Petitioners
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, et al.
Respondent
Walter Lee, Police Superintendent of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
Petitioners' Claim
That the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey's regulations against soliciting funds and distributing literature inside airports under its control violated the First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioners
Barry A. Fisher
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Arthur P. Berg
Justices for the Court
Sandra Day O'Connor, William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
Harry A. Blackmun, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
26 June 1992
Decision
Denied the petitioners' claim, upholding a court of appeals decision that airports did not constitute public fora, and as such are legally justified in regulating speech on their premises in a "reasonable" manner.
Significance
The ruling placed airports in the category of nonpublic fora for the purposeof evaluating government regulation of speech. Under the public forum doctrine, regulation of speech in nonpublic fora need only be "reasonable and content neutral."
Running the Gamut
Any air traveler in the United States during the 1970s and 1980s will well remember being accosted in airports by representatives of numerous political and religious organizations. Among the most ubiquitous of such groups was the International Society of Krishna Consciousness (ISKC), whose followers are obliged to perform an act known as "sankirtan." Sankirtan involves going into public places and distributing printed information and soliciting contributionsfor the ISKC. The members of the ISKC became so familiar a part of the landscape of airports in the United States that their presence became the focal point of humorous scenes in popular comedies such as the film Airplane.Although the followers of the ISKC were normally not aggressive in their solicitations, their presence caused anxiety among some travelers and caused already crowded air terminals to become even more congested.
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey is responsible for the operation of the International Arrivals Building at Kennedy Airport and the Central Terminal Building at LaGuardia Airport in New York City and the North TerminalBuilding at the Newark Airport in Newark, New Jersey. In 1975, in order to relieve congestion at these facilities, and in response to customer complaints, the port authority adopted a regulation which prohibited the sales and distribution of literature and merchandise and solicitation of funds
Hare Krishna and the Public Forum Doctrine
With their ability to perform sankirtan in airport terminals effectively eliminated, the ISKC sought legal recourse. They met with success initially, as the district court held that airport terminals are public fora, and that therefore any state regulation of speech within them must be narrowly drawn to support a "compelling state interest." As such, the ISKC was granted injunctiverelief from the port authority's regulation against solicitation and distribution of literature. This ruling was in keeping with the so-called public forum doctrine, which has traditionally been used to evaluate state regulation ofspeech in government-owned places. Under the public forum doctrine, there are three categories of government (public) property: public fora such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, where communication among citizens has traditionally occurred; designated public fora, such as public university auditoriums, that have been opened for the express purpose of promoting certain types of communication; and nonpublic fora, comprising all government property that doesnot fall into the first two categories. The legal implications of a property's categorization are vast: the state can only regulate speech in public or designated fora in a narrowly defined manner designed to protect a compelling state interest. In a nonpublic forum, however, the state can only impose regulations on speech that are reasonable and neutral with regard to the speech'scontent. By ruling that airport terminals were public fora, the district court had to conclude that the port authority's regulation of speech within its terminals was overly broad. The port authority subsequently brought the case before the court of appeals, which reversed the district court's decision. Thecourt of appeals held that airport terminals were not public fora and, as such, that the port authority's regulations met the standard of being reasonable and content neutral with regard to solicitation of funds. The appeals courtfound, however, that the port authority's ban on distribution of literaturewas in violation of the First Amendment. Following this partial victory witha partial setback, the ISKC appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court, which heard arguments on 25 March 1992.
Defining a Public Forum
The ISKC advanced the position that "transportation nodes," such as railroadand bus stations, docks, and even Ellis Island are historically established public fora, and that airport terminals fall into the same category. The Courtdisagreed, and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals by a majority of 5-4. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, focused on the original definition of a public forum, developed by Justice Roberts in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, (1939):
Having defined airport terminals as nonpublic fora, the Court had only to determine if the port authority's regulations were reasonable and content neutral. Given the pedestrian congestion at the port authority's air terminals andthe rigid deadlines inherent to air travel, the Court ruled that the regulations in question were a reasonable measure to ensure freer flow of foot traffic within the terminals. It also determined that the regulation was content neutral, because it banned all solicitation and distribution of leaflets.
Impact
The ruling represented a more narrow interpretation of the public forum doctrine than had been made in the past. Such an interpretation was in keeping with the Court's more conservative leanings following the appointments of justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Souter, and Thomas by Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush during the 1980s. This case did not represent an unmitigated victoryfor the port authority, however. Despite its more narrow interpretation of the public forum doctrine the Court relied heavily on practical considerations,in this case relieving pedestrian congestion in airport terminals, in reaching its decision. As such, it was unwilling to allow the port authority to restrict speech under circumstances where exercise of such speech would not posean undue inconvenience to air travelers. For this reason, the Court agreed with the court of appeals in a parallel case, Lee v. International Societyfor Krishna Consciousness, that the port authority could not ban distribution of literature within its terminals.
Related Cases
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, et al.
Respondent
Walter Lee, Police Superintendent of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
Petitioners' Claim
That the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey's regulations against soliciting funds and distributing literature inside airports under its control violated the First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioners
Barry A. Fisher
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Arthur P. Berg
Justices for the Court
Sandra Day O'Connor, William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
Harry A. Blackmun, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
26 June 1992
Decision
Denied the petitioners' claim, upholding a court of appeals decision that airports did not constitute public fora, and as such are legally justified in regulating speech on their premises in a "reasonable" manner.
Significance
The ruling placed airports in the category of nonpublic fora for the purposeof evaluating government regulation of speech. Under the public forum doctrine, regulation of speech in nonpublic fora need only be "reasonable and content neutral."
Running the Gamut
Any air traveler in the United States during the 1970s and 1980s will well remember being accosted in airports by representatives of numerous political and religious organizations. Among the most ubiquitous of such groups was the International Society of Krishna Consciousness (ISKC), whose followers are obliged to perform an act known as "sankirtan." Sankirtan involves going into public places and distributing printed information and soliciting contributionsfor the ISKC. The members of the ISKC became so familiar a part of the landscape of airports in the United States that their presence became the focal point of humorous scenes in popular comedies such as the film Airplane.Although the followers of the ISKC were normally not aggressive in their solicitations, their presence caused anxiety among some travelers and caused already crowded air terminals to become even more congested.
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey is responsible for the operation of the International Arrivals Building at Kennedy Airport and the Central Terminal Building at LaGuardia Airport in New York City and the North TerminalBuilding at the Newark Airport in Newark, New Jersey. In 1975, in order to relieve congestion at these facilities, and in response to customer complaints, the port authority adopted a regulation which prohibited the sales and distribution of literature and merchandise and solicitation of funds
within the interior areas of buildings or structures at an air terminal if conducted by a person to or with passers-by in a continuous or repetitive manner.The new regulation amounted to a ban on sankirtan within the air terminals operated by the port authority.
Hare Krishna and the Public Forum Doctrine
With their ability to perform sankirtan in airport terminals effectively eliminated, the ISKC sought legal recourse. They met with success initially, as the district court held that airport terminals are public fora, and that therefore any state regulation of speech within them must be narrowly drawn to support a "compelling state interest." As such, the ISKC was granted injunctiverelief from the port authority's regulation against solicitation and distribution of literature. This ruling was in keeping with the so-called public forum doctrine, which has traditionally been used to evaluate state regulation ofspeech in government-owned places. Under the public forum doctrine, there are three categories of government (public) property: public fora such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, where communication among citizens has traditionally occurred; designated public fora, such as public university auditoriums, that have been opened for the express purpose of promoting certain types of communication; and nonpublic fora, comprising all government property that doesnot fall into the first two categories. The legal implications of a property's categorization are vast: the state can only regulate speech in public or designated fora in a narrowly defined manner designed to protect a compelling state interest. In a nonpublic forum, however, the state can only impose regulations on speech that are reasonable and neutral with regard to the speech'scontent. By ruling that airport terminals were public fora, the district court had to conclude that the port authority's regulation of speech within its terminals was overly broad. The port authority subsequently brought the case before the court of appeals, which reversed the district court's decision. Thecourt of appeals held that airport terminals were not public fora and, as such, that the port authority's regulations met the standard of being reasonable and content neutral with regard to solicitation of funds. The appeals courtfound, however, that the port authority's ban on distribution of literaturewas in violation of the First Amendment. Following this partial victory witha partial setback, the ISKC appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court, which heard arguments on 25 March 1992.
Defining a Public Forum
The ISKC advanced the position that "transportation nodes," such as railroadand bus stations, docks, and even Ellis Island are historically established public fora, and that airport terminals fall into the same category. The Courtdisagreed, and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals by a majority of 5-4. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, focused on the original definition of a public forum, developed by Justice Roberts in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, (1939):
(locations which) have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.In the Court's judgement the fact that air travel had only become common within the last50 years ruled out classification of airports as being used from "time out of mind" for any purpose whatsoever. Furthermore, the use of airports for speech purposes was a recent development in the brief history of air travel. Theargument of the ISKC, that airports should be classified in the same manner as traditional transportation nodes, was rejected on the basis that most transportation nodes have been privately owned, and the public forum doctrine canonly be applied to publicly owned sites and facilities. The Court also pointed out that airports by their nature differ from other transportation nodes inmany ways. For instance, everyone boarding an aircraft is forced to submit to a metal detection search to ensure passenger safety in flight. Finally, theCourt observed that publicly owned airport facilities had been established for transportation and defense purposes, without regard for their use as forafor dissemination of information.
Having defined airport terminals as nonpublic fora, the Court had only to determine if the port authority's regulations were reasonable and content neutral. Given the pedestrian congestion at the port authority's air terminals andthe rigid deadlines inherent to air travel, the Court ruled that the regulations in question were a reasonable measure to ensure freer flow of foot traffic within the terminals. It also determined that the regulation was content neutral, because it banned all solicitation and distribution of leaflets.
Impact
The ruling represented a more narrow interpretation of the public forum doctrine than had been made in the past. Such an interpretation was in keeping with the Court's more conservative leanings following the appointments of justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Souter, and Thomas by Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush during the 1980s. This case did not represent an unmitigated victoryfor the port authority, however. Despite its more narrow interpretation of the public forum doctrine the Court relied heavily on practical considerations,in this case relieving pedestrian congestion in airport terminals, in reaching its decision. As such, it was unwilling to allow the port authority to restrict speech under circumstances where exercise of such speech would not posean undue inconvenience to air travelers. For this reason, the Court agreed with the court of appeals in a parallel case, Lee v. International Societyfor Krishna Consciousness, that the port authority could not ban distribution of literature within its terminals.
Related Cases
- Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 486 (1939).
- Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association,460 U.S. 37 (1983).
- Board of Airport Commissioners of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569 (1983).
- Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, 473 U.S. 788(1985).
- United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
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