prevent police misconduct. Suppressing evidence gathered without policemisconduct occurring would not serve the purpose of the exclusionary rule andwould benefit criminals.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear Massachusetts v. Sheppard to determine if the officers reasonably believed that the search of Sheppard's residencewas authorized by a valid warrant. The trial court and the majority of the Massachusetts Supreme Court felt that there was an objectively reasonable basis for the officers' mistaken belief that the warrant authorized the search they conducted. The majority of the Supreme Court justices agreed with these lower courts.
The attorney for Sheppard argued that since O'Malley knew the warrant form was defective he should have examined it to see if the necessary changes had been made.
Justice White wrote the opinion for the majority stating, "The officers in this case took every step that could reasonably be expected of them . . . We refuse to rule that an officer is required to disbelieve a judge who has just advised him, by word and by action, that the warrant he possesses authorizes him to conduct the search . . . " White pointed out that in most jurisdictions, the determinations of a judge are valid and binding, even if erroneous, until they are set aside through recognized procedure. White noted that there islittle reason why an officer "should be expected to disregard assurances that everything is all right especially when he has alerted the judge to the potential problems."
White summed up by noting that the police conduct in this case was objectively reasonable. The judge, not the police officers, made the mistake. Since theexclusionary rule was designed to deter unlawful searches by police, not topunish clerical errors by judges, suppressing the evidence would not serve adeterrent purpose. The decision of the Supreme Judicial Court was reversed and the case sent back for further proceedings.
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented in this case, stating that under theFourth Amendment, illegally obtained evidence cannot be admitted. Their dissent in this case appeared in United States v. Leon. There they stated that the main deterrent function of the exclusionary rule goes beyond just theprevention of police misconduct. They felt that if a search warrant was defective for any reason, including an honest mistake, the evidence in the case should be suppressed. Brennan and Marshall stated that this strict interpretation would preserve the integrity of law enforcement and the Fourth Amendment.They summed up their dissent by noting that the majority's viewpoint "robbedthe [exclusionary] rule of legitimacy."
Excluded Evidence Can Still Be Used In Court
Massachusetts v. Sheppard involved the application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, articulated in United States v. Leon on the same day that Massachusetts v. Sheppard was decided. In Massachusetts v. Sheppard, the Supreme Court held that although a warrant was found invalid after a search, the exclusionary rule did not apply. In United States v. Leon, the Court redefined the test for applying the exclusionary rule and narrowed the scope of Fourth Amendment protection for defendants. In Leon, the Court allowed evidence obtained in a search with amistakenly issued warrant to be admitted because the police were acting in good faith. To determine whether the exclusionary rule should be applied, the Court used a cost-benefit analysis. The benefits of deterring police misconduct were weighed against the costs of suppressing the evidence. The purpose ofthe rule is to prevent the police from overstepping constitutional bounds. InLeon, the police did not overstep their bounds, so the Court concluded that there would be little benefit in applying the rule. Releasing a law breaker was a cost outweighing any benefit from attempting to prevent outrageous police behavior.
Decisions prior to Leon and Massachusetts v. Sheppard failed tocreate a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The Court finally created the good faith exception with Leon and applied it immediately inMassachusetts v. Sheppard, pointing out the possibilities of excludedevidence still being used in court, then noting the purposes of the exclusionary rule.
The Supreme Court revisited the good faith exception to the exclusionary rulein Arizona v. Evans (1995). A court employee mistakenly identified Isaac Evans as the subject of an arrest warrant. When a police officer stoppedEvans for a traffic violation and searched him, using the incorrect warrant information, he found marijuana. The Supreme Court ruled that evidence seizedin violation of the Fourth Amendment because of a clerk's error does not haveto be excluded from the defendant's trial. The Court once again emphasized that the Fourth Amendment's purpose is to prevent unreasonable searches and seizures by the police.
Related Cases
State of Massachusetts
Respondent
Osborne Sheppard
Petitioner's Claim
That evidence found and used against Osborne Sheppard should not be suppressed because it was gathered using a defective warrant.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Barbara A. H. Smith
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
John Reinstein
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Byron R. White (writing for the Court)
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall
Place
Washington D.C.
Date of Decision
5 July 1984
Decision
Reversed the decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts and held that evidence is admissible, even if gathered under a defective search warrant, as long as the police acted in good faith in executing what they believed was a valid warrant.
Significance
The ruling settled controversy over whether evidence gathered with a defective warrant should be suppressed, even if the police officers acted in good faith. Because the exclusion of evidence gathered by unreasonable search and seizure was designed to prevent police misconduct, the Court determined that excluding evidence obtained in good faith would not serve the purpose of deterring police misbehavior. This ruling assures that criminals will not benefit from clerical errors in search warrants.
On Saturday, 5 May 1979, the burned body of Sandra Boulware was found in an empty lot in the part of Boston, Massachusetts, known as Roxbury. Boulware haddied from multiple blows to the head. On investigating, the police questioned one of Boulware's boyfriends, Osborne Sheppard. He claimed to have last seen Boulware on Tuesday night. Sheppard stated that he had been in a gaming house from 9:00 p.m. on Friday until 5:00 a.m. on Saturday. Witnesses agreed that he had been there, but that he had borrowed a car at 3:00 a.m. to give twomen a ride home. The trip should have taken 15 minutes, but Sheppard did notreturn until almost 5:00 a.m.
The police searched the borrowed car and found bloodstains, hair, and wire similar to that found near Boulware's body. Based on this evidence, Detective Peter O'Malley drafted an affidavit in order to get an arrest warrant and a search warrant so he could search Sheppard's residence. The affidavit listed what the police intended to look for: a bottle of amaretto liquor, two nickel bags of marijuana, a woman's jacket, wire and rope like those found near the victim, a blunt instrument, and clothing with blood, gasoline, or burns on them.
O'Malley showed the affidavit to the district attorney, the district attorney's first assistant, and a sergeant. They all agreed that probable cause existed for a search and arrest. The local court was closed because it was Sunday,and O'Malley had trouble locating a warrant application form. He finally found one that had been used in the Dorchester District regarding a controlled substance. O'Malley deleted the subtitle "Controlled Substance," substituted "Roxbury" for "Dorchester," and added Sheppard's name and address. The words "controlled substance" were not deleted from the part of the form that would become the warrant itself, once signed.
O'Malley brought the affidavit and the warrant form to the home of a judge who agreed to authorize the search. The detective explained that the present form dealt with controlled substances and he showed the judge where he had crossed out the subtitles. The judge told O'Malley that he would make the changesnecessary for a proper search warrant. The judge then took the form, made some changes, and signed and dated the warrant. He had not, however, changed the part of the warrant that authorized a search for controlled substances. Healso did not alter the form to incorporate the affidavit. The judge gave theaffidavit and warrant back to O'Malley, stating that the warrant was sufficient to carry out the requested search.
O'Malley and other officers took the documents to Sheppard's residence, whichthey proceeded to search. While looking for the items listed in the affidavit, they found several pieces of incriminating evidence--bloodstained boots, bloodstains on the floor, a woman's earring with blood on it, bloody clothing,and three types of wire. They then charged Sheppard with first-degree murder.
A suppression hearing was held before the trial itself. This type of hearingis used to determine what evidence will be suppressed, or excluded, from a trial. Excluding evidence is possible because of the exclusionary rule, which states that evidence gathered during an unreasonable search and seizure cannotbe used in a criminal prosecution. At the suppression hearing in the Sheppard case, the judge decided that the warrant did not conform to the Fourth Amendment because it did not describe the items to be seized. The Fourth Amendment forbids unreasonable searches and seizures and states that probablecause must exist for a warrant to be issued and that the warrant must describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. However, the judge ruled that although the warrant was inaccurate, the evidence could still be admitted because the police had acted in good faith. They thought they were executing a valid warrant.
Sheppard was convicted, but appealed on the grounds that the evidence seizedwith the defective warrant should have been suppressed. The Supreme Court ofMassachusetts agreed with this decision. The justices decided that although the police had conducted the search in good faith, the evidence should have been excluded because the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had not recognized a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
The Court Applies the Good Faith Rule
The Supreme Court created the "good faith" rule in United States v. Leon. The rule states that evidence gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure will still be admissible in a trial if the police acted reasonably, although mistakenly. The good faith exception was deemed necessary because the exclusionary rule was designed to prevent police misconduct. Suppressing evidence gathered without policemisconduct occurring would not serve the purpose of the exclusionary rule andwould benefit criminals.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear Massachusetts v. Sheppard to determine if the officers reasonably believed that the search of Sheppard's residencewas authorized by a valid warrant. The trial court and the majority of the Massachusetts Supreme Court felt that there was an objectively reasonable basis for the officers' mistaken belief that the warrant authorized the search they conducted. The majority of the Supreme Court justices agreed with these lower courts.
The attorney for Sheppard argued that since O'Malley knew the warrant form was defective he should have examined it to see if the necessary changes had been made.
Justice White wrote the opinion for the majority stating, "The officers in this case took every step that could reasonably be expected of them . . . We refuse to rule that an officer is required to disbelieve a judge who has just advised him, by word and by action, that the warrant he possesses authorizes him to conduct the search . . . " White pointed out that in most jurisdictions, the determinations of a judge are valid and binding, even if erroneous, until they are set aside through recognized procedure. White noted that there islittle reason why an officer "should be expected to disregard assurances that everything is all right especially when he has alerted the judge to the potential problems."
White summed up by noting that the police conduct in this case was objectively reasonable. The judge, not the police officers, made the mistake. Since theexclusionary rule was designed to deter unlawful searches by police, not topunish clerical errors by judges, suppressing the evidence would not serve adeterrent purpose. The decision of the Supreme Judicial Court was reversed and the case sent back for further proceedings.
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented in this case, stating that under theFourth Amendment, illegally obtained evidence cannot be admitted. Their dissent in this case appeared in United States v. Leon. There they stated that the main deterrent function of the exclusionary rule goes beyond just theprevention of police misconduct. They felt that if a search warrant was defective for any reason, including an honest mistake, the evidence in the case should be suppressed. Brennan and Marshall stated that this strict interpretation would preserve the integrity of law enforcement and the Fourth Amendment.They summed up their dissent by noting that the majority's viewpoint "robbedthe [exclusionary] rule of legitimacy."
Excluded Evidence Can Still Be Used In Court
Massachusetts v. Sheppard involved the application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, articulated in United States v. Leon on the same day that Massachusetts v. Sheppard was decided. In Massachusetts v. Sheppard, the Supreme Court held that although a warrant was found invalid after a search, the exclusionary rule did not apply. In United States v. Leon, the Court redefined the test for applying the exclusionary rule and narrowed the scope of Fourth Amendment protection for defendants. In Leon, the Court allowed evidence obtained in a search with amistakenly issued warrant to be admitted because the police were acting in good faith. To determine whether the exclusionary rule should be applied, the Court used a cost-benefit analysis. The benefits of deterring police misconduct were weighed against the costs of suppressing the evidence. The purpose ofthe rule is to prevent the police from overstepping constitutional bounds. InLeon, the police did not overstep their bounds, so the Court concluded that there would be little benefit in applying the rule. Releasing a law breaker was a cost outweighing any benefit from attempting to prevent outrageous police behavior.
Decisions prior to Leon and Massachusetts v. Sheppard failed tocreate a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The Court finally created the good faith exception with Leon and applied it immediately inMassachusetts v. Sheppard, pointing out the possibilities of excludedevidence still being used in court, then noting the purposes of the exclusionary rule.
The Supreme Court revisited the good faith exception to the exclusionary rulein Arizona v. Evans (1995). A court employee mistakenly identified Isaac Evans as the subject of an arrest warrant. When a police officer stoppedEvans for a traffic violation and searched him, using the incorrect warrant information, he found marijuana. The Supreme Court ruled that evidence seizedin violation of the Fourth Amendment because of a clerk's error does not haveto be excluded from the defendant's trial. The Court once again emphasized that the Fourth Amendment's purpose is to prevent unreasonable searches and seizures by the police.
Related Cases
- Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
- United States v. Johnson, 459 U.S. 1214 (1983).
- Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
Further Readings
- Bessette, Joseph M., ed. American Justice, Vol. 2. Pasadena, CA: Salem Press, Inc., 1996.
- West's Encyclopedia of American Law. St. Paul, MN: West Group, 1998.
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