Petitioner
United States
Respondents
Eugene H. Edwards, William T. Livesay
Petitioner's Claim
The Fourth Amendment was not violated when, ten hours after a suspected burglar was placed in jail, police officers took the clothes of the suspected burglar without first obtaining a search warrant.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Edward R. Korman
Chief Lawyer for Respondents
Thomas R. Smith
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, Byron R. White (writing for the Court)
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall, Potter Stewart
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
26 March 1974
Decision
The Fourth Amendment was not violated when, without a search warrant, policeofficers took the clothes of a suspected burglar ten hours after the suspecthad been placed in jail.
Significance
The holding in Edwards is significant because it effectively expands the length of time that police officers have to make warrantless searches andseizures after the time of arrest, but while the suspect is still detained.
On 21 May 1970, at around 10:15 p.m., Patrolman Ashley of the Lebanon, Ohio Police Department received a report that a suspicious tan car with out-of-townlicense plates was parked near the city's post office. Three men had been seen leaving the car, and two persons had been seen at a meat locker on the street corner. After examining the car and the meat locker and finding nothing amiss, Ashley decided to check the post office, where he spotted two men walking along the sidewalk and then crossing the street. About three minutes later, Ashley received a radio report that the silent burglar alarm at the post office had sounded in the home of a nearby resident.
Ashley overtook, apprehended, and arrested the two men, Eugene H. Edwards andWilliam T. Livesay. While the two men were being processed in jail, Lebanonpolice officers investigated the post office and found that someone had triedto get into a window. An officer took paint samples from the window sill andthe wire mesh screen as evidence. The next morning, Lebanon police officerstook Edward's clothes from him and gave him some new clothes because they wanted to compare the paint chips found in Edwards's clothes to the paint chipsat the post office window. The officers had to wait ten hours to seize Edwards's clothes because they did not have any other clothing to give to Edwards.
Edwards and Livesay were tried in federal court on a charge of attempted breaking and entering of a U.S. Post Office. Before trial, Edwards challenged theseizure of his clothes, claiming that they were obtained in violation of hisFourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and that the clothes and the paint chips from his clothes should be excluded from the trial. According to Edwards, the officers should have obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate before seizing his clothes. The trial court disagreed, the evidence was admitted, and Edwards and Livesay were convicted. The two appealed their convictions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for theSixth Circuit, which reversed. Because the arrest and booking process had come to a halt, reasoned the appeals court, the officers had no right to seizeEdwards's clothes without a warrant.
The federal government appealed the reversal to the U.S. Supreme Court. In the meantime, Livesay died leaving Edwards as the sole defendant. A divided Court voted 5-4 to reverse the appeals court, effectively reinstating Edwards'sconviction.
Justice White wrote the majority's opinion. The Court cited the general rulethat searches and seizures should be conducted pursuant to a search warrant.A search warrant may be obtained by a police officer from a judge or magistrate after the police officer has offered enough information to support a probable cause belief that the search or seizure will uncover criminal activity. There are, however, exceptions to the search warrant requirement. One of theseexceptions is the search of a person, the person's possessions, and the immediate area of the person at the time of arrest. It also was well settled fromprior decisions, noted the Court, that police officers have the right to seize the clothing and belongings of an arrestee upon arriving at jail after thearrest.
The appeals court nevertheless had held that the seizure of Edwards's clotheswas illegal under the Fourth Amendment because the "administrative mechanicsof arrest" had been completed. Once that procedure was complete, the appealscourt had opined, the police officers should have obtained a search warrantfor any seizures of evidence. There was, in fact, no extraordinary circumstance that required immediate attention and made an application for a search warrant impracticable. The High Court, however, disagreed with the appeals court's analysis. "[I]t seems to us," Justice White declared for the majority, "that the normal processes incident to arrest and custody had not been completedwhen Edwards was placed in his cell."
The appeals court had conceded that the police officers had probable cause tobelieve that Edwards's clothing would yield evidence, and that they were justified in taking the clothes from him when they arrived at jail. The appealscourt had held, though, that the long period between arrival at jail and theactual seizure of the clothes was not justified without a warrant. Accordingto the High Court, though, the police officers had a right to take Edwards'sclothing as soon as they could find another set of clothing to wear in jail.It would have been quite unreasonable, observed the Court, if the police officers had "stripped [Edwards] of his clothing and left him exposed in his cellthroughout the night." Because they made the exchange of clothing as soon asthey could, the seizure "was no more than taking from [Edwards] the effectsin his immediate possession that constituted evidence of crime."
Since the police already had lawful custody of Edwards and his possessions, the Court pondered how the seizure could have been unreasonable. "[I]t is difficult to perceive what is unreasonable," wondered the Court, "about the police's examining and holding as evidence those personal effects of the accused that they already have in their lawful custody as the result of a lawful arrest." In prior cases, other federal appeals courts had approved of such seizures, and the Court was inclined to agree with those courts. The majority conceded that it was possible for a warrantless, post-arrest search or seizure to violate the warrant requirement of Fourth Amendment. However, citing the FirstCircuit Court of Appeals, the Court closed its opinion by describing the shift in the constitutional balance between the rights of accused persons and the rights of police officers after an arrest has been made: "`While the legalarrest of a person should not destroy the privacy of his premises, it does--for at least a reasonable time and to a reasonable extent--take his own privacy out of the realm of protection from police interest in weapons, means of escape, and evidence.'"
Justices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented. In an opinion written by Justice Stewart, the dissenters deplored the majority's understandingof the Fourth Amendment. The issue was not, as the majority claimed, "`whether the Fourth Amendment should be extended'" in the case. To the dissenters,the question was "whether the Fourth Amendment is to be ignored." Citing theCourt's own precedent, Stewart observed that "`the most basic constitutionalrule'" in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was that a warrant was required forall searches and seizures unless the search or seizure was one of "`a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" The burden was on thegovernment to show that the circumstances of the seizure brought it "withinone of the `jealously and carefully drawn' exceptions to the warrant requirement," and, in the opinion of the dissenters, the government had failed to doso.
The dissent acknowledged that a warrantless search or seizure is valid when it is conducted incident to a valid arrest. Under the Court's precedent, though, such searches should be limited in space and time. In Edwards's case, thedissent felt that a time span of ten hours was too remote from the time of arrest, and that the failure to obtain a search warrant prior to the seizure was not justified.
The dissent disagreed also with the Court's philosophical approach to the Fourth Amendment. The majority was analyzing the reasonableness of searches according to "`the acceptability of police conduct, and not on considerations relevant to Fourth Amendment interests.'" This was flawed because, according todissenting Justice Felix Frankfurter in Chimel v. California (1969), the test of reason that makes a search reasonable "`is the reason underlying and expressed by the Fourth Amendment: the history and the experience which itembodies and the safeguards afforded by it against the evils to which it wasa response.'"
The dissent conceded that the seizure in Edwards's case "was not a shocking one," and that the officers had not acted in bad faith. Nonetheless, the dissent warned, such seemingly innocuous transgressions should not be ignored because "`illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing inthat way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modesof procedure.'" (quoting Boyd v. United States [1886])
Impact
The Edwards decision resolved a split between federal courts and established that police do not need a search warrant to seize articles from arrested persons after the booking process is completed. Depending on the facts ofthe case, a warrantless search or seizure of a jailed person might still be ruled unconstitutional. However, the Edwards Court omitted any specificguidelines for time limitations on the right of police officers to seize theclothes of a person who has been arrested and jailed.
Related Cases
United States
Respondents
Eugene H. Edwards, William T. Livesay
Petitioner's Claim
The Fourth Amendment was not violated when, ten hours after a suspected burglar was placed in jail, police officers took the clothes of the suspected burglar without first obtaining a search warrant.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Edward R. Korman
Chief Lawyer for Respondents
Thomas R. Smith
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, Byron R. White (writing for the Court)
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall, Potter Stewart
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
26 March 1974
Decision
The Fourth Amendment was not violated when, without a search warrant, policeofficers took the clothes of a suspected burglar ten hours after the suspecthad been placed in jail.
Significance
The holding in Edwards is significant because it effectively expands the length of time that police officers have to make warrantless searches andseizures after the time of arrest, but while the suspect is still detained.
On 21 May 1970, at around 10:15 p.m., Patrolman Ashley of the Lebanon, Ohio Police Department received a report that a suspicious tan car with out-of-townlicense plates was parked near the city's post office. Three men had been seen leaving the car, and two persons had been seen at a meat locker on the street corner. After examining the car and the meat locker and finding nothing amiss, Ashley decided to check the post office, where he spotted two men walking along the sidewalk and then crossing the street. About three minutes later, Ashley received a radio report that the silent burglar alarm at the post office had sounded in the home of a nearby resident.
Ashley overtook, apprehended, and arrested the two men, Eugene H. Edwards andWilliam T. Livesay. While the two men were being processed in jail, Lebanonpolice officers investigated the post office and found that someone had triedto get into a window. An officer took paint samples from the window sill andthe wire mesh screen as evidence. The next morning, Lebanon police officerstook Edward's clothes from him and gave him some new clothes because they wanted to compare the paint chips found in Edwards's clothes to the paint chipsat the post office window. The officers had to wait ten hours to seize Edwards's clothes because they did not have any other clothing to give to Edwards.
Edwards and Livesay were tried in federal court on a charge of attempted breaking and entering of a U.S. Post Office. Before trial, Edwards challenged theseizure of his clothes, claiming that they were obtained in violation of hisFourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and that the clothes and the paint chips from his clothes should be excluded from the trial. According to Edwards, the officers should have obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate before seizing his clothes. The trial court disagreed, the evidence was admitted, and Edwards and Livesay were convicted. The two appealed their convictions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for theSixth Circuit, which reversed. Because the arrest and booking process had come to a halt, reasoned the appeals court, the officers had no right to seizeEdwards's clothes without a warrant.
The federal government appealed the reversal to the U.S. Supreme Court. In the meantime, Livesay died leaving Edwards as the sole defendant. A divided Court voted 5-4 to reverse the appeals court, effectively reinstating Edwards'sconviction.
Justice White wrote the majority's opinion. The Court cited the general rulethat searches and seizures should be conducted pursuant to a search warrant.A search warrant may be obtained by a police officer from a judge or magistrate after the police officer has offered enough information to support a probable cause belief that the search or seizure will uncover criminal activity. There are, however, exceptions to the search warrant requirement. One of theseexceptions is the search of a person, the person's possessions, and the immediate area of the person at the time of arrest. It also was well settled fromprior decisions, noted the Court, that police officers have the right to seize the clothing and belongings of an arrestee upon arriving at jail after thearrest.
The appeals court nevertheless had held that the seizure of Edwards's clotheswas illegal under the Fourth Amendment because the "administrative mechanicsof arrest" had been completed. Once that procedure was complete, the appealscourt had opined, the police officers should have obtained a search warrantfor any seizures of evidence. There was, in fact, no extraordinary circumstance that required immediate attention and made an application for a search warrant impracticable. The High Court, however, disagreed with the appeals court's analysis. "[I]t seems to us," Justice White declared for the majority, "that the normal processes incident to arrest and custody had not been completedwhen Edwards was placed in his cell."
The appeals court had conceded that the police officers had probable cause tobelieve that Edwards's clothing would yield evidence, and that they were justified in taking the clothes from him when they arrived at jail. The appealscourt had held, though, that the long period between arrival at jail and theactual seizure of the clothes was not justified without a warrant. Accordingto the High Court, though, the police officers had a right to take Edwards'sclothing as soon as they could find another set of clothing to wear in jail.It would have been quite unreasonable, observed the Court, if the police officers had "stripped [Edwards] of his clothing and left him exposed in his cellthroughout the night." Because they made the exchange of clothing as soon asthey could, the seizure "was no more than taking from [Edwards] the effectsin his immediate possession that constituted evidence of crime."
Since the police already had lawful custody of Edwards and his possessions, the Court pondered how the seizure could have been unreasonable. "[I]t is difficult to perceive what is unreasonable," wondered the Court, "about the police's examining and holding as evidence those personal effects of the accused that they already have in their lawful custody as the result of a lawful arrest." In prior cases, other federal appeals courts had approved of such seizures, and the Court was inclined to agree with those courts. The majority conceded that it was possible for a warrantless, post-arrest search or seizure to violate the warrant requirement of Fourth Amendment. However, citing the FirstCircuit Court of Appeals, the Court closed its opinion by describing the shift in the constitutional balance between the rights of accused persons and the rights of police officers after an arrest has been made: "`While the legalarrest of a person should not destroy the privacy of his premises, it does--for at least a reasonable time and to a reasonable extent--take his own privacy out of the realm of protection from police interest in weapons, means of escape, and evidence.'"
Justices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented. In an opinion written by Justice Stewart, the dissenters deplored the majority's understandingof the Fourth Amendment. The issue was not, as the majority claimed, "`whether the Fourth Amendment should be extended'" in the case. To the dissenters,the question was "whether the Fourth Amendment is to be ignored." Citing theCourt's own precedent, Stewart observed that "`the most basic constitutionalrule'" in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was that a warrant was required forall searches and seizures unless the search or seizure was one of "`a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" The burden was on thegovernment to show that the circumstances of the seizure brought it "withinone of the `jealously and carefully drawn' exceptions to the warrant requirement," and, in the opinion of the dissenters, the government had failed to doso.
The dissent acknowledged that a warrantless search or seizure is valid when it is conducted incident to a valid arrest. Under the Court's precedent, though, such searches should be limited in space and time. In Edwards's case, thedissent felt that a time span of ten hours was too remote from the time of arrest, and that the failure to obtain a search warrant prior to the seizure was not justified.
The dissent disagreed also with the Court's philosophical approach to the Fourth Amendment. The majority was analyzing the reasonableness of searches according to "`the acceptability of police conduct, and not on considerations relevant to Fourth Amendment interests.'" This was flawed because, according todissenting Justice Felix Frankfurter in Chimel v. California (1969), the test of reason that makes a search reasonable "`is the reason underlying and expressed by the Fourth Amendment: the history and the experience which itembodies and the safeguards afforded by it against the evils to which it wasa response.'"
The dissent conceded that the seizure in Edwards's case "was not a shocking one," and that the officers had not acted in bad faith. Nonetheless, the dissent warned, such seemingly innocuous transgressions should not be ignored because "`illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing inthat way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modesof procedure.'" (quoting Boyd v. United States [1886])
Impact
The Edwards decision resolved a split between federal courts and established that police do not need a search warrant to seize articles from arrested persons after the booking process is completed. Depending on the facts ofthe case, a warrantless search or seizure of a jailed person might still be ruled unconstitutional. However, the Edwards Court omitted any specificguidelines for time limitations on the right of police officers to seize theclothes of a person who has been arrested and jailed.
Related Cases
- Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
- Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
- Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
- Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
Further Readings
- Biskupic, Joan, and Elder Witt, eds. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court, 3rd ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1996.
- New York Times, March 27, 1974.
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