Appellant
William Malloy
Appellee
Patrick J. Hogan, Sheriff of Hartford County, Connecticut
Appellant's Claim
That imprisonment for contempt of court, following refusal to answer questions in state court about a previous conviction, violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Harold Strauch
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
John D. LaBelle
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, William J. Brennan, Jr. (writing for the Court), William O. Douglas, Arthur Goldberg, Earl Warren
Justices Dissenting
Tom C. Clark, John Marshall Harlan II, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
18 June 1964
Decision
The Supreme Court found that the Fifth Amendment applies at the state level and reversed Malloy's conviction.
Significance
Malloy reversed the Court's long-standing view that the Fourteenth Amendment only required state courts to follow a policy of fundamental fairnesstowards criminal defendants. Here, for the first time, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was made applicable to state defendants.
William Malloy was initially arrested during a gambling raid in 1959 by Hartford, Connecticut, police. He pleaded guilty to the lesser crime of misdemeanor, and was sentenced to a year in jail and a fine of $500. After he had served 90 days, his sentence was suspended, and he was placed on probation for twoyears.
About a year later, Malloy was ordered to testify at a state inquiry into gambling and other crimes. When he was asked several questions about his arrestand conviction, Malloy refused to answer "on the grounds it may tend to incriminate [him]." The Connecticut Superior Court ruled him in contempt of courtand sent him to prison until he was willing to answer the questions put to him. Malloy petitioned the superior court for a writ of habeas corpus--arequest to be released on grounds that he had been unlawfully detained. Thecourt rejected his petition, and this rejection was upheld on appeal. Malloythen petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review of this decision.
The Court had long held, in decisions such as Twining v. State of New Jersey (1904) and Adamson v. California (1947), that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination did not apply in state courts. In Twining and Adamson, the issue was that the prosecution drew attention to the defendant's failure to testify in his own defense. In both cases,the defendant's appeal of his conviction failed. The Supreme Court reasoned,even as late as 1961, in Cohen v. Hurley, that state courts were onlyobliged to show fundamental fairness to criminal defendants.
Right to Remain Silent
In cases like Mallory v. United States (1957), however, the Warren Court had been moving towards a policy of overturning convictions obtained in state court through the use of confessions acquired through improper means, such as prolonged detention without arraignment. Writing for the five-member majority in Malloy, Justice Brennan made a connection between the prohibition against coerced confessions and the privilege against self-incrimination:
This decision was an important part of the "due process revolution" that reached its highest point during the tenure of Chief Justice Warren. During thisrevolution, most of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights--which had previously been thought to apply only to the federal government--were made to apply tothe states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The due process revolution affected many areas of the law, but criminal defendants--most of whom are tried in state courts--were among the primary beneficiaries of this shift in constitutional interpretation. The closeness of the vote in Malloy is one indication of how hard fought some of the battles wereduring the revolution. In fact, Justices White and Stewart, although concurring with the majority's view that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the privilege against self-incrimination, nevertheless dissented from the decisionto apply the privilege to William Malloy. They did not believe that there had been any risk that he might incriminate himself.
Related Cases
Transactional Immunity
Because the Fifth Amendment protects people from giving self-incriminating evidence, state and federal courts sometimes trade immunity from prosecution for testimony that will help them convict offenders who are more detrimental tosociety. Rather than prosecute a prostitute, for instance, an agency may usetestimony from a prostitute to break an entire prostitution ring. Transactional immunity, or full immunity, is one of the two kinds of prosecutorial immunity offered by state prosecutors to witnesses. Transactional immunity exempts witnesses not only from providing self-incriminating evidence, but also from being prosecuted for any wrongdoings admitted even when the prosecution obtains evidence outside of and not stemming from the witness's testimony. Although controversial, Congress passed a statute in 1893 that allowed transactional immunity in exchange for testimony and the Supreme Court sustained the statute by a 5-4 vote.
Use immunity, on the other hand, offers the same protection against any admittance of wrongdoing during the testimony. If, however, prosecutors obtain outside evidence outside of the scope of the testimony, they can still use it toprosecute a witness. Congress has found use immunity consistent with the Fifth Amendment. Congress also replaced all previous immunity statutes with a use-immunity statute. The Supreme Court agreed, arguing in 1972 that "[t]ransactional immunity . . . affords the witness considerably broader protection than does the Fifth Amendment privilege." Nevertheless, federal and state prosecutors continue to grant transactional immunity.
Sources
FindLaw. http://www.findlaw.com.
William Malloy
Appellee
Patrick J. Hogan, Sheriff of Hartford County, Connecticut
Appellant's Claim
That imprisonment for contempt of court, following refusal to answer questions in state court about a previous conviction, violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Harold Strauch
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
John D. LaBelle
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, William J. Brennan, Jr. (writing for the Court), William O. Douglas, Arthur Goldberg, Earl Warren
Justices Dissenting
Tom C. Clark, John Marshall Harlan II, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
18 June 1964
Decision
The Supreme Court found that the Fifth Amendment applies at the state level and reversed Malloy's conviction.
Significance
Malloy reversed the Court's long-standing view that the Fourteenth Amendment only required state courts to follow a policy of fundamental fairnesstowards criminal defendants. Here, for the first time, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was made applicable to state defendants.
William Malloy was initially arrested during a gambling raid in 1959 by Hartford, Connecticut, police. He pleaded guilty to the lesser crime of misdemeanor, and was sentenced to a year in jail and a fine of $500. After he had served 90 days, his sentence was suspended, and he was placed on probation for twoyears.
About a year later, Malloy was ordered to testify at a state inquiry into gambling and other crimes. When he was asked several questions about his arrestand conviction, Malloy refused to answer "on the grounds it may tend to incriminate [him]." The Connecticut Superior Court ruled him in contempt of courtand sent him to prison until he was willing to answer the questions put to him. Malloy petitioned the superior court for a writ of habeas corpus--arequest to be released on grounds that he had been unlawfully detained. Thecourt rejected his petition, and this rejection was upheld on appeal. Malloythen petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review of this decision.
The Court had long held, in decisions such as Twining v. State of New Jersey (1904) and Adamson v. California (1947), that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination did not apply in state courts. In Twining and Adamson, the issue was that the prosecution drew attention to the defendant's failure to testify in his own defense. In both cases,the defendant's appeal of his conviction failed. The Supreme Court reasoned,even as late as 1961, in Cohen v. Hurley, that state courts were onlyobliged to show fundamental fairness to criminal defendants.
Right to Remain Silent
In cases like Mallory v. United States (1957), however, the Warren Court had been moving towards a policy of overturning convictions obtained in state court through the use of confessions acquired through improper means, such as prolonged detention without arraignment. Writing for the five-member majority in Malloy, Justice Brennan made a connection between the prohibition against coerced confessions and the privilege against self-incrimination:
[T]oday the admissibility of a confession in a state criminal prosecution is tested by the same standard applied in federal prosecutions . .. Under this test, the constitutional inquiry is not whether the conduct of state officers in obtaining the confession was shocking, but whether the confession was "free and voluntary" . . . In other words the person must not havebeen compelled to incriminate himself.The reason the Malloy Court was shifting to the federal standard concerning compelled testimonywas the "recognition that the American system of criminal prosecution is accusatory, not inquisitional, and that the Fifth Amendment privilege is its essential mainstay." After Malloy, state prosecutors had to shoulder theentire burden of proof when witnesses proved unwilling to testify.
This decision was an important part of the "due process revolution" that reached its highest point during the tenure of Chief Justice Warren. During thisrevolution, most of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights--which had previously been thought to apply only to the federal government--were made to apply tothe states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The due process revolution affected many areas of the law, but criminal defendants--most of whom are tried in state courts--were among the primary beneficiaries of this shift in constitutional interpretation. The closeness of the vote in Malloy is one indication of how hard fought some of the battles wereduring the revolution. In fact, Justices White and Stewart, although concurring with the majority's view that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the privilege against self-incrimination, nevertheless dissented from the decisionto apply the privilege to William Malloy. They did not believe that there had been any risk that he might incriminate himself.
Related Cases
- Twining v. State of New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1904).
- Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
- Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
- Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
- Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
- Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
- Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Transactional Immunity
Because the Fifth Amendment protects people from giving self-incriminating evidence, state and federal courts sometimes trade immunity from prosecution for testimony that will help them convict offenders who are more detrimental tosociety. Rather than prosecute a prostitute, for instance, an agency may usetestimony from a prostitute to break an entire prostitution ring. Transactional immunity, or full immunity, is one of the two kinds of prosecutorial immunity offered by state prosecutors to witnesses. Transactional immunity exempts witnesses not only from providing self-incriminating evidence, but also from being prosecuted for any wrongdoings admitted even when the prosecution obtains evidence outside of and not stemming from the witness's testimony. Although controversial, Congress passed a statute in 1893 that allowed transactional immunity in exchange for testimony and the Supreme Court sustained the statute by a 5-4 vote.
Use immunity, on the other hand, offers the same protection against any admittance of wrongdoing during the testimony. If, however, prosecutors obtain outside evidence outside of the scope of the testimony, they can still use it toprosecute a witness. Congress has found use immunity consistent with the Fifth Amendment. Congress also replaced all previous immunity statutes with a use-immunity statute. The Supreme Court agreed, arguing in 1972 that "[t]ransactional immunity . . . affords the witness considerably broader protection than does the Fifth Amendment privilege." Nevertheless, federal and state prosecutors continue to grant transactional immunity.
Sources
FindLaw. http://www.findlaw.com.
Further Readings
- Levy, Leonard W. Origins of the Fifth Amendment: The Right AgainstSelf-Incrimination. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Meltzer, Milton. The Right to Remain Silent. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972.
- Mykkeltvedt, Roald Y. The Nationalization of the Bill of Rights: Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and the Procedural Rights. Port Washington, NY: Associated Faculty Press, 1983.
User Comments Add a comment…