Petitioner
State of Oregon
Respondent
Michael James Elstad
Petitioner's Claim
The police obtained two confessions from a suspect. The first one was a voluntary admission obtained without Miranda warnings, and the second was a written confession made in full compliance with Miranda warnings. Petitioner claimed that the earlier voluntary admission made his subsequent, written confession inadmissible evidence.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
David B. Frohnmayer
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Gary D. Babock
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Sandra Day O'Connor (writing for the Court), Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
4 March 1985
Decision
There was no question that the respondent's first confession was illegal since it was obtained without Miranda warnings. Nevertheless, because his admission of guilt was voluntary and because his second, written confession was preceded by properly administered Miranda warnings, the Court ruled that the second confession was admissible as evidence.
Significance
The Miranda rule dictates that failure to inform a suspect in custody of Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion. The U.S. Supreme Court found that if a confession given without Miranda warnings was voluntary, then subsequent confessions are not tainted because the first was illegal. This decision provided law enforcement with more latitude when faced with an accommodating suspect who volunteers evidence or confession prior to waiving Miranda rights.
Miranda Warnings
In Miranda, the right to remain silent and a continuous opportunity toexercise that right was viewed as critical to the question of voluntarinessand coercion regarding confessions. To secure the privilege against self-incrimination, several procedural safeguards were established: persons who were in custody, prior to any questioning, must be warned of their right to remainsilent, must be told that any statement they made might be used as evidence against them, that they had a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed, and that they might waive these rights, provided the waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The right to interruptthe conversation and refrain from answering any further inquiries until consultation with an attorney was also included. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that Miranda warnings were not constitutional rights, but wereinstead protective measures created to ensure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected. The basis for establishing Miranda warnings was the conviction that police interrogation itself was inherently coercive and that this coercion conflicted with the privilege of self-incrimination protection. Statements or confessions made without the benefit of Miranda warnings were presumed to be given under compulsion. As a result, they were excluded from evidence. The matter of voluntariness and coercion in giving confessions was thus resolved, and courts and the police were furnished with useful means to secure the admissibility of evidence.
Inadmissible Confessions?
Michael James Elstad was suspected of committing a burglary in his neighborhood in December of 1981, and was picked up by two police officers at his homein Salem, Oregon. He was not given Miranda warnings before making a voluntaryconfession to one of the officers. Elstad was then transported to the policestation and advised of his rights. He waived his Miranda rights and executeda written confession. No threats or promises were involved in making his confessions either at his home or at the sheriff's office.
Elstad was tried in an Oregon trial court. The defendant tried to suppress both his oral statement and signed confession saying that his first, illegallyobtained confession tainted his second confession as, in Elstad's defense, "fruit of the poisonous tree." The U.S. Supreme Court, in United States v. Bayer (1947), remarked that after an accused had once "let the cat out ofthe bag" by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he was never thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed.The Court also held that making a confession under circumstances that preclude its use did not perpetually disable the confessor from making a usable confession after those conditions had been removed. Wong Sun v. United States (1963) was a case in which the Supreme Court held that evidence and witnesses discovered as a result of a search in violation of the Fourth Amendmentmust be excluded from evidence. This doctrine also applied to whether an illegal confession and the admissibility of that confession was "sufficiently anact of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion." Thus,Elstad's first incriminating statement--made at the defendant's home--was excluded from evidence because he had not been advised of his Miranda rights. The circuit court judge ruled that the other, written confession made at the Sheriff's office, in full compliance with Miranda, was given freely, voluntarily, and knowingly after waiving Miranda rights, and that it was not tainted in any way by the previous brief statement. The second confession was admitted in evidence, and Elstad was found guilty of burglary in the first degree.
Elstad then appealed to the Oregon Court of Appeals. The state of Oregon as respondent recognized that the first incriminating statement was inadmissibleas evidence because Elstad was in custody and was not given Miranda warningswhen he first confessed. The state claimed that the second confession was nottainted, because of the careful administration of Miranda warnings. The court of appeals found that the main constitutional inquiry was whether there hadbeen a sufficient break in the stream of events between the inadmissible statement and the written confession to insulate the latter statement from the effect of the previous. The court concluded that the period separating the twoincidents was brief and therefore the "cat was sufficiently out of the bag to exert a coercive impact on latter admissions." The state trial court's decision was reversed. The state of Oregon petitioned to the Oregon Supreme Courtfor review, but the court declined to review the case. The U.S. Supreme Court then granted certiorari, a written order to a lower court to forwardthe proceedings of a case for review, and subsequently, the case was heard before the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Second Confession is Admissible
In a 6-3 vote, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Oregon Court of Appeals, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Delivering themajority opinion, Justice O'Connor pointed out that a procedural Miranda violation differed in significant respects from violations of the Fourth Amendment invoked by the "fruit of the poisonous tree" metaphor. O'Connor emphasizedthat Miranda warnings were not a constitutional provision, but rather a protective measure to reinforce the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In this case there was no constitutional violation. Earlier precedents established that evidence obtained in violation of Miranda rights, though it was "fruit of the poisonous tree," could be used for purposes of impeachment orcross-examination. The Court concluded that it was an unwarranted extensionof Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or undermining of the suspect's ability to exercise his free will, so tainted the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver was ineffective for some indeterminate period.
The Court reasoned that the failure of the police to administer Miranda warnings did not mean that the statements received had actually been coerced, butthat it should be presumed the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination had not been intelligently exercised. In this case, the Court held that thefirst confession was clearly voluntary. In such circumstances, the Court held, a careful and thorough administration of Miranda warnings served to cure the condition that had made the unwarned statement inadmissible. O'Connor alsoemphasized that the psychological effects of voluntary unwarned admissions should not have constitutional implications because they would practically immunize a suspect against the effect of statements made and disable the policefrom obtaining informed cooperation.
Referring to the issue of holding a suspect in custody without benefit of Miranda warnings, the U.S. Supreme Court felt that whatever the reason for the police officers' "oversight," the incident had no earmarks of coercion. O'Connor also noted that the police officers had not used the unwarned admission topressure the respondent into waiving his right to remain silent. The respondent's attorney argued that Elstad had been unable to give a fully informed waiver of his rights because he had been unaware that his prior statement couldnot have been used against him. The attorney suggested that an additional warning should have been given when his client had been informed of Miranda warnings. The Court found that such a requirement was not constitutionally necessary.
The U.S. Supreme Court found no rationale for presuming coercive effect wherethe suspect's initial inculpatory statement, though technically in violationof Miranda, had been voluntary (although Miranda dictates thatfailure to administer its warnings creates a presumption of compulsion). TheCourt held that the relevant inquiry was whether the second statement had also been made voluntarily. Concluding the decision, Justice O'Connor wrote that the Court that day in no way retreated from Miranda's "bright-line"rule (a simple, practicable and effective rule). In this case it was enough to bar use of the unwarned statement pursuant to a voluntary and knowing waiver.
Dissenting Opinions
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, claimed that there was a refutable presumption that a confession obtained in violation of Miranda tainted subsequent confessions, and that the taint could not be dissipated solelyby giving Miranda warnings. He argued that to resolve this case the practiceof state courts should be examined. His view was that the practice justifiedapplication of the "cat out of the bag" presumption to this case, and therefore there had been a causal connection between the confession obtained in violation of Miranda and the subsequent confession preceded by the usualMiranda warnings. (Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, referred to these arguments of the dissenting justices, and noted that their reasoning didnot include the fact that there had obviously not been any compulsion presentin obtaining either of the two statements.) Justice Brennan also wrote thatthe police officers should have given an additional warning while they had been informing the suspect of his Miranda rights. They should have clarified that Elstad's prior confession could not have been used against him, and that would have sufficed to dissipate the taint from the subsequent confession. Brennan concluded that the Court's decision undermined the rights protected by Miranda warnings.
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens objected to the Court's finding that there was no presumption of coercion in obtaining both confessions.It was an ill-founded conclusion, since Miranda regulated that both the state of custody and failure to administer Miranda warnings presumed presence of compulsion. He reasoned that the Court intended its holding to apply only to a narrow category of cases in which the first statement was obtained in uncoercive setting and had no influence on the second. He concluded that even such an exception was discordant with prior cases, and the attempt to identify its boundaries in future cases would breed confusion and uncertainty inthe administration of criminal justice.
Impact
The right to remain silent as a privilege against self-incrimination is one of the core components of the notion of freedom in the American society. The key element for judging admissibility of confessions was the question of coercion and voluntariness. In Oregon v. Elstad, the Supreme Court found that the issue of voluntariness was essential for a confession to be admitted in evidence. The Court also ruled that an incriminating confession might be voluntary even though it was obtained without Miranda warnings. Though dissenting justices opposed this point of jurisprudence, the Court affirmed the importance of voluntariness in obtaining confessions despite the presumption of compulsion and the "bright-line" rule of Miranda was upheld.
Related Cases
State of Oregon
Respondent
Michael James Elstad
Petitioner's Claim
The police obtained two confessions from a suspect. The first one was a voluntary admission obtained without Miranda warnings, and the second was a written confession made in full compliance with Miranda warnings. Petitioner claimed that the earlier voluntary admission made his subsequent, written confession inadmissible evidence.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
David B. Frohnmayer
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Gary D. Babock
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Sandra Day O'Connor (writing for the Court), Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
4 March 1985
Decision
There was no question that the respondent's first confession was illegal since it was obtained without Miranda warnings. Nevertheless, because his admission of guilt was voluntary and because his second, written confession was preceded by properly administered Miranda warnings, the Court ruled that the second confession was admissible as evidence.
Significance
The Miranda rule dictates that failure to inform a suspect in custody of Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion. The U.S. Supreme Court found that if a confession given without Miranda warnings was voluntary, then subsequent confessions are not tainted because the first was illegal. This decision provided law enforcement with more latitude when faced with an accommodating suspect who volunteers evidence or confession prior to waiving Miranda rights.
Miranda Warnings
In Miranda, the right to remain silent and a continuous opportunity toexercise that right was viewed as critical to the question of voluntarinessand coercion regarding confessions. To secure the privilege against self-incrimination, several procedural safeguards were established: persons who were in custody, prior to any questioning, must be warned of their right to remainsilent, must be told that any statement they made might be used as evidence against them, that they had a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed, and that they might waive these rights, provided the waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The right to interruptthe conversation and refrain from answering any further inquiries until consultation with an attorney was also included. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that Miranda warnings were not constitutional rights, but wereinstead protective measures created to ensure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected. The basis for establishing Miranda warnings was the conviction that police interrogation itself was inherently coercive and that this coercion conflicted with the privilege of self-incrimination protection. Statements or confessions made without the benefit of Miranda warnings were presumed to be given under compulsion. As a result, they were excluded from evidence. The matter of voluntariness and coercion in giving confessions was thus resolved, and courts and the police were furnished with useful means to secure the admissibility of evidence.
Inadmissible Confessions?
Michael James Elstad was suspected of committing a burglary in his neighborhood in December of 1981, and was picked up by two police officers at his homein Salem, Oregon. He was not given Miranda warnings before making a voluntaryconfession to one of the officers. Elstad was then transported to the policestation and advised of his rights. He waived his Miranda rights and executeda written confession. No threats or promises were involved in making his confessions either at his home or at the sheriff's office.
Elstad was tried in an Oregon trial court. The defendant tried to suppress both his oral statement and signed confession saying that his first, illegallyobtained confession tainted his second confession as, in Elstad's defense, "fruit of the poisonous tree." The U.S. Supreme Court, in United States v. Bayer (1947), remarked that after an accused had once "let the cat out ofthe bag" by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he was never thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed.The Court also held that making a confession under circumstances that preclude its use did not perpetually disable the confessor from making a usable confession after those conditions had been removed. Wong Sun v. United States (1963) was a case in which the Supreme Court held that evidence and witnesses discovered as a result of a search in violation of the Fourth Amendmentmust be excluded from evidence. This doctrine also applied to whether an illegal confession and the admissibility of that confession was "sufficiently anact of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion." Thus,Elstad's first incriminating statement--made at the defendant's home--was excluded from evidence because he had not been advised of his Miranda rights. The circuit court judge ruled that the other, written confession made at the Sheriff's office, in full compliance with Miranda, was given freely, voluntarily, and knowingly after waiving Miranda rights, and that it was not tainted in any way by the previous brief statement. The second confession was admitted in evidence, and Elstad was found guilty of burglary in the first degree.
Elstad then appealed to the Oregon Court of Appeals. The state of Oregon as respondent recognized that the first incriminating statement was inadmissibleas evidence because Elstad was in custody and was not given Miranda warningswhen he first confessed. The state claimed that the second confession was nottainted, because of the careful administration of Miranda warnings. The court of appeals found that the main constitutional inquiry was whether there hadbeen a sufficient break in the stream of events between the inadmissible statement and the written confession to insulate the latter statement from the effect of the previous. The court concluded that the period separating the twoincidents was brief and therefore the "cat was sufficiently out of the bag to exert a coercive impact on latter admissions." The state trial court's decision was reversed. The state of Oregon petitioned to the Oregon Supreme Courtfor review, but the court declined to review the case. The U.S. Supreme Court then granted certiorari, a written order to a lower court to forwardthe proceedings of a case for review, and subsequently, the case was heard before the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Second Confession is Admissible
In a 6-3 vote, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Oregon Court of Appeals, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Delivering themajority opinion, Justice O'Connor pointed out that a procedural Miranda violation differed in significant respects from violations of the Fourth Amendment invoked by the "fruit of the poisonous tree" metaphor. O'Connor emphasizedthat Miranda warnings were not a constitutional provision, but rather a protective measure to reinforce the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In this case there was no constitutional violation. Earlier precedents established that evidence obtained in violation of Miranda rights, though it was "fruit of the poisonous tree," could be used for purposes of impeachment orcross-examination. The Court concluded that it was an unwarranted extensionof Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or undermining of the suspect's ability to exercise his free will, so tainted the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver was ineffective for some indeterminate period.
The Court reasoned that the failure of the police to administer Miranda warnings did not mean that the statements received had actually been coerced, butthat it should be presumed the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination had not been intelligently exercised. In this case, the Court held that thefirst confession was clearly voluntary. In such circumstances, the Court held, a careful and thorough administration of Miranda warnings served to cure the condition that had made the unwarned statement inadmissible. O'Connor alsoemphasized that the psychological effects of voluntary unwarned admissions should not have constitutional implications because they would practically immunize a suspect against the effect of statements made and disable the policefrom obtaining informed cooperation.
Referring to the issue of holding a suspect in custody without benefit of Miranda warnings, the U.S. Supreme Court felt that whatever the reason for the police officers' "oversight," the incident had no earmarks of coercion. O'Connor also noted that the police officers had not used the unwarned admission topressure the respondent into waiving his right to remain silent. The respondent's attorney argued that Elstad had been unable to give a fully informed waiver of his rights because he had been unaware that his prior statement couldnot have been used against him. The attorney suggested that an additional warning should have been given when his client had been informed of Miranda warnings. The Court found that such a requirement was not constitutionally necessary.
The U.S. Supreme Court found no rationale for presuming coercive effect wherethe suspect's initial inculpatory statement, though technically in violationof Miranda, had been voluntary (although Miranda dictates thatfailure to administer its warnings creates a presumption of compulsion). TheCourt held that the relevant inquiry was whether the second statement had also been made voluntarily. Concluding the decision, Justice O'Connor wrote that the Court that day in no way retreated from Miranda's "bright-line"rule (a simple, practicable and effective rule). In this case it was enough to bar use of the unwarned statement pursuant to a voluntary and knowing waiver.
Dissenting Opinions
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, claimed that there was a refutable presumption that a confession obtained in violation of Miranda tainted subsequent confessions, and that the taint could not be dissipated solelyby giving Miranda warnings. He argued that to resolve this case the practiceof state courts should be examined. His view was that the practice justifiedapplication of the "cat out of the bag" presumption to this case, and therefore there had been a causal connection between the confession obtained in violation of Miranda and the subsequent confession preceded by the usualMiranda warnings. (Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, referred to these arguments of the dissenting justices, and noted that their reasoning didnot include the fact that there had obviously not been any compulsion presentin obtaining either of the two statements.) Justice Brennan also wrote thatthe police officers should have given an additional warning while they had been informing the suspect of his Miranda rights. They should have clarified that Elstad's prior confession could not have been used against him, and that would have sufficed to dissipate the taint from the subsequent confession. Brennan concluded that the Court's decision undermined the rights protected by Miranda warnings.
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens objected to the Court's finding that there was no presumption of coercion in obtaining both confessions.It was an ill-founded conclusion, since Miranda regulated that both the state of custody and failure to administer Miranda warnings presumed presence of compulsion. He reasoned that the Court intended its holding to apply only to a narrow category of cases in which the first statement was obtained in uncoercive setting and had no influence on the second. He concluded that even such an exception was discordant with prior cases, and the attempt to identify its boundaries in future cases would breed confusion and uncertainty inthe administration of criminal justice.
Impact
The right to remain silent as a privilege against self-incrimination is one of the core components of the notion of freedom in the American society. The key element for judging admissibility of confessions was the question of coercion and voluntariness. In Oregon v. Elstad, the Supreme Court found that the issue of voluntariness was essential for a confession to be admitted in evidence. The Court also ruled that an incriminating confession might be voluntary even though it was obtained without Miranda warnings. Though dissenting justices opposed this point of jurisprudence, the Court affirmed the importance of voluntariness in obtaining confessions despite the presumption of compulsion and the "bright-line" rule of Miranda was upheld.
Related Cases
- Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
- United States v. Bayer, 311 U.S. 532 (1947).
- Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
- Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
User Comments Add a comment…