Appellant
Greg Grusendorf
Appellee
City of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
Appellant's Claim
That city regulation which prohibited firefighter trainees from smoking bothon duty and off duty violated his constitutional right to privacy.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Steven M. Angel
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Diane Davis Huckins
Judges for the Court
James E. Barrett (writing for the court), Bruce S. Jenkins, Deanell Reece Tacha
Judges Dissenting
None
Place
Denver, Colorado
Date of Decision
17 April 1987
Decision
The city regulation was reasonably related to the city's legitimate interestin protecting the health and safety of its firefighters, and thus was constitutional.
Significance
The court's decision cleared the way for city and state governments to imposerestrictions on the conduct of their employees outside of work, so long as those restrictions are related in some way to the performance of the employee's job. Particularly with respect to public safety employees, such as police officers and firefighters, the court's decision essentially approved a wide range of government restrictions on the off-work conduct of public employees.
In the early 1980s, as the medical community and the public became more awareof the dangers associated with smoking, private and public employers began to institute severe restrictions on the ability of employees to smoke. In October of 1984 Greg Grusendorf was hired as a firefighter trainee by the Oklahoma City Fire Department, which had a policy prohibiting firefighter trainees from smoking either on or off duty. In December of 1984, while at lunch with other trainees, Grusendorf partially smoked a cigarette. The incident was observed by another city employee, who reported the incident to the fire chief. Grusendorf was fired, pursuant to the city's anti-smoking policy.
Because the city is a public entity, it is bound by the terms of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which provides that the government may not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Although the Fourteenth Amendment speaks ofthe fairness of the "process" used to deprive someone of their rights, the Supreme Court has held that the amendment protects against any deprivation ofcertain "fundamental" rights, regardless of the procedures used by the government, a concept known as "substantive due process." These "fundamental" rights include the rights mentioned in the first ten amendments to the Constitution, such as the right to free speech, and certain rights concerning privacy and personal autonomy, such as marriage and procreation.
Grusendorf filed a lawsuit against the city in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, claiming that the city's anti-smoking policy,as applied to his activities when he was off-duty, violated his substantivedue process rights under the Due Process Clause. The district court granted the city's motion to dismiss Grusendorf's suit, and Grusendorf appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Tenth Circuit Finds City's Policy Reasonable
Grusendorf argued that the city's anti-smoking policy violated his liberty and privacy rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. He claimed, based on U.S. Supreme Court cases recognizing various privacy rights, that under the Fourteenth Amendment he has a right to be left alone in the conduct of his private life, which includes the right to smoke. The city, on the other hand, argued that its anti-smoking policy did not implicate any privacy rights, because theSupreme Court has limited the scope of privacy rights protected by the Due Process Clause to privacy rights of an intimate, personal nature, such as the right to abortion, to educate one's children, and to marriage.
The court partially disagreed with the city's position. The court noted thatalthough smoking does not implicate the same privacy concerns that marriage,procreation, and child-rearing do, the city's policy extended far beyond theworkplace and regulated Grusendorf's conduct in his own home. The court reasoned that in the 1976 case of Kelley v. Johnson the Supreme Court assumed, without ultimately deciding the issue, that a public employee has a privacy interest in matters of personal appearance, and concluded that smoking wassimilar to personal appearance. Thus, the court of appeals assumed that Grusendorf had a privacy interest in smoking outside of work.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the city's anti-smoking policy did notviolate Grusendorf's right to privacy. In Kelley, the Supreme Court concluded that a city policy relating to the personal appearance and activities of public safety employees, such as police officers and firefighters, doesnot violate an employee's privacy rights unless the employee shows "that there is no rational connection between the regulation . . . and the promotion ofsafety of persons and property." Applying this test, the court of appeals concluded that the city's anti-smoking policy was rationally related to protecting property and personal safety. The court reasoned that cigarette smoking is hazardous to health, and that the city has an interest in making sure thatits firefighters are in good health and physical conditioning. The court alsoreasoned that firefighters face health risks due to smoke inhalation, and that smoking can increase these risks. Accordingly, the court concluded that the city's anti-smoking policy did not violate Grusendorf's privacy rights.
Impact
The court's decision was important in defining the scope of rules which employers may impose on their employees. Certainly, both public and private employers are free to impose a wide range of rules relating to an employee's conduct in the workplace. The Grusendorf decision, however, also cleared theway for at least public employers to impose restrictions on an employee's conduct outside of work, so long as those restrictions are related to the employee's job. Also, the decision was part of a larger debate throughout the 1980s and intensifying in the 1990s concerning the rights of smokers.
Related Cases
Greg Grusendorf
Appellee
City of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
Appellant's Claim
That city regulation which prohibited firefighter trainees from smoking bothon duty and off duty violated his constitutional right to privacy.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Steven M. Angel
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Diane Davis Huckins
Judges for the Court
James E. Barrett (writing for the court), Bruce S. Jenkins, Deanell Reece Tacha
Judges Dissenting
None
Place
Denver, Colorado
Date of Decision
17 April 1987
Decision
The city regulation was reasonably related to the city's legitimate interestin protecting the health and safety of its firefighters, and thus was constitutional.
Significance
The court's decision cleared the way for city and state governments to imposerestrictions on the conduct of their employees outside of work, so long as those restrictions are related in some way to the performance of the employee's job. Particularly with respect to public safety employees, such as police officers and firefighters, the court's decision essentially approved a wide range of government restrictions on the off-work conduct of public employees.
In the early 1980s, as the medical community and the public became more awareof the dangers associated with smoking, private and public employers began to institute severe restrictions on the ability of employees to smoke. In October of 1984 Greg Grusendorf was hired as a firefighter trainee by the Oklahoma City Fire Department, which had a policy prohibiting firefighter trainees from smoking either on or off duty. In December of 1984, while at lunch with other trainees, Grusendorf partially smoked a cigarette. The incident was observed by another city employee, who reported the incident to the fire chief. Grusendorf was fired, pursuant to the city's anti-smoking policy.
Because the city is a public entity, it is bound by the terms of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which provides that the government may not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Although the Fourteenth Amendment speaks ofthe fairness of the "process" used to deprive someone of their rights, the Supreme Court has held that the amendment protects against any deprivation ofcertain "fundamental" rights, regardless of the procedures used by the government, a concept known as "substantive due process." These "fundamental" rights include the rights mentioned in the first ten amendments to the Constitution, such as the right to free speech, and certain rights concerning privacy and personal autonomy, such as marriage and procreation.
Grusendorf filed a lawsuit against the city in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, claiming that the city's anti-smoking policy,as applied to his activities when he was off-duty, violated his substantivedue process rights under the Due Process Clause. The district court granted the city's motion to dismiss Grusendorf's suit, and Grusendorf appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Tenth Circuit Finds City's Policy Reasonable
Grusendorf argued that the city's anti-smoking policy violated his liberty and privacy rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. He claimed, based on U.S. Supreme Court cases recognizing various privacy rights, that under the Fourteenth Amendment he has a right to be left alone in the conduct of his private life, which includes the right to smoke. The city, on the other hand, argued that its anti-smoking policy did not implicate any privacy rights, because theSupreme Court has limited the scope of privacy rights protected by the Due Process Clause to privacy rights of an intimate, personal nature, such as the right to abortion, to educate one's children, and to marriage.
The court partially disagreed with the city's position. The court noted thatalthough smoking does not implicate the same privacy concerns that marriage,procreation, and child-rearing do, the city's policy extended far beyond theworkplace and regulated Grusendorf's conduct in his own home. The court reasoned that in the 1976 case of Kelley v. Johnson the Supreme Court assumed, without ultimately deciding the issue, that a public employee has a privacy interest in matters of personal appearance, and concluded that smoking wassimilar to personal appearance. Thus, the court of appeals assumed that Grusendorf had a privacy interest in smoking outside of work.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the city's anti-smoking policy did notviolate Grusendorf's right to privacy. In Kelley, the Supreme Court concluded that a city policy relating to the personal appearance and activities of public safety employees, such as police officers and firefighters, doesnot violate an employee's privacy rights unless the employee shows "that there is no rational connection between the regulation . . . and the promotion ofsafety of persons and property." Applying this test, the court of appeals concluded that the city's anti-smoking policy was rationally related to protecting property and personal safety. The court reasoned that cigarette smoking is hazardous to health, and that the city has an interest in making sure thatits firefighters are in good health and physical conditioning. The court alsoreasoned that firefighters face health risks due to smoke inhalation, and that smoking can increase these risks. Accordingly, the court concluded that the city's anti-smoking policy did not violate Grusendorf's privacy rights.
Impact
The court's decision was important in defining the scope of rules which employers may impose on their employees. Certainly, both public and private employers are free to impose a wide range of rules relating to an employee's conduct in the workplace. The Grusendorf decision, however, also cleared theway for at least public employers to impose restrictions on an employee's conduct outside of work, so long as those restrictions are related to the employee's job. Also, the decision was part of a larger debate throughout the 1980s and intensifying in the 1990s concerning the rights of smokers.
Related Cases
- Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1964).
- Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
- Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
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