Petitioner
United States
Respondent
William Matlock
Petitioner's Claim
That out-of-court statements should not have been excluded from evidence at asuppression hearing and that a third party who had common authority over a premises may give permission for a search.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Wallace, U.S. Deputy Solicitor General
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Donald S. Eisenberg
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White (writing for the Court)
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
20 February 1974
Decision
A third party with control over a property may give permission for a warrantless search of the property. Also, no automatic rule exists against receivinghearsay evidence during a suppression hearing.
Significance
The decision clarified when a third party can give permission for a warrantless search of a property. When a prosecutor seeks to justify a warrantless search by showing voluntary consent was given, that consent is not limited to the defendant, but can be given by a third party who had common authority overthe premises.
On 12 November 1970, William Matlock was arrested, on charges of bank robbery, in the front yard of the house where he lived in Pardeeville, Wisconsin. The arresting officers did not ask him if they could search the house, and theydid not have a search warrant. Gayle Graff, with whom Matlock shared a roomin the house, admitted three of the arresting officers into the house. They told Mrs. Graff that they were looking for money and a gun and asked if they could search the house. She said they could. They did not tell her that she had a right to refuse to consent to the search. The officers searched the bedroom where they found $4,995 in a diaper bag in the closet.
Matlock asked that the evidence seized from the bedroom be suppressed (deemedinadmissible). The district court held that when a third person gives consent for a search, the government must show that it reasonably appeared to the searching officers that the person had authority to consent and that the person had actual authority to permit the search. The district court concluded that the government had failed to prove that Mrs. Graff had actual authority toconsent to the search. Although Mrs. Graff had told the officers that she andMatlock shared the bedroom, proving the good faith of the officers, her statement failed to prove that what she said was true. At various times and places Gayle Graff and William Matlock had told people they were married, which they were not. The district court felt that the evidence was insufficient to prove that at the time of the search the two were living together in the east bedroom. The court also rejected the government's claim that it only had to prove that the officers could reasonably have concluded that Gayle Graff's consent was binding on Matlock. The district court excluded the out-of-court statements Mrs. Graff made regarding her and Matlock's joint occupancy and use ofthe bedroom and their claim that they were married. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court. The case then went to the Supreme Court.
Rules Of Evidence Applicable In A Criminal Trial
Justice White wrote the opinion of the majority. Various state courts and courts of appeal have applied the basic proposition that the voluntary consent of any joint occupant of a residence to search the premises is valid and permits evidence discovered in the search to be used against a co-occupant in a criminal trial. The consent of a person who has common authority over a premises is valid against the absent, nonconsenting person who shares that authority. Other co-occupants have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common property to be searched.
White questioned why the district court ruled inadmissible Matlock's own out-of-court statements that he and Mrs. Graff were married. White noted that regarding Mrs. Graff's statements to the officers, the rules of evidence applicable in a criminal trial do not apply with full force at hearings to determineadmissibility of evidence, known as a suppression hearing. In a proceeding where the judge is considering the admissibility of evidence, the exclusionaryrules should not be applicable. The judge should receive the evidence and decide using his judgment and experience whether it should be admitted. White stated that the trial judge should not have excluded Mrs. Graff's statements in this case. No apparent reason existed for the judge to distrust the evidence and to exclude her statements while resolving the issues raised at the suppression hearing. The judge should have admitted her statements at the suppression hearing, even if they would not have been admitted at the criminal trial.
White noted that Mrs. Graff was a witness for Matlock at the suppression hearing. Because she was available for cross examination, the use of hearsay wasreduced. At the hearing, she denied that she gave consent to the search or made the statements to the officers that the court excluded. When asked if sheand Matlock lived together, she declined to answer on the grounds that she might incriminate herself. Byron stated that given the admissibility of Mrs. Graff's out-of-court statements, the government proved, by the preponderance ofthe evidence, that her voluntary consent to search the bedroom was sufficient to admit the money as evidence.
Police Acting On Their Own
Justice Douglas dissented because he believed that "the absence of a search warrant in this case, where the authorities had opportunity to obtain one, isfatal." He noted that at no time did the officers attempt to get a search warrant. Also, the search of the house was not incidental to the arrest of Matlock.
Douglas explained that a search warrant provided judicial intervention as a restraint of police conduct before a search. A neutral and detached magistrate, not law enforcement agents, should decide if a home must be searched. Douglas quoted from McDonald v. United States (1948), "The right of privacywas deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals. Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted."
Douglas noted that Mrs. Graff's permission to the police to invade the houseprovided a sorry and wholly inadequate substitute for a search warrant. The police commanded all the authority that they had during colonial times when general warrants were used, the hatred of which led to the passage of the Fourth Amendment. This amendment prohibits warrantless searches and seizures. Douglas summed up by stating, "Government agents are now free to rummage about the house, unconstrained by anything except their own desires . . . Since the Framers of the Amendment did not abolish the hated general warrants only to impose another oppressive regime on the people, I dissent."
Justices Brennan and Marshall also dissented. Brennan wrote that it was necessary to determine if Mrs. Graff consented to the search knowing that she wasnot required to do so. An individual cannot waive this right if he or she istotally ignorant of the fact that, without consent, the invasion of privacy would be unconstitutional. Brennan quoted his own dissent in Schneckloth v.Bustamonte (1973), "It wholly escapes me how our citizens can meaningfully be said to have waived something as precious as a constitutional guaranteewithout ever being aware of its existence."
Impact
In United States v. Matlock, the Supreme Court determined that third party consent to search a premises without a warrant was sufficient if the person "possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to thepremises or effects sought to be inspected." The Court ruled in Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) that actual common authority over a place is not required. It is sufficient if the officer had a reasonable but mistaken belief that the third party possessed common authority and could consent to the search.United States v. Matlock and Illinois v. Rodriguez illustratethe Supreme Court's growing interest in upholding warrantless searches as not"unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment.
Related Cases
United States
Respondent
William Matlock
Petitioner's Claim
That out-of-court statements should not have been excluded from evidence at asuppression hearing and that a third party who had common authority over a premises may give permission for a search.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Wallace, U.S. Deputy Solicitor General
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Donald S. Eisenberg
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White (writing for the Court)
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
20 February 1974
Decision
A third party with control over a property may give permission for a warrantless search of the property. Also, no automatic rule exists against receivinghearsay evidence during a suppression hearing.
Significance
The decision clarified when a third party can give permission for a warrantless search of a property. When a prosecutor seeks to justify a warrantless search by showing voluntary consent was given, that consent is not limited to the defendant, but can be given by a third party who had common authority overthe premises.
On 12 November 1970, William Matlock was arrested, on charges of bank robbery, in the front yard of the house where he lived in Pardeeville, Wisconsin. The arresting officers did not ask him if they could search the house, and theydid not have a search warrant. Gayle Graff, with whom Matlock shared a roomin the house, admitted three of the arresting officers into the house. They told Mrs. Graff that they were looking for money and a gun and asked if they could search the house. She said they could. They did not tell her that she had a right to refuse to consent to the search. The officers searched the bedroom where they found $4,995 in a diaper bag in the closet.
Matlock asked that the evidence seized from the bedroom be suppressed (deemedinadmissible). The district court held that when a third person gives consent for a search, the government must show that it reasonably appeared to the searching officers that the person had authority to consent and that the person had actual authority to permit the search. The district court concluded that the government had failed to prove that Mrs. Graff had actual authority toconsent to the search. Although Mrs. Graff had told the officers that she andMatlock shared the bedroom, proving the good faith of the officers, her statement failed to prove that what she said was true. At various times and places Gayle Graff and William Matlock had told people they were married, which they were not. The district court felt that the evidence was insufficient to prove that at the time of the search the two were living together in the east bedroom. The court also rejected the government's claim that it only had to prove that the officers could reasonably have concluded that Gayle Graff's consent was binding on Matlock. The district court excluded the out-of-court statements Mrs. Graff made regarding her and Matlock's joint occupancy and use ofthe bedroom and their claim that they were married. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court. The case then went to the Supreme Court.
Rules Of Evidence Applicable In A Criminal Trial
Justice White wrote the opinion of the majority. Various state courts and courts of appeal have applied the basic proposition that the voluntary consent of any joint occupant of a residence to search the premises is valid and permits evidence discovered in the search to be used against a co-occupant in a criminal trial. The consent of a person who has common authority over a premises is valid against the absent, nonconsenting person who shares that authority. Other co-occupants have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common property to be searched.
White questioned why the district court ruled inadmissible Matlock's own out-of-court statements that he and Mrs. Graff were married. White noted that regarding Mrs. Graff's statements to the officers, the rules of evidence applicable in a criminal trial do not apply with full force at hearings to determineadmissibility of evidence, known as a suppression hearing. In a proceeding where the judge is considering the admissibility of evidence, the exclusionaryrules should not be applicable. The judge should receive the evidence and decide using his judgment and experience whether it should be admitted. White stated that the trial judge should not have excluded Mrs. Graff's statements in this case. No apparent reason existed for the judge to distrust the evidence and to exclude her statements while resolving the issues raised at the suppression hearing. The judge should have admitted her statements at the suppression hearing, even if they would not have been admitted at the criminal trial.
White noted that Mrs. Graff was a witness for Matlock at the suppression hearing. Because she was available for cross examination, the use of hearsay wasreduced. At the hearing, she denied that she gave consent to the search or made the statements to the officers that the court excluded. When asked if sheand Matlock lived together, she declined to answer on the grounds that she might incriminate herself. Byron stated that given the admissibility of Mrs. Graff's out-of-court statements, the government proved, by the preponderance ofthe evidence, that her voluntary consent to search the bedroom was sufficient to admit the money as evidence.
Police Acting On Their Own
Justice Douglas dissented because he believed that "the absence of a search warrant in this case, where the authorities had opportunity to obtain one, isfatal." He noted that at no time did the officers attempt to get a search warrant. Also, the search of the house was not incidental to the arrest of Matlock.
Douglas explained that a search warrant provided judicial intervention as a restraint of police conduct before a search. A neutral and detached magistrate, not law enforcement agents, should decide if a home must be searched. Douglas quoted from McDonald v. United States (1948), "The right of privacywas deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals. Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted."
Douglas noted that Mrs. Graff's permission to the police to invade the houseprovided a sorry and wholly inadequate substitute for a search warrant. The police commanded all the authority that they had during colonial times when general warrants were used, the hatred of which led to the passage of the Fourth Amendment. This amendment prohibits warrantless searches and seizures. Douglas summed up by stating, "Government agents are now free to rummage about the house, unconstrained by anything except their own desires . . . Since the Framers of the Amendment did not abolish the hated general warrants only to impose another oppressive regime on the people, I dissent."
Justices Brennan and Marshall also dissented. Brennan wrote that it was necessary to determine if Mrs. Graff consented to the search knowing that she wasnot required to do so. An individual cannot waive this right if he or she istotally ignorant of the fact that, without consent, the invasion of privacy would be unconstitutional. Brennan quoted his own dissent in Schneckloth v.Bustamonte (1973), "It wholly escapes me how our citizens can meaningfully be said to have waived something as precious as a constitutional guaranteewithout ever being aware of its existence."
Impact
In United States v. Matlock, the Supreme Court determined that third party consent to search a premises without a warrant was sufficient if the person "possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to thepremises or effects sought to be inspected." The Court ruled in Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) that actual common authority over a place is not required. It is sufficient if the officer had a reasonable but mistaken belief that the third party possessed common authority and could consent to the search.United States v. Matlock and Illinois v. Rodriguez illustratethe Supreme Court's growing interest in upholding warrantless searches as not"unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment.
Related Cases
- Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
- McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
- Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
- Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
- Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
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