Stanley v. Georgia

Appellant
Robert Eli Stanley
Appellee
State of Georgia
Appellant's Claim
A Georgia state law criminalizing the possession of obscene material in one'shome is unconstitutional because it violates the freedom of speech clause inthe First Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Wesley R. Asinof
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
J. Robert Sparks
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, William J. Brennan, Jr., William O. Douglas, Abe Fortas, John Marshall Harlan II, Thurgood Marshall (writing for the Court), PotterStewart, Earl Warren, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
7 April 1969
Decision
Reversed a Georgia Supreme Court decision that upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia state statute that criminalized the private possession of obscenematerial.
Significance
With Stanley v. Georgia the Court established boundaries over which state and federal laws could criminalize private ownership of pornographic or obscene material. The Court ruled that the First Amendment protects the rightof what an individual reads or watches in the privacy of his home.
Obscene Materials, Privacy and the First Amendment
Appellant Stanley was being investigated for operating an illegal gambling operation in his home. Federal and state law enforcement officers obtained a search warrant and were searching Stanley's home, but uncovered little to provea bookmaking operation. However, law enforcement authorities discovered three reels of eight-millimeter film in a desk drawer. Using a projector and screen found in Stanley's living room, they watched the films. The state law enforcement officer determined that the movies were obscene. Stanley was chargedwith possession of obscene material and was arrested. He was later indicatedfor "knowingly hav[ing] possession of obscene matter," which violated the state's law. Stanley was tried by a jury and convicted. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the conviction.
In his opinion, Justice Marshall dealt solely with Stanley's argument that the Georgia obscenity statute violated the First Amendment. He wrote:

If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds.

Attorneys for the state argued that law was derived from the dangers of viewing obscene material that it could lead to "deviant sexual behavior or crimesof sexual violence." Justice Marshall dismissed this concern. ". . . the State may no more prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on the ground that it may lead to antisocial conduct than it may prohibit possession of chemistrybooks on the ground that they may lead to the manufacture of homemade spirits." Finally, the Court addressed the argument that banning private possessionof pornographic material was the only way to prevent distribution of such material. While the Court acknowledged that it may be difficult to make a caseagainst the "intent to distribute or in producing evidence of actual distribution," that was not a good reason to violate the sanctity and privacy of an individual's home. Justice Marshall wrote:

We are not convinced that such difficulties exist, but even if they did we do not think that they would justify infringement of the individual's right to read or observe what hepleases. Because that right is so fundamental to our scheme of individual liberty, its restriction may not be justified by the need to ease the administration of otherwise valid criminal laws.

Justice Stewart in a concurring opinion reasoned that the majority while correct in reversing the conviction had over looked that the obscene material wasillegally obtained. Before the criminal trial, Stanley had filed a motion tosuppress the films because they were obtained in violation of the Fourth andFourteenth Amendments, against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Georgia Supreme Court ruled that the seizure of the materials was indeed legal.

This record presents a bald violation of that basic constitutionalrule. To condone what happened here is to invite a government official to usea seemingly precise and legal warrant only as a ticket to get into a man's home, and, once inside, to launch forth upon unconfined searches and indiscriminate seizures as if armed with all the unbridled and illegal power of a general warrant.

Impact
Two years later in United States v. Reidel (1971), the Court did not extend the same rights to the distribution of pornographic material. While theCourt acknowledged the First Amendment right for an individual to have obscene material distributing such material was not afforded the same protectionsbecause that material could be sent to children. In later cases the Court hassaid that obscene materials are not protected by the First Amendment, but any such statutes must be limited.
Related Cases

• Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
  
• Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
  
• United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
  
• Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
  
• Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
  
• Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
  
• Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
  
• Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
  
• Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987).