Petitioner
Smith, Prosecuting Attorney and Circuit Judges of Kanawha County, West Virginia
Respondent
Daily Mail Publishing Co., et al.
Petitioner's Claim
That two newspapers violated West Virginia state law by publishing, without prior approval of juvenile court, the name of a juvenile charged with a crime.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Cletus B. Hanley
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Floyd Abrams
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger (writing for theCourt), Thurgood Marshall, William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
None (Lewis F. Powell, Jr., did not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
26 June 1979
Decision
Affirmed West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals finding that a West Virginialaw prohibiting publication of a lawfully obtained identification of a juvenile offender violated the First and Fourth Amendments.
Significance
The Supreme Court found that two local newspapers could not be prosecuted forpublishing the identity of a juvenile defendant. The Court held that if a newspaper obtains truthful information about a matter of public importance thenthe state can not constitutionally punish its publication, unless the stateidentifies an exceptional need to restrict the information. The argument of compelling interest to protect a juvenile for future rehabilitation purposes was not considered sufficient by the Court. In fact, the Court held under a "lawfully obtained" standard that states would rarely be able to demonstrate sufficient interest to restrict publication of truthful information. The practice of concealing juvenile offenders' identities was increasingly questioned by the public during a period of rising youth violence in the 1990s.
In February of 1978 a 14-year-old student shot and killed a 15-year-old classmate at Hayes Junior High School in St. Albans, West Virginia. Several eyewitnesses identified the alleged assailant arrested shortly after the shooting.Reporters and photographers for two nearby Charleston newspapers arrived shortly after the shooting to cover the incident. The reporters of both papers obtained the assailant's name at the scene through interviews with witnesses, police, and an assistant prosecuting attorney. The Charleston Daily Mail published a news article on the incident that same evening, but did not reveal the alleged juvenile offender's name as directed by state law. The Charleston Gazette, however, chose to include the assailant's name in theirmorning edition the following day. Meanwhile, at least three local radio stations broadcast the name of the assailant on the day of the crime and the following day. With the name of the assailant then public knowledge, the DailyMail included the name in their next evening edition.
Three weeks later a grand jury indictment was issued against both newspapersalleging the papers knowingly published the name of the youth without state-required court approval. In response, the two papers filed a petition with theWest Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to stop legal action claiming the lawviolated their constitutional rights. The court concurred the state showed no compelling reason that state's interest in protecting the juvenile's identity outweighed the constitutional protections of press freedom. The court thusheld the law requiring written permission by a juvenile court judge prior topublishing a juvenile's identity posed a "prior restraint" on free speech. The court thus prohibited the prosecuting attorney and county circuit court judges from pursuing prosecution of the two newspapers. The case was taken by the Supreme Court in 1978.
The newspapers continued their argument before the Supreme Court that state law operated as a "prior restraint" on speech. They considered having to ask permission of a judge an unconstitutional restraint. They also argued "the State's interest in the anonymity of a juvenile offender is not sufficient" to justify the restriction. In contrast, Smith argued that the state's interest in keeping the juvenile's name confidential was sufficient to impose restrictions. The stigma the juvenile would endure for the remainder of his life wouldsignificantly hamper rehabilitation measures and greatly restrict future employment opportunities.
Juvenile Protection and State Regulation of the Press
The Supreme Court had previously addressed the specific question of protecting juvenile defendant identities and the larger question of state regulation of the press. The Court ruled in Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court (1977) against a lower court injunction barring publication of the name and photograph of an accused juvenile defender in a murder case. Basis for thedecision was that reporters and public had been allowed access to a court hearing on the case. The Court held that since the juvenile's identity was already "in the public domain" the lower court could not constitutionally restrict publication. A year later in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia (1978), the Court established standards for assessing when a state's interest outweighs constitutional press protections. In that case, the Court unanimously ruled in favor of the press for publishing information on confidentialstate judicial review commission proceedings about alleged judge misconduct.The Court held that the state could not criminally prosecute the press for publishing such information, despite its compelling interest in maintaining confidentiality of judicial review.
In assessing the appropriateness of a state's restriction on publication of truthful information by the press, the Court routinely considers a series of questions. First, the state is responsible for demonstrating compelling interest in suppressing publication of certain information. Is the restriction necessary to achieve a specific objective? Secondly, if the Court agrees with thestate on compelling interest, it then assesses effectiveness of the restriction. Does it really serve the purpose for which it was intended? Lastly, if the intended purpose is served to at least some degree, is the restriction sufficiently narrow to restrict no more speech than absolutely necessary? To assess this last question, the Court must conceive of different restrictions that would accomplish the same objective while imposing less of a restriction onfreedom of speech and press.
In applying these questions, the Court ruled in favor of the two newspapers in a 8-0 vote. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, acknowledged thatstate law giving prior approval authority to juvenile court judges is "less oppressive" than a total ban. But the Court determined that assessing the constitutionality of West Virginia's state law was unnecessary because the need for withholding the juvenile's identity was not sufficiently demonstrated. TheCourt considered the law overly "burdensome" because Smith did not adequately demonstrate other alternatives existed to restrict publication of minors' names rather than resorting to criminal prosecution. Burger added that the West Virginia law was indeed unconstitutional by treating various forms of the press separately. The state law addresses only newspapers, not electronic media or other forms of publication.
Though writing in concurrence, Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the primary findings of the Court. He believed the claim for preserving the identity of the juvenile was sufficient to outweigh freedom of press concerns. He assertedthe effect of such restrictions would be "minimal." Rehnquist wrote that the"hallmark of our juvenile justice system . . . [is that] youths . . . have been shielded from publicity." The main objective of the juvenile system is torehabilitate and protect. He wrote, "Publication of the names of juvenile offenders may seriously impair the rehabilitative goals . . . The press is freeto describe the details of the offense and inform the community of the proceedings against the juvenile." He did not see the general need for including names as well. The state law under question allowed a judge to grant permissionwhere it may be warranted. Rehnquist agreed, though, that punishment after publication was likely the primary means for the state to enforce such restrictions. Though disagreeing with the other justices on these points, Rehnquistconcluded the law was simply invalid due to its discrimination between electronic and print media.
Impact
Rights granted to the press in the Constitution are unique as the only rightsgranted to an institution rather than the individual. The Court must balancepress freedom from government intervention on one hand, with public interestin privacy and confidentiality on the other, while ensuring the press servesits social role responsibly. Though the Court ruled in Smith that publication of truthful information gathered legally is protected by the Constitution, truthful information could be restricted in situations involving substantial state interest to restrict certain publication. In effect, the statesfind almost insurmountable standards in suppressing truthful information no matter how lawfully obtained. In Florida Star v. B. J. F. (1989) the casual mistakes by police clerks led to the continued endangerment of a crime victim because the press published the leaked information. Yet the Court ruledin favor of the press when the victim sued the press for damages. In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for the County of Norfolk (1982) the Court ruled a state law unconstitutional that excluded the press and public from trials concerning sex offenses against juvenile victims. The Court ruled the restriction did not adequately serve the compelling interest of the state in protecting minors from additional trauma since the effects of press coverage would vary from case to case. Many believed the Court provided the press excessive access and authority to publish sensitive information.
A series of Court findings led to the creation of a rigid "lawfully obtained"standard regarding press publication rights. The standard posed major ramifications in the electronic information era that mushroomed in the 1990s with advanced computer technologies and vast databases. A source for just about anytype of information can be discovered lawfully by a diligent reporter, and the Court has liberally judged almost everything as "newsworthy."
Legal scholars argued that more appropriate standards would involve whether the person was a public figure or private individual and a more strict interpretation of newsworthiness. Using these criteria for assessing the appropriateness of news publication could better serve public and privacy protection interests. Opponents to the "legally obtained" standard assert that some rare situations have occurred in which illegally obtained information was legally published for the benefit of the public as decided in the New York Times Company v. United States decision. Advocates for the press in support of the"lawfully obtained" standard believe that truth is the ultimate defense forpublishing information. Variables, such as judgements regarding the appropriateness of material, they believe are subject to the changing values and personal tastes of judges. By the late 1990s, several bills aimed at restricting the flow of intimate personal data were considered.
Related Cases
Smith, Prosecuting Attorney and Circuit Judges of Kanawha County, West Virginia
Respondent
Daily Mail Publishing Co., et al.
Petitioner's Claim
That two newspapers violated West Virginia state law by publishing, without prior approval of juvenile court, the name of a juvenile charged with a crime.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Cletus B. Hanley
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Floyd Abrams
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger (writing for theCourt), Thurgood Marshall, William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
None (Lewis F. Powell, Jr., did not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
26 June 1979
Decision
Affirmed West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals finding that a West Virginialaw prohibiting publication of a lawfully obtained identification of a juvenile offender violated the First and Fourth Amendments.
Significance
The Supreme Court found that two local newspapers could not be prosecuted forpublishing the identity of a juvenile defendant. The Court held that if a newspaper obtains truthful information about a matter of public importance thenthe state can not constitutionally punish its publication, unless the stateidentifies an exceptional need to restrict the information. The argument of compelling interest to protect a juvenile for future rehabilitation purposes was not considered sufficient by the Court. In fact, the Court held under a "lawfully obtained" standard that states would rarely be able to demonstrate sufficient interest to restrict publication of truthful information. The practice of concealing juvenile offenders' identities was increasingly questioned by the public during a period of rising youth violence in the 1990s.
In February of 1978 a 14-year-old student shot and killed a 15-year-old classmate at Hayes Junior High School in St. Albans, West Virginia. Several eyewitnesses identified the alleged assailant arrested shortly after the shooting.Reporters and photographers for two nearby Charleston newspapers arrived shortly after the shooting to cover the incident. The reporters of both papers obtained the assailant's name at the scene through interviews with witnesses, police, and an assistant prosecuting attorney. The Charleston Daily Mail published a news article on the incident that same evening, but did not reveal the alleged juvenile offender's name as directed by state law. The Charleston Gazette, however, chose to include the assailant's name in theirmorning edition the following day. Meanwhile, at least three local radio stations broadcast the name of the assailant on the day of the crime and the following day. With the name of the assailant then public knowledge, the DailyMail included the name in their next evening edition.
Three weeks later a grand jury indictment was issued against both newspapersalleging the papers knowingly published the name of the youth without state-required court approval. In response, the two papers filed a petition with theWest Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to stop legal action claiming the lawviolated their constitutional rights. The court concurred the state showed no compelling reason that state's interest in protecting the juvenile's identity outweighed the constitutional protections of press freedom. The court thusheld the law requiring written permission by a juvenile court judge prior topublishing a juvenile's identity posed a "prior restraint" on free speech. The court thus prohibited the prosecuting attorney and county circuit court judges from pursuing prosecution of the two newspapers. The case was taken by the Supreme Court in 1978.
The newspapers continued their argument before the Supreme Court that state law operated as a "prior restraint" on speech. They considered having to ask permission of a judge an unconstitutional restraint. They also argued "the State's interest in the anonymity of a juvenile offender is not sufficient" to justify the restriction. In contrast, Smith argued that the state's interest in keeping the juvenile's name confidential was sufficient to impose restrictions. The stigma the juvenile would endure for the remainder of his life wouldsignificantly hamper rehabilitation measures and greatly restrict future employment opportunities.
Juvenile Protection and State Regulation of the Press
The Supreme Court had previously addressed the specific question of protecting juvenile defendant identities and the larger question of state regulation of the press. The Court ruled in Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court (1977) against a lower court injunction barring publication of the name and photograph of an accused juvenile defender in a murder case. Basis for thedecision was that reporters and public had been allowed access to a court hearing on the case. The Court held that since the juvenile's identity was already "in the public domain" the lower court could not constitutionally restrict publication. A year later in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia (1978), the Court established standards for assessing when a state's interest outweighs constitutional press protections. In that case, the Court unanimously ruled in favor of the press for publishing information on confidentialstate judicial review commission proceedings about alleged judge misconduct.The Court held that the state could not criminally prosecute the press for publishing such information, despite its compelling interest in maintaining confidentiality of judicial review.
In assessing the appropriateness of a state's restriction on publication of truthful information by the press, the Court routinely considers a series of questions. First, the state is responsible for demonstrating compelling interest in suppressing publication of certain information. Is the restriction necessary to achieve a specific objective? Secondly, if the Court agrees with thestate on compelling interest, it then assesses effectiveness of the restriction. Does it really serve the purpose for which it was intended? Lastly, if the intended purpose is served to at least some degree, is the restriction sufficiently narrow to restrict no more speech than absolutely necessary? To assess this last question, the Court must conceive of different restrictions that would accomplish the same objective while imposing less of a restriction onfreedom of speech and press.
In applying these questions, the Court ruled in favor of the two newspapers in a 8-0 vote. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, acknowledged thatstate law giving prior approval authority to juvenile court judges is "less oppressive" than a total ban. But the Court determined that assessing the constitutionality of West Virginia's state law was unnecessary because the need for withholding the juvenile's identity was not sufficiently demonstrated. TheCourt considered the law overly "burdensome" because Smith did not adequately demonstrate other alternatives existed to restrict publication of minors' names rather than resorting to criminal prosecution. Burger added that the West Virginia law was indeed unconstitutional by treating various forms of the press separately. The state law addresses only newspapers, not electronic media or other forms of publication.
Though writing in concurrence, Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the primary findings of the Court. He believed the claim for preserving the identity of the juvenile was sufficient to outweigh freedom of press concerns. He assertedthe effect of such restrictions would be "minimal." Rehnquist wrote that the"hallmark of our juvenile justice system . . . [is that] youths . . . have been shielded from publicity." The main objective of the juvenile system is torehabilitate and protect. He wrote, "Publication of the names of juvenile offenders may seriously impair the rehabilitative goals . . . The press is freeto describe the details of the offense and inform the community of the proceedings against the juvenile." He did not see the general need for including names as well. The state law under question allowed a judge to grant permissionwhere it may be warranted. Rehnquist agreed, though, that punishment after publication was likely the primary means for the state to enforce such restrictions. Though disagreeing with the other justices on these points, Rehnquistconcluded the law was simply invalid due to its discrimination between electronic and print media.
Impact
Rights granted to the press in the Constitution are unique as the only rightsgranted to an institution rather than the individual. The Court must balancepress freedom from government intervention on one hand, with public interestin privacy and confidentiality on the other, while ensuring the press servesits social role responsibly. Though the Court ruled in Smith that publication of truthful information gathered legally is protected by the Constitution, truthful information could be restricted in situations involving substantial state interest to restrict certain publication. In effect, the statesfind almost insurmountable standards in suppressing truthful information no matter how lawfully obtained. In Florida Star v. B. J. F. (1989) the casual mistakes by police clerks led to the continued endangerment of a crime victim because the press published the leaked information. Yet the Court ruledin favor of the press when the victim sued the press for damages. In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for the County of Norfolk (1982) the Court ruled a state law unconstitutional that excluded the press and public from trials concerning sex offenses against juvenile victims. The Court ruled the restriction did not adequately serve the compelling interest of the state in protecting minors from additional trauma since the effects of press coverage would vary from case to case. Many believed the Court provided the press excessive access and authority to publish sensitive information.
A series of Court findings led to the creation of a rigid "lawfully obtained"standard regarding press publication rights. The standard posed major ramifications in the electronic information era that mushroomed in the 1990s with advanced computer technologies and vast databases. A source for just about anytype of information can be discovered lawfully by a diligent reporter, and the Court has liberally judged almost everything as "newsworthy."
Legal scholars argued that more appropriate standards would involve whether the person was a public figure or private individual and a more strict interpretation of newsworthiness. Using these criteria for assessing the appropriateness of news publication could better serve public and privacy protection interests. Opponents to the "legally obtained" standard assert that some rare situations have occurred in which illegally obtained information was legally published for the benefit of the public as decided in the New York Times Company v. United States decision. Advocates for the press in support of the"lawfully obtained" standard believe that truth is the ultimate defense forpublishing information. Variables, such as judgements regarding the appropriateness of material, they believe are subject to the changing values and personal tastes of judges. By the late 1990s, several bills aimed at restricting the flow of intimate personal data were considered.
Related Cases
- Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
- Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 345 U.S. 829 (1978).
- Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
- Florida Star v. B. J. F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
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